




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FLEET ACTION AT PORT ARTHUR, 9TH FEBRUARY, 1904.

Frontispiece.



POLTAVA.

POBYEDA.
BOYARIN.
DIANA.

ASKOLD.

BAYAN.
SEVASTOPOL.

NOVIK.
PETROPAVLOVSK.

PERESVYET.

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OFFICIAL HISTORY

(NAVAL AND MILITARY)

OF

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

TO BE COMPLETED IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

To 24th AUGUST, 1904.

PREPARED BY

THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE COMMITTEE
OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.



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PREFACE.

THIS volume contains an account of the Russo-Japanese War from the opening of hostilities until the end of the first general attack upon Port Arthur on the 24th August, 1904. It therefore includes the transfer oversea and the disembarkation on the mainland of the Japanese forces, the converging march of the First, Second, and Fourth Armies upon Liao-yang, and General Kuropatkin's gradual retreat to his prepared lines of defence in front of that town. It also covers the advance of the Japanese Third Army down the Kuan-tung Peninsula, until it was checked by the formidable line of permanent and semi-permanent works which protected the harbour. The naval operations include those undertaken by the Japanese in conjunction with, and for the protection of, the landing of their armies, the three attempts to block the exit from the harbour of Port Arthur, and the battles of the Yellow Sea on the 10th August, and of Ulsan on the 14th of that month. In the latter action the Vladivostok squadron was so severely handled that it took no further part in the war; but at the date when this volume closes the Port Arthur fleet, although greatly weakened, was still an important factor in the situation.

An account of the military operations has already appeared in Parts 1, 2, and 3 of the Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, but the chapters dealing with the naval operations are now published for the first time. Advantage has also been taken of the publication of this volume to incorporate in it all further information which has been collected since the completion of the purely military parts. Some of the fresh material, in particular the correspondence between Generals Kuropatkin and Stessel which is given in Chapter XII, is of exceptional interest. The proofs have, moreover, been very carefully revised at Tokio, both in the Admiralty and the War Office. Much useful information has also been supplied by the Historical Section of the War Office in St. Petersburg. The thanks of the Committee of Imperial

Defence are therefore due to all those officers, both Russian and Japanese, who have done so much to ensure the accuracy of this account of the war. The Committee is also indebted to Major A. I. R. Glasford, 97th Deccan Infantry, and to Mr. Norman Wilkinson, for their drawings which have been reproduced.

In addition to the Reports by British Officers, the principal works which have been consulted in the preparation of this volume are :—

The Austrian Official Account. (“*Einzelschriften über den russisch-japanischen Krieg.*”)

The German Official Account. (“*Der russisch-japanische Krieg 1904 bis 1905.*”)

The American Official Account. (Epitome, and Reports of Military Attachés.)

Conférences sur la Guerre Russo-Japonaise faites à l'Académie Nicholas à St. Petersburg.” (Translated from the Russian.)

Japanese Official Reports. M. Kinai.

“*Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei.*” Freiherr von Tettau.

“*Der russisch-japanische Krieg.*” Captain Immanuel, German Great General Staff.

“*Taktische Detaildarstellungen aus dem russisch-japanischen Kriege.*” (By direction of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff.) Colonel von Hebermann and Captain Nowak.

“*Lyetopis Russko-Yaponskoi Voinui.*” F. Bulgakov. (Records of the War.)

“*Oborona Port-Artura.*” Yu. Romanovski and A. von Schwartz.

“*Stradnuie dni Port-Artura.*” P. Larenko.

“*Pravda o Port-Arturye.*” E. K. Nozhin.

“*Journal d'un Cossack du Trans-Baikal.*” Colonel A. Kvitka.

“*Vom russisch-japanischen Kriege, 1904–1905.*” Colonel F. Gertsch.

“*Al Campo Russo in Manciuuria.*” Captain Camperio.

“*Rasplata.*” Captain V. Semenov.

“*Vospominaniya.*” Captain M. Bubnov. (Reminiscences of First Pacific Squadron and the Naval Brigade on Shore; Port Arthur.)

Lectures by N. Beklemishev, President of the Navy League in Russia. (The Russo-Japanese War afloat.)

“*Gibel Slavnago Ryurika.*” B. Tagyëv. (Loss of the *Rurik.*)

“*Na Kreiserye Rossiya.*” G. K. (On board the cruiser *Rossiya.*)

Articles from “*Russkaya Starina,*” and from the “*Morskoi Sbornik*” (the Russian Official Naval Journal).

“*Diary of a Sister of Mercy at Port Arthur.*” O. A. von Baungarten.

THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

(NAVAL AND MILITARY.)

CHAPTER I.

POLITICAL EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR.

ON the 14th November, 1860, six days after the withdrawal of the allied forces of Great Britain and France from Peking, a treaty of the highest importance was concluded between Russia and China, whereby the eastern coast of Manchuria from the Amur to the Korean frontier, a district which subsequently became known as the *Primorsk* or Maritime Province, was ceded to the Tsar. Nearly three centuries earlier, the Cossack Yermak, acting under imperial auspices, had led his motley band of freebooters across the Urals to Siberia, and the explorers who had followed in his footsteps now found themselves established on the far distant shores of the Sea of Japan.

The advance to the dreary confines of the Asiatic continent, though spasmodic, had been rapid; conquest had led to conquest, and the treaty signed at Peking marked one stage, but not the last, in the absorption of vast regions into the Russian Empire. Checked again and again in her efforts to reach the Mediterranean, Russia had followed the line of least resistance and, although it had led her far afield, she now possessed a frontier on the sea. The Peking treaty was a veritable triumph of Muscovite diplomacy, extracted as it was from the Chinese at a time when, smarting from the lesson lately taught them by the Allies, they were in no position to resist. But though Russia's eastern boundary was now washed by the same sea that half surrounds the empire of Japan, her aspirations were unsatisfied. Along the coast line of her new possessions no ice-free port existed, for Vladivostok at its southern extremity, whither the Russian naval head-quarters were moved from Nikolaievsk, is closed by ice for three months of the

year.* Moreover, from that port admission to the Pacific mainly depended on the goodwill of Japan, for the two principal channels which lead to the open sea were practically in her hands.† On the north-east, between Yezo (Hokkaido) and the main island of Hondo, is the narrow Tsugaru channel, while on the south are the straits between the southern shore of Korea and the Japanese island of Kiusiu or Nine Provinces. The northern route is under Japanese control, and in the southern straits, which measure little more than six score miles across, the islands of Tsushima and Ikishima are well situated for guarding the passage east and west.

The problem of securing freedom of navigation to and from Vladivostok through these straits, under all conditions, could not be satisfactorily solved by Russia unless she could obtain a foothold in Southern Korea, or could debar her island neighbour from acquiring one. The time was inopportune for further territorial expansion on the mainland, but there remained other means which would afford the necessary access to the ocean. The island of Tsushima, which possesses several good harbours, might be occupied and added to the Tsar's dominions; and, with this intention, a Russian warship landed a party of marines there in 1861. Remonstrances from the alarmed inhabitants proved of no avail, but on the appearance of a British squadron, backed by a protest from the British Minister at Yedo (Tokio), the intruders were withdrawn. Several years passed and no other attempt like that on Tsushima was made, but the necessity for an ice-free port was not lost sight of by the Russian government.

In 1885, the situation in the Far East revived interest in the question, and, with a view to securing a port which should be accessible throughout the year, Russia entered into negotiations for the lease of Port Lazarev in north-eastern Korea. This project was subsequently abandoned, and Russia announced her intention "never to occupy Korean territory under any circumstances whatever." In the meantime the British government had occupied Port Hamilton, in the Korean Straits, but after the Russian declaration with regard to Korea, the island was again evacuated.

The gradual approach of Russia was viewed with apprehension in Japan. Many years prior to the incidents just mentioned, and before Russia had gained possession of the Maritime Province, her settlers in Kamchatka, striving to push southward, had given tokens of that spirit of aggression which culminated, in 1806, in

* A passage for naval vessels is now maintained by means of ice-breakers.

† See Strategical Map 1.

depredations committed in the island of Yezo. Half a century later, differences which arose regarding the ownership of Sakhalin reached a crisis and, although compounded at that time by a partition of the island, the weaker power found herself, in 1875, forced to give up the southern half, accepting in exchange what was practically her own—the Kurile group of islands.

The Russian acquisition of Sakhalin.

The shame of this surrender, unavoidable though it was, sank deep into the hearts of the *Samurai*, and in the minds of Japanese statesmen the dread of Russia grew stronger. They knew that, in the past, China had proved unable to protect her own interests, and that though she posed as suzerain of Korea, whose north-east frontier was conterminous with that of Russia, the task of keeping that dependency inviolate was beyond her strength.

To avert the danger of a Russian occupation, partial or complete, two courses were open to the Japanese. Either Korea, whose historic attitude was far from friendly, must be conquered, or, failing that, must be made independent. The first course, for which all preparations had been made, was abandoned lest it should lead to outside interference and so defeat its object, and the alternative, which aimed at terminating the Chinese suzerainty, was chosen. To carry out the scheme all that was needed was the opportunity, and that was soon to come. In 1875, a few months after the decision to intervene had been formed, a Korean battery opened fire upon a boat which had been dispatched from the Japanese gunboat *Unyo* to survey the River Hankau. The Japanese sent in a landing party which captured the battery, and the outrage served as a pretext for the opening of negotiations between Japan and Korea. In the terms of the treaty which resulted the suzerain power was studiously ignored, while the offending state was regarded as an independent power enjoying the same sovereign rights as Japan. But China, who was not to be rebuffed so easily, took measures to regain her former influence in Seoul, and in 1882 the moment came for furthering her schemes. In that year advantage was taken of an attempt to assassinate the Korean King and Queen to offer troops for their protection. The offer was accepted and Chinese influence was once again in the ascendant at Seoul. A few months after this incident Japan's turn came to reassert herself. The anti-foreign party at the Korean capital attacked and burned the Japanese legation, the minister escaping with difficulty to the coast. Reparation was demanded by the Tokio government and troops were sent to Seoul, where their presence,

coupled with that of the Chinese garrison, caused disturbances and led to complications which threatened to bring on a war between

Japan and China. But the danger passed and, in April 1885, an agreement, called the Tientsin Convention, was signed by Marquis Ito and Viceroy Li Hung-chang. According to its provisions, both countries agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea, and settled that if either power should ever find it necessary to intervene in that state with armed force, the other should receive due notice and should have the right to send an equal number of troops.

By virtue of this convention, and in spite of constant friction between Korea and Japan, peace was preserved until 1894, when a wide-spread rebellion broke out against the government of the former country. The King's troops were defeated by the rebels, and the royal cause became so seriously imperilled that help from the suzerain power was earnestly besought. China complied with readiness and dispatched two thousand troops to Seoul, at the same time warning Japan of her action, under the terms of the Tientsin Convention. A Japanese mixed brigade was at once mobilized, and Fusan and Chemulpo were occupied. But the troops sent by China had already quelled the rising, and when she proposed a simultaneous evacuation Japan, tired of the continuous spectacle of misrule and resolved to terminate once and for all a situation which invited foreign aggression, intimated her unwillingness to withdraw until peace was placed upon an assured foundation. With this view she demanded, as a condition of evacuation, that certain reforms should be introduced into Korea. The Chinese government, however, peremptorily refused to admit her right to interfere and, after some negotiations which proved fruitless, hostilities began.

The campaign, which lasted eight months, opened with the battle of Pingyang on the 15th September, and two days later the Chinese fleet was dispersed in an engagement which took place off Hai-yung Tao, an island lying about seventy miles south-west of the mouth of the Ya-lu River. The Japanese First Army then advanced to invade Manchuria, and, forcing the passage of the Ya-lu on the 25th October, occupied the country as far north as Hai-cheng by the 13th December. Meanwhile the Japanese Second Army, disembarking on the 24th October on the southern coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula, captured Chin-chou on the 6th November, and on the 21st took Port Arthur by assault. Part of the Second Army

The Sino-
Japanese War
of 1894-5.

then moved north, and on the 6th March, 1895, occupied New-chuang (Ying-kou), where it joined hands with the First Army from Hai-cheng. Three days later the combined forces attacked the Chinese, who had taken up a position in great force on the right bank of the Liao River at Tien-chuang-tai, and completely routed them. Prior to this decisive engagement, an expeditionary force had captured Wei-hai-wei in February. The Chinese, everywhere defeated, sued for an armistice, which was granted on the 30th March, and on the 10th April a treaty of peace was signed at Shimonoseki, in Japan. By its terms China recognized the "full and complete independence of Korea," ceded Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Liao-tung* Peninsula to Japan, and agreed to pay a war indemnity of 200,000,000 taels (£25,160,256). Pending the fulfilment of these stipulations, Wei-hai-wei was to remain in the hands of the Japanese.

The Treaty of
Shimonoseki.

The significance of this treaty was not lost upon Russia, who realized that her whole scheme of expansion in eastern Asia was imperilled. With Japan installed securely in the Liao-tung Peninsula and exerting strong influence in Korea, all hope of possessing an ice-free port on the Pacific would disappear, while the possible dismemberment of China would be postponed indefinitely.

The intervention
of Russia, France,
and Germany.

So serious a crisis demanded instant action, which took the form of a coalition between Russia, France, and Germany. On the 20th April, before the Shimonoseki Treaty had been ratified, the representatives of those three Powers at Tokio presented a joint note to Japan, suggesting that she should forego her claim to territory on the mainland, since its retention would be prejudicial to the lasting peace of the Far East. Japan was in no position to meet so strong a combination and, simultaneously with the publication of the ratified treaty, an Imperial rescript was issued, in which it was stated that the Emperor, out of regard for peace, "yielded to the dictates of magnanimity, and accepted the advice of the three Powers." As compensation for the retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula, Japan received from China 39,000,000 taels (£4,906,250).

Retrocession of
the Liao-tung
Peninsula.

* The Liao-tung Peninsula includes, roughly, all the territory which lies to the south of a line from Newchuang through Hai-cheng to An-tung on the Ya-lu. The Kuan-tung Province is the portion of the Liao-tung Peninsula south of a line from Pu-lan-tien to Pi-tzu-wo.

A digression from the sequence of events in Far Eastern politics is necessary at this point, in order to glance at a project of great importance initiated some four years prior to the Sino-Japanese war.

For over thirty years the question of constructing a railway across Siberia had been under discussion in Russia, but it was not until the 19th May, 1891, that the first sod was turned by the Tzesarevich, now the reigning Emperor. The construction of this railway was pushed on with such energy from both the Asiatic and European termini, that five years later the eastern section had reached Khabarovsk and the western extended beyond Irkutsk to the shores of Lake Baikal, from the further side of which the line was carried on to Strietensk. The gap of about a thousand miles between Strietensk and Khabarovsk was still untouched, but the line across it was intended to follow the course of the River Amur, which forms the southern boundary of Russian territory in that part of eastern Asia. Unfortunately, that river makes a wide bend to the north, and a railway to Vladivostok through Russian territory must make a similar detour. But towards the end of 1896, a contract was concluded between the Chinese government and the Russo-Chinese bank, whereby the Chinese Eastern Railway Company was formed to construct a railway through Manchuria from Chita, some two hundred miles west of Strietensk, to a point on the southern section of the Ussuri railway between Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. By this contract the necessity for following the vagaries of the river Amur would be avoided and a direct and far more convenient line could be made to Vladivostok.

The next link in the chain of events which preceded the struggle between Russia and Japan was the murder of two German missionaries in the province of Shan-tung in the year 1897. This outrage was followed by prolonged negotiations which terminated, after several months, in the grant to Germany of a ninety-nine years' lease of territory on both sides of the entrance to Kiao-chao Bay, as well as a zone of influence and certain railway and mining rights. With Kiao-chao in German hands, Wei-hai-wei still held as a guarantee by the Japanese, and the prospect that Ta-lien-wan, owing to British representations, would shortly become a treaty port, Russia determined to settle the question of an ice-free port, and at the same time to establish

Port Arthur
leased to Russia.

her supremacy in the Far East. In December, 1897, her warships had appeared at Port Arthur, and on the 27th March of the following year a convention was concluded with China by which Port Arthur, Ta-lien-wan, and the adjacent waters were leased to Russia for twenty-five years, at the end of which period an extension might, by mutual agreement, be arranged. Other provisions included a neutral zone, and the power to erect forts and other defences. Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan were occupied on the 28th March, 1898, and in the spring of the ensuing year the construction of the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Harbin to the extremity of the Liao-tung Peninsula was begun.

Territory leased
to Great Britain
and France.

Immediately after the conclusion of this convention, a ninety-nine years' lease of certain territory adjacent to Hongkong was acquired by Great Britain, while Wei-hai-wei was also to be held by her, so long as the lease of Port Arthur to Russia lasted. The conventions granting these leases were signed at Peking on the 9th June and the 1st July, 1898, and Wei-hai-wei, which was still in the occupation of the Japanese pending the final payment of the Chinese war indemnity, was evacuated by them in favour of Great Britain. Earlier in the same year France had put forward a demand, which was granted on the 10th April, for the lease of Kuang-chou-wan.

The Boxer rising
and attack on the
Peking legations.

We now come to the two remaining stages of the prelude to the war—the Boxer rising and the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In 1899, the inflammatory edicts which were put in circulation, inciting the people to rebel against the powers whose aggressive action since the war with Japan threatened the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire, brought on the rising. First noticed during the previous year in the Shan-tung Province as a movement against native Christians, and next aimed at Chinamen displaying foreign sympathies, the agitation spread gradually over north China and became directed against all foreigners. Troops fraternized with the rioters they were sent to suppress, the chancellor of the Japanese legation and the German minister in Peking were murdered, and on the 12th June, 1900, the legations were attacked, and then besieged. Armed intervention on the part of the governments represented at the Chinese capital became necessary, and on the 14th August the legations were relieved.

Prior to this outbreak steady progress had been made on both

the Imperial Railway* and the Chinese Eastern Railway. In June, 1900, the former was running trains to Newchuang with a break at the Ta-ling Ho, while the embankment of the line to Hsin-min-tun was completed. The Chinese Eastern Railway at the same time was running trains between Liao-yang and Port Arthur on an imperfectly ballasted road, and although through communication between Siberia and the termini at Vladivostok and Port Arthur was far from being established, the earth work had been completed, and considerable stretches of unballasted rails had been laid. Such was the position of affairs when the Boxer outbreak, spreading to Manchuria, forced Russia to intervene.

On the 5th July, the railway stations at Tieh-ling and Liao-yang were burnt, the Christian missions at Mukden were destroyed, and the French Roman Catholic bishop and his staff were massacred. The railway servants fled, protected by small Cossack escorts, some north

The Boxers in Manchuria.

to Harbin, others to Newchuang. On the 13th July, Chinese troops opened fire on the Russians from the bank of the River Amur in the neighbourhood of Helampo, and disturbances occurred elsewhere on the Russo-Manchurian frontier. On the 26th June, the Russian government issued orders for the mobilization of the troops in the Amur and Siberian Military Districts, and a few days later in the Liao-tung Peninsula. Troops were also dispatched from Europe, and forces were collected at Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Blagovieschensk, Chita, and Port Arthur; but it was not until August that

Russian occupation of Manchuria.

the Russians were in sufficient strength to cross the Amur and capture and burn Argun. At the same time seven flying columns were organized, composed of twenty-two and a half squadrons of cavalry and thirty and a half battalions of infantry, with ninety-six guns. These columns entered Manchuria from different points; three were to converge on Harbin, and two on Kirin, while the remaining two from Port Arthur were to operate in the south. Harbin, which was besieged, was relieved on the 3rd August and, by the middle of September, Hsin-cheng and Kuan-cheng-tzu were occupied, while Kirin was entered by a Russian column on the 23rd September. In the south, Mukden was occupied on the 30th September, by which date the whole country was practically in the hands of the Russians. Very little resistance had been met by them, their losses

* The Imperial Railway runs from Peking to Newchuang via Tientsin and Shan-hai-kuan.

amounting only to two hundred and forty-two killed and twelve hundred and eighty-three wounded. Their forces in Manchuria were shortly afterwards reduced, the European units returning to Russia.

Meanwhile the international contingents, which had relieved the Peking legations and occupied the province of Chih-li, had been gradually increased until they numbered about seventy thousand men. Negotiations were carried on between the several Powers and the Chinese government, and on the 16th January the latter agreed to the terms which had been demanded. The most important of these were the punishment of the principal authors of the outrages, an indemnity, control of the legation quarter, and the maintenance of Legation Guards, the razing of the forts at Taku and those which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea, as well as the garrisoning by foreign troops of certain points for the maintenance of that communication. At the same time the Powers agreed to withdraw their troops from Peking on the 17th September, 1901, leaving the Legation Guards, the total strength of which was fixed at two thousand men. The province of Chih-li was to be vacated five days later, but garrisons aggregating rather over six thousand men were to hold Tientsin, Shan-hai-kuan, and other places. By the end of August the contingents had been reduced to about eighteen thousand men, and during 1902 the numbers fell to the limit that had been arranged.

On the 30th January, 1902, the governments of Great Britain and Japan, "actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover especially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations," signed an agreement which was to remain in force for five years. By it each power contracted, in the event of either of them becoming involved in war with a third power in defence of its interests in the extreme East, to maintain strict neutrality and use its efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally; but should any other power or powers join in hostilities, to come to the assistance of its ally and conduct the war in common.

On the 16th March, 1902, a Franco-Russian declaration announced the satisfaction of the two governments to find in the

The evacuation
of Peking.

The Anglo-
Japanese agree-
ment.

Anglo-Japanese agreement the affirmation of the fundamental principles which they had themselves declared to form the basis of their policy, but reserved complete freedom of action as to the means to be adopted in the case of aggressive action on the part of a third power, or of the recurrence of disturbances in China.

This declaration was followed on the 8th April by the signing of a treaty between China and Russia, the text of which, when published in the Russian *Official Messenger* four days later, was accompanied by a fresh assurance that the government of the Tsar adhered to the principles of the integrity and independence of China. By the terms of this treaty Russia consented to withdraw completely from Manchuria; while China, on her part, agreed to protect the railway as well as Russian subjects and their undertakings in that country. The evacuation was to be gradual and was to be completed in three successive periods of six months, or eighteen months in all from the date of the signature of the agreement, and during each period a stipulated section of territory would be handed back to China. In the following October, at the end of the first six months, the evacuation began, and the south-west portion of the Mukden Province was restored. The withdrawal from the second section was not, however, carried out on the date appointed. When the Chinese minister made inquiries at St. Petersburg, he was informed that the delay was temporary and that the Emperor's commands would be fulfilled; subsequently, however, the Russian *chargé d'affaires* at Peking presented a demand for further concessions regarding Manchuria. These demands, which were seven in number, were in general terms as follows:—(1) None of the territory restored to China was to be leased or sold to any other power; (2) the existing system of government in Mongolia was not to be altered; (3) no new ports or towns were to be opened in Manchuria without notice to Russia; (4) the authority of foreigners in the Chinese service was not to extend over affairs in Hei-lung-chiang, the northern province of Manchuria; (5) the Newchuang-Peking telegraph line was to be maintained; (6) on Newchuang being restored to China the customs' receipts were to continue to be paid into the Russo-Chinese bank; (7) the rights acquired by Russian subjects or foreign companies during the occupation were to be respected.

Russian under-taking to evacuate Manchuria.

Russia's seven demands.

Protests from the representatives of Great Britain, the United

States, and Japan were lodged against these demands, and on the 29th April the Chinese government finally intimated their refusal to comply with them.

Meanwhile events in Korea had aroused alarm in Japan. Although the Sino-Japanese war had settled the question of Chinese interference, there existed in Korea a strong anti-Japanese party which, headed by the Queen, opposed the party of reform,

Russian action
in Korea. and created a general feeling of unrest throughout the country. During an attempt, made on the 8th October, 1895, by the King's father and some of the reformers to enter the palace for the purpose of presenting a plan of reform, the Queen was assassinated. On the 11th July, 1896, a rising in northern Korea induced the King to take refuge in the Russian legation, whence he issued an order which resulted in the murder of the prime minister and two of his colleagues in office. The Japanese government now appear to have accepted the Russian co-operation, for by a memorandum dated Seoul, 14th May, and an arrangement dated Moscow, 9th June, 1896, several possible causes of misunderstanding were removed, and it was eventually agreed to recommend the King to return to his palace, to employ liberal and moderate men as ministers, and to suppress all useless expenditure. It was arranged that Japan should retain three companies of infantry, to be replaced as soon as possible by military police, to protect the Fusan-Seoul telegraph line, while companies not exceeding two hundred men each were to guard the Japanese settlements, two being stationed at Seoul, one at Fusan, and another at Gensan. Russia, on her side, was to maintain forces of similar strength for the protection of her legation and consulates.

By a further agreement of three articles, dated Tokio, 25th April, 1898, the two governments (1) definitely recognized the independence of Korea, and pledged themselves mutually to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country; (2) agreed to take no measure in respect to the appointment of military instructors or provincial advisers, without previous mutual understanding; and (3) the Russian government agreed not to hinder the development of commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.

In 1897, a Russo-Korean bank had been founded, and Russian subjects began to take considerable interest in land purchase and concessions. A year earlier a Russian merchant had secured the right, with a monopoly for twenty-five years, to cut timber on the Ya-lu and Tumen Rivers, but work was not begun upon the under-

taking until April, 1903. Then Russian aggression, which had so far been limited to Manchuria, became noticeable in northern Korea, and advantage was taken of the timber concession to occupy Yongampo, at the mouth of the Ya-lu River, with Russian troops. Other acts followed from which it became apparent that Russia had little or no intention of adhering to her agreement with Japan.

The issues both in Korea and Manchuria had now reached a point where representations on the part of Japan were unavoidable. On the 28th July, 1903, her minister at St. Petersburg was instructed that it was considered that Russia, by the seven demands enumerated above, was consolidating rather than relaxing her hold on Manchuria, compelling the belief that she had abandoned her intention of retiring from that territory, while her increased activity on the Korean frontier was such as to raise doubts regarding the limit of her ambition; that the permanent occupation of Manchuria would create a condition of affairs prejudicial to the security and interests of Japan; that, from Manchuria, Russia would be a constant menace to the separate existence of the kingdom of Korea, where Japan possessed paramount political as well as commercial and industrial interests, which for her own security she was not prepared to surrender or to share with any other power. The minister was therefore authorized to intimate the readiness of his government to enter upon *pourparlers* with that of Russia, which, on being informed, accepted the suggestion. Thereupon a draft treaty, in which their proposals were set forth, was drawn up by the Tokio cabinet. This draft consisted of six articles, and was to the following effect:—

- (1) A mutual agreement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires.
- (2) A reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and of Russia's special interests in railway enterprise in Manchuria; the right of Japan to take in Korea, and of Russia to take in Manchuria, such measures as might be necessary for the protection of their several interests, subject, however, to Article (1).
- (3) A reciprocal undertaking not to impede the development of Japan's industrial and commercial activities in Korea, nor Russia's in Manchuria. Russia was to engage not to hinder the extension of the Korean railway into Manchuria.

- (4) A reciprocal engagement that if either power found it necessary to take military measures for the protection of her interests as set forth in Article (2), the troops should not exceed the actual number required and should be recalled as soon as their mission was accomplished.
- (5) A recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interests of reform and good government in Korea, including any necessary military assistance.
- (6) All previous agreements respecting Korea were to be abrogated.

This draft was presented at St. Petersburg on the 12th August, 1903. The Russian government consented to negotiate, but insisted upon Tokio being made the place of meeting. On the 3rd October, the Russian counter-proposals were presented to Japan. They omitted all reference to China and Manchuria except in Article (7), which stated that "Manchuria with its littoral [was] to be recognized by Japan as outside her sphere of interest." The territory of Korea north of the 39th parallel was proposed as a neutral zone; no part of the territory of Korea was to be used for "strategic purposes," nor were any military works, capable of menacing the freedom of navigation of the Straits of Korea, to be undertaken on its coasts. In general, the proposals of Japan with regard to Korea were accepted as the basis of negotiation, but by limiting the treaty to that country, except in one significant particular, restrictions were imposed upon Japan there, while Russia was left free to do as she pleased in Manchuria.

In the negotiations which followed between the 16th October, 1903, and the 13th January, 1904, six further drafts of agreement were exchanged. Japan accepted the proposal of a neutral zone, but with the limitation that it should extend to fifty kilometres on each side of the Ya-lu, and acceded to the demand that Manchuria should be considered outside her sphere of interest, provided that Russia gave a similar undertaking with regard to Korea. She further consented not to fortify the straits, but a reference to "strategic purposes" in the same article was expunged. Russia, however, continued to endeavour to exclude Manchuria from the agreement on the plea that this was "a question exclusively between Russia and China," and that although "Russia once took possession of Manchuria by right of conquest, nevertheless she is willing to restore it to China, but with certain guarantees assuring security to the enormous interests which Russia has in

Manchuria. While China is still insisting on her refusal to give such guarantees, it is not possible for Russia to come to any agreement with a third power respecting Manchuria, as the question is exclusively between the two countries concerned."

On the 13th January, 1904, Japan replied for the last time, accepting the Russian proposal that she should regard Manchuria as being outside her sphere of influence, on condition of a similar engagement by Russia as regards Korea. In presenting the last draft to the Russian minister for foreign affairs, the Japanese minister was instructed to request an early reply; for it was known that Russia was actively engaged in endeavouring to improve her military and naval position, by sending reinforcements of men and ships to the Far East. No reply being received, the Japanese government decided, on the 4th February, to terminate the negotiations, and on the 6th the Japanese minister at St. Petersburg informed Count Lamsdorff that he had been directed to sever diplomatic relations and to withdraw from the Russian capital. On the 10th February, nearly forty-eight hours after the first shots had been fired at Chemulpo, both countries published formal declarations of war. On the 12th, China, at the instigation of the United States, made a declaration of neutrality, and proclamations of a similar nature were issued on the 9th and 11th by several of the great and lesser powers. On the 23rd February, an agreement was signed by Japan and Korea by which the former country guaranteed the independence and integrity of the latter, receiving in return permission to utilize certain places in Korea for military purposes. This agreement was followed a few days later by an intimation that Japan proposed to undertake the immediate construction of a railway from Seoul to Wiju, and on the 8th March some three thousand Japanese engineers arrived in Korea to prosecute the work.

CHAPTER II.

THE JAPANESE ARMY.

CONSCRIPTION was introduced into Japan in 1871, but it was not put into full force throughout the empire until two years later. Up to 1868 feudalism had prevailed, under which system each feudal lord or *Daimyo* supported as many retainers—*Samurai* or *Shizoku*—as his finances would permit; but the restoration of administrative power to the Emperor, which took place in that year, combined with the increasing danger of western aggression rendered necessary a radical change in the military system of the country. Patriotism and loyalty to the sovereign were to replace the narrower forms of duty to the feudal lord and readiness to die at his command. Clans and tribal groupings were to disappear, and the ancient loyalty, built up by a thousand years of war, was to be diverted into broader channels, and one supreme form of national sentiment—obedience to the dictates of the Emperor—evolved.

The new order of things put an end to the domination of the *Samurai* and, although at first it was feared that the other classes of the people—farmers, artisans, and tradesmen—about to be included in the army might lack the military spirit, subsequent events completely justified the confidence of the reformers. Even in the feudal days loyalty had not been confined to the fighting classes, and the paramount duty of fitting himself to defend his native soil roused the latent patriotic spirit in the breast of every Japanese.

In deciding to adapt her army to modern conditions Japan took what was best and most suited to her needs from European systems, and in the work of military regeneration she was from time to time aided by foreign officers. Ultimately, however, all outside assistance was dispensed with and selected officers were sent to Europe to complete their studies. On their return they received appointments in which the knowledge gained abroad could best be utilized and, in course of time, permeate the army.

As a model for a general staff, that of Germany was taken, and a corps of highly-trained and able officers was created, to whose labours both at home and in the field the credit for many brilliant victories is largely due.

But however much indebted Japan may have been to external help in evolving the formidable military machine which she now possesses, she owes to her own people that wonderful spirit of self-sacrifice which animates the heart of every man—soldier or sailor—and makes him feel it a privilege to give his life, if by that means the welfare of the nation may be advanced. The whole army is imbued with the strongest sense of duty. The officers of all ranks are devoted to their profession and are educated to a pitch as near perfection as it is possible to attain. The men are highly intelligent and, thanks to the simple and frugal life led by them from early childhood, are possessed of great endurance, boundless patience, and a marked capacity for fighting under difficulties.

Every Japanese between the ages of seventeen and forty who is physically fit is liable to serve either in the army or the navy. Military service does not, however, usually begin until a man has reached his twentieth year, although between the ages of seventeen and twenty voluntary enlistment is permitted.

At the outbreak of the war, military service* was divided into four categories :—

	Terms of Service. Years.
(1) Standing army (<i>Jōbi Hei-eki</i>) subdivided into—	
(a) Active army (<i>Gen-eki Hei-eki</i>)	3
(b) First reserve (<i>Yōbi Hei-eki</i>)	4½
(2) Second reserve (<i>Kōbi Hei-eki</i>)	5
(3) Conscript reserve (<i>Hōjū Hei-eki</i>) subdivided into—	
First Term	7½
Second Term	1½

The men belonging to the second reserve were those who had completed their service in the standing army, and both they and the men of the first reserve were called out for periodical training. The first term of the conscript reserve consisted of those men who, although liable to conscription and medically fit, had drawn high numbers and had consequently escaped service with the colours; and the second term of those similarly liable and qualified, who had escaped not only service with the colours

* The military system which existed in Japan at the outbreak of the war has undergone no fundamental changes since its termination.

but also the lot of service with the first term. The men of the first term received a preliminary training of ninety days' drill, under regular officers, and a further training of three weeks during the third and fifth years of service; they were liable, however, like the German *ersatz reserve*, to be called up to fill vacancies in the standing and reserve armies. The men of the second term were untrained, and, ~~after~~ completing their period of purely nominal service, were passed into the second section of the national army.

(4) National army (*Kokumin Hei-eki*) subdivided into—

First section	}	Formed of men up to forty years of age.
Second section		

The first section consisted of men between twenty and forty years of age who had completed their service in the second reserve or in the first term of the conscript reserve. The second section consisted of all men between the ages of twenty and forty not belonging to other categories, and was quite untrained.

By an Imperial ordinance dated the 29th September, 1904, which had retrospective effect, the liability to serve in the second reserve was increased from five to ten years; and the two terms of conscript reserve were amalgamated, and service in it was increased to twelve and one-third years.

The total number of youths annually available for enrolment exceeded 430,000, and over 60,000 were taken for service with the colours, while fully 130,000 were drafted into the *Hoju*. The exact number of men in the various categories in February, 1904, is not known, as the figures of the annual contingents have seldom been published, but it may be taken to be approximately as follows:—

Active army	180,000
First reserve	200,000
Second reserve	200,000
Trained conscript reserve	50,000
Trained men of the national army ..	220,000
Total	850,000 men
Untrained men liable for service in the conscript reserve	250,000
Untrained men available for service in the national army, based on the popu- lation of 46 millions in 1898	4,000,000 men.

When the five younger classes of the trained men of the national army, probably 120,000 in number, were transferred to the reserve
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army in September, 1904, by the imperial ordinance referred to above, there were available for field service some 750,000 men with 18,000 officers.

In 1904 the Japanese standing army consisted of thirteen divisions, namely, the Imperial Guard Division and twelve territorial divisions two cavalry brigades, two artillery brigades, and the garrisons of Formosa, North China, and of various fortresses, as well as certain guards in Korea.

For inspectional purposes, the twelve territorial divisions were grouped into three armies of four divisional districts each, but as this arrangement was departed from before the outbreak of the war, the division must be regarded as the real unit of Japanese organization. When mobilized, each division,* which is a unit complete in itself, consisted, in round numbers, of 11,400 rifles, 600 sabres, and 36 guns, 750 engineers, and 5,500 non-combatants. Each divisional district also provided on mobilization a second reserve brigade composed of three regiments of infantry, each regiment containing two battalions, in all some 3,500 men. In some of these districts two second reserve brigades were formed, and in some cases these were organized as mixed brigades, composed of two regiments of two battalions, three batteries of field artillery, a company of engineers and a few troopers as orderlies, the whole amounting to some 5,000 men.

Depot units were also organized, each infantry regiment forming a battalion, each cavalry regiment a squadron, each artillery regiment a battery, to keep its own regiment and the affiliated *Kobi* unit up to strength.

Line of communication troops for each division were at first furnished by the *Kobi*, and afterwards by the depot troops, who were thus close at hand to replace casualties, and were themselves kept up to strength by drafts from the depots in Japan, where fresh units were continually being formed for training.

Each cavalry brigade consisted of two regiments; and in each regiment were four squadrons. The total number of sabres in the two brigades amounted to about 3,000.

The two artillery brigades, each of three regiments, had a total of 180 guns.†

* For details of a mobilized division and a second reserve (*Kobi*) brigade, see note on page 22. In the case of the second reserve and mixed (*Kobi*) brigades, the composition in particular cases was subject to considerable modification as circumstances required.

† The regiments of the 1st Artillery Brigade were composed of two battalions, each with three batteries; the regiments of the 2nd Artillery Brigade had two battalions, each with two batteries only.

The garrison of Formosa, which was replaced by reserve troops, consisted of three mixed brigades, making a total of eleven battalions, three squadrons, eleven batteries, and three engineer companies or, in round numbers, 11,000 rifles, 430 sabres, and 66 guns.

The Japanese troops in Korea, kept as guards for the foreign quarters under agreement with Russia, consisted of two companies of infantry at Seoul, one company at Fusan, and one at Gensan, total 800 men,* and there were also small posts of military police, along the Japanese telegraph lines, totalling 200 men.

The field troops available were therefore approximately :—

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers.
13 divisions	148,200	7,800	468	9,750
13 <i>Kobi</i> brigades†	45,500	—	78	—
Depot troops	52,000	2,600	78	2,990
2 cavalry brigades	—	2,300	—	—
2 artillery brigades	—	—	180	—
Formosa garrison	11,000	430	66	690
Guards, etc., in Korea	1,000	—	—	—
Total	257,700	13,130	870	13,430

In addition some 400,000 trained men were available to replace casualties.

Four more divisions—the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th—were formed during 1905, as well as a similar number of *Kobi* brigades, raising the total number of divisions and *Kobi* brigades to seventeen, including the Guard Division and its *Kobi* brigade. Beyond these units no new formations were created during the war, and the recruits and reservists called to the depots were used exclusively to keep the original units up to strength. At first none but men with at least a year's training were sent to the front as combatants, but at a later period of the war it was found that the term of instruction could be reduced without detriment to six months.

The system of training in force in Japan prior to the war closely resembled that of Germany, and the textbooks of instruction were based on those of the latter country.

The cavalry, like that of European nations, was trained principally

* At the outset these companies were drawn from the 38th Regiment of the 4th Division.

† The figures in this line represent the strength in men and guns of thirteen normal *Kobi* brigades.

for shock action, but was also taught to fight on foot. The men were selected from among the most intelligent and best suited for this arm of the service, but they were indifferent riders, and their horses were overweighted.

The artillery was trained to open an action, and to work with the battalion of three batteries as a unit wherever ground admitted. Isolated action on the part of batteries was regarded with disfavour and as only to be employed in hilly or broken country where space would necessarily be limited. Great stress was laid upon the importance of concealing guns from view and fire, and earthworks were ordered to be made whenever possible.

The infantry was taught that the great object of the attack was to obtain superiority of fire; that the aim of every man must be to press forward regardless of loss, and that any wavering or lack of dash would lead to increased casualties and diminish the prospects of success. It was laid down that the deployment would be made under cover of artillery, and the troops pushed as close to the enemy's position before opening fire as the nature of the ground admitted. The difficulty of crossing the fire-swept zone by day was recognized, and much time was devoted to night operations. The distinguishing feature of the attack lay in the rapidity with which the men moved from point to point; at the same time the operation was characterized by deliberation, and the importance of reconnaissance and of entrenching was borne in mind.

The cavalry was armed with swords, and the 1897 pattern carbine, taking the same cartridge as the rifle, was slung on the back. In the field the amount of ammunition was increased and ninety rounds were carried by each man. With each cavalry brigade was a battery of six Hotchkiss machine guns.

Five of the infantry divisions, the Guard Division, the four additional divisions, and the two artillery brigades were armed with the Arisaka field gun, which is not a quick-firing gun. It has a calibre of 2.95-in., a muzzle velocity of 1,600 f.s., and throws either a shrapnel shell of 13.23 lbs. in weight or a high-explosive shell weighing 13.45 lbs. to a range of 5,000 yards. Six of the divisions had mountain guns of the same calibre as the field artillery, and these, though of less range, proved most effective. One division, the 7th, had two batteries of field and two of mountain guns. In addition to the field and mountain guns some batteries of howitzers of 4.72-in. calibre were used as army artillery.

The infantry was armed with the 1897 pattern of rifle and bayonet. The rifle had a calibre of .256-in. and a muzzle velocity of 2,200 f.s., and was sighted up to 2,000 metres (2,187 yards). The ammunition was made up in clips of five rounds, and each man had one hundred and twenty rounds in pouches and thirty in the haversack, while an additional sixty rounds were carried in the battalion transport. The number of rounds taken into action was on an average two hundred, but was sometimes increased to three hundred and eighty.

Kits were carried in knapsacks with the great-coat and shelter-tent rolled outside. Two-thirds of the men carried an entrenching tool strapped to the knapsack, in which, in addition to necessities, were two days' rations; the whole weighed some 57 lbs.

An important item of the soldier's kit was the blue cloth holdall. This took the form of a sack six feet six inches long, but with both ends open, and was eight and a-half inches across when laid flat. It was made of stout blue drill, and was sewn across the centre so as to form two long compartments. It was used by men, such as those of the train, who were not provided with knapsacks, to carry their kit. With the infantry soldier, however, it served to carry ammunition in one compartment and emergency rations in the other. It was usually carried empty, but when it was known that a severe action was impending, the knapsack and its contents were discarded, the emergency rations were transferred to one of the compartments of the blue holdall, and as much as two hundred and thirty rounds were sometimes placed in the other compartment. The sack was then worn over the right shoulder *en bandoulière* by tying the two ends across the chest. This equipment was improvised owing to the necessity of carrying as much ammunition as possible into action.

At the beginning of the war the infantry had no machine guns, but during the autumn of 1904 ten of these weapons of Hotchkiss pattern were supplied to each division, and before March of the following year, this number was increased to fourteen, which were organized in two batteries, each of six guns, and one section of two guns.

The bridging section of each engineer battalion had sufficient material for a bridge one hundred and fifty-three yards long; and there were some thirty-five miles of air line and cable with each telegraph company.

NOTE.

COMPOSITION OF A JAPANESE MOBILIZED DIVISION.

2 infantry brigades, each brigade of two regiments of three battalions.

1 cavalry regiment of three squadrons.

1 artillery regiment of two battalions of three batteries.*

1 engineer battalion of three companies with a bridging train.

1 telegraph company of three sections.

6 field hospitals.

5 ammunition columns (three artillery, two infantry).

4 supply columns.

In round numbers 11,400 rifles, 600 sabres and 36 guns, with staff, 750 engineers and 5,500 non-combatants.

COMPOSITION OF A SECOND RESERVE (*Kobi*) BRIGADE.

1 infantry brigade of three regiments, each regiment of two battalions.

In round numbers 3,500 infantry.

COMPOSITION OF A "MIXED" SECOND RESERVE (*Kobi*) BRIGADE.

1 infantry brigade of two regiments, each regiment of two battalions.

1 artillery battalion of three batteries.†

1 company of engineers.

A few troopers from the divisional cavalry regiment.

$\frac{1}{2}$ a divisional train.

1 supply column.

$\frac{1}{2}$ a bearer company.

1 or 2 field hospitals.

1 infantry ammunition column.

1 artillery ammunition column.

In round numbers 5,000 combatants and 18 guns.

* The Guard, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th Divisions, were armed with field guns; the 5th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Divisions had mountain guns, and the 7th Division had only four 6-gun batteries, two of which had field and two mountain guns.

† The Guard "Mixed" (*Kobi*) Brigade had four field batteries.

CHAPTER III.

THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

IN Russia, as in Japan, the motive spirit of the army lies in the devotion of the soldiers to their ruler. This almost amounts to a religion, and embodies everything which in other countries is understood as patriotism. The Russian soldier, coming mostly from the peasant class, is no stranger to a hard, laborious, and frugal life and it is not to be wondered at that he bears privation and endures discomfort without a murmur. The dull surroundings of his village home deaden his imagination and produce a stolid nature which, even after frequent defeats, is usually proof against sudden panic or disorganization. His natural submissiveness makes him obedient and respectful to his superiors, but limited education, and wits dulled by a purely agricultural life, give to his mind a superstitious and fatalistic bent. Brave and well-disciplined, he is steady under fire, and when well led is a very formidable enemy, possessing many admirable military qualities, both actual and potential. His officers, like himself, are brave, and form a body of men of the most varying degrees of education and social standing. The officers of the general staff, the majority of whom are graduates of the staff college, are well educated and obtain rapid advancement.

The period of military service in the Russian army extends from the twenty-first to the forty-third year of a man's age, of which the first eighteen years are passed in the standing Terms of service. army and its reserve, the remainder in the *Opolchenie* or national militia. Service with the colours lasts for five years, and in the reserve for thirteen years, during which every man is liable to two trainings of six weeks each. The actual time, however, with the colours is four years,* as he is then sent to the reserve. During the first seven years of his reserve service he belongs to the 1st Category, and is then passed into the 2nd Category.

* Since the conclusion of the war with Japan, colour service for the infantry and field artillery has been reduced to three years, and in the case of other arms to four years; service in the reserve being fifteen and thirteen years respectively.

The national militia comprises all men fit to bear arms from their twenty-first to the end of their forty-third year, and is divided into two *bans*.

The Cossacks, the inhabitants of Finland, and the Christian native population of the Caucasus serve under special regulations. Mohammedans pay a tax instead of serving personally, but are allowed to volunteer for service in certain cases.

The total number of trained men at Russia's disposal at the beginning of 1904 was as follows :—

Active army	1,100,000
Reserve of active army	2,400,000
Cossack troops	345,000
Caucasian native troops	12,000
National militia	684,000

Total 4,541,000 men.

For war purposes the army is classified as follows :—

Field troops (part of which are styled "reserve" troops and are so organized as to expand upon mobilization), depot troops, fortress troops, local troops, and national militia.

The field troops comprise the units of the standing army brought up to war strength by means of the reserve, and reserve units expanded upon mobilization.

The depot troops are formed upon cadres detached from the standing army, and are filled up by men not required for the mobilization of the active army, by recruits, etc. They serve to feed the field and fortress troops in time of war.

The fortress and local troops are completed to war strength in the same manner as the field troops. In war they are used for garrison work only.

The national militia in war time forms independent units for home defence, and may also be used to fill up gaps among the field troops.

The standing army at the commencement of 1904 consisted of the following units :—

- (a) In European Russia and the Caucasus, twenty-five army corps.
- (b) In Turkistan, two Turkistan army corps.
- (c) In Eastern Siberia, two Siberian army corps.
- (d) In various parts of the empire, a number of independent cavalry divisions and brigades, rifle brigades, and other troops not included in any army corps.

The composition of an army corps varies considerably, according to the part of the empire in which it is stationed. Thus in European Russia the normal army corps consists of:—

Two infantry divisions, each consisting of two brigades (each of two regiments of four battalions), one artillery brigade of six or eight batteries,* one sapper company, and administrative services.

One cavalry division of two brigades, each of two regiments of six squadrons, with two horse artillery batteries (twelve guns).

Corps engineers, consisting of one sapper company, one telegraph company, and half a pontoon battalion.

Administrative services, etc.

In round numbers, 28,000 rifles, 3,400 sabres, with 124 guns.

In Siberia infantry divisions did not exist at the beginning of the war,† and cavalry divisions were not included in the army corps, which had also fewer guns than the European army corps. Altogether the organization of the Siberian army corps was of a provisional and defective nature, but, as the war went on, this gradually improved, and their number was increased from two to seven.

The composition of the various army corps which took part in the war, therefore, varied according to the part of the empire from which they were drawn; the various types and established strengths were as follows:—

- (a) From the active army in European Russia, the 1st, IVth, VIIIth, Xth, XVIth and XVIIth Army Corps, each numbering 28,000 rifles and 112 guns. The XIXth, IXth, and XIIIth Army Corps were sent to Manchuria, but were too late to take part in the war.
- (b) From "reserve" units in European Russia the 5th and 6th Siberian Army Corps, each numbering 28,000 rifles and 96 guns. Of the 7th Siberian Army Corps (53rd and 71st Divisions), whose formation was approved by the Tsar on the 1st July, 1905, only the 71st Division‡ actually took part in the war.

* In every army corps one artillery brigade has 6, the other 8 batteries, making a total of 14 batteries or 112 guns, or 124 guns if the two horse batteries of the cavalry division be included.

† They were formed later by the expansion of the existing brigades.

‡ The 71st Division formed part of the 5th Siberian Army Corps, until replaced by the 61st Division.

- (c) Expanded from Siberian "reserve" units, the 4th Siberian Army Corps, numbering 28,000 rifles and 64 guns.
- (d) From East Siberian units, the 1st and 3rd Siberian Army Corps, each numbering 22,000 rifles and 64 guns.
- (e) Lastly, the 2nd Siberian Army Corps was composed partly of East Siberian units and partly of Siberian "reserve" units, and numbered 27,000 rifles and 80 guns.

The cavalry, consisting almost entirely of Cossacks, was organized at the outset in separate divisions and brigades. No divisional or corps cavalry was provided for, but was detailed from cavalry divisions as required. The established strength of a cavalry division was, in round numbers, 3,400 sabres and lances, with, in some cases, twelve horse artillery guns.

About one hundred infantry depot battalions were formed during the war for the purpose of keeping the units at the front supplied with men. Of these, at least forty proceeded to the Far East, but the exact number is unknown. The other arms were supplied, partly by depot units formed in the Far East, partly from depots in European Russia, and partly by drafts of men serving with units in European Russia.

Fortress troops were stationed at Port Arthur, Vladivostok, Possiet Bay, and Nikolaievsk, and consisted of infantry, artillery, and engineer units. At Nikolaievsk was stationed a fortress infantry regiment of one battalion, which was subsequently increased to four battalions. The infantry portion of the garrisons of Port Arthur and Vladivostok was supplied by four East Siberian rifle divisions, two to each fortress: each division comprised about eleven thousand rifles and from twenty-four to thirty-two guns. Two of these divisions had been converted from fortress infantry into rifles shortly before the war.

Troops for lines of communication were provided by independent battalions of Siberian infantry, Trans-Baikal Cossack infantry, Frontier Guards, and battalions of Siberian *Opolchenie*.

The Manchurian and Ussuri railways were worked entirely by railway battalions. Of these, six were East Siberian battalions, which were reinforced in the course of the war by several battalions brought from European Russia.

The system of tactical training was not unlike that of other European armies. Thus the cavalry was trained both for mounted and dismounted combat, but the musketry training necessary to make it efficient when on foot fell short of the requirements of modern warfare. The Cossacks,

Tactical training.

who formed the greater part of the Russian mounted force in Manchuria, were trained on lines similar to the regular cavalry, but did not attain to the standard laid down for the latter. Moreover, as the Cossack provides his own horse, uniform, and equipment for which he is inadequately compensated in case of loss or damage, he is naturally disinclined to expose them to greater risk than he need.

In the Russian artillery the tactical unit at the beginning of the war was the brigade of two, three, or four batteries.* Indirect laying was little taught in peace time, but during the war it was much resorted to, and gun pits were employed whenever circumstances permitted.

The infantry was trained in the belief that battles are won by movements in close order and by shock tactics rather than by the development of a well-aimed fire, and, although the regulations prescribed the usual attack formations, these were not closely followed. Extended order was disliked as tending to increase the difficulties of command, and to this fact is mainly due the heavy losses of the Russians in Manchuria as compared with those of the Japanese. A peculiarity of the Russian infantry soldier is that both in peace time and in the field he carries his bayonet fixed, and this, together with inadequate attention to rifle shooting, naturally inclined him to place his faith in cold steel rather than in bullets.

The cavalry was armed with sword, rifle, and bayonet, and although the Cossacks in Manchuria did not carry the last-named weapon the front rank of the majority of their regiments had the lance. The rifle was slung across the back and was practically identical with that carried by the infantry. Forty-five rounds of ammunition were carried by each man and twenty-four in the regimental transport. The Cossacks were indifferently mounted, but their ponies possessed great endurance.

The artillery was in course of rearmament when the war broke out, and there were several patterns of guns in Manchuria. At first only about one-third of the guns available were the new 3-in. Q.F. weapon, and in many of the batteries neither the officers nor the men had any knowledge of it; the remainder, with the exception of some batteries of mountain guns and howitzers, were guns of 3.42-in. calibre. The 3-in. Q.F. gun throws a shell weighing

* The tactical unit is now the division of two or three batteries; two or three divisions form a brigade.

13·6 lbs. to a distance of 6,000 yards, up to which range only the time fuze for shrapnel fire is graduated, while the older 3·42-in. pattern, although it has a heavier projectile, has a shorter range.

The infantry was armed with a rifle of ·299-in. calibre, sighted up to 3,000 yards, with a muzzle velocity of 2,000 f.s. The ammunition was made up in clips of five rounds; each man carried one hundred and twenty rounds,* and there were sixty-six rounds per man in the regimental carts. In Manchuria, each man carried fifteen additional rounds in his kit bag and a further supply in the pockets of his blouse, so that from two hundred to three hundred rounds were frequently taken into action.

Kits were carried in a waterproof canvas bag suspended over the right shoulder and hanging on the left side. In this bag were also two and a half days' biscuit and salt. The great-coat was worn or rolled *en bandoulière* over the left shoulder, together with a portion of a shelter tent, and about eighty men in each company had spades. With extra ammunition, kettle, and other personal effects the weight carried amounted to about 70 lbs., or nearly 10 lbs. more than that laid down by regulation.

Machine gun detachments of four guns now form part of every infantry and rifle regiment of the line; but of those units which reached the seat of war before May, 1905, only five East Siberian rifle divisions, the divisions of six army corps, and five rifle brigades of the line were provided with machine gun companies. The weapon used was the Maxim automatic gun firing the infantry cartridge, and proved to be a great success.

Each pontoon battalion of engineers had sufficient material for a bridge which could be varied in length from two hundred and thirty-three to four hundred yards, according to whether it was required to carry siege artillery or the other arms; and the first and second companies of each sapper battalion had a light bridge park which was carried on six wagons.

European telegraph companies had forty miles of wire and cable, while East Siberian sapper units had four air-line sections, each section with about sixteen and a half miles of wire. There were also with the army in Manchuria three telegraph companies with Marconi equipment for the purpose of maintaining communication between the commander-in-chief and commanders of armies.

* Thirty rounds in each of two pouches, 30 in a bandolier slung over the left shoulder, and 30 in a reserve pouch suspended by a strap over the right shoulder and fastened to the waistbelt on the left side.

The Russian forces in the Far East have always been subject to considerable variations in their organization and strength.

Originally, a comparatively small force was maintained east of Lake Baikal, which sufficed for the garrisons of the frontier districts and of the Littoral Province, extending from the mouth of the Amur to Vladivostok. The strength of these troops, however, was gradually increased as the advent of the Siberian Railway and other considerations enhanced the importance of the vast region lying between Lake Baikal and the Pacific, an area which is known as the Russian Pri-Amur Military District. In the summer of 1900 the Boxer outbreak resulted in damage to large portions of the lines then under construction across Manchuria from Harbin to Vladivostok and Port Arthur. For the purpose of the campaign then undertaken by the Russians to re-establish their possession of the railway line, and to ensure its ultimate completion, the troops in the Far East were mobilized and reinforcements were brought from European Russia. In the middle of July the order to mobilize was issued, and in October the Russian troops, including those in the Kuan-tung District, numbered about 124,000 men.* In the middle of October, on demobilization, the Russian troops were reduced to forty battalions and twenty squadrons with seventy-four guns, or about 38,000 men, exclusive of the garrison of the Kuan-tung Peninsula, which numbered 14,600 men with 24 field guns. Four brigades of Frontier Guards, numbering 25,000 men, were then formed for the protection of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

In April, 1902, under the pledge given to China, the withdrawal of troops from the south-west portion of the province of Mukden as far as the Liao River, was put into execution; but some, at least, of the troops remained in Manchuria on the line of the railway. During the negotiations which immediately preceded the war, two infantry brigades,† with part of the divisional artillery, were moved from European Russia to Chita in Trans-Baikalia; two additional East Siberian rifle brigades‡ were

* Viz., in Manchuria, including the Kuan-tung District, 80 battalions, 62 squadrons, and 232 guns; and in the Pri-Amur District, 26 battalions, 25 squadrons, and 28 guns.

† *i.e.*, 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Infantry Divisions, belonging to the Xth and XVIIth Army Corps respectively, each with 3 batteries of artillery.

‡ *i.e.*, 7th and 8th.

formed by drafts from Russia and from the fortress infantry of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, and an additional railway battalion was raised, which reached Liao-yang early in September. Further reinforcements were contemplated, and various units in Russia received orders to mobilize, or to hold themselves in readiness to do so, before the end of 1903.

It must not be forgotten that even the troops in the Far East* were scattered over the vast area stretching from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, and from Port Arthur to Nikolaievsk; a large proportion of the force, therefore, cannot be considered as having been actually available for operations in the field at the opening of the campaign.

Although an organization of four army corps was officially adopted at the outset of the war, it was soon abandoned, for all practical purposes, by General Kuropatkin, and the troops were formed into armies and mixed columns or detachments, as circumstances required. The bulk of the Russian force available was massed in two main groups, in the neighbourhood of Vladivostok and Port Arthur respectively; a third and much smaller group was distributed over Southern Manchuria and along the railway between Harbin and Liao-yang, the latter of which places had been selected as the centre of the zone of concentration of the field army. The remaining troops were further north in Trans-Baikalia; some were on their way to the theatre of operations, but others were still in process of mobilization.

The disposition of the field troops was therefore as follows:—

- (a) In the Ussuri District (*i.e.*, from Tsitsihar to the coast but north of the Vladivostok—Harbin—Tsitsihar Railway), in the fortress of Vladivostok, and near Possiet Bay—

Five East Siberian rifle brigades (1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 8th†); less two regiments, the 5th and 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiments.

Two European Infantry brigades (the 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Infantry Divisions).

Two regiments of cavalry (the Primorsk Dragoon Regiment and the 1st Nerchinsk Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment).

* See Appendix A and Strategical Map 1 for the strength and allocation of the Russian forces in the Far East in February, 1904.

† The 7th and 8th Brigades respectively had only recently been formed from the fortress infantry at Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

One sapper battalion (1st East Siberian).

Twelve field* and two mountain batteries.

Total.—52 battalions, 12 squadrons, 4 engineer companies and 112 guns.

(b) In Port Arthur and Kuan-tung Peninsula :—

Three East Siberian rifle brigades (3rd, 4th, and 7th†) less two regiments (16th and 28th East Siberian Rifles).

One infantry regiment (5th East Siberian Rifles).

One regiment of cavalry (1st Verkhne-Udinsk Trans-Baikal Cossacks).

Two and a quarter sapper battalions (2nd and 3rd‡ East Siberian and one Kuan-tung Sapper Company).

Five field batteries.

Total.—25 battalions, 6 squadrons, 9 engineer companies and 40 guns.

(c) In southern Manchuria, *i.e.*, south of the Tsitsihar-Vladivostok Railway and exclusive of (b)—

One East Siberian rifle brigade (the 9th).§

Three infantry regiments (16th, 18th, and 28th East Siberian Rifle Regiments).

Two regiments and five squadrons of cavalry (1st Chita, 1st Argun Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiments, and three squadrons of Amur and two squadrons of Ussuri Cossacks).

Two horse batteries.

Total.—19 battalions, 17 squadrons, and 12 guns.

(d) West of Tsitsihar and in Trans-Baikalia :—

One Siberian Reserve Infantry Brigade (4 battalions).

Four field batteries.

Total.—4 battalions and 32 guns.

The above table does not include the fortress and technical troops allotted to Nikolaijevsk, Vladivostok, and Port Arthur respectively; these are enumerated in detail in Appendix A, and are shown on Strategic Map 1.

* One battery of the 2nd E.S.R. Artillery Brigade was at Port Arthur.

† The 7th and 8th Brigades respectively had only recently been formed from the fortress infantry at Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

‡ Formed on 14th February.

§ At the beginning of February this brigade consisted of only 8 battalions, but the remaining 4 had been completed by the 18th February.

Estimating the combatant strength of a battalion of infantry at 700 rifles, and that of a squadron at 120 sabres, the total number of Russian combatants in the field, exclusive of fortress and technical troops, may therefore be taken as:—

	Guns.	Combatants.
Infantry (100 battalions)	—	70,000
Cavalry (35 squadrons)	—	4,200
Artillery (25 batteries)—		
Field guns	168	6,450
Horse guns	12	
Mountain guns... ..	16	
Engineers (13 companies)	—	2,700
Grand total	196	83,350

CHAPTER IV.

THE RIVAL NAVIES.

During the war of 1894-95, the great superiority of Japan's sea forces enabled her at once to place her armies in advantageous positions, whence they overwhelmed China with ease and rapidity and soon compelled her to make peace. It was, therefore, natural that the important part which the command of the sea would play in the inevitable struggle should long have been foreseen by both Russia and Japan.

In April, 1895, the Japanese navy was slightly inferior to the Russian naval force in the Far East. Even including the vessels which had been captured from the Chinese and refitted, it consisted of only one old battleship, built in 1877, one small armoured cruiser, the *Chiyoda*, built in 1890, seven second class protected cruisers, and three third class cruisers less than ten years old, together with a few small vessels of low speed and old date. Russia, on the other hand, had in eastern waters one second class battleship of 8,400 tons, three armoured cruisers, and two second class cruisers, besides smaller vessels. At this time both countries were building battleships. The *Fuji* and *Yashima* had already been laid down in England for Japan, and the *Sevastopol*, *Petropavlovsk*, and *Poltava* were more than half completed at St. Petersburg.

In shipbuilding resources Russia held a great advantage, since Japan was still entirely dependent on foreign yards for her armoured vessels. On the other hand the indemnity received from China after the war of 1894-95 placed at the disposal of Japan a good

fund which enabled her to make use of the great shipbuilding facilities of private firms in England. In these circumstances Japan lost no time in drawing up a comprehensive naval programme which provided for six battleships of the first class and for six armoured cruisers. All these vessels were to be ready in seven

Shipbuilding resources of Russia and Japan.

years; and it will be seen that, in addition to her battleships, Japan from an early date made it part of her naval scheme to provide herself with large and powerfully armoured cruisers of high speed. In contrast to this far-seeing policy, Russia does not appear to have drawn up any definite programme until some time later, but it should be remembered that her problems were more complex than those of her eastern rival, and that her alliance with France, as well as her general position in Europe, necessitated her keeping a considerable part of her navy in western waters.

By June, 1902, when the Japanese *post bellum* programme was complete, the naval position in the Far East was greatly changed, and a comparison of the strength of the two countries was now altogether in favour of Japan, a condition for which the slow rate of Russian shipbuilding was largely responsible.

THE NAVAL STRENGTH OF JAPAN AND RUSSIA IN JUNE, 1902.

Class.	Japan.			Russia.			
	Built.	Building or Projected.	Total.	Asiatic Fleet.	European Waters, excluding the Black Sea.	Building or Projected.	Total.
Battleships—							
First class	6	—	6	4	3	8	15
Second class	1	—	1	—	3	—	3
Armoured coast defence vessels	2	—	2	—	3	—	3
Cruisers—							
First class—							
Armoured	6	—	6	4	3	1	8
Protected	—	—	—	1	2	5	8
Second class, protected ...	10	2	12	—	3	5	8
Third class—							
Armoured	1	—	1	—	—	—	—
Protected	7	—	7	—	1	—	1
Second class, unprotected ...	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
Third class, unprotected ...	9	—	9	—	2	—	2
Torpedo boats—							
First class	31	5	36	10	41	12	63
Second class	26	5	31	7	45	—	52
Torpedo boat destroyers ...	15	4	19	18*	15	21	54
Torpedo vessels	1	—	1	2	3	—	5
Divisional torpedo boats ...	7	11	18	—	—	—	—
Other small vessels	13	—	13	—	—	—	—
Gun vessels armoured	—	—	—	2	2	—	4
Sloops	—	—	—	4	8	—	12
Mining transports	—	—	—	2	—	—	2

The Russian battleships were modern, but were of less power.

* Nine of these were sent to Port Arthur in sections and were not all put together until later.

than those of the Japanese and, owing to lack of resources on the Far Eastern station, the battleships *Imperator Nikolai I*, *Navarin*, and *Sisoï Veliki*, and the armoured cruisers *Dmitri Donskoi*, *Vladimir Monomakh*, *Admiral Nakhimov* and *Pamyat Azova* were sent back to Cronstadt to undergo important repairs and to be fitted with new boilers. These repairs were so tardily carried out that two years later, when war began, only the *Vladimir Monomakh* and *Dmitri Donskoi* had been rearmed. The *Pamyat Azova* did not receive her new guns until the end of 1904 (nearly a year after the outbreak of war) and the *Nikolai I*, *Navarin*, and *Admiral Nakhimov* actually went out again with their old armaments, the *Navarin* having also her old boilers.

From June, 1902, up to the opening of hostilities the following changes took place in the two fleets. In the late summer of 1902, Russia sent the *Askold*, a first class protected cruiser, and the *Novik*, a third class protected cruiser, to reinforce her eastern fleet, while three destroyers, the *Vnushitelni*, *Vuinoslivi*, and *Vnimatelni*, which were supposed to be proceeding to China, had reached the Mediterranean. There they remained until they were joined by the first class battleships *Retvizan* and *Pobyeda*, the first class protected cruisers *Bogatuir*, *Diana*, and *Pallada*, the second class protected cruiser *Boyarin*, and four more destroyers, viz., the *Grozovoi*, *Vlastni*, *Boiki*, and *Burni*. All these vessels had joined the eastern fleet between the beginning of February and the end of June, 1903. In December, 1903, the *Tzesarevich*, a first class battleship, and the *Bayan*, a first class armoured cruiser, arrived at Port Arthur, thus completing the Russian forces available at the outset of the war. In addition to the vessels already enumerated the *Oslyabya*, first class battleship, *Avrora*, first class protected cruiser, *Dmitri Donskoi*, armoured cruiser (which had just been rearmed), seven destroyers, and four torpedo boats, all of which were dispatched as reinforcements at about the same time as the *Tzesarevich*, had only reached the Red Sea when war was declared; for the first named ship had run ashore and had been delayed two months in Spezia while undergoing repairs.

During these months the only reinforcements received by Japan were the *Niitaka*, a second class protected cruiser, which was completed just previous to the war, four destroyers and twenty-one torpedo boats; but the first class armoured cruisers *Kasuga* and *Nisshin*, which were being built in Italy for the Argentine government, were purchased at the end of 1903, and arrived in time to join the main Japanese fleet in April, 1904. The *Tsushima*, a

second class protected cruiser, built in Japan, was also added to the fleet at the end of February.*

Thus, as can be seen by comparing the following table with that on p. 34, the naval situation in Far Eastern waters was much more favourable to Russia on the outbreak of hostilities than had been the case two years earlier.

THE NAVAL STRENGTH OF JAPAN AND RUSSIA IN FEBRUARY, 1904.†

Class.	Russia.	Japan.
Battleships—		
First class	<i>Tzesarevich, Retvizan, Pobyeda, Peresvyet, Petropavlovsk, Poltava and Sevastopol</i>	<i>Mikasa, Asahi, Hatsuse, Shikishima, Yashima, and Fuji</i>
Second class	—	<i>Chinyen</i>
Coast defence vessels	—	<i>Fuso and Heiyen</i>
Armoured cruisers	<i>Bayan, Gromoboi, Rossiya and Rurik</i>	<i>Yakumo, Idzumo, Iwate, Tokiwa, Asama, Adzuma, Kasuga‡ and Nisshin‡</i>
Cruisers—		
First class, protected	<i>Bogatuir, Askold, Var-yag, Diana and Pallada</i>	
Second class, protected	—	<i>Tsushima,§ Nitaka, Chitose, Kasagi, Takasago, Yoshino, Akit-sushima, Hashidate, Matsushima, Itsuku-shima, Naniwa and Takachiho</i>
Third class, protected (19 knots and above)	<i>Novik and Boyarin ...</i>	<i>Chihaya, Suma, Akashi, Chiyoda and 4 others of slow speed</i>
Third class, unprotected (19 knots and above)	—	<i>Miyako, Yaeyama and 7 others of slow speed</i>
Torpedo gunboats	<i>Gaidamak and Vsadnik</i>	<i>Tatsuta</i>
Destroyers... ..	25 in number	19 in number
Sloops and gunboats	10 ,,	15 ,,
Torpedo boats—		
First class	10 ,,	58 ,,
Second class	7 ,,	27 ,,

Russia's effective fleet consisted, therefore, of seven battleships, four armoured, five first class, and two third class cruisers, twenty-five destroyers, ten first class and seven second class torpedo boats, and ten sloops and gunboats. This force was, however, by no means

* The *Otowa*, third class cruiser, was under construction in Japan, and joined the active fleet in August, 1904.

† A more detailed account of these vessels and a complete list of all vessels employed on both sides is given in Appendices N to Q.

‡ At Singapore, on passage to Japan.

§ Under construction; joined main fleet in February.

so formidable as it might appear at first sight, for it was lacking in many of the qualities which help to form a really efficient fighting unit. The battleships varied in speed, armament, protection, and tactical qualities. The same remark applies to the cruisers, of which four only were armoured, and of these the *Rossiya* and the *Rurik* carried their armaments practically unprotected. The five first class and the two third class cruisers were nominally of high speed, though it will be seen later that in some cases they had sadly deteriorated from their trial speeds. The destroyers were of various types, French, German, British, and Russian-built from British designs; moreover, four or five of those which had been sent out to Port Arthur in sections had not been completed in February, 1904, although they joined the fighting force later on. Lastly, the torpedo boats were old craft, slow and of little fighting value.

On the other hand Japan possessed six first class battleships and eight first class armoured cruisers, most of which were of British design and formed two powerful homogeneous squadrons. She was also well provided with fast second and third class cruisers. Her nineteen destroyers, of which fifteen were built in England and four in Japan from British materials and designs, were of the British thirty-knot type; and of the fifty-eight first class torpedo boats, sixteen were quite new twenty-nine knot vessels, thirty-seven were modern craft of twenty-two to twenty-five knots, and only five were old boats. Of the twenty-seven second class torpedo boats, nine were new vessels of twenty to twenty-one knots, and sixteen, though ten years old, were in good order and possessed fair speed, eighteen to twenty knots. To these may be added twenty-six old cruisers, sloops, and gunboats which had no fighting value so long as there was a possibility of meeting the enemy at sea, but which proved invaluable for covering landing operations and for co-operating with the army when the command of the sea had been obtained.

In both the Russian and the Japanese navies service is compulsory, but in the latter there are many volunteers who engage for eight years' active service and four years in the reserve; in the former navy the term of service is ten years, of which, as a rule, seven years are passed in active service and three years in the first reserve.

Theoretically, therefore, there should have been little to choose between the navies so far as concerned the efficiency of the personnel; but in actual fact it varied no less than that of the material, and here again a comparison is all in favour of Japan.

Personnel of the
rival fleets.

Presumably from motives of economy, the Russian fleet had been kept in "armed reserve" during the greater part of the year preceding the war. The officers and men were deficient in sea training. The former had had little practice in handling their ships, and a large percentage of the latter were recruits who had hardly been to sea; while the engine room complements were notoriously inefficient and badly trained. In strong contrast to this system Japan kept a standing squadron, which consisted of two first class battleships, two first class cruisers and eight second and third class cruisers permanently in commission and in a most efficient state. The remainder of her fighting force was kept in the first reserve, with full complements of all but officers. A considerable number of torpedo craft was also kept in commission at the several ports, and in the handling of these vessels there was no lack of practice. In March, 1903, the whole fleet was mobilized for manœuvres, and for this purpose it was unnecessary to call out any reserves, for, with the exception of vessels undergoing extensive repairs, all were in the first reserve.

Passing from the fleets themselves to the hardly less important matter of harbours, we find that up to 1898 the sole base of the Russian fleet in the Pacific was Vladivostok, where there is an excellent harbour with ample accommodation for a large number of ships. But from December to March it is frozen over, and, although a passage could be kept open by the constant use of an ice-breaker, it could not be considered a satisfactory naval base at that time of year. The dockyard was not extensive, nor did it provide the means necessary for carrying out important repairs; but it contained a dry dock capable of taking a battleship, and a floating dock (in sections) with a capacity when put together of lifting 4,000 tons. This was the only dry dock available for battleships and large cruisers, but this fact does not seem to have influenced the Russian plans.

Port Arthur, a good natural harbour on the south-east shore of the Liao-tung Peninsula, had been first made into a naval base by the Viceroy of Chih-li, Li Hung-chang, in the year 1880 for the use of the newly formed Chinese fleet which he had raised. From this time onwards the work of fortification and development was continued with unimportant intervals until the time of the war with Japan, and £8,500,000 was spent in converting a fishing village into a fortress and naval base. After twelve years' labour a port, dock, and workshops were constructed, and were sufficiently well equipped to permit of repairs to war vessels.

In addition, torpedo stores, a naval arsenal, a machinery factory, magazines, and provision stores were formed. All the establishments were lighted by electricity, and the latest improvements and inventions were adopted throughout. At the same time strong fortifications were erected, especially on the sea front, and a large, though inefficient, garrison was maintained. Then in November, 1894, the fortress was captured by the Japanese, but it was again ceded to China in 1895. During the next two years lack of funds prevented China from undertaking any further improvements, and when Russia obtained her lease of the Kuan-tung Peninsula in 1897 the fortress was in much the same condition as before the war of 1894.

Unfortunately for Russia, the port, as constructed by the Chinese, was confined to the eastern basin, and was soon found to be on too small a scale for her increasing fleet in the Pacific. On the north side of the basin there was a dry dock, which, however, could not be entered by any ship larger than a second class cruiser, and not even by all of these.* Nevertheless, it was not until 1900 that Russia began her programme for its improvement. In that year a sum of £200,000 was allotted for this purpose, followed by £300,000 in 1901, £320,000 in 1902, and £436,000 in 1903. The scheme included the construction of a second southerly entrance, the complete dredging of the western basin, the building of breakwaters to enclose the outer roadstead, the conversion of the fresh water lake into a locked basin, and the construction of two new docks as well as other undertakings of minor importance. As though these improvements were not on sufficiently large a scale, vast sums were also expended

in developing Dalny, the Russian name which was given to a small Chinese settlement on the south side of Ta-lien Bay, with the result that by the end of 1903, when war was imminent, very little of the work at Port Arthur had been completed. Whether the money allotted had all been expended or not is uncertain; but it is known that the western basin had been deepened, and that the dock had been lengthened, although it was still not wide enough to take a battleship.

Thus at the outbreak of war Russia had but two naval bases in the Pacific, neither of which was sufficiently well equipped to meet the requirements of the fleet. At Vladivostok there was a dry dock capable of taking a battleship, but the workshops were indifferent; while at Port Arthur, where the shops were good, the only dock was of comparatively small dimensions.

* The dimensions of this dock were: length 359 feet, depth at entrance 23½ feet at low water, width of entrance 72 feet.

Turning now to Japan, we find that she possessed four naval bases, all of which were strongly fortified. These bases were:—Yokosuka, in the Gulf of Tokio; Kure, on the north side of the Inland Sea; Maizuru, in Wakasa Bay, on the north side of the main island; Sasebo, on the west coast of the Island of Kiusiu, about twenty miles north of Nagasaki. In addition, Takeshiki, in the Island of Tsushima, Ominato in the extreme north of the main island, and Makyu in the Pescadores were the head-quarters of torpedo craft, and were well equipped for that purpose.

Kure, the principal dockyard and arsenal, possessed two docks, and was well equipped with modern constructive and repairing plant. Yokosuka, the oldest of the imperial yards, had three docks and slip accommodation for destroyers and small craft. Maizuru dockyard (only begun in 1896) had one large dock, and two small ones suitable for torpedo craft. Sasebo was primarily a repairing yard, and possessed two docks and a small floating dock; it had plant fully capable of executing repairs. Owing to its position this dockyard was much used as a base by the fleet, and an ample supply of coal was kept in reserve there.

In every respect, therefore, except the total number of ships possessed by the two countries, Japan held the advantage, but before closing this summary of the naval position it will be as well to consider the reinforcements upon which the belligerents could rely. In the case of Russia the possible accession to her fleet consisted primarily of the battleship *Oslabya*, the first class protected cruiser *Avrora*, and the old armoured cruiser *Dmitri Donskoi*, together with seven destroyers and four torpedo boats, which, as before mentioned, had reached the Red Sea. These vessels, which would have made a considerable difference to the strength of the Russian fleet, remained at Jibuti* for some days, and were ordered to return to the Baltic after the news of the first engagement at Port Arthur had been received. This order would appear to indicate that the authorities in St. Petersburg had realized that their fleet in the Far East would now be forced to stand upon the defensive, and that so small a detachment could have no hope of effecting a junction with it. The difficulties which might arise from the action of neutrals, especially of Great Britain, as regards the supply of coal to war vessels on the outward voyage may also have influenced the Tsar's naval advisers; although the eventual passage of the Baltic fleet

* In French Somaliland.

showed that they were not unsurmountable. On the return voyage the four torpedo boats proved to be most unseaworthy. One foundered in the Mediterranean, and the remaining three were left at Piræus under repairs. The *Buini*, torpedo boat destroyer, was also left in dock at Algiers, having grounded off that port. Thus the early reverses which were sustained not only weakened the fleet at Port Arthur, but also deprived it of the reinforcements which had already left Europe.

In addition to the vessels which had been recalled, and to a number of old armoured ships which were undergoing repairs, Russia had no less than five first class battleships at St. Petersburg and Cronstadt in various stages of preparation, as well as the first class cruiser *Oleg*, and two third class protected cruisers, the *Zhemchug* and *Izumrud*. All these ships had been launched, two of the battleships as far back as 1901, but the work on them was slow, and, as will be seen later, none were dispatched to the scene of action until October, 1904.

Hitherto Japan had been greatly dependent upon foreign private firms (principally British), and, although she had already made preparations for building armoured vessels of the largest size at home, it was doubtless felt that to begin experiments in this work under the stress caused by a great war would not be practicable, more especially as her skilled workmen were required to keep her fighting fleet up to the highest state of efficiency. The *Nisshin* and *Kasuga* were hurried out from Genoa with all dispatch, and it is significant that they left Singapore on the date on which diplomatic relations were suspended; thus avoiding the danger, which might have arisen had war commenced, of being detained by the British authority at that port. Two battleships, the *Kashima* and *Katori*, of the latest design, were being built in England, but these Japan could not hope to receive during the war, owing to the terms of the Foreign Enlistment Act in force in Great Britain.*

In these circumstances Japan had absolutely no reserve of armoured vessels upon which she could fall back, nor did she possess a single yard in which they had ever been built. This is a condition of affairs without parallel in the annals of naval warfare; and if Japan's naval tactics occasionally appeared cautious in comparison with her great attacks on land, it must be borne in mind that while she possessed large reserves of trained men she had no reserve of ships.

* Clause 8 of this Act prohibits the delivery until after the termination of hostilities, of any ship-of-war which is being built under contract for a belligerent.

CHAPTER V.

THE THEATRE OF WAR AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

(Strategical Map 1.)

THE theatre of war, the scene of the struggle between Russia and Japan, may be divided into three sections, the sea, Korea, and Manchuria.

Of these sections the first and most extensive area was formed by the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, two bodies of water linked together by the Straits of Korea. The former lies east of the peninsula of Korea, and from it the Pacific may be reached by several channels. The two most important have been already mentioned, and when war broke out they were practically under Japanese control; but a third way, free from ice throughout the year, leads to the ocean through the Straits of La Pérouse between the islands of Sakhalin and Hokkaido. Between the western coast-line of Korea and the Shan-tung Province of the Chinese Empire lies the Yellow Sea, at whose north-western extremity are the Gulfs of Pei-chih-li and of Liao-tung. To reach this portion of the sea the Straits of Pei-chih-li, some sixty miles in width, between the Liao-tung Peninsula and the Shan-tung Province must be traversed. On the northern coast of the Gulf of Liao-tung is the port of Newchuang (Ying-kou), which is closed for some months of the year by ice. It is situated on the left bank of the Liao Ho, about five miles from the mouth.

Thrust out from the province of Manchuria and stretching southward towards Japan is the peninsula of Korea. With a mean breadth of one hundred and fifty miles, it varies in length from four hundred to six hundred miles, and has an area approximately equal to that of England and Scotland. The peninsula is generally mountainous, and has been described as being "as plentifully sprinkled with mountains as a ploughed field with ridges"; nevertheless Korea is a purely agricultural country. It possesses many excellent ports, more

especially on the southern and western coasts, while on the east the principal harbour is Gensan or Wensan. Situated on the Korean Straits is Masampo, a splendid landlocked port, and forty miles east of it is the Japanese settlement of Fusan where the railway* to Seoul, the capital, has its southern terminus.

Not far from the south-western extremity of the peninsula is Mokpo, and further north are the harbours of Chemulpo, the port of Seoul, and Chinampo. The former is connected with the capital by a single line of railway twenty-six miles in length. This harbour is not frozen over in winter, but there is enough ice to prevent the working of cargo during January and February, and to make it difficult from the beginning of December to the end of March. North of Chemulpo is Chinampo on the northern shore of the Pingyang Inlet, while some thirty miles to the north-east, on the Taitong River, is the important town of Pingyang, with 35,000 inhabitants. Chinampo is closed for at least two months annually by ice. The roads, or rather unmetalled tracks through the interior of the country, are of varying width and are generally steep and stony. In dry weather, cavalry, infantry, and mountain artillery can move freely, but in wet weather, or when the ground is thawing, movements are extremely difficult.

To the north-east of Korea is the Russian Maritime Province, and across the frontier line formed by the Ya-lu and Tumen Rivers lies Manchuria. The province of that name, which is called by the Chinese the Tung-san-sheng or "Three Eastern Provinces," occupies the north-eastern corner of the Chinese Empire. The area of the three provinces is some 366,000 square miles, but that of Feng-tien and Kirin, the actual scene of the operations which took place in Manchuria, is only 161,000 square miles, and is therefore slightly greater than the Transvaal and Orange River Colony combined.

Within the province of Feng-tien, in the space between the Ya-lu and Liao Rivers, lies a confused mass of mountains whose main ridge stretches in one direction to the extremity of the Liaotung Peninsula, and in the other far into the Primorsk, or Maritime Province, north of Vladivostok. In the neighbourhood of Hai-cheng and Liao-yang the range is known from its picturesquely pointed outline as the Chien Shan or Thousand Peaks. Several roads cross it, of which the most important is the Imperial Peking highway leading from Korea to the Chinese capital by way of Liao-yang. This road traverses the mountain chain by the Mo-tien Ling (the

* This railway was completed in January, 1905.

Heaven-reaching Pass), which is four thousand feet in height. Further towards the south-west, where the range is lower, there are several roads, notably those from Hsiu-yen and Feng-huang-cheng, to Hsi-mu-cheng and Hai-cheng, and still further in the same direction roads across the peninsula become numerous. The hills are for the most part wooded, more especially in the higher regions, and the roads across the main ridge are merely cart tracks, which make the passage of large bodies of troops and transport a slow and arduous affair.

West of the hilly region just described, a large area of the theatre of operations is occupied by the valley, or as it might more correctly be termed the plain, of the Liao Ho, where immense crops of millet and beans are grown. This millet or *kao-liang* (tall grain) is planted in drills two feet apart, and soon after it has sprouted the crop is thinned so that each plant remains about eighteen inches from the next. In the rainy season it grows rapidly to between twelve and fifteen feet in height, and thus forms an admirable screen behind which troops can manœuvre unobserved; but by breaking off the stalks some three feet from the ground this screen can readily be converted into a serious obstacle.

The Liao Ho, by which this fertile area is watered, enters Manchuria from Mongolia after a course of three hundred and fifty miles and flows into the sea near Newchuang. It is navigable at certain seasons of the year by junks of varying size, as is also its tributary the Tai-tzu Ho, which flows past Liao-yang and joins the main stream from the east. By an unwritten agreement, or mutual understanding, military operations were confined to the east bank of the Liao Ho throughout the greater part of the war, with the result that in the later stages the Japanese army was forcing the defences of a wide defile which was bounded by rugged mountains on the east and by a swampy river valley on the west.

The climate of Manchuria is temperate in summer, but in winter it is extremely cold. July and August are the hottest months, but the heat is not excessive. The rainy season generally occurs during these months, but occasionally the rains begin earlier and at times last into September. The rainfall although not great throughout the year, amounting usually only to some thirteen inches, is sometimes so heavy as to inundate the country and cause damage to the railway. The snowfall is light, only two or three storms, on an average, occurring in the course of the winter, but the snow melts quickly under the warm sun and does not lie for long upon the plains. The country is generally ice-bound from November to

March, when the rivers, being frozen, are passable for heavy traffic. Roads in the European sense do not exist, being mere tracks through the soft soil, and after heavy rains or when the thaw begins they become impassable. The lack of good means of communication limits the period during which military operations can be carried on to the dry months of the spring, summer, and autumn, for the cold in winter is so severe that troops are practically driven at that time to resort to quarters in the numerous villages which are scattered here and there wherever there is cultivation; but in the hilly districts and in the north, where the population is sparse, houses are few and far between.

To the west of Manchuria lies the neutral province of Mongolia, from which large quantities of cattle and ponies can be obtained.

To keep her army in the Far East supplied with troops and necessary war material, Russia was restricted to the Trans-Siberian Communications.

Railway and its extension from the Manchurian frontier by Harbin to the south. The great length of this line of communication from Moscow to the extremity of the Liao-tung Peninsula, amounting almost to 5,500 miles, exercised an important influence on Russian strategy throughout the war, more especially during its earlier phases, and the difficulties were increased by the fact that the railway round the southern end of Lake Baikal was not completed until several months after the opening of the campaign.

On the other hand, Japan depended for the transport of her troops and their supplies upon her mercantile marine, which had risen from 167,000 gross tonnage in 1893 to 626,745 at the outbreak of war, and included in these figures were many fine and fast steamers exceeding 5,000 tons burthen. Hence, as soon as she had established her superiority at sea, she could land her troops at almost any point on the sea-board of the theatre of war; and even before that object was achieved the southern ports of Korea, lying close to her own, were practically safe from the risk of Russian naval intervention. Moreover her strategic position was well suited for the assembly of a large fleet of transports, for her coast-line is studded with fine harbours connected with the garrisons in the interior of the country by rail, while the Inland Sea forms a practically safe line of communication as far as the western extremity of the main island, whence the distance across the straits to Masampo, on the southern coast of Korea, is about one hundred and twenty miles. The distance from Masampo by sea, to either Vladivostok or Port Arthur is rather more than five hundred miles.

CHAPTER VI.

THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES—FIRST ATTACK ON PORT ARTHUR.

(Chart 2 and Plan 1.)

ALTHOUGH Japan did not sever diplomatic relations with Russia until the 6th February, 1904, it had been evident to her for some time that little prospect of a peaceful settlement remained. Long before the rupture, her plan of action had been carefully thought out, and a wise division of her limited resources had brought both army and navy to such a footing that, when the crisis came, it lay within her power to strike on sea and land without delay. Her naval strength, if slightly inferior on paper to the Russian fleet in Far Eastern waters, was rendered more than a match for it by superior efficiency. Her army, once sea command had been secured, could reach the field of operations in force superior to the Russian troops already there, and could, it was hoped, be maintained in greater numbers than those which the Trans-Siberian Railway could convey. The whole issue of the coming struggle, if the question of finance be excluded, evidently depended upon naval supremacy; but it was clear that no fleet, however powerful, could of itself expel the Russians from Manchuria, or bring the war to a successful conclusion. To that end the possession of an adequate land force was essential, but, despite her care and calculation, Japan failed to estimate correctly what its strength should be. The enemy's numbers in the field and power of adding to them, his preparations, armament, and general efficiency had all been searchingly examined; no efforts had been spared, no means neglected, to ensure a just appreciation of all that the struggle would demand; yet, such is the difficulty of forecasting with exactitude an adversary's strength, that in the first year of the war Japan was obliged to modify her military law in order to recall reservists who had been passed to the national army, and before the end of the campaign was forced to augment the permanent establishment of her military forces by

Japan and the
command of the
sea.

four additional divisions. With a military system less elastic than that which she actually possessed, or less well-fitted for the rapid training of both officers and men, her situation in Manchuria would have been precarious.

As pointed out above, the leading object of the Japanese was to obtain command of the sea. For the time being, therefore, everything depended upon the efficiency of the peace organization of the two fleets, and upon being in a favourable position to strike the first blow. At the beginning of February, 1904, the main Japanese naval force, which was known as the Combined Fleet, was at Sasebo under Vice-Admiral Togo.* On the same date the Russian fleet

* The following table shows the composition of the Japanese Combined Fleet on the 5th February, 1904 :—

		<i>1st Squadron.</i>
1st Division	...	Battleships <i>Mikasa</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral Togo, Commander-in-Chief), <i>Asahi</i> , <i>Fuji</i> , <i>Yashima</i> , <i>Shikishima</i> , and <i>Hatsuse</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral Nashiba); dispatch vessel <i>Tatsuta</i> .
3rd Division	...	Second class cruisers <i>Chitose</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral Dewa), <i>Takasago</i> , <i>Kasagi</i> , and <i>Yoshino</i> .
1st Torpedo Boat Destroyer Flotilla		<i>Shirakumo</i> (Captain Asai), <i>Asashiwo</i> , <i>Kasumi</i> , and <i>Akatsuki</i> .
2nd Torpedo Boat Destroyer Flotilla		<i>Ikadzuchi</i> (Commander Ishida), <i>Oboro</i> , <i>Inadzuma</i> , and <i>Akebono</i> .
3rd Torpedo Boat Destroyer Flotilla		<i>Usugumo</i> (Lieutenant-Commander Tsuchiya), <i>Shinonome</i> , and <i>Sazanami</i> .
1st Torpedo Boat Flotilla		Nos. 69 (Lieutenant-Commander Seki), 67, 68, and 70.
14th Torpedo Boat Flotilla		<i>Chidori</i> (Lieutenant-Commander Sakurai), <i>Hayabusa</i> , <i>Manadzuru</i> , and <i>Kasagi</i> .
		<i>2nd Squadron.</i>
2nd Division	...	Armoured cruisers <i>Idzumo</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral Kamimura), <i>Adzuma</i> , <i>Asama</i> , <i>Yakumo</i> , <i>Tokiwa</i> , and <i>Iwate</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral Misu); dispatch vessel <i>Chihaya</i> .
4th Division	...	Second class cruiser <i>Naniwa</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral Uriu); third class cruiser <i>Akashi</i> ; second class cruisers <i>Takachiho</i> and <i>Niitaka</i> .
4th Torpedo Boat Destroyer Flotilla		<i>Hayatori</i> (Commander Nagai), <i>Asagiri</i> , <i>Harusame</i> , and <i>Murasame</i> .
5th Torpedo Boat Destroyer Flotilla		<i>Murakumo</i> (Commander Mano), <i>Shiranui</i> , <i>Yugiri</i> , <i>Kagero</i> .
9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla		<i>Aotaka</i> (Commander Yashima), <i>Hato</i> , <i>Kari</i> , <i>Tsubame</i> .
20th Torpedo Boat Flotilla		Nos. 62 (Lieutenant-Commander Arakawa), 63, 64, and 65.

was distributed between several ports. At Vladivostok were the first class cruisers *Rossiya*, *Rurik*, *Gromoboi*, and *Bogatuir*, and seventeen torpedo boats; at Chemulpo were the first class protected cruiser *Varyag* and the gunboat *Koreetz*; at Newchuang was the gunboat *Sivuch*, and at Shanghai was the *Mandzhur*, also a gunboat. The strength of the detachment at Vladivostok was probably due to the congested state of the harbour at Port Arthur, where the

Fleet Auxiliaries' Squadron.

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|--------------|-----|---|
| 1st Division | ... | Gunboats <i>Oshima</i> and <i>Akagi</i> ; torpedo parent ship <i>Kasuga Maru</i> ; armed merchant cruisers <i>Taichu Maru</i> and <i>Tainan Maru</i> ; repair ship <i>Miike Maru</i> ; hospital ship <i>Kobe Maru</i> ; fleet auxiliaries <i>Yamaguchi Maru</i> , <i>Fukuoka Maru</i> , <i>Kinshu Maru</i> , <i>Jinsen Maru</i> , <i>Bushu Maru</i> , <i>Buyo Maru</i> , <i>Tenshin Maru</i> , and <i>Hokoku Maru</i> . |
| 2nd Division | ... | Torpedo parent ship <i>Nikko Maru</i> ; armed merchant cruisers <i>Hongkong Maru</i> and <i>Nippon Maru</i> ; repair ship <i>Koto Maru</i> ; fleet auxiliaries <i>Taro Maru</i> , <i>Hikosan Maru</i> . |

Note.—The torpedo parent ship *Kumano Maru* and the armed merchant cruiser *America Maru*, being in dockyard hands, did not join.

In addition, the following force, forming a third squadron, independent of the Combined Fleet, was placed under the command of Vice-Admiral Kataoka, with Rear-Admirals M. Togo and S. Hosoya under him :—

3rd Squadron.

- | | | |
|----------------------------|-----|--|
| 5th Division | ... | Second class battleship <i>Chinyen</i> ; second class cruisers <i>Itsukushima</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral Kataoka), <i>Hashidate</i> , <i>Matsushima</i> . |
| 6th Division | ... | Third class cruisers <i>Idzumi</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral M. Togo), <i>Suma</i> , <i>Akitsuushima</i> , <i>Chiyoda</i> . |
| 7th Division | ... | Third class battleship <i>Fuso</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral S. Hosoya); coast defence vessels <i>Kaimon</i> , <i>Saiyen</i> ; gunboats <i>Heiyen</i> , <i>Tsukushi</i> , <i>Banjo</i> , <i>Chokai</i> , <i>Atago</i> , <i>Maya</i> , <i>Uji</i> ; dispatch vessel <i>Miyako</i> . |
| 10th Torpedo Boat Flotilla | ... | Nos. 43 (Lieutenant-Commander Otaki), 42, 40, 41. |
| 11th Torpedo Boat Flotilla | ... | Nos. 73 (Lieutenant-Commander Takebe), 72, 74, 75. |
| 16th Torpedo Boat Flotilla | ... | <i>Shirataka</i> (Lieutenant-Commander Wakabayashi) 71, 39, 66. |
| Attached ships | ... | <i>Toyohashi</i> , <i>Ariake Maru</i> . |

main fleet* was under the command of Vice-Admiral Stark, whose flag was in the *Petropavlovsk*. The junior flag officer was Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomski, with his flag in the *Peresvyyet*; while the Vladivostok division was commanded by Rear-Admiral Baron Stakelberg. But above the naval commander-in-chief was the viceroy and commander-in-chief of all the land and sea forces in the Far East, the Viceroy Alexeiev, an officer high in the favour of the Tsar. This officer, to whom had been entrusted the carrying out of Russian policy in that part of the world, must in the main be held responsible for the condition of affairs at the outbreak of war, and, being himself a naval officer of long service, he should have been in a position to judge of the strategical needs of the moment. Unfortunately for Russia, he seems utterly to have underestimated the power of Japan and her capacity for taking the initiative, and to have so far blinded himself to the result of the policy he was pursuing that he did not consider war imminent even at the last moment. The orders which were given to the *Varyag* by Admiral Stark, that she was "on no account to leave Chemulpo without instructions, which will be transmitted by some means or other," show complete lack of comprehension of the crisis which had been reached.

In Japan, on the other hand, everything was ready for instant action. The situation was known to be critical, and it was realized that a false move might easily upset the most careful plans.

* The following table shows the composition of the Russian main fleet at Port Arthur on 5th February, 1904 :—

Battle Squadron ...	Battleships <i>Petropavlovsk</i> (flag of Vice-Admiral Stark, Commander-in-Chief), <i>Tsesarevich</i> , <i>Retvizan</i> , <i>Sevastopol</i> , <i>Peresvyyet</i> (flag of Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomski), <i>Pobyeda</i> , <i>Poltava</i> .
Cruiser Division ...	Armoured cruiser <i>Bayan</i> (Captain Viren); first class cruisers <i>Diana</i> , <i>Pallada</i> , <i>Askold</i> ; third class cruisers <i>Boyarin</i> , <i>Novik</i> .
Torpedo Gunboats	<i>Vsadnik</i> , <i>Gaidamak</i> .
Torpedo Boat Destroyers	<i>Bditelni</i> , <i>Bezposhadni</i> , <i>Bezskumni</i> , <i>Bezstrashni</i> , <i>Boevoi</i> , <i>Boiki</i> , <i>Burni</i> , <i>Grozovoi</i> , <i>Lieutenant Burakov</i> , <i>Rastoropni</i> , <i>Razyashchi</i> , <i>Ryeshitelni</i> , <i>Serditi</i> , <i>Silni</i> , <i>Skori</i> , <i>Smyeli</i> , <i>Statni</i> , <i>Steregushchi</i> , <i>Storozhevoi</i> , <i>Strashni</i> , <i>Stroini</i> , <i>Vlastni</i> , <i>Vnimatelni</i> , <i>Vnushitelni</i> , <i>Vuinoslivi</i> .
Armoured Gunboats	<i>Gremyashchi</i> , <i>Otvazhni</i> .
Gunboats and Sloops	<i>Gilyak</i> , <i>Dzhigit</i> , <i>Razboinik</i> , <i>Zabiyaka</i> , <i>Bobr</i> .
Mining Vessels ...	<i>Amur</i> , <i>Yenisei</i> .
Auxiliary Vessels ...	<i>Silach</i> , <i>Angara</i> , <i>Mongolia</i> , <i>Kazan</i> .

Politically it was desirable to forestall the Russians in Korea ; moreover, if this could be effected, not only would Admiral Stark find it difficult, if not impossible, to secure a port in the south from which to operate against Japan, but the harbours on its western coast would be available as bases for Admiral Togo's fleet. But there was still another great advantage to be gained by a timely occupation of the peninsula. From Wiju on the Ya-lu to Fusan on the Korean Straits its length is some four hundred miles, and by laying hands on the capital and pressing quickly towards the Ya-lu, the northern ports might be secured for disembarking troops, and a long and toilsome march to the Manchurian frontier avoided.

Rapidity of action was imperative, and, as mobilized troops could not be sent to occupy Seoul, four battalions from the 12th Division,* at peace strength, were chosen for that service. The order for their movement reached them at 6 p.m. on the 5th February, and by 2 a.m. on the 6th, the day on which negotiations were broken off at St. Petersburg, they were embarking at Sasebo. Three transports, the *Dairen Maru*, *Heiyo Maru*, and *Otaru Maru*, which were lying in readiness, were employed. Two took the troops, numbering in all about 2,500 men, while the third vessel carried a temporary wharf, some boats, steam launches and other gear necessary to effect a rapid landing.

Simultaneously with the instructions to the 12th Division, Admiral Togo was ordered to attack the Russian fleet. Simultaneously with the instructions to the 12th Division, Admiral Togo was ordered to leave port on the following day and to defeat the Russian fleet. At 1 a.m. on the 6th, the admirals and captains of the Combined Fleet assembled on board the *Mikasa* ; the Imperial message was read to them, and the remainder of the night was spent in discussing the war.

Admiral Togo's plans contemplated a torpedo attack on the Russian fleet which was believed still to be anchored in the roadstead outside Port Arthur. This attack was to be delivered by the whole of his destroyers on the night of the 8th, and if successful was to be followed up the next morning by the armoured ships. The 3rd Division was to cover the destroyers' attack and was to ascertain, if possible, the amount of damage inflicted on the enemy.

* Two battalions from Kokura, one battalion from Fukuoka, and one from Omura. These places are in the island of Kiusiu, in which the naval base Sasebo is situated. One battalion was selected for this service from each of the four regiments of the 12th Division, namely, the 14th, 24th, 46th and 47th Regiments. These four battalions were placed temporarily under the command of Major-General Kigoshi.

To Admiral Uriu and the 4th Division, with eight torpedo boats, was entrusted the work of escorting the three transports and of landing the troops at Chemulpo.

At 9 a.m. on the 6th, amidst a scene of great enthusiasm, the five divisions of destroyers got under weigh and left Sasebo, followed by the 3rd Division and the torpedo boats, with their parent ships. By 2 p.m. the 2nd, 1st, and 4th Divisions had also departed on their mission in the above order.

Before following the movements of Admiral Togo and the main fleet, it will be as well to describe the action of the 4th Division under Admiral Uriu and the landing of the leading Japanese troops in Korea. The original plan appears to have been to land the troops at Asan Bay, but it was left to the discretion of the naval commander to disembark them at Chemulpo, in accordance with the wishes of the military authorities, should he deem it feasible to do so. At 2 p.m. on the 6th February, he left Sasebo with the *Naniwa*, *Takachiho*, *Nitaka*, second class cruisers, and the *Asama*, first class cruiser, which had been placed under his command temporarily. Outside the harbour he was joined by the three transports carrying the troops, and at 4.30 p.m. the next day he was off Single Island, where he met the battle fleet and was joined by the *Akashi*, and the 9th and 14th Torpedo Boat Flotillas. Thus reinforced he proceeded off Baker Island, where, at 8 a.m. on the 8th, he met the *Chiyoda*, which had left Chemulpo at midnight and was able to give him the latest news from that port. This vessel, to which had been entrusted the difficult and delicate task of watching the trend of affairs at Chemulpo during the last few weeks, reported that the *Varyag* and *Koreetz* were still lying in the anchorage, together with the following warships of other nations :— *Talbot*, British ; *Pascal*, French ; *Elba*, Italian ; as well as the United States dispatch vessel *Vicksburg*, and the Korean gunboat *Yobu*, somewhat further up the river.

At 12.30 p.m., Asan Bay was reached, and it was then decided that the landing should take place at Chemulpo. At 2.15 p.m., the division and transports proceeded towards that place, and it was arranged that the *Chiyoda*, *Takachiho*, *Asama*, and the torpedo boats should enter with the transports, while the *Naniwa*, *Nitaka*, and *Akashi* were to take up a position outside. As the leading vessels approached the entrance to the river, the *Koreetz* was seen to be coming out. It was afterwards discovered that she was on her way to Port Arthur with mails and dispatches from the Russian Minister at Seoul. When off Yodolmi Island, the captain

of the *Koreetz* seeing that the Japanese meant to prevent him from leaving, decided to return to Chemulpo. The Russian commander although quite unprepared for hostilities, then sent his men to quarters, and the order was given to open fire. It was immediately countermanded, but through a misunderstanding two shots, the first of the war, were fired by a light gun.* The *Koreetz* then returned to her anchorage near the *Varyag*.

Meanwhile the *Chiyoda*, the *Takachiho*, the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, and the transports anchored off Chemulpo, while the remaining ships took up their positions outside as arranged. Two torpedo boats were told off to watch the *Varyag* and *Koreetz*. At 6.15 p.m., the troops began to disembark. By Troops landed at 3 a.m. on the 9th all were ashore, and fifteen Chemulpo. hundred men were at once sent by rail to Seoul.

The landing was effected in flat-bottomed sampans, which had been brought by the transports and each of which could carry about fifty men. At 6 a.m., all the Japanese cruisers, transports, and torpedo boats left to join the ships outside with the exception of the *Chiyoda*, which remained to deliver letters from Admiral Uriu to the various ships present. At 9.30 a.m., Captain Rudnev of the *Varyag* received a formal demand that he should leave the port before noon, and was informed that in case of refusal he would be attacked in harbour. In his letter, which was received two hours earlier, to the captains of the neutral warships, Admiral Uriu stated that hostilities had begun between the Empires of Russia and Japan, and that if the Russian vessels did not leave Chemulpo before noon they would be attacked at anchor. He also respectfully requested the neutral vessels to leave the scene of operations in order to avoid any danger to themselves, and added that the attack would not take place before 4 p.m. On receiving information from Captain Rudnev that he intended to put to sea, the British, French, and Italian captains decided to remain at anchor, though ready to move at a moment's notice. At the same time they dispatched a reply to Admiral Uriu, which was handed on board the *Naniwa* about two minutes before the first gun was fired, protesting against the prospective violation of Korean neutrality.

About 11 a.m., Admiral Uriu ordered his ships to take up their appointed stations and made preparations for sinking the *Varyag* and *Koreetz* at anchor, in the event of their deciding not to quit the harbour. Just at this moment the gunboat was observed steaming

* The commander of the *Koreetz* states that before the order to fire was given the Japanese had already discharged three torpedoes.

out to sea followed by the cruiser. The action of Captain Rudnev was gallant, but his task was hopeless. The Naval action at Chemulpo, 9th February, 1904. *Varyag's* nominal speed was twenty-three knots, but at a trial which took place towards the end of 1903 she developed fourteen knots only, and every man on board knew that she had no chance of escape. As for the *Koreetz*, her probable intention was to proceed a short distance and then to return and destroy herself at her anchorage.

At 11.30 a.m., the *Varyag*, which was now leading, was nearly midway between the Chemulpo anchorage and Yodolmi Island, and the Japanese were to the eastward of Philip Island (*see* Plan 1). The *Naniwa* and *Asama* at once slipped their cables and proceeded in a southerly direction. The *Chiyoda* was ordered to follow the *Asama* and to attack the enemy. The remaining Japanese vessels also got under weigh. The *Naniwa* and *Nitaka* followed the *Asama* and *Chiyoda*, while the *Takachiho* and *Akashi* steamed in a south-westerly direction; the 14th Torpedo Boat Flotilla was on the disengaged side of the *Naniwa*. The tide was ebbing at about one and threequarters to two knots, and the water was about twenty feet above low water springs.

At 11.45 a.m., the *Asama* opened fire with her 8-in. guns at a range of about 7,500 yards, and the *Varyag* immediately replied. The *Koreetz* also replied, but as her shell fell short she ceased to fire until the range decreased. The remaining Japanese vessels fired as opportunity offered. One of the first shell which struck the *Varyag* shattered her upper bridge, causing a fire in the chart house, and shot away the fore rigging; the junior navigator, who was taking the range, was killed and all the range-takers at No. 1 station were either killed or wounded. The Russians poured a heavy fire on the Japanese vessels, but their range was inaccurate, and not only did they miss every time, but most of their shell failed to burst on striking the water.* In contrast to this indifferent work the Japanese shell hit the *Varyag* frequently, while those which fell near her burst on striking the water, and the splinters shattered the superstructure and the boats. During this period of the engagement five 6-in., five 12-pr. and four 3-pr. guns on board the *Varyag* were put out of action; all the crew and the shell party of one of the 6-in. guns being either killed or wounded. No. 2 range-finding station was destroyed, and fires broke out on the quarter deck and on the protective deck; both fires, however, being quickly subdued. After

The *Varyag* in action.

* The Russians, however, claim to have made a number of hits.

the action had lasted about fifteen minutes the *Asama* altered her course to starboard, and, at 12.10 p.m., when she had turned sixteen points, the *Varyag* was seen to be in difficulties. Acting under orders from Admiral Uriu the *Asama* at once put on full speed and attacked closely, followed by the *Chiyoda*.

When the *Varyag* was passing Yodolmi Island the rods leading to the steering engine were shot through and all connexions were cut. The steering was transferred to the hand wheel, but the noise on deck was so great that the voice tube to the hand wheel was of little use, and the vessel was steered by the engines until the end of the action. At the same time Captain Rudnev, who was standing between the conning tower and its entrance screen, with a bugler and drummer on either side, was wounded in the cheek by the splinters of a shell which had burst near the foremast. The bugler and drummer were killed on the spot and, as a result of the same shot, two guns near the conning tower were disabled ; of the guns' crews four men were killed and one was wounded, while a helmsman and the captain's orderly were also injured. When the steering gear broke down the helm was over to port, and at 12.15 p.m. the captain of the *Varyag* decided to attempt to take shelter behind Yodolmi Island in order to repair the damage and to extinguish the fires which had broken out in various places. Owing to the strong tide the cruiser obeyed her helm badly, and it was necessary to go astern in order to avoid running ashore. The range now decreased rapidly, and as all the Japanese vessels, including the *Takachiho* and *Akashi*, joined in the attack the *Varyag* suffered more severely than ever. About this time a large calibre shell* struck her on the port side below the waterline, causing an enormous breach. The water rushed through the open doors of an empty coal bunker into a stokehold, which began rapidly to fill, causing her to take a heavy list to port. Collision mats were placed and the pumps were got to work, but although the level of the water was reduced the vessel continued to list. A fire next broke out in the provision room, and was got under with great difficulty. Immediately afterwards the hammock nettings on the upper deck were shot through, and some splinters finding their way to the sick bay set fire to the hammocks.

The *Varyag* now made for Chemulpo anchorage, firing as she went with her two after 6-in. guns, which were still serviceable. The *Asama* followed her for a short distance past Yodolmi Island, but ceased firing and turned back at 12.40 p.m. on account of the danger to the neutral ships. The *Varyag* also ceased firing about the same

* Probably 8-in. from the *Asama*.

time owing to the increase of range, and steamed in to the anchorage with a heavy list to port and on fire aft.

The part played by the *Koreetz* in this action may be described very briefly. After being passed by the *Varyag* she proceeded on the port quarter of that vessel for a distance of about one and a-half cables. When the *Varyag* altered course to starboard the captain of the *Koreetz* turned to port and made a circle of 270 degrees, in order, as he says, "to avoid aligning himself with the *Varyag* and the Japanese ships," and then steamed back to Chemulpo. She fired her guns when the range was not too great, but with no effect; she was not struck nor had she any casualties.

About 1 p.m., both the Russian ships anchored at Chemulpo, and all the neutrals at once sent their doctors to succour the wounded.

The Russian vessels destroyed. The Russian officers now decided that their vessels should be destroyed, but before carrying this decision into effect the crews were transhipped to the *Talbot*, *Pascal*, and *Elba*; the *Vicksburg* refusing to receive any of the men. By 4 p.m., all hands were disembarked with their effects. In the case of the *Varyag* the Kingston valves were opened, and she went slowly down, heeling over to port until her masts were horizontal, her after-part burning furiously.* The *Koreetz* was blown

* The amount of ammunition expended by the Japanese is unknown. The range had varied from 7,500 to 5,000 yards, and no opportunity had arisen for action by torpedo boats. The Japanese state that none of their vessels were hit, but the Russian accounts give a very different report. In this action, as in all those that followed, little reliance can be placed on statements made by the Russians of injuries to Japanese vessels or *vice versa*.

The *Varyag* fired 425 6-in., 470 12-pr., and 210 3-pr. shell, making a total of 1,105 rounds, whilst the *Koreetz* fired 49 rounds from her 8-in. and 6-in. guns. The Japanese used common shell with bursting charges of Shimose powder; the Russians chiefly used high-explosive shell, which, unlike that of the Japanese, failed to explode.

The *Varyag* sustained the following injuries during the action :—

- (a) Ten 6-in. guns seriously damaged.
- (b) All 12-pr. guns damaged in running out cylinders, compressors, and other parts.
- (c) All 3-pr. guns disabled.
- (d) Upper ring of the third funnel broken.
- (e) All ventilators and boats riddled.
- (f) The upper deck pierced in many places and burnt.
- (g) The captain's quarters destroyed.
- (h) The fore-top damaged.
- (i) Four more holes below the waterline and many slighter injuries.

Thus, with the exception of two 6-in., all the *Varyag's* guns were disabled. The casualties among the personnel were heavy. One officer, a sub-lieutenant, and thirty men were killed; six officers, including the captain and eighty-five men were seriously injured, and upwards of a hundred of all ranks were slightly wounded.

up, and the Russian steamship *Sungari*, which had arrived on the previous day, was also set on fire and went to the bottom.

Of the Russian seamen, twenty-four of the more seriously wounded were taken to Chemulpo hospital for treatment, and the rest were taken to Hongkong and Saigon for internment. Two of the men landed at Chemulpo died shortly afterwards, and the remaining twenty-two were eventually allowed to return to Russia after swearing not to take any further part in the war. The officers and men sent to Hongkong and Saigon were also permitted to return home on the same conditions.

At the close of the engagement, which lasted rather less than an hour, the Japanese vessels returned to Philip Island. During the night of the 9th they guarded the approach to Chemulpo, and at 7.30 a.m. Admiral Uriu weighed anchor with his whole squadron and proceeded to Asan Bay, where he anchored at 10 a.m. on the 10th.


While Admiral Uriu had been engaged at Chemulpo events of greater moment had occurred elsewhere. By 6 p.m. on the 8th February, the main fleet under Admiral Togo was off Round Island, about sixty miles east of Port Arthur, and at 7 p.m. the destroyers were dispatched to make their attack. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Flotillas of torpedo boat destroyers had orders to proceed to Port Arthur, and the 4th and 5th Flotillas were to make a simultaneous attack on any vessels which might be lying outside Dalny. Why the Japanese should have supposed that any portion of the Russian fleet would be found at the latter port is not known, but whatever hopes they may have had were doomed to disappointment, for the only vessel they found there was the British merchant steamer *Foo Chow*, which was anchored in the middle of the bay. This vessel had a somewhat narrow escape from being torpedoed. She had been chartered by the Japanese consul at Chefoo to remove the Japanese subjects from Port Arthur and Dalny, and had already embarked them, but the captain had refused to sail until the following morning owing to the difficulty of navigation at night. At first the Japanese officers on the destroyers took her for a mine-laying vessel, for she was in an unusual position for a peaceful trader, but fortunately she was given the benefit of the doubt and was left unmolested. Being disappointed in their search for a more formidable enemy the 4th and 5th Flotillas eventually returned to Round Island.

The first attack
on Port Arthur.

Before dealing with the torpedo attack by the remaining flotillas

TORPEDO ATTACK ON RUSSIAN FLEET AT ANCHOR, ON THE NIGHT OF Feb'y. 8th-9th 1904.

(Position of Russian ships approximate.)



REFERENCE
 Battleships thus 
 Cruisers " 

Scale
 Yards 500 0 500 1000 1500 2000 Yards
 or 1 Sea Mile

Track of 2nd Attack
 Track of 1st Attack

on the ships outside Port Arthur, it will perhaps be as well briefly to describe the position of affairs at that place.

There is no reason to doubt that the Russian authorities at Port Arthur were aware that the Japanese minister at St. Petersburg had been recalled, although the significant wording of his note may possibly have been unknown to them. Yet no special precautions were taken, and only those general preparations which had been in progress for several days continued. Vice-Admiral Stark's request for permission to place his fleet in a state of preparedness for war was met with the reply from the Viceroy, "This is premature." He had, however, for two or three nights previously made the signal to "Prepare to repel torpedo attacks," but this order seems to have been looked upon by his subordinates as a mere peace exercise. Those ships which made an attempt to carry out the order (and it is reported that at least one ship took no notice whatever) did not get their torpedo nets out, no heavy guns were loaded, and in some cases the crews slept in their hammocks instead of at their guns. Moreover, some of the Russian ships were employed in coaling; but a story, which at the time was generally accepted in Europe, that many of the officers were attending an evening party on shore, was unjust and without foundation. All the battleships and cruisers were in the outer anchorage, but the destroyers, with the exception of the *Rastoropni* and *Bezstrashni*, were lying inside the harbour.

For some days previously a roster of vessels for searchlight duty had been instituted, two ships being told off each night; two destroyers had also been detailed nightly to patrol to seaward. A copy of the secret orders issued for these vessels fell into the hands of a Russian journalist, by whom they have been published. In the case of the searchlight ships, the orders were that vessels approaching the anchorage should be shown up by the light, and that an officer should be sent to board them, but nothing was laid down as to firing on them. The orders to the destroyers were of a similar character. They were to search the sea for a distance of twenty miles, cruising in company, and to return and report to the flagship should anything suspicious be observed. They were to show lights and not to prepare for action without special orders. On the night of the 8th the *Rastoropni* and *Bezstrashni* were carrying out this duty.

Such was the condition of affairs when the ten boats comprising the Japanese 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas left Round Island and steered for Port Arthur in single line. At 10.50 p.m., lights were


sighted on the port bow, and were soon made out to belong to two Russian destroyers. These were the *Rastoropni* and *Bezstrashni*, which, in accordance with their orders, refrained from opening fire and returned to Port Arthur, where they were actually engaged in making their report at the time when the attack took place. However, their mere presence had some effect on the Japanese attack, for the leading destroyer turned to starboard to avoid them, and the rear boats, some of whom stopped to escape notice, became separated from the leaders. Thus, instead of being a combined effort by ten destroyers, the operation resolved itself into a series of attacks by groups.

The foremost group consisted of the 1st Flotilla, which was led by Captain Asai in the *Shirakumo*. This officer, guided by the searchlights of the *Pallada*, which was "duty ship," approached on a northerly course. Shortly after midnight, when nearing the Russian line, he turned to port followed by his flotilla and, running along the line of ships at anchor, each boat in succession discharged her torpedoes and turned away at full speed. This group was followed almost immediately by three more destroyers, each of which turned to starboard on approaching the Russian line, fired two torpedoes, and rapidly disappeared in the darkness. Finally, about an hour later, the two last destroyers each made a separate attack.

The Russian accounts show that although the leading vessels had been seen from the *Pallada* some minutes previously, they were not fired upon until after their torpedoes had been discharged; for it was not realized that they were hostile ships. All the destroyers escaped without damage or loss of life; eighteen torpedoes were fired, of which three only took effect. The *Pallada* was the first ship to be struck. She was hit on the port side by a torpedo, which exploded amidships abreast of a coal bunker, making a large hole and setting the coal on fire. The *Retvizan* and the *Tzesarevich* suffered the same fate a few moments later. The former was struck on the port side forward; a hole, said to measure two hundred and twenty square feet, being made. The latter was torpedoed aft on the same side, abreast of the magazine compartment; the force of the explosion shattered the bulkhead and armoured deck and flooded the steering compartment. All three vessels remained afloat, and got under weigh as quickly as possible in order to reach shallow water. The *Pallada* grounded close to the lighthouse on the west side of the entrance; the *Retvizan* and the *Tzesarevich* attempted to enter the harbour but both grounded

FLEET ACTION AT PORT ARTHUR, on 9th Feb^y 1904.

Scale
Yards 3000 1000 0 2000 4000 Yards
for 2 Sea Miles



in the gullet and there remained, leaving only a narrow passage on either side. By 2 a.m., all the hostile destroyers had drawn off and firing had ceased. The *Novik* was then sent out, but failing to find the enemy, she returned at 5 a.m.

At 8 a.m., the Japanese 3rd Division was seen from Port Arthur, where the utmost confusion prevailed after the events of the night. The forts had been hastily manned, but in some cases ammunition was not provided until later, and in others the guns could not be made ready, for they had been coated with grease for the winter. The 3rd Division, in accordance with the original orders, was to ascertain the state of the Russian fleet after the night attack. Rear-Admiral Dewa, who was in command, took his vessels near enough to ascertain that three ships had very heavy lists, and, although he was within range, he was not fired upon. He then retired, and reported to the commander-in-chief that the enemy was still outside, and in a position which invited attack. Thereupon Admiral Togo, with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions, each in single line, steamed

The battleship
attack.

towards Port Arthur from a south-easterly direction. The approaching fleet was discovered by the *Boyarin*, which had been sent out to reconnoitre after the retirement of the Japanese 3rd Division, and returned about 10.30 a.m. flying the signal "The enemy in sight in force." It so happened that Admiral Stark had been summoned by the Viceroy to attend a council, and when the Japanese fleet appeared on the horizon he was not present to give the necessary orders. However, his flag captain made the signal to prepare to weigh, and just as fire was opened from the Japanese fleet the admiral returned on board.

By noon Admiral Togo, who was leading the 1st Division on a westerly course, had closed the Russian fleet to a distance of about nine thousand yards. Each ship in turn, as she arrived within range, opened a deliberate fire on the vessels outside Port Arthur, and was answered by the Russians from their ships and shore batteries. The latter, although slow to begin, appear to have had the greater effect. The Russian ships were now getting under weigh, but, in accordance with orders received from the Viceroy, they did not attempt to leave the protection afforded them by the shore batteries. One exception must, however, be made. The *Novik*, unarmoured as she was, gallantly closed the Japanese armoured cruisers to a range of about three thousand yards, whence she fired a torpedo which passed close to one of the enemy. When the 1st Division had steamed past the front of Port Arthur, at ranges from nine to seven thousand yards, and had closed Lao-tieh Shan, they turned eight points to

port in succession, and ceased fire as the distance became too great. The 1st Division was followed by the 2nd, and that in turn by the 3rd. But the fire from the shore batteries gradually became more accurate, and Admiral Togo, realizing that he could not inflict any serious damage on his opponents so long as they remained under the protection of the fortress, withdrew his rearmost division, which was being unnecessarily exposed. The whole action lasted only about forty minutes and was over at 1 p.m.

The Japanese lost about ninety men killed and wounded, and the Russian loss in the two attacks amounted to one hundred and fifty. The damage to the ships was not great. On the Russian side the *Novik*, *Askold*, *Diana*, and *Bayan* suffered most from shell fire, the first named requiring some ten days to repair before being ready for sea. None of the Japanese vessels were seriously injured, although several had been struck by heavy shells.

The comparatively insignificant losses are, however, no real indication of the results which had been achieved since the Japanese destroyers had left Round Island. In the eighteen hours which had passed Japan had vindicated her claim to be considered a first class naval power, and her success had done much towards securing

that sea command upon which the result of the war was largely dependent. The strength of the Russian fleet, from which so much had been expected, was broken, and henceforth it was compelled to act entirely upon the defensive. But the moral effect of Japan's assumption of the offensive was even greater than the material results which were achieved, and in no way was it more clearly demonstrated than by the plain fact that the Russian ships elected to await attack under the guns of Port Arthur. Correct as this attitude undoubtedly was, it proved to the world at large that Russia acknowledged the superiority of her enemy's fleet. At the same time it must have exercised a most demoralizing influence upon the personnel of her own navy, while the confidence of every officer and man in the Japanese fleet, indeed in the Japanese nation, was proportionately raised. Such, briefly put, were the results of the first important naval action, on the conclusion of which the Japanese battleships returned to the coast of Korea, whither they had already been preceded by the destroyers. At 2 p.m. on the 10th February, Admiral Togo arrived at Asan, where he received news of Admiral Uriu's successful action of Chemulpo, and was joined by the destroyers, which had reached Sunito from Round Island on the previous afternoon.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SECOND ATTACK UPON PORT ARTHUR AND FIRST ATTEMPT TO
BLOCK THE HARBOUR.

(Charts 3 and 4.)

ALTHOUGH the battle of the 9th February had done but little credit to the Russian navy, the promptitude which was displayed in repairing the damage was highly commendable.

Preparations
made for repair-
ing Russian ships.

The *Novik* was docked immediately after the action, and at 2 p.m. the *Pallada* was floated and taken into harbour. The *Tzesarevich* was aground

aft, but when all movable heavy weights had been shifted forward, she, too, was floated and was taken inside. The *Retvizan*, however, defied all efforts to tow her off, and had to be left in the gullet, where she partially blocked the entrance. Meanwhile the *Yenisei*,

Russian mines
laid in Ta-lien
Bay.

convoys by the *Boyarin*, was dispatched to lay mines at the entrance to Ta-lien Bay. During the same afternoon the Russians experienced the first stroke of good fortune which had befallen them

since the declaration of war, for soon after the Japanese fleet had retired the *Silach*, which had been detached to Thornton Haven to remove a small quantity of coal, was lucky enough to make the return passage without being sighted by the enemy.

It was decided that the squadron should remain outside the harbour until the morning of the 10th, and that all the available cruisers and destroyers should be employed in scouting and patrolling to seaward. The night passed without incident, and on the following morning the *Boyarin* returned from Ta-lien Bay; but a northerly gale delayed the work of getting the fleet into harbour, and a portion remained outside for yet another night, during which the destroyer *Boevoi* was damaged by a collision with the *Silni*. However, she managed to regain the harbour and was eventually repaired. There was also an alarm when three vessels were seen to be approaching the harbour, and were fired upon before it was discovered that

they were peaceful traders whose masters were unaware that war had broken out. On the 11th the remainder of the ships were at last taken into harbour, with the exception of the *Boyarin* and four destroyers, which were sent off to Ta-lien Bay where the *Yenisei* had met with disaster. On that morning, when a section of the defence had been completed, one of the mines was seen to be floating. The captain tried to destroy it by firing upon it, but while doing so the ship struck one of the other mines which had just been laid, and suffered such damage that she sank in less than twenty minutes. Four officers and eighty-nine men were lost, including Commander Stepanov, who is said voluntarily to have perished with his ship.

When the news reached Port Arthur, it was at first thought that the *Yenisei* had been sunk by Japanese destroyers, and the *Boyarin*, with four destroyers, was ordered to attack them. Before sailing, Captain Saruichev, the commander of the *Boyarin*, had some conversation with Rear-Admiral Molas, from which it appears that there was some uncertainty as to the position of the mine-field which had been laid. The admiral thought that it was probably in one place; Captain Saruichev thought it was in another. He was therefore ordered to keep well out to sea so as to run no risk.

Leaving Port Arthur with the four destroyers, the *Boyarin* proceeded along the shore to Cap Island and then shaped course for the southern island of the San-shan-tao group; there she turned to starboard with the intention of anchoring, but at that moment struck a mine. All boats were immediately lowered, the ship was abandoned, and the crew was transhipped to the destroyers, which had approached directly the explosion had occurred. The *Boyarin* settled down, but as she did not sink, her captain, who was then on board the *Rastoropni*, signalled to the *Storozhevoi* to torpedo her. The captain of the *Storozhevoi* appears to have considered this order somewhat extraordinary, as he twice questioned it, but being at last convinced that it was seriously intended, he attempted to fire a torpedo at a very long range. This torpedo did not leave the tube, while a second one failed to hit the *Boyarin*. Then, seeing that the remaining destroyers were already steaming back to Port Arthur, and concluding that it was not the fate of the *Boyarin* to sink, the *Storozhevoi* followed their example and returned to Port Arthur. On the morrow Captain Matusevich was sent with several destroyers to ascertain what had become of the *Boyarin*. As she was still afloat in Ta-lien Bay, where she had drifted to the north side of the mine-field,

Loss of the
Yenisei.

Loss of the
Boyarin.

Captain Matusevich brought her to anchor, removed the ward room silver and various other trifles, and returned to Port Arthur. A violent snowstorm got up during the night and the *Boyarin* went down for good. Captain Saruichev was brought before a court-martial a few days later for irregular conduct, and was deprived of command for a year.

The gale which had completed the destruction of the *Boyarin* also interfered with the plans of Admiral Togo. Not content with the results which had been achieved on the 9th, he issued orders for another attack on the Russian fleet, or such portion of it as might still be outside Port Arthur. The attack was to be delivered on the night of the 12th February by the 4th and 5th Flotillas of torpedo boat destroyers. They were to be escorted as far as Round Island by the 3rd Division, which was then to shape a course for Shan-tung Promontory, and, throwing out a line of search, endeavour to capture any hostile vessels it might encounter. The 2nd Division was to make a reconnaissance of Port Arthur on the morning of the 13th and afterwards to throw out a line of search and sweep across the Yellow Sea. Meanwhile the 1st Division, with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Flotillas of torpedo boat destroyers moved up the coast to assist in establishing a new base and to complete with coal.

The weather, which was bitterly cold, with north-westerly gales, heavy snow, and a high sea, rendered these plans impracticable, and the officers in charge considered it necessary to postpone the operations. However, Commander Nagai of the 4th Flotilla, who had become separated from Admiral Dewa, deemed it possible to make the attempt; and on the 13th, with only three destroyers (*Hayatori*, *Asagiri*, and *Harusame*), he set out for Port Arthur. Undaunted by the gale, the blinding snow, and a heavy sea he pushed on. The *Asagiri* and *Harusame* lost touch with him, and with one another. Eventually the latter put back, but the *Asagiri* held on until she reached Port Arthur. Avoiding the Russian destroyers, three of which she saw patrolling, she approached to within about one thousand yards of the entrance and, at half past 5 a.m. on the 14th, fired a torpedo at a ship she saw lying to the north, probably the *Retvizan*. She then made off at full speed, and again meeting the Russian destroyers fired on them; she was under fire for some minutes, but was not hit. The *Hayatori* reached Port Arthur about 5 a.m. on the 14th. She also fired her torpedo at the ship in the entrance and escaped. Neither torpedo took effect; but, curiously enough, the Japanese were


under the impression that they had sunk the *Boyarin* which ship was then lying at the bottom of Ta-lien Bay. Nevertheless, valuable information had been obtained, and it was now known that the Russian fleet was inside, and that a good look-out was being kept by the forts and the patrolling destroyers.


By the 16th, Admiral Togo's force was concentrated at his temporary base on the south-west coast of Korea, with the exception of the 4th Division, which, with the 9th and 14th Torpedo Boat Flotillas, was guarding the approaches to Chemulpo and protecting the landing of the 12th Division at that port. It had already been decided to push on the landing of troops in Korea, and the first transports were now at sea on their way to Chemulpo. This was a bold step considering that the Russian destroyers at Port Arthur were still intact and that the port was not being watched, but the Japanese had accurately gauged the lack of initiative of their foe, and were perfectly ready to take the risk of any interference. At the same time Admiral Togo prepared for his next move. The step which he was contemplating was an attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur, and thus to prevent the hostile fleet from leaving the sanctuary in which it had sought refuge; but before going any further it will be as well to follow for a moment the movements of the Vladivostok section of the Russian fleet.

On the morning of the 9th February the Russians at Vladivostok heard the news of the attack which had been made on Port Arthur during the previous night. It was then decided to send out the cruiser squadron, which consisted of the *Rossiya*, *Gromoboi*, *Rurik*, and *Bogatuir*, to make a demonstration off the Tsugaru Straits, in order to draw off a portion of the Japanese fleet from the south. The cruisers were also to reconnoitre Gensan, where it was thought that the Japanese were landing troops. They got under weigh at noon, and, with the aid of ice-breakers, made their way out of the bay. Approaching the shores of Japan at 10 a.m. on the morning of the 11th two small coasting steamers were sighted. The Russians state that they first fired blank, and that they had recourse to live shell only when the vessels declined to stop. One of them, the *Nagonoura Maru*, was sunk, while the other, the *Zensho Maru*, was damaged, but effected her escape and took refuge in Fukushima. The Russian cruisers then left for the coast of Korea, but, experiencing heavy gales and extreme cold, they returned to Vladivostok, where they arrived on the afternoon of the 14th.

Meanwhile the land and sea defences of Port Arthur were being

Plate 4.





1st BLOCKING EXPEDITION,
24th Feb^y 1904.

Scale
Yards 1000 500 0 1000 2000 Yards
or 1 Sea Mile

strengthened. On the 12th February, the mining operations which had begun so disastrously were put in charge of Rear-Admiral Loshchinski, who had arrived on the 10th, and the *Amur*, *Gilyak*, *Vsadnik*, *Gaidamak*, and two destroyers were placed under his orders. On the same day the fortress was declared to be in a state of siege, and every man capable of bearing arms was enrolled in the militia. Four days later General Stessel was appointed to the command of the 3rd Siberian Corps on the Ya-lu, but he delayed his departure and was shortly afterwards made commandant of the fortified zone from Chin-chou to Port Arthur. General Smirnov who was at this time in the north was appointed commandant of the fortress, but did not arrive until the 17th March. From the middle of February work on the land defences went on night and day, while Admiral Loshchinski was fully employed in perfecting the mine-field which had been laid by the *Yenisei*. Many of the mines were found to be moored at unsuitable depths, but, in view of the danger entailed, he decided not to attempt to re-adjust them. His first step was to supplement the mines already laid off Dalny by others laid in the roadstead, leaving a ship channel. Then, in accordance with the orders of the Viceroy, he proceeded to mine Deep and Kerr Bays, which lie further to the eastward. No less than eight hundred mines were laid in this area, doubtless with a view to preventing a landing, but as they were not protected by gun fire in any way, it was only a matter of time for the Japanese to clear them. To the westward of the peninsula, mines were laid in Eight Ships Bay and even as far north as New-chuang, but no attempt was made to lay mines in the immediate vicinity of Port Arthur, probably because no controlled mines were yet available.

At the same time, the repairs to the injured vessels were proceeding slowly. The *Pallada* was docked on the 22nd, when the *Novik* came out, and work was continually in progress on both the *Tzarevich* and the *Retvizan*, which were being repaired by means of cofferdams. Although the latter was still aground in the gullet she was of great service to the defence, for her position enabled her to use her guns on vessels which approached the entrance.

Such was the state of affairs when Admiral Togo made his first attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur. This operation was to be preceded by a destroyer attack on any guardships outside, and was to be succeeded by a long range bombardment of the dockyard and the ships in harbour. Five merchant vessels, the *Tenshin Maru* (2,942 tons), *Hokoku Maru* (2,766 tons), *Jinsen*


Maru (2,331 tons), *Buyo Maru* (1,163 tons) and the *Bushu Maru* (1,249 tons) were prepared as blockships. They were loaded with coal dust as there was no time to provide more suitable material, and were fitted with explosive charges which could be fired at the moment of leaving and were calculated to sink the ships almost instantaneously in the positions assigned to them. Volunteers were called for, and a very large number of officers and men immediately responded, ready to sacrifice themselves for their country, as it was generally thought that they were going to almost certain death. Seventy-seven were chosen, and the commands were allotted as follows; *Tenshin Maru*, Commander Arima; *Hokoku Maru*, Lieutenant-Commander Hirose; *Jinsen Maru*, Lieutenant Saito; *Buyo Maru*, Lieutenant Masaki; *Bushu Maru*, Lieutenant Torisaki.

The five vessels left the temporary base at 8.30 a.m. on the 20th, escorted by the 3rd Squadron and followed later in the day by the 1st and 2nd Squadrons. The next day they arrived at Sunito, where they were obliged to remain on account of bad weather. On the 22nd, the storm had abated and the operations began. Led by the 5th Destroyer Flotilla the blockships steered for a rendezvous south of Round Island, followed by the remainder of the fleet. The 5th Destroyer Flotilla had orders to reconnoitre the mouth of the harbour and to attack any vessels which might be found there. The blockships were then to go forward, and to the 9th Flotilla of torpedo boats was assigned the special duty of saving the crews. The 3rd Division was to support the blockships and the covering and rescuing flotillas from a distance, while the 1st and 2nd Divisions reconnoitred in the direction of Pigeon Bay and Ta-lien-wan respectively.



At 5 p.m. on the 23rd, the whole force was off Round Island and a formal farewell was taken of the gallant seventy-seven. The 5th Flotilla led the way and, at 1.50 a.m., when the moon had set, approached the harbour mouth and fired torpedoes at a ship which appears to have been taken for the *Amur*.*

At 4.15 a.m., the blockships moved forward, led by the *Tenshin Maru*, at a speed of eight knots. The design appears to have been that they should creep along under the shore of the Liao-tieh Shan Peninsula and, when discovered, make a dash for the harbour

* The *Amur* was not present and it is probable that the ship aimed at was the *Retvizan*, as the Russians report an attack on her. The torpedoes did not take effect.



BOMBARDMENTS OF PORT ARTHUR, Feb'y, March and April 1904.



3rd Division,
March 22nd & April 15th

entrance. Soon after rounding the eastern point they came under the beam of the searchlights on the southern end of the Tiger Peninsula, and a heavy fire was opened on them by the western batteries. Blinded by the searchlights and gunfire, Commander Arima lost his position and the *Tenshin Maru* ran on the rocks at Kai-yang-chou. The *Hokoku Maru* came next. Her captain, observing the fate of the *Tenshin Maru*, put his helm to port and passed on towards the harbour entrance; but as he approached his goal under a withering fire, in which the eastern forts and the *Retvizan* had now joined, his ship was repeatedly struck and at last took fire. Finally her helm was disabled, and, becoming unmanageable, she grounded on the western side of the entrance close to the lighthouse, in the position shown on the accompanying plate. The *Jinsen Maru* followed, and was steering for the entrance when she struck what appeared to be a sunken vessel and became immovable. There she was blown up and sank. The *Buyo Maru* was sunk near the *Tenshin Maru* by her captain, who seems to have mistaken the position of that vessel; and the *Bushu Maru*, whose captain apparently mistook the depression in the hills at the south end of Tiger Peninsula for the true entrance, and whose helm was disabled by shell fire, grounded in the position shown and was then blown up and sunk.

The 14th Flotilla of torpedo boats was engaged until dawn under a hostile fire, in picking up the crews of the *Tenshin Maru*, *Hokoku Maru*, and *Buyo Maru*, all of whom escaped although a strong north-east wind was blowing. The crews of the other two ships were not picked up by the torpedo boats, and for some time it was feared that they were lost, but it was eventually found that they had made their way out to sea and, with the exception of one stoker who was killed by a shell, had all reached Chefoo.

Thus ended the first attempt to block Port Arthur. Well conceived and gallantly executed, the Russian accounts admit that it was very nearly successful, although it ended in a failure for which the difficulties of navigation under the glare of searchlights and heavy gun-fire were largely responsible.

On the morning of the 24th, the 3rd Division approached Port Arthur and exchanged shots with the *Novik*, which was returning from Pigeon Bay with some destroyers. The *Bayan* also joined in the firing, but the range was too great and none of the ships were hit. The Japanese were not yet aware that the passage into the harbour was still open, and seem to have been under the

impression that the cruisers would not be able to get back. But whatever the reason, another torpedo attack was delivered that night by the 4th Destroyer Flotilla. The cruisers, which had only come out that morning were again safely inside and only the *Retvizan* was found in her old place. Torpedoes were discharged at her without effect, and the Japanese destroyers returned without having received or inflicted any injury.

On the morning of the 25th, Admiral Togo decided to bombard the harbour with the 1st and 2nd Divisions. Since this attack was delivered at low water, when the Russian battleships could not come out, it is probable that his intention was to destroy any cruisers which might be outside, and at the same time to throw shell into the harbour and dockyard and to disorganize the work of repairing the damaged ships. With this object he approached Port Arthur from the eastward at 10 a.m. and found the *Askold*, *Novik*, and *Bayan* lying outside the harbour, under the protection of the western forts. At 11.30 a.m., after manœuvring to get into the desired formation, fire was opened on the cruisers at a range of about nine thousand yards, and soon afterwards the indirect bombardment of the harbour began. Directly the Japanese opened fire the forts and cruisers replied, but, as the range varied from eight to fifteen thousand yards most of the shots from the latter fell short and little damage was done. After about an hour the Japanese drew off with all their ships uninjured, although towards the end of the action the projectiles from the forts were falling close to them. Their fire had been very accurate. The *Askold* had two guns disabled by a 12-inch shell, the *Bayan* had a funnel shot through, and the *Novik* sustained slight damage. The casualties in the Russian ships were twenty-two killed and forty-one wounded; the losses on shore were twenty-one killed and wounded.

Meanwhile the 3rd Division, which had been sent to the south of Lao-tieh Shan, had met with some success. During the previous night two Russian destroyers had been sent to Pigeon Bay, as it was thought the Japanese would attempt a landing there, and it was to aid these vessels that the three cruisers had been sent out. The Japanese 3rd Division observed the destroyers coming round Lao-tieh Shan and endeavoured to cut them off, while the Russian cruisers, owing to the presence of the Japanese fleet, were unable to render assistance. One destroyer, the *Bezstrashni*, made

a dash and reached safety, but the other, the *Vnushitelni*, turned back hoping to hide in Pigeon Bay. In this attempt she was disappointed for she was chased by the Japanese cruisers and driven ashore, where she was destroyed by shell fire, but the crew managed to escape to land.

This phase of the operations now came to an end, and the Japanese returned to Sunito and later to their base in Korea without having achieved their object. From a naval point of view the Japanese position was not a simple one. It is true that they had forced the Russian fleet to seek shelter inside Port Arthur with their two most powerful ships severely damaged and that the passage of troops to Korea had been rendered practicable, but repairs were proceeding and Port Arthur was still unblocked. Until the fortress could be invested by a military force there was no means of dealing a decisive blow at the Russian fleet, while it was free to reappear when sufficiently repaired. The dockyard resources of Port Arthur were limited, but communication by land was still open, and Russia was sending out her most skilled artisans to make the utmost of what facilities there were. The strength of the sea defences of Port Arthur had been shown to be sufficient to render any close bombardment most hazardous to Japan's armoured ships, which could not be replaced ; and the enemy was known to be making considerable use of submarine mines in the vicinity. In the distance loomed the ships in Europe and the problem, from Japan's point of view, had already resolved itself into the question whether the fortress could be taken and the fleet destroyed before these reinforcements arrived.

Naval position
of Japan.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE LANDING OF THE JAPANESE FIRST ARMY IN KOREA, AND THE
CONCENTRATION ON THE YA-LU.

ALTHOUGH Admiral Togo had not met with complete success in his efforts to block the exit from Port Arthur, he had done enough to render the transport of troops to Korea comparatively safe. For the present this was all that was asked of him, and no time was lost in dispatching troops to follow up the advantage which had been gained. The order to Admiral Togo to defeat the Russian fleet was issued on the 5th February. At 2 p.m. on the 6th, orders to mobilize were issued to the Guard, 2nd, and 12th


Mobilization of
the Japanese
First Army.

Divisions, and to the fortresses of Tsushima and Hakodate; other forts being merely warned to be in readiness against attack. Apparently two alternative plans of campaign had been prepared, the choice between them being dependent upon the degree of success which the fleet might achieve during the first few hours of the war. If, as actually occurred, the Japanese fleet should establish its superiority from the outset, troops were to be sent at once to Asan Bay and to seize Chemulpo. If, however, the voyage should be considered too risky, the 12th Division was to land at Fusan, and thence to push forward to the Korean capital, distant about eighteen days' march. Along this road posts with food and other necessaries for the troops had been prepared, but the opening of the campaign had proved even more favourable to the Japanese than they had dared to anticipate. Chemulpo had been occupied almost without

Chemulpo
selected as land-
ing place for
First Army.


opposition, and it was now definitely decided to abandon any idea of marching on Seoul from the south. Chemulpo was to be utilized as a landing place, at least until the melting of the ice should open up some harbour further north, and the transports were ordered to equip at Ujina on the Inland Sea and thence to repair to Nagasaki. By the 14th February, the

Plate 6.



NORTHERN KOREA
*The advance of the 1st Japanese Army
 to the River Ya-lu*

Plate 6.



Scale
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Miles

Ordnance Survey Office, Southampton, 1910.

12th Division had finished mobilizing and was brought by rail to Nagasaki, where it embarked in six groups. The leading group sailed at noon on the 15th, and, on the morning of the 17th, landed at Chemulpo; and by midnight on the 22nd the whole division, as well as the 16th and 28th Regiments of the 2nd Division, and the 37th and 38th Regiments of the 4th Division, had disembarked at that port. Thence they went to Seoul, while Fusan, Masampo and Gensan were all garrisoned by Japanese troops.*

So far the Japanese land operations had been no less successful than those at sea, and it was now decided to make every preparation for seizing a fresh base further north. As a preliminary step a company of infantry had been sent by sea to Haiju very soon after the first troops had landed at Chemulpo. From this company a party of twenty men with a commissariat officer was at once dispatched to Pingyang, where it arrived on the 27th February, and on the following day drove off a small body of Cossacks who attempted to enter from the north. Pingyang, the most important town in northern Korea, lies one hundred and fifty miles, or twelve days' march, north of Seoul. Since throughout the whole of this distance there were no supplies another company of infantry with a commissariat officer had been sent from the capital, on the 15th, to prepare four line-of-communication posts. By means of this arrangement the cavalry of the 12th Division reached Pingyang from Seoul on the 23rd and assured the safety of the little garrison. On the 25th February, the leading infantry of the division arrived, and by the 18th March most of it had moved north from Pingyang, leaving that place vacant for the reception of other troops shortly to arrive. Anju was occupied on the 10th March by two squadrons of Japanese cavalry, which were joined next day by a battalion of infantry; and about a week later three more battalions came up to strengthen the outpost line on the Chechen River, which at this time served as a boundary between the Russians and the Japanese.

Meanwhile mobilization had been proceeding steadily in Japan, and by the 9th March,† the Guard Division and the rest of the 2nd Division were concentrated at Hiroshima in readiness to embark. The sea at the mouth of the Taitong River, where the

* The 38th Regiment and one battalion of the 37th Regiment went to Gensan, passing through Seoul.

† Both divisions are stated to have begun moving by rail to Hiroshima on the 15th February. The embarkation began on the 8th March, but no troops seem actually to have sailed until a few days later. See p. 73.

port of Chinampo is situated, though still reported to be frozen, would be clear of ice in a few days. From that point Pingyang could readily be reached, and the long march from Chemulpo through Seoul would be avoided. These advantages were held to outweigh any risks which would be incurred, and Chinampo was selected as the landing place for the remaining troops of the First Army. The movement of the transports by sea was to be covered by another naval attack on Port Arthur, and the disembarkation of the troops was to be protected by Rear-Admiral Hosoya with the 7th Division and a number of torpedo boats; while on land the same duty was to be performed by the troops of the 12th Division already at Pingyang. On the 8th, a small party which had been sent to build piers at Chinampo failed to effect a landing, though the ice was then melting fast; but on the 10th, another effort was successful and the news was telegraphed to Ujina,* the port of Hiroshima.

At this time General Kuroki, who had been appointed to command the Japanese First Army, was at Hiroshima and had received information that the enemy was concentrating near Liao-yang and Feng-huang-cheng, and that a small detachment of the Japanese 12th Division had occupied Pingyang, where the remainder was due to arrive by about the middle of March. Chinampo had been selected by the military authorities at Tokio as the point of disembarkation, but as he was himself responsible for the arrangements in Korea, General Kuroki decided to take measures lest the 12th Division should fail to reach Pingyang in time to cover the landing. The coast roads which ran from Chinampo northward were known to be bad, and to require repairs before troops, guns, and transport could move; telegraphic communication from the landing place to the head-quarters of the 12th Division was also necessary.

General Kuroki therefore detailed an advanced force, consisting of the cavalry of the Guard and 2nd Divisions (six squadrons), a regiment of infantry, two battalions of engineers, and two telegraph companies, which landed at Chinampo on the 13th March. Of this force, the cavalry, one battalion of infantry, and one of engineers marched direct to Anju. That place was reached on the 18th, and the new arrivals raised the total force in its vicinity to eight squadrons of cavalry, five battalions of infantry, and one battalion of engineers. Immediately after the advanced force came

* Ujina, about 3½ miles from Hiroshima, was the principal Japanese base throughout the war.

the Guard and 2nd Divisions, dispatched in four groups from Ujina. The first group sailed on the 13th, and by the 29th the whole force had landed in Korea.

It is now time to turn to the Russians, who were gathering such troops as were available to oppose the Japanese advance and to cover the concentration of their principal army at Liaoyang. Towards the end of January, when the diplomatic relations between the two countries were highly strained, the 9th, 11th, and 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiments* had been withdrawn from Port Arthur and dispatched to the neighbourhood of Feng-huang-cheng under Major-General Kashtalinski. During the first days of February these three regiments were joined by the 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment,* and the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division was then complete under its own commander.

On the 9th February, the day of the first attack upon Port Arthur, the Viceroy Alexeiev issued a proclamation ordering the mobilization of the troops under his jurisdiction; on the 11th February, similar orders were issued in the Siberian Military District; and on the 15th the reservists were called up in the Departments of Viakta and Perm. On the 20th February, General Kuropatkin, who was generally regarded as one of the most able commanders in Europe, was appointed to command the military forces in Manchuria; on the 12th March, he left St. Petersburg for the Far East, and reached Harbin on the 27th of that month. The mobilization arrangements in the Far East worked smoothly, but the units could not be brought up to their full strength without bringing men from Europe, and in the meanwhile the following steps were taken locally:—

- (1) The formation of a 9th Brigade of East Siberian Rifles.
- (2) The formation of a third battalion in each of the existing East Siberian Rifle Regiments.
- (3) The grouping into divisions of the various East Siberian Rifle Brigades, and providing the necessary supply services.
- (4) Providing the Siberian units with nineteen batteries of artillery, which were deficient.
- (5) Furnishing the two European brigades with quick-firing artillery in place of the old pattern guns.
- (6) The formation of a 3rd Siberian Army Corps by uniting the 3rd and 6th East Siberian Rifle Divisions.
- (7) The creation of a head-quarter staff for the army of Manchuria.

* At this date these regiments consisted of two battalions only.

The mobilization of the 2nd and 3rd Siberian Divisions, which formed the 4th Siberian Army Corps, was necessarily a slow process owing to the immense distances which the men had to cover before reaching their units. The mobilization of an infantry unit occupied from nineteen to forty-one days, of a Siberian Cossack regiment from eight to twenty-four days, and of an artillery group, *i.e.*, two batteries, from eighteen to fifty-one days. On the 9th April, a Caucasian cavalry brigade was mobilized, and this step was followed ten days later by calling up a division of Orenburg Cossacks and a brigade of Cossacks of the Ural.

Unlike her enemy, therefore, Russia was in no position to undertake military operations when her diplomatic relations were broken off, and the only troops available to interfere in any way with the Japanese movements were the 1st Argun, 1st Chita, and 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Regiments of Trans-Baikal Cossacks, all of which were under Major-General Mishchenko. On the 14th February, advanced parties of the Russian cavalry crossed the Ya-lu at Wiju and Chyangsyong, brushing aside a few Korean soldiers who were posted on the south side of the river, and protested against this infringement of their neutrality. On the 18th, the Chita Cossacks reached Sienchien, and one of the patrols captured a Japanese officer at Koksan. Still pushing south, some scouts under Lieutenant Lomchakov appeared in the neighbourhood of Pingyang on the 28th.

The appearance of the Russian cavalry led the Japanese to believe that some opposition might be encountered in the Anju valley. For tactical reasons it was advisable that the army should be able to concentrate at short notice, but, at the same time, if the troops were to be billeted in the villages some dispersion was unavoidable. To reconcile these two requirements serviceable roads were almost indispensable; but, when the thaw set in soon after the middle of March, those which had been repaired by the engineers became so bad that marches were sometimes reduced to less than five miles a day. Guns, carriages, and transport carts sank to the axles in the mud, and men and horses floundered through with difficulty. In these circumstances the question of supply became acute, but was solved temporarily by employing ten thousand Korean coolies.

Such was the state of affairs when General Kuroki and his staff reached Chinampo on the 17th March. There he heard from a staff officer who had preceded him that it had been ascertained that, with the exception of fifteen hundred to two thousand cavalry

between Wiju and Paksan, there were no hostile forces south of the Ya-lu. This weakness of the enemy led General Kuroki to decide that it was unnecessary to await the concentration of his army* south of Anju before undertaking measures which would facilitate his eventual northward advance. Something might be attempted at once, and, with this view, he ordered the two rivers north of Anju, the Chechen and the Taing, to be bridged. To cover this work a force was detailed from Anju, consisting of seven squadrons of cavalry, two batteries of mountain artillery, five battalions of infantry, and one company of engineers.† On the 25th, Paksan and Kasan were occupied, the enemy falling back upon the roads leading to Wiju and Unsan. By the 27th, a pontoon bridge was thrown over the Taing, and another was built across the Chechen River with material which was obtained locally.

General Kuroki now wished to dispense with his covering force and to push forward with his main army after the retiring enemy. But the difficulties to be overcome were still great. A reconnaissance had shown that the main road along the coast was the only one fit for the movement of a large body of troops. Two other roads ran parallel to it, but between them and the coast road there was no lateral communication, while the front of the army if all these roads were used would be not less than forty-four miles. It was already almost impossible to feed General Asada's covering detachment, and it was quite evident that the whole army could not advance unless some fresh means of supplying it were devised. There was but one possible solution of the difficulty, namely, that the greater part of the army should march along the western road and should be supplied from a succession of supply depots established on the depots on the coast. Combined naval and military reconnaissances were made as soon as the ice began to melt, and eventually Rikaho‡ was selected as the most favourable landing place south of the Ya-lu River. To cover the proposed depot the Asada detachment was to be pushed forward four days' march to Chyaryonkoan. Now, however, it was dis-

* The 12th Division did not at first form part of the First Army, but was placed under General Kuroki's orders on the 17th March, when he landed at Chinampo.

† 1st Guard Regiment, two battalions, 14th Regiment (12th Division), two mountain batteries (12th Division), the bulk of the cavalry of the Guard and 12th Divisions, one company Guard Engineers. The whole was under command of Major-General Asada.

‡ This place is sometimes referred to as Ihoapho.

covered that so large a force could not be supplied at such a distance from head-quarters even by allotting to it two-thirds of the regular transport of the whole army. The only course open to General Kuroki was to weaken his covering party, although by pushing up a small detachment so near to the enemy he was incurring considerable risk. Two battalions of infantry and the 12th Cavalry Regiment were therefore left at Paksan under Colonel Imamura; and General Asada, with three battalions of infantry, two mountain batteries, and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, was ordered to hold himself in readiness to advance as soon as his supplies could be brought round by sea from Chinampo.

Meanwhile the Guard Cavalry, supported by a small force of infantry, engaged some six hundred Russian horsemen south of Tiessu, and occupied that place on the 28th with a loss of nine killed and ten wounded. This was the day on which Cavalry skirmish General Kuroki had hoped to send forward the at Tiessu. Asada detachment, but the necessary supplies did not reach the Chechen River until the 31st. Storms had occasioned considerable delays, and some anxiety was beginning to be felt as to the safety of the convoy, which consisted of Korean boats and was in charge of army officers, as no naval officers were available.

Advance of
General Asada.

At last all preparations were complete. The advanced party moved out from Napchyongtyong on the 1st April; on the 3rd, Chyaryonkoan was reached by the troops and the boats carrying the supplies arrived at Rikaho. On the day that General Asada began his advance, the 12th Division left Syunchyon, and on the 5th reached Tiessu, establishing depots, which were supplied by sea, at Yusapho, Totangpho, and Rikaho. On the same day also a flank guard of one regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and two mountain batteries under Major-General Sasaki was sent to Yongpyon to protect the right of the main army.

On the 4th April, General Asada's cavalry entered Wiju and Yongampo, and a general advance was at last considered feasible. It was to take place on the 7th, and on the night of the 5th General Kuroki issued his orders:—

Occupation of
Wiju and
Yongampo.

General Kuroki's
orders for general
advance.

(1) The Asada detachment was to leave Chyaryonkoan on the 7th, to reach Wiju on the 8th, and to protect the front of the main army.

(2) The Sasaki detachment was to remain at Yongpyon until

the 12th, guarding the right of the advance, and should then move to Chyangsyong on the Ya-lu, and reconnoitre towards Kuan-tien-cheng, Pyoktang, and Chosan.

- (3) The 12th Division was to leave Tiessu on the 7th and to reach Wiju on the 12th, moving in two columns, with an interval of one day.
- (4) The Guard Division was to leave Sukchyon on the 7th and to reach Wiju on the 15th, also moving in two columns.
- (5) The 2nd Division to leave Ibshokchyang on the 11th, and to reach Wiju on the 19th.

The advance began on the 7th, and Wiju was entered on the 8th. On the morning of the 12th, a company of General Asada's infantry drove off an enterprising party of fifty Russians who tried to cross the Ya-lu near that town, but a violent storm which raged during the 8th and 9th put a stop to all movement for two days. On the latter date the bridge over the Taing River was swept away, and the columns of the Guard Division were separated. The bridge over the Chechen River barely escaped a similar fate, for its abutments were destroyed, and the centre portion was covered by two feet of rushing water. One half of the army was now completely cut off from the other, but, to prevent still further damage, engineers, helped by infantry and transport drivers, worked all night up to their necks in the ice-cold torrent, and by piling heavy stones on the Chechen bridge saved it from destruction. Much damage was also done elsewhere. A bridge which had been made at Pingyang was swept away, the piers at Chinampo were broken, and all the newly finished telegraph lines thrown down in many places. Fortunately, however, amid so much to cause anxiety to General Kuroki, the landing stage at Rikaho stood fast and none of the vessels carrying supplies were lost.

Next day, the 10th, the water fell, but the pontoon company at Anju could not reach the Taing River until the bridge over the Chechen had been restored. By 7 a.m. on the 11th, a pontoon bridge was thrown across the former river and communication between the two columns of the Guard Division was again established, but the concentration was not completed until the 21st, when the troops of the Asada detachment rejoined their own divisions. On the 20th, the Sasaki detachment reached Chyangsyong from Yongpyon, after a trying march over difficult passes where all stores had to be carried by the men, and on the 26th the main army was strengthened by the

arrival of five four-gun batteries of 4.7 in. howitzers which had been landed at Rikaho. These guns, which fired 46.3 lb. shells filled with high explosives, had been purchased just before the war. In places the road had to be specially strengthened with planks to facilitate their movement.

The 12th Division was now south-east of Wiju, the Guard Division was behind that town, and to the south-west of it stood the 2nd Division. From the date of the landing of the first troops of the Guard Division at Chinampo until the concentration of the First Army at Wiju, almost six weeks had elapsed, and in that time a distance amounting only to about one hundred and thirty miles had been covered. Nevertheless, when all the circumstances under which the advance was carried out are taken into consideration, it was far from slow. At first the climate rendered water carriage for supplies impossible; then, when that means became available through the disappearance of the ice, land communication, at any time bad in Korea, grew worse, and the three divisions of the army found themselves limited to a single road. Movement under such conditions is necessarily laborious, and would have been more so had the Russians been able to offer serious opposition.

As it was, however, General Mishchenko had fallen back across the Ya-lu on the 3rd April, and had there joined the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division under General Kashtalinski, whose force then consisted of eight battalions of infantry, twenty-three squadrons of cavalry,* twenty-four field guns, six horse artillery guns, eight mountain guns, and eight machine guns. These troops formed the nucleus of the Russian "Eastern Force," to the command of which Lieutenant-General Zaslulich was appointed on the 12th April, and the units which were still required to raise it to full strength were hurried south as they became available.

On the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd April, the 22nd and 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiments and the 2nd and 3rd Batteries, 6th East Siberian Artillery Brigade left Liao-yang and reached Feng-huang-cheng on the 14th April. Thence they proceeded to the Ya-lu, except six companies of the 24th Regiment, which remained on the line of communication repairing roads.

* As follows :—

1st Argun Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment	6 squadrons
1st Chita Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment	6 "
1st Verkhne-Udinsk Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment	5	...	"
Ussuri Cossack Regiment	6 "

One squadron of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Regiment was in Port Arthur.

On the 10th and 12th April, the newly-formed third battalions of the 9th and 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiments left Liao-yang, and on the 24th April they arrived on the Ya-lu.

On the 13th, the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment, except one company which remained in the Pri-Amur District, and the 1st Battery 6th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade left Hai-cheng for Ta-ku-shan, and reached that place on the 21st April.

On the 14th and 16th April, the newly-formed third battalions of the 11th and 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiments started from Liao-yang and arrived on the Ya-lu on the 25th and 26th April respectively.

On the 16th April, the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment reached the Ya-lu.

On the 21st April, a mountain battery, escorted by a company of the 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, left Feng-huang-cheng for Chang-tien-cheng, twenty-eight miles north-east of Wiju.

When these movements were completed the Russian "Eastern Force" and the Japanese First Army were concentrated on the River Ya-lu, but there they must be left for the present; for it is now necessary to return to the naval operations, particularly those of the Combined Fleet by which the movements of the First Army were protected and the landing of the Second Army was prepared.

CHAPTER IX.

VLADIVOSTOK—NAVAL OPERATIONS AT PORT ARTHUR UNDER
ADMIRAL MAKAROV.

(Charts 3 and 4, and Plan 4.)

AS soon as the Japanese oversea communications were rendered practically secure from interference by the Port Arthur fleet Admiral Togo turned his attention to the Vladivostok cruisers which had returned to port on the 14th February, after having sunk the *Nagonoura Maru*. There they remained until the 24th, when they again put to sea in the hope of inflicting some further damage on Japanese troops which were reported to be landing at Gensan. Arriving on the 26th, they found no sign of the Japanese, and after remaining in the vicinity until the 28th they returned to Vladivostok on the 29th. On their way north the coast of Korea was searched, but nothing was seen beyond a few Korean junks. The appearance of a Russian squadron off Gensan was quickly reported to Admiral Togo and, as there seemed to be more prospect of bringing it to action than the Port Arthur ships, Admiral Kamimura with the 2nd Division was detached from the Combined Fleet to deal with it. At the same time, Vice-Admiral Kataoka's force, which had previously been guarding the Korean Strait was added to the Combined Fleet.

On the 6th March, a telegram was received in Vladivostok from the signal station on Askold Island, saying that seven Japanese ships were approaching the harbour. This was Admiral Kamimura's force, which consisted of five armoured and two unarmoured cruisers. Avoiding the fire of the forts at the entrance to the Bosphorus, they steamed parallel to the shore in Ussuri Bay and bombarded the harbour from 1.50 p.m. till 2.30 p.m., throwing shell over the low hills; but the Russian cruisers, which were lying at the entrance, and not in the inner harbour, were concealed from Ussuri Bay by the conformation of the land and were not fired upon.

The forts did not reply—probably because no guns had as yet been mounted to command Ussuri Bay—and, although the Russian cruisers began to get under way before the bombardment began, they did not appear outside until between three and four o'clock, when the Japanese were already retiring so as to avoid the danger of a torpedo attack during the night.

The Russian cruisers followed for twenty miles, but as night came on they returned to harbour. On the following day the Japanese again appeared; but on this occasion they did not open fire and, as the Russian cruisers did not put to sea, Admiral Kamimura seems to have concluded that his ships could be better employed elsewhere. On his return voyage he looked into Possiet Bay and Gensan, but finding nothing at either place he rejoined the Combined Fleet on the 16th.

The actual damage done by the bombardment was slight; but although the Vladivostok squadron was not brought to battle it was effectually prevented from making any prolonged cruises. For a considerable time the Viceroy Alexeiev would not allow it to go further than one day's run from Vladivostok, and so long as this order was in force the Japanese oversea communications were secure.

While these operations were in progress off Vladivostok preparations were being made for a third attack on Port Arthur. Another temporary base was established on the west coast of Korea, just north of Chemulpo, thus reducing the distance to Port Arthur to two hundred and forty miles, and a second batch of blockships was made ready. A small force was also sent to Thornton Haven, where the Russians were known to have established a coal store, but, as has been related, this expedition was forestalled by the *Silach*.*

During the first week in March bad weather was experienced in the Yellow Sea, but on the 7th the operations against Port Arthur were begun. The blockships were not yet ready, but the necessity for covering the landing of the army would not admit of any further delay. It was therefore arranged that, as in the case of the first attack, a destroyer action at night was to be followed by a bombardment on the following day. The 1st and 3rd Flotillas were selected to deliver the attack which was to take place on the night of the 9th, and it seems to have been anticipated that although there was little chance of finding

Third attack on
Port Arthur.

* See p. 61.

any ships outside the harbour at night, there was every probability of an encounter with hostile destroyers. This forecast proved to be accurate, but two events which had occurred inside the fortress must now be noted. The misfortunes of the defenders had not ceased with the departure of the Japanese fleet on the 24th February, for on the 4th March two more destroyers went ashore in a snowstorm. Both were soon got off, but they were considerably damaged, and, as the only available dock was occupied by the *Pallada*, the necessary repairs were much delayed. The second event of importance was the arrival of Admiral Makarov on the morning of the 8th March. This officer had been appointed to command the fleet at Port Arthur as soon as the news of its first reverse was received in St. Petersburg. His appointment was received with universal approval, for he was known to be an energetic and scientific officer who had made a thorough study of his profession. Great confidence was therefore felt in him and his arrival did much to raise the spirits of his men. Hitherto the lack of enterprise displayed by the fleet had given rise to bitter recriminations, particularly among the dockyard hands, who complained that they were kept at work night and day repairing ships which never left the harbour. Now, however, it was felt that something would be done, and when Admiral Makarov hoisted his flag in the *Novik* it was believed that the fleet would very soon retrieve its reputation. With him came also a number of skilled workmen from Cronstadt, whose services were very badly needed; and, on the very day of his arrival, the *Retvizan* was at last floated and taken into harbour. In order to take the place of her guns, which had proved most useful in meeting the Japanese blockships, two 4.7 inch guns were taken out of the *Angara* and were mounted ashore to command the approach to the gullet.

On the following night, the 9th March, the four destroyers which composed the Japanese 1st Flotilla arrived off Port Arthur a little before midnight, but finding no enemy to attack, they patrolled outside. At 4.30 a.m. on the 10th, being then to the south of Lao-tieh Shan Promontory, they suddenly encountered four Russian destroyers. Both commanders were anxious to engage, and in the darkness a confused fight ensued at close quarters. As the attack came from astern, the leading Japanese boat, the *Shirakumo*, could not get into close action, but the other three, the *Asashiwo*, *Kasumi*, and *Akatsuki* fought the *Vuinoslivi*, *Vlastni*, *Vnimatelni*, and *Bezstrashni* for about twenty minutes. At one time a broadside to broadside fight between

Arrival of
Admiral Makarov
at Port Arthur.

Engagement be-
tween destroyers.

individual boats took place at a range of only fifty yards, and in the confusion both sides overestimated the numbers of their opponents. More than once collision was narrowly avoided ; and one torpedo was fired by either side, but without result. Although no boat was completely disabled, the damage was considerable, but the casualties among the crews were slight. The Japanese acknowledge that they had seven killed and eight wounded, while the Russian account admits a loss of two killed and twenty-two wounded, including among the latter the officer in command, Captain Matusevich. The action was brought to a close by the Russian destroyers returning to Port Arthur.

Meanwhile the Japanese 3rd Destroyer Flotilla, which had arrived off Port Arthur shortly after the 1st, had reconnoitred the entrance and found no enemy. The Japanese remained outside the harbour until 7 a.m., dropping dummy mines, or, rather, planks fitted with calcium lights, in the hope of drawing the fire of the forts and causing them to expend their ammunition. Some of these planks were afterwards picked up by the Russians. As the Japanese were about to leave, two Russian destroyers were observed returning to harbour. These were the *Ryeshitelni* and *Steregushchi*, part of another flotilla of four destroyers which had been sent out at night by Admiral Makarov to scout to seaward, and had in some way become separated from their consorts. The Japanese at once tried to cut them off from their base, and a running fight ensued in which the *Ryeshitelni* managed to make her escape into harbour, but the

Loss of the
Steregushchi.

Steregushchi was not so fortunate. A shell struck her engine-room, and disabled her just as she was getting within range of the forts. The Japanese

immediately surrounded and captured her, and sent a crew to take possession. Although she was already settling down in the water and the sea was high, the *Sazanami* succeeded in taking her in tow, and was endeavouring to get her away from under the fire of the forts when the tow rope parted. Admiral Makarov had put to sea with the *Novik* and *Bayan* to endeavour to cover the retreat of the destroyers, but was too late to save the *Steregushchi*, and the approach of the Japanese 3rd Division caused him to withdraw. However, it was impossible for the Japanese again to take possession of their prize and she was left to sink, finally disappearing at 10.50 a.m. The Japanese made several attempts to save her crew, but only succeeded in rescuing four men.

Meanwhile the Japanese 1st Division had arrived off Port Arthur with orders to carry out an indirect bombardment. The plan was

for the battleships to fire at a long range from behind the cover of Lao-tieh Shan, where they were not exposed to fire from the harbour defences, while the 3rd Division, lying well to the south of Port Arthur, watched the effect. The latter ships were obliged to remain more than six miles from the forts, for the Bombardment of Port Arthur. Russians had become so accurate in their shooting that any nearer approach was hazardous. The battleships also found that they could not emerge from under cover of the hills at Lao-tieh Shan without great risk, although the range was about seven miles.

At 9.30 a.m., the *Hatsuse* opened fire with her 12-in. guns, followed by the *Shikishima* and the *Yashima*. The firing was slow and deliberate, and was so directed over the hills at Lao-tieh Shan as to fall in the inner harbour. These ships were relieved at 11.30 a.m. by the 1st Sub-division, consisting of the *Mikasa*, *Asahi*, and *Fuji*, which opened fire soon after noon and continued till about 1.30 p.m. In all about one hundred and fifty rounds were fired, of which, by Russian accounts, the majority fell in the gullet and the inner harbour where the whole Russian fleet was assembled. The captain of the *Bobr* states that seventeen shell fell within one hundred yards of his ship, which was lying at the end of the Tiger Peninsula; some dropped within two or three fathoms of the side, sending a hail of splinters into the rigging. While the battleships were bombarding Port Arthur, the 4th Division shelled some buildings which had been erected at San-shan-tao as a quarantine station, but which the Japanese apparently thought were intended for some more warlike purpose. Whether intentionally or not, the attack was well timed, for there was not enough water to permit the battleships to leave the harbour until the afternoon, but even then they showed no signs of wishing to do so.

Nevertheless the actual damage done was remarkably slight. On board the *Bobr* there were no casualties, and in the rest of the fleet only five men were killed and nineteen wounded. Ashore in the town there were three killed and one wounded, among the former being two women. One of the *Askold's* guns was damaged, and the unfortunate *Retvizan* was struck by a shell, which sank two boats alongside of her. This shell also damaged the cofferdam which had been placed over the injury received on the 9th February, and casting off her moorings she ran on to a shoal. Soon afterwards another shell struck her armoured plates, but this time no harm resulted. Thus the material results which were achieved were altogether out of proportion to the amount of ammunition expended.

But the principal object of the attack was attained with little or no loss to the Japanese, for the First Army was enabled to land unmolested.

After the Japanese fleet had withdrawn, Admiral Makarov held a council of war, at which it was decided that the whole available squadron should go to sea the following morning, apparently for the purpose of practising the ships in getting in and out of harbour ; and no doubt the new commander was also anxious to exercise his fleet at sea should the absence of the Japanese fleet render it possible. At daylight on the 11th, the ships weighed in succession and proceeded to the outer roadstead. There they anchored while gunboats and destroyers swept a channel to the southward, through which the squadron passed in safety at 9.30 a.m., none but dummy mines having been found. The cruisers which had been stationed as look-outs reported that no Japanese vessels were in sight, and after steaming some five miles southward the fleet was exercised for some hours before returning to the outer roadstead at 4 p.m. The harbour was entered in the afternoon tide and the day's operations were completed before dusk.

Russian ships exercised.

In addition to the tactical training of his fleet Admiral Makarov took steps to render the protection of the harbour against blockships and torpedo craft more effective. To assist in searching the approaches two gunboats were placed in the gullet and one in the channel in rear of them. Two merchant ships, the *Kharbin* and *Khailar*, were sunk off the western shore and between them a boom was placed. Arrangements were also made for the ships in harbour to defend themselves by indirect fire in case of another bombardment, and with that object observation posts were erected. The energy of the new commander was also felt in the dockyards, where, with the assistance of the skilled mechanics who had been brought out from Europe, work on the injured vessels was proceeding with great rapidity. In every way, therefore, the efficiency of the Russian fleet was improving and Admiral Makarov's personality had begun to impress itself upon all ranks under his command.

Harbour defences strengthened.

Meanwhile Admiral Togo reached his new base with the Combined Fleet on the 12th, and at once resumed his preparations for sealing up the entrance to Port Arthur. On the 15th, he dispatched Admiral Dewa with the 3rd Division to reconnoitre ; and on the 16th, although the weather was so foggy that the Russians do not seem

Japanese naval reconnaissance.


to have observed the hostile ships, that officer was able to satisfy himself that the main body of the Russian fleet was still inside the harbour. With this information he returned on the 17th, and as Admiral Kamimura had rejoined from his Vladivostok cruise on the preceding day there was no reason to delay. With a view to the next blocking expedition, information as to the condition of the defences at night was of great importance, and the 4th and 5th Flotillas were to carry out a reconnaissance after dark. On this occasion two ships only were detailed to carry out a bombardment on the following day. They were to be supported by the remainder of the fleet, but Admiral Kamimura's 2nd Division was to be kept in reserve out of sight from the shore, probably so that its return from the Sea of Japan might not become known to the Russians.

On the night of the 21st the reconnaissance was carried out as arranged, although the ships were observed and fired upon about midnight. At 8 a.m. on the 22nd, the 1st and 3rd Divisions arrived, and about an hour later the *Fuji* and *Yashima* took up their stations for bombarding. The *Fuji* placed herself about a mile south-west of Lao-tieh Shan and the *Yashima* further to the northward. The bombardment began about 10.30 a.m. and lasted about an hour, during which about a hundred shells were fired at a range of over seven miles. The 3rd Division, as before, lay off the entrance to observe. On this occasion, in accordance with Admiral Makarov's plans, the Russians replied with indirect fire from the *Retvizan* and *Tzesarevich*, and many shells fell close to the *Fuji*, though she was not struck.

The effect of the bombardment was not serious, and no damage was inflicted on the Russian ships, with the exception of the hospital ship *Kazan*, struck by a 12-in. shell which did not explode. One shell struck some barracks on Tiger's Tail, killing five soldiers and wounding nine. The *Fuji* also fired direct with her secondary armament on a building near Lao-tieh Shan lighthouse, apparently an observation post.

On this occasion the Russian fleet did not remain inactive. At daylight orders were given to raise steam, and about 7 a.m. the vessels began to leave the basin. The cruisers and destroyers went first, led by the *Bayan*. Admiral Makarov was on board the *Askold*. The battleships followed as soon as the state of the tide permitted, but it was not until 11.30 a.m. that the last ship, the *Sevastopol*, reached the outer anchorage. With the exception of the *Tzesarevich*, *Retvizan*, and *Pallada* all the Russian ships

2nd BLOCKING EXPEDITION, 27th March 1904.



were now outside and formed in single line, but they remained under the protection of the forts and, except for a few occasional shots, did not open fire. As soon as the hostile fleet was seen to be leaving the harbour the Japanese 2nd Division closed in to support the *Fuji* and *Yashima*; but since the battleships did not dare to approach within range of the shore batteries, and the Russian fleet would not leave their protection, no action ensued. Soon after noon the state of the tide compelled Admiral Makarov to withdraw into harbour, unless he was prepared to wait outside until dark and to expose his vessels to torpedo attack. He wisely chose the former alternative and withdrew his ships, beginning with those of the deepest draught. By 3 p.m., they were once more in harbour and, although there had been no fighting, Admiral Makarov had the satisfaction of knowing that for the first time the whole fleet had got out and back again on a single tide. At 1 p.m., seeing the Russian fleet was not going to give battle unsupported by the forts, the Japanese withdrew to Techongto in the Sir James Hall group, where the blockships which had been prepared were already anchored.

Immediately on his return, Admiral Makarov again set to work to improve the defences and to raise the fighting value of his fleet. To prevent a recurrence of the indirect bombardment from behind Lao-tieh Shan, twenty-five mines were laid off the promontory and some batteries were established on the neighbouring hills. On the following day, the 24th, there was a dense fog which prevented the cruisers from putting to sea to scout as they had been ordered, but on the morning of the 26th the admiral, whose flag had been transferred to the *Petropavlovsk*, led his fleet towards the Miao-tao Islands. At 10 a.m., a small Japanese steamer was sighted off the northernmost island, and was captured by the *Novik* and the destroyers, but as there was some difficulty in towing her the crew was transferred and the vessel was sunk. About this time a message from Port Arthur was received by wireless telegraphy, saying that fourteen ships were on the horizon. Course was now shaped to return, but it was a false alarm, for the vessels soon proved to be merchantmen and not the hostile fleet. The outer roadstead was reached at 1 p.m., and the fleet was again in harbour three hours later. On the return journey, while performing some practice evolutions, there was a slight collision between the *Peresvyet* and *Sevastopol*, in which the latter had a propeller-blade bent. The captain of the *Sevastopol*, who was held to be in fault, was removed from his command and sent back to Russia.

Preparations for the second attempt to block Port Arthur were now complete. Four vessels had been made ready secretly in Japan, viz., *Chiyo Maru*, 2,707 tons; *Fukui Maru*, 2,943 tons; *Yoneyama Maru*, 2,693 tons; and the *Yahiko Maru*, 2,692 tons. These ships were loaded with stone and concrete and, as on the former occasion, charges were fitted to sink them rapidly when in position. Machine guns were also mounted to drive off guard-boats. On account of the experience which had been gained the command of the blockships was given to the same officers who had commanded on the former occasion; but different crews were provided, although the men were no less anxious than their superiors to make the second attempt. Commander Arima was in the *Chiyo Maru*, Commander Hirose in the *Fukui Maru*, Lieutenant Saito in the *Yahiko Maru*, and Lieutenant Masaki in the *Yoneyama Maru*.

At 7 p.m. on the 26th, just three hours after the Russians had returned from their cruise, the Japanese fleet, which had been delayed for twenty-four hours by the foggy weather and heavy sea, reached its rendezvous south-east of Round Island. Thence the blockships, with their attendant destroyers and torpedo boats, were dispatched to carry out their mission. This time there was to be no preliminary attack, and the first intimation of danger to the enemy was to be the approach of the blockships. The duty of the destroyers was to drive off the Russian guardboats and destroyers, and to pick up the crews of the blockships after their work was done. The 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, reinforced by the *Manadzuru* and *Kasasagi* under the command of Commander Yashima, had a similar duty to perform as close inshore as possible. The 3rd Division, with the *Asama* and *Tokiwa* attached, was to arrive in the early morning. It was then to assist in the rescue and to ascertain the result, while the 1st Division was to lie at a convenient distance ready to take part should the Russian battleships come out.

About 2.45 a.m. on the 27th, the blockships, led by the *Chiyo Maru*, approached the entrance. When about two miles off they were discovered by the Russian searchlights and at 3 a.m., by Port Arthur time,* fire was opened upon them from the forts and gunboats. Gallantly disregarding the heavy fire they pushed on but, as on the former occasion, Commander Arima could not exactly make out the position of the entrance. He therefore anchored his ship, the *Chiyo Maru*, on the eastern shore,

* It should be noted that throughout the war the Japanese kept central Japanese time (135° E.) which was about one hour in advance of the Port Arthur time.

heading north, and blew her up just where the entrance begins to narrow.* The *Fukui Maru* came up on the port side of the *Chiyo Maru* and was about to anchor when she was struck by a torpedo fired from the Russian destroyer *Silni*, which was doing guard duty that night and had come out when the alarm was given. Captain Hirose also exploded his mine and sank his vessel immediately beyond the *Chiyo Maru*. She was followed by the *Yahiko Maru* which was sunk on the port side of the *Fukui Maru*. The last ship was the *Yoneyama Maru*. Coming up on the starboard side of the *Chiyo Maru*, she passed round the bows of that ship and anchored in the middle of the entrance. As she reached this point the captain exploded his mine and almost at the same moment she was struck by a torpedo fired from the Russian destroyer *Ryeshitelni*, which had followed the *Silni*. Carrying her way towards the western shore she sank athwart the channel, partially blocking it, but leaving a passage between her stern and the *Yahiko Maru*. The *Silni*, after firing both of her torpedoes, one of which took effect, passed on and became engaged at close quarters for a short time with the Japanese torpedo boats *Aotaka* and *Tsubame* about a mile from the entrance. Neither of the Japanese was hit, but a shell burst in the engine room of the *Silni*, pierced a steam pipe, filled the engine room with steam, and killed the engineer and six of his staff. Notwithstanding this misfortune, and although the captain and twelve men were wounded, the engines worked slowly and she steamed towards Port Arthur, but failing to find the passage ran ashore under Golden Hill. She was got off next day with her bottom damaged, but was not fit for service for about a month.

As soon as the blockships were blown up their crews took to the boats under a very heavy fire. With the exception of four killed and nine wounded all were picked up in safety by the torpedo boats and destroyers, which remained under fire till dawn carrying out the work of rescue and were fortunate enough to escape without damage. Commander Hirose was killed by a shell as he was leaving the *Fukui Maru*, having with great gallantry delayed his departure while he searched for a warrant officer who was missing.

During the attack Admiral Makarov was on board the *Otvazhni*, whence he was able to observe what was going on and to receive reports. On the conclusion of the firing he gave orders to the fleet to raise steam, and in the morning he took it out of harbour and along the shore towards Lao-tieh Shan, where the Japanese ships

* See Plate 7.

appeared in sight to the southward. Possibly he hoped to draw them on to the minefield which he had laid down off that point, but they did not close and at 2 p.m. he returned into harbour. At the same time Admiral Togo, who had received the reports on the events of the night and ascertained that the crews of the blockships had been picked up, realized that the Russian fleet was still determined not to leave the shelter of the shore batteries, and returned to his base in Korea, where he arrived on the morning of the 28th.

The night had been as favourable to the Japanese as they could have hoped, for after the moon had set it was very dark and the sea was calm. Nevertheless the appearance of the Russian fleet outside Port Arthur on the morning of the 27th was conclusive proof of the failure of the blocking expedition. Carried out with the utmost gallantry and dash, it had nearly proved successful, as the Russian accounts bear witness, for they state that had one more vessel been sunk between the *Yoneyama Maru* and the *Yahiko Maru*, Port Arthur would have been sealed. Undeterred by failure, Admiral Togo determined to make another attempt to close the entrance, and this time he asked that no less than twelve merchant ships should be prepared. But since they could not be ready for some time he proceeded to devise other means for crippling his enemy. It was now thought that if mines could be laid outside Port Arthur, in places where the Russians were in the habit of cruising under the protection of the forts, some damage might be done. It was essential to the success of this plan that it should be carried out without exciting suspicion, and it was consequently necessary that the mines should be moored at night. Moreover, under the new *régime*, the Russian fleet was constantly at sea, and there was some anxiety lest it should make a sudden dash to join the cruisers at Vladivostok. In these circumstances it was necessary to watch the port so as to ensure that the movements of any hostile vessels towards the high sea should be immediately reported. With this object in view a squadron of observation, consisting of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Cruiser Divisions, under Admiral Kamimura was established between Shantung and the Sir James Hall group of islands, and wireless communication was kept up between the cruisers and the commander-in-chief at his temporary base.

Meanwhile the sea defences of Port Arthur were still being strengthened; two steamships, the *Edward Barry* and the *Shilka* were sunk so to render the approach more difficult, and a cruiser was moored outside the gullet, but inside the sunken ships, in a position whence she could engage approaching blockships or

destroyers.* The defending destroyers were also kept constantly on the move both by day and by night, but two causes combined to prevent them from becoming really efficient. In the first place, their cruising area was limited to about fifty miles from Port Arthur ; in the second place, the difficulty of finding really capable officers necessitated constant changes of command which, in their turn, operated very adversely upon the fighting value of the ships.

On the 4th April, Admiral Makarov received information that the Japanese were creating a naval base in the Elliot Islands. He promptly ordered the officer in command of the destroyer flotilla to search these islands, as well as Eight Ships Bay, at night ; but bad weather again came on and the expedition was deferred until the evening of the 12th. On the morning of the 11th, Admiral Makarov took all his available battleships and destroyers to Ta-lien-wan and returned the same evening. This short cruise, although free from accident, showed in a marked manner the inability of many of the captains to handle their commands, and drew from the admiral a strong expression of his opinions. Among other incidents, a collision between two of the battleships was narrowly averted. On the following day the destroyers left for the Elliot Islands. At 8 p.m., in two divisions of four boats each, they shaped course to pass three miles south of San-shan-tao, and thence to Hai-yung Tao, where course was again altered for the eastern end of the Elliot Islands. The night was

Russian
destroyers sent
to reconnoitre
Elliot Islands.

calm, but rain coming on made the navigation among the islands difficult, with the result that three of the destroyers became separated from the main body. A little later it was noticed that another was not in sight, and as soon as he

had satisfied himself that there were no hostile vessels in the anchorage, the commanding officer shaped course for the appointed rendezvous in the San-shan-tao Islands where he hoped to pick up the missing ships. After waiting there for half an hour one boat rejoined, and others were sighted away to the south-east. The latter, which were steaming to the southward, were soon made out to be Japanese, and the Russian commander with his five destroyers started at once for Port Arthur. While still about sixteen miles from harbour the *Bayan* was seen to be engaged with hostile cruisers, which were also in a position to cut off the returning destroyers from their base. Fortunately for the Russians

* According to one account the sunken Japanese ships afforded a welcome protection to the Russian guardships both from the sea and from torpedo attack.

they were not detected in time, and they succeeded in reaching harbour, where the *Rastoropni* and *Smyeli* had already arrived. The *Strashni* was still absent, but before following her adventures it will be as well again to revert to the movements of the Japanese.

The bad weather which had kept the Russians in harbour had also delayed the Japanese mine-laying expedition, but on the 11th a start was made. The mines were to be placed by the 4th and 5th Destroyer Flotillas and by the 14th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, with the merchant ship *Koryo Maru*, which had been specially fitted up for the purpose. The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla acted as escort, and the 3rd Division, to which were attached the *Tokiva* and *Asama*, was to lure the Russian fleet over the mine-field and to support the destroyers if they were attacked. Out of sight from Port Arthur, but sufficiently near to render assistance and to engage the enemy if he left the protection of his shore batteries, were the 1st and 2nd Divisions which were now reinforced by the two new armoured cruisers *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*.

Before midnight on the 12th, the mine-layers were off Port Arthur, and at once proceeded to their work, while twenty miles to the eastward the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla was on guard.

Mines laid by Japanese outside Port Arthur. The mines were placed in positions over which it had been observed that the Russian fleet usually passed when manœuvring outside the harbour.

At times the searchlights shone upon the Japanese vessels, which were also observed from the *Diana*, the cruiser on guard duty at the harbour mouth, on board of which was Admiral Makarov. Yet, strangely enough, they were permitted to complete their task undisturbed. The Russian commander appears, from all accounts, to have made up his mind that they were some of his own destroyers which had been parted from their leader and were waiting for daylight to enter the harbour. He therefore gave orders that they were not to be fired upon, and it was not until the mine-layers had finished their labours and fired a few parting shots at the searchlights, that doubts as to their nationality crossed his mind for the first time. Then, however, he gave orders for their bearings and distance to be taken, with a view to sweeping the area in which they had been at work so soon as daylight should appear. Unfortunately for Admiral Makarov these orders were never carried out, perhaps because the events of the morning caused him to forget for a time those of the preceding night.

We must now return to the *Strashni*, which, after losing the remainder of her flotilla proceeded to make her way back towards Port Arthur. During the night she came across some destroyers,

which she followed unseen. The strange vessels proved to be the Japanese 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, and at daylight there was a mutual recognition of identity. The Russian vessel dashed off for Port Arthur, and a running fight ensued. The *Strashni* fired a torpedo, which passed between two of the Japanese destroyers, but after the engagement had lasted fifteen minutes she was on fire and in a sinking condition. A survivor states that a shell struck the after torpedo just as it was about to be fired and burst it. This misfortune was the cause of her sinking, but further resistance was already impossible. She had made a gallant fight against greatly superior force, and her captain and many of her crew had been killed and wounded. On the other hand the Japanese had hardly suffered at all; on board the *Ikadzuchi* five men had been wounded, but none of the other ships had been struck. The Japanese then left the *Strashni* to try and cut off the *Smyeli*, which had been observed; but just at this moment the *Bayan* came out to the assistance of the destroyers, and the Japanese fell back upon their 3rd Division, which appeared from the southward. The *Bayan*, while picking up five men belonging to the *Strashni*, opened fire at long range upon the Japanese cruisers, and was joined by the *Novik*, *Askold*, and *Diana*, all of which hurried to her assistance. The Russian battle fleet was now getting under way, and, at 8 a.m. by Port Arthur time, the *Petropavlovsk* and *Poltava* joined the cruisers. The Japanese withdrew slowly in accordance with their instructions, firing at long range and drawing the Russians after them. Then, at 8.40 a.m., when about fifteen miles from Port Arthur, the Japanese battleships appeared out of the mist which had hitherto obscured the scene, and the Russians in their turn retired at full speed until within range of their forts, when they were joined by the remainder of the battleships. At 9.30 a.m., seeing that the enemy was determined to refuse action, Admiral Togo turned to the westward, while the Russians, led by the *Petropavlovsk*, proceeded on their usual course towards Swainson Point, under the protection of the batteries. Suddenly, at 9.40 a.m., a loud report was heard, and the eyes of everyone in both fleets were turned upon the Russian flagship. She had struck a mine. The first explosion was followed by a second, and that again by a third. A vast cloud of smoke and steam hung over the water, and when it lifted the *Petropavlovsk* had disappeared. Of her whole crew only seven officers and seventy-three men were picked up, and with her perished the celebrated painter Vereshchagin.

Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomski in the *Peresvyet* now took the lead, and, after re-forming his fleet, continued to patrol in front of the

harbour. At 10.15 a.m., as the *Peresvyet* turned eastward, another report was heard, and the *Pobyeda*, the second ship, was seen to heel over. This second disaster seems to have caused something approaching a panic in the Russian fleet. Ships began to fire wildly at the water round them, apparently under the impression that they were being attacked by submarine boats; but when some sort of order had been restored, Prince Ukhtomski signalled, "Squadron to proceed into harbour." The *Pobyeda* was already on her way, and the remainder of the ships followed her in. By noon they were once more inside. At 11 a.m., Admiral Togo withdrew his battleships, leaving the 3rd Division to observe the movements of the Russians. But when they had re-entered the harbour, this division also steamed away eastward, and, on the morning of the 14th, all three Japanese divisions anchored off Thornton Haven.

The Japanese scheme had met with extraordinary success. Under the difficulties of a wet and misty night the mines had been laid in two groups exactly where the Russians were in the habit of passing. The group which was struck by the *Petroparlovsk* was a little to the southward of Lutin Rock, while the other, two miles to the south-west, accounted for the *Pobyeda*. It had been a sad day for Russia. One battleship had been lost and another severely damaged;* but a far more severe blow was the loss of Admiral Makarov, the man upon whom all hope was centred, and whose short period of command had awakened a new spirit of confidence in the Port Arthur fleet. Every contemporary account of these operations bears witness to the profound impression which the strong personality of the admiral had produced, in a few short weeks, upon the discipline of the fleet and upon the morale of his subordinates. Born of humble parentage, he had worked his way to the head of his profession through sheer force of character; and, although his career in no way proves that he was a great fleet commander, the fact that in a period of profound depression he had produced this new feeling shows him to have been a real leader of men. From the first he must have felt, and it is but just to his memory to acknowledge the fact, that the fleet was not fit to meet the Japanese with any reasonable chance of success; and his endeavours were therefore confined to pushing on the repairs to the *Tzesarevich* and *Retvizan* as quickly as possible, and at the same time to giving the remaining ships the practice in manœuvring of which they were so badly in need.

* All the spectators of the disaster to the *Petroparlovsk* are agreed that the second explosion occurred in the magazine and the third in the boilers. The mine struck by the *Pobyeda* exploded under her largest coal bunker, which happened to be full at the time and consequently localized its effect to some extent.

CHAPTER X.

ADMIRAL KAMIMURA'S OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF JAPAN; AND
THE THIRD ATTEMPT TO BLOCK PORT ARTHUR.

(Charts 4 and 5.)

ON the day following the loss of the *Petropavlovsk*, the 14th April, it was announced that the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeiev, would assume supreme command of the fleet pending the arrival of a new commander-in-chief. On the afternoon of the same day the Japanese 1st Division, with the *Kasuga* and *Nisshin* attached, the 3rd Division, with the *Tokiwa* and *Asama*, three divisions of destroyers, and one of torpedo boats, left for Port Arthur; while Admiral Kamimura, with the remainder of the 2nd Division, proceeded to the base in Korea to prepare for another expedition to Vladivostok.

The 2nd, 4th, and 5th Destroyer Flotillas and the 9th Torpedo Boat Flotilla arrived off Port Arthur about 3 a.m. There they remained till dawn, no doubt in the hope of cutting off any Russian destroyers which might be returning from nightwork. The torpedo boats again dropped some dummies with calcium lights attached, but neither they nor the destroyers were fired upon from the shore. At daylight nothing could be seen of the Russians outside the port. The 3rd Division arrived soon afterwards and two hours later came the battleships, but there was still no sign of movement among the enemy.

When about twenty miles from Port Arthur the 1st Division sighted some floating mines which had probably broken adrift from one of the Russian mine-fields. They were fired at from the ships and were successfully exploded, but otherwise the return passage to Port Arthur was without incident.

At 10 a.m., the *Kasuga* and *Nisshin*, which had been selected on account of the greater angle of elevation of their heavy armament, took up positions to the south-west of Lao-tieh Shan light-house and began an indirect bombardment of the inner harbour with their 10-inch and 8-inch guns, at a range of about nine miles. They were rather further from the shore than the position of the *Fuji* during the last bombardment and were thus outside the

mines which had been laid by Admiral Makarov since that date, but at one moment they cannot have been more than half a mile from them. The Russian battleships replied, also with indirect fire, and so great was the elevation required that the first shot from one of the 12-inch guns of the *Sevastopol* damaged the mounting irreparably. The new forts on Lao-tieh Shan also fired at the cruisers, but without effect, and they appear to have been silenced by the fire of the Japanese 6-inch guns. During the action the battleships cruised to the south-east of the promontory and, as on the former occasion, the 3rd Division was placed to the southward to observe the effect of the bombardment, which lasted for about two hours. This time no ships were hit and the only damage was done by a shell which fell in the town where it killed seven non-combatants and wounded five, most of whom were Chinamen. At 1 p.m. the Japanese fleet withdrew to its base where it anchored about noon on the 16th.

On the same day Admiral Kamimura left the base for Masampo. There he assembled his forces which consisted of the cruisers *Idzumo*, *Adzuma*, *Kasuga*, *Tokiwa*, *Iwate*, *Naniwa*, *Takachiho*, *Niitaka*, *Tsushima*, *Idzumi*, and *Chihaya*, with four destroyers, six torpedo boats, and some fleet auxiliaries. Mines were to be laid outside Vladivostok, and advantage was to be taken of any opportunity which might arise of dealing with the cruisers stationed there. On the 22nd April, Admiral Kamimura arrived at Gensan and the following day he sailed for Vladivostok, leaving behind him the collier *Kinshu Maru* and the 11th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, consisting of four boats, which were charged with a special mission. Soon after leaving Gensan, the Japanese ran into a thick fog. The further northward they went the thicker the fog became until, at 4.30 p.m. on the 24th, it was so dense as to preclude all possibility of action. Course was then shaped south for the night and, at 6 a.m. on the following morning, when in latitude 40° 50' N and longitude 132° 20' E., as the weather was no clearer, Admiral Kamimura decided to return to Gensan. For the time being he had failed to achieve the object with which he had set out, but for this the weather was accountable as will be seen by following the movements of the Russian squadron, which had selected this very moment to make its first prolonged cruise since the bombardment on the 6th March. On the 16th of that month, Rear-Admiral Iessen arrived to take command and hoisted his flag in

Bombardment of
the inner harbour.

The Vladivostok
squadron and
Admiral Kami-
mura's operations.

the *Rossiya*. By the 8th April, the ice in the harbour had melted and the channel was free for the passage of the cruisers which had hitherto been dependent upon an ice-breaker.

Between the 16th March and the 21st April, the new commander went to sea with his squadron three times; on each occasion he was out for one day only, and solely with a view to exercising. In addition he several times went out reconnoitring with a single ship, but his longest expedition was to Povorotni Point, a distance of sixty miles, and on one of these occasions the armed transport *Lena* struck on a shoal in the Bosphorus Strait. At last it was decided to make a more ambitious cruise, and on the 22nd April preparations were made for going to sea next day.

Cruise of
Admiral Iessen. At 9 a.m. on the 23rd, the day on which Admiral Kamimura left Gensan for Vladivostok, Admiral Iessen took his four cruisers out of harbour. Owing to thick fog they were kept at anchor for three hours in the Bosphorus, and again for four hours off Skryplev Island. The secret of the proposed cruise had been so carefully guarded that the ships had not been provisioned, and it was necessary to send back from the last anchorage for stores from Vladivostok. At the same time the *Rurik* was sent back as, for some unknown reason, she could not steam full speed, and the squadron was joined by torpedo boats Nos. 205 and 206. Thus constituted, the squadron sailed at 6 p.m. The object of the expedition was an attack by the torpedo boats on any Japanese vessels which might be found at Gensan, and subsequently a bombardment of Hakodate by the cruisers. As the torpedo boats eventually entered Gensan in daylight it is reasonable to suppose that they did not expect to encounter armed vessels.

At 9 p.m., speed was reduced to seven knots, for the squadron was again enveloped in a fog which did not clear until the following evening. About 10 a.m. on the 24th, the *Bogatuir* reported that she was getting signs by wireless telegraphy and Admiral Iessen came to the conclusion that he was passing a Japanese squadron about twenty miles off. In this he was correct as Admiral Kamimura was probably even closer, and but for the fog the two squadrons must have sighted one another, although the Japanese do not seem to have had any idea of the near approach of the enemy. At 8 a.m. on the 25th, the Russian squadron was within thirty miles of Gensan, and the torpedo boats were sent in at 9 a.m. with orders to blow up any Japanese ships that were there, while the cruisers lay about five miles off the harbour. The Japanese torpedo boats which had been left behind by Admiral Kamimura had just sailed,

and when the Russians steamed in about 11 a.m. they found only one Japanese merchant vessel, the *Goyo Maru*, of about six hundred tons gross tonnage. After being searched she was sunk by a torpedo, her crew escaping to the shore. At 2 p.m., the torpedo boats rejoined the cruisers and the squadron then proceeded towards Cape Chestakov. At 5 p.m., a steamer was sighted which was examined by the *Bogatuir*, and proved to be the *Haginoura Maru*, a small Japanese merchant vessel of two hundred and nineteen tons, laden with fish and vegetables. Her crew of twenty-seven was transferred to the *Bogatuir*, and she was sunk by a guncotton charge.

Soon after Admiral Kamimura left for Vladivostok news was received at Gensan that a Russian force of about two hundred and fifty men was marching by the coast road towards Pukcheng. This was an opportunity which should not be missed, and it was for that reason that the *Kinshu Maru* and the 11th Torpedo Boat Flotilla were left at Gensan on the 23rd. During the 24th some two or three hundred infantry were embarked on board the transport vessel and, at 6 a.m. on the 25th, she sailed for Iwon in Pallada Bay, escorted by the torpedo boats. Although they were quite close the hostile cruisers from Vladivostok were not sighted, and at 2 p.m. the troops were landed at their destination. No sign of the enemy could be discovered and at 6 p.m. the *Kinshu Maru* started to

The *Kinshu Maru*
sunk by the
Russians.

carry the troops back to Gensan, but owing to the threatening appearance of the weather it was considered advisable for the torpedo boats to shelter for the night at Chahopho. About 11 p.m., when off Cape Chestakov, the *Kinshu Maru* suddenly met the Russian cruisers steaming north. Mistaking them for Japanese she stopped and signalled to them. The Russians, who were then close alongside, replied by giving those on board an hour in which to leave the ship. Some availed themselves of their opportunity, but a large number of the troops refused to surrender and, when the Russian ships opened fire at the conclusion of the period of grace, they replied with their rifles until their ship was struck by a torpedo from the *Rossiya* and sank. As she went down some of the troops managed to put off in the boats, and eventually reached the shore after suffering great privations. From the prisoners he had taken the Russian commander heard, for the first time, of the presence of the Japanese squadron off the coast. Thereupon he at once abandoned all idea of bombarding Hakodate and steered to the northward of Povorotni Point. Making land on the morning of the 27th, he steamed south along the

coast and, after hearing from Povorotni lighthouse that no Japanese ships were in the neighbourhood, reached Vladivostok at 8 p.m.

At 1 p.m. on the 26th, having spent three days in dense fog, Admiral Kamimura returned to Gensan, where to his great chagrin he heard from the Japanese consul of the Russian raid.

The 11th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, which had been delayed by fog on the passage from Chahopho, also arrived in the afternoon of the 26th, and was at once dispatched to search for the *Kinshu Maru*. At 7 a.m. on the 27th, Admiral Kamimura again took his squadron to sea. The torpedo boats and the *Chihaya* were directed to search the coast, while the cruisers, destroyers, and mining vessel made for Vladivostok. On the way northward some articles belonging to the *Kinshu Maru* were picked up, from which it was evident that she had fallen into the hands of the enemy. Arriving during the afternoon of the 28th, the destroyers were sent in to reconnoitre. Although the weather was still foggy, they were seen from the shore, but, through some delay in the batteries, they were not fired upon and before midday on the

Japanese mines
laid outside
Vladivostok.

29th seventy-five mines were laid. One group of mines was laid off Skryplev Island, another to the east-south-east of Shkota Island, while a third group was placed on the south side of the Currie Channel.* The Russians must have been well aware that mines were being laid, for they were able to observe the Japanese vessels both off Shkota Island and in Ussuri Bay. At the conclusion of their work the Japanese returned to Gensan and eventually to Takeshiki.

Thus when Admiral Kamimura was compelled to return to Korea his mining operations had been accomplished, but in other respects he had met with but little success, for the Vladivostok squadron was still free to threaten the Japanese coast and overseas communications. It must, however, be acknowledged that throughout the operations the Russian squadron was extremely fortunate. In the first place it escaped a general action with a greatly superior force of whose presence it was ignorant; in the second place the torpedo boats reached Gensan at the moment when the Japanese were absent; lastly, there was the meeting with the *Kinshu Maru* in the short time during which she was unprotected.

After the departure of Admiral Kamimura for the Sea of Japan with the 2nd and 4th Divisions, the remainder of the Combined Fleet, including the 3rd Squadron under Vice-Admiral Kataoka con-

* A plan showing the position of these mines was given to the Russians at the end of the war.

centrated at the base and detachments were sent out for various services. About this time the Japanese operations may be said to have entered upon a new phase, for the day upon which the First Army under General Kuroki would force the passage of the Ya-lu could not be distant, and this operation was to be followed immediately by the landing of the Second Army under General Oku near Pi-tzu-wo. The transports conveying the troops were already assembling in the Pingyang Inlet, and for the present the first duty of the fleet was to safeguard their landing in the Liao-tung Peninsula. In addition, that portion of Admiral Kataoka's force which was under the command of Admiral Hosoya was detached to co-operate with the First Army, and a reconnaissance was made in the neighbourhood of Ta-ku-shan to find a suitable landing place for the Third Army.* The duty of the last-named force was to form a connecting link between the First and Second Armies during their march on Liao-yang, and from the first all its movements were veiled in the most profound secrecy. It was imperative that the survey of the proposed landing place should not become known to the Russians and, as their suspicions would certainly be aroused if men-of-war were seen on that portion of the coast, the work was carried out by officers in Chinese junks. On the other hand, Yen-tai Bay, which had been selected as the place of disembarkation of the Second Army, was comparatively well known, for it was here that the Japanese had landed before the capture of Port Arthur from the Chinese in 1894. No survey was therefore necessary, but it was recognized that the only means of ensuring the safety of a large fleet of transports so near to the Russian base was to establish a very strict blockade in place of the isolated attacks which had hitherto been made. Preparations for a third attempt to block the exit were already nearly complete, but whether successful or not it could only form a part of the scheme, and in either event the continuous blockade must be undertaken. As the coast of Korea was much too far distant from the proposed scene of action, the first necessity was to set up a new base in some more suitable spot, and for this purpose the Elliot Islands were selected, but since they might have been freely visited by the Russians in the intervals between the various attacks, it was considered advisable, as a precautionary

* The force which eventually landed near Ta-ku-shan was the 10th Division, and expanded later into the Fourth Army. The Third Army remained at Port Arthur. See p. 170.

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measure, to sweep the anchorage very thoroughly in search of mines before any use was made of it. This duty was entrusted to the 3rd Division under Admiral Dewa, who was also responsible for the survey work near Ta-ku-shan. But for the present the blockade which, although the Third attempt to block the harbour of Port Arthur. Japanese did not yet realize it, was to last many months, was of less importance than the third attempt to seal the exit from the harbour.

For this expedition twelve ships had been prepared. When it is remembered that practically the whole available merchant shipping of Japan had been requisitioned as transport for the Second Army the sacrifice of twenty-one vessels gives some idea of the importance which was attached by the Japanese to their blocking operations. It must also be remembered that although, owing to remarkable skill and good fortune, the loss of life in the first and second attempts was not great the risks were immense, and each succeeding effort was rendered more hazardous by the fresh obstacles which were created by the Russians as the result of the experience they had gained. Owing, it is said, to a wish expressed by the Emperor, the officers and men who had risked their lives on the earlier occasions were not again selected, and crews for the twelve vessels were made up from fresh volunteers. As before, the call for men met with a most enthusiastic response, especially from the men of the Third Squadron, who had so far had little opportunity of taking part in the actual fighting. The officer chosen to command the expedition was Commander Mineo Hayashi, the captain of the *Chokai*, who was on board the *Shibata Maru*. The names of the vessels which had been prepared and their respective commanders were as follows :—

Name of Vessel.	Gross Tonnage.	Commander.
<i>Shibata Maru</i> ...	2,783	Lieutenant Yunosuke Toya
<i>Fusan Maru</i> ...	2,501	Lieutenant Mineo Osumi
<i>Sakura Maru</i> ...	2,978	Lieutenant Yoshie Shiraishi
<i>Kokura Maru</i> ...	2,596	Lieutenant-Commander Masateru Fukuda
<i>Asagao Maru</i> ...	2,464	Lieutenant Kikutaro Muko
<i>Mikawa Maru</i> ...	1,403	Lieutenant Tane tsugu Sosa
<i>Nagato Maru</i> ...	1,884	Lieutenant-Commander Juro Tanaka
<i>Sagami Maru</i> ...	1,926	Lieutenant Takejiro Yusa
<i>Totomi Maru</i> ...	1,953	Lieutenant-Commander Chikatami Honda
<i>Aikoku Maru</i> ...	1,781	Lieutenant Taro Inudzuka
<i>Yedo Maru</i> ...	1,724	Lieutenant Tadao Takayanagi
<i>Otaru Maru</i> ...	2,547	Lieutenant Ben Nomura

In addition, a sub-lieutenant, an engineer, and a crew of from fifteen to twenty men were attached to each ship, making a total of thirty-seven officers and two hundred and seven men.

The vessels had been specially fitted up for the work they were to perform, under the superintendence of one of the officers who had taken part in an earlier attempt, and at his suggestion some improvements had been effected. Guns were again mounted to keep off guardboats, and on this occasion searchlights were also carried in some of the ships; probably with a view to assisting those which followed. The arrangements for sinking were much as before, but the electrical apparatus for exploding the charges was fitted with duplicate circuits. Certain of the vessels also carried mines which they were to drop just before they entered the narrowest part of the channel. Needless to say that these were to be the last vessels to make the rush, but properly to appreciate the difficulties which must be overcome it will be as well to review the steps which had been taken by the defenders to frustrate any fresh attempts to curtail their power of offensive action.

The positions of the ships which had been sunk, and of the old Chinese boom which was also utilized as an obstruction can be seen in the accompanying plate. Across the gullet was another boom which was fitted with torpedo nets reaching nearly to the bottom, and just behind it were the gunboats which acted as guardships. In addition to these obstructions, electro-contact mines, which could be controlled from the shore, had been laid in two groups, one on each side of the fairway. This was probably the work of a company of submarine miners who arrived at Port Arthur on the 10th April, for about that date one hundred and thirty-five mines were laid. The western group consisted of three lines of mines and extended in an east-south-east direction for about six cables from a point on the Tiger Peninsula one mile outside the entrance, and was thus half a mile outside the western boom. The eastern group also consisted of three lines and curved away to the south-west from Lutin Rock for about three cables, and thence in a westerly direction for another eight cables. The western end of the second mine-field was thus four cables from the eastern end of the first field, and was some distance inside it. The line of leading marks into the harbour led just clear of the end of each field. Inside the eastern mine-field was a further obstruction of which no details are known, but which appears to have consisted of booms and steel nets. It extended from the

Fresh Russian
defences at Port
Arthur.

middle of the bay west of Lutin Rock to within about a cable and a half of the *Khailar*, thus leaving a narrow passage on the leading marks. From this brief description it will be seen that the strength of the defences had been enormously increased since the middle of April, and that the difficulties which the Japanese were compelled to face were very great.

These difficulties were partially realized, and Admiral Togo decided to make a preliminary reconnaissance under cover of darkness. His object in doing so was to make certain of the positions of the searchlights and to afford the officers who were to take part in the expedition an opportunity of obtaining a vivid impression of the fortress as it appeared at night from seaward. This duty was entrusted to Rear-Admiral Nashiba, the second in command of the battle fleet, with whom, in addition to his own sub-division, were the *Yakumo* and the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Destroyer Flotillas. The 3rd Flotilla was to pretend to be occupied in laying mines, while the officers who were to command the blockships were to make note of the entrance from on board the ships of the 4th and 5th Flotillas.

With these instructions Admiral Nashiba left the coast of Korea early on the 27th April, and at 2 p.m. he detached his destroyers, which reached Port Arthur shortly after midnight. A few ineffectual shots were fired at the 3rd Flotilla at a range of over two miles, and the Russians were undoubtedly induced to believe that mines were being laid. The remaining destroyers were not interfered with in any way, and in the morning the three flotillas rejoined Admiral Nashiba. The whole detachment returned on the morning of the 29th.

The force which was employed in this, the third, blocking expedition consisted of the 1st and 3rd Divisions of the Combined Fleet and the *Akagi* and *Chokai* from the 3rd Squadron, together with four out of the five destroyer flotillas (the 1st Flotilla was with Admiral Kamimura) and the 9th, 10th, 14th, and 16th Torpedo Boat Flotillas. Nothing now remained except to make the attempt which had been so carefully prepared. The First Army was expected to cross the Ya-lu on the 1st May, and it was decided that Admiral Togo was to make his great effort on the following night, so as to ensure a safe passage for the transports of the Second Army. But as it was recognized that the chances, both of success and of rescuing the crews, would depend greatly upon the weather, it was arranged

Admiral Togo's
plans.

Date fixed for
the attempt.

that if the conditions were not favourable at 7 p.m. on the chosen night the attempt would be deferred.

When, however, the blockships and the escort of torpedo craft parted company with the fleet at 7 p.m. on the 2nd May, everything appeared to be in their favour. But these conditions did not last, and about 10 p.m. a strong south-east wind sprang up which drove in a heavy sea on the coast and scattered the blockships. In these circumstances Commander Hayashi felt compelled to suspend the operations, but his signals were received by two ships only, with the result that the remainder reached Port Arthur in isolated groups.*

The first vessels to arrive were some of the escort which came under fire from the batteries and guardships about 1 a.m. on the 3rd. The moment the alarm was given the Viceroy went on board the *Otvazhni*, whence he directed the operations of the defenders. The firing was seen almost immediately by the *Mikawa Maru*, which was the first of the blockships to come up, and she at once dashed for the entrance under the impression that her consorts were already engaged. She was met by the guns of the three guardships *Gilyak*, *Otvazhni*, and *Gremyashchi*, as well as by the shore batteries, all of which had been put on the alert by the appearance of the escorting destroyers. Pushing on in the face of heavy fire directed under the rays of the searchlights, she was fortunate enough to pass between the mine-fields, but she grazed the end of the boom which was inside the eastern field, and, turning to port, crossed the line of leading marks inside the *Khailar*. Being no doubt under the impression that the boom he had struck was inside the gullet, Lieutenant Sosa anchored his ship in the position shown on the plate and blew her up.

The next ships to arrive were the *Sakura Maru* and *Totomi Maru*, which came up together about half an hour later. Like the *Mikawa Maru*, they dashed straight for the entrance. The *Sakura Maru* seems to have traversed the eastern mine-field in safety and to have run into the boom beyond, the centre part of which she dragged nearly as far as the sunken *Shilka*, where she was sunk by her commander in the position shown in Plate 8. The

* The description of the events of this night has been taken mainly from the Russian journal "Russkaya Starina," for April, 1907. The statements it contains agree so closely with the positions in which the vessels were found when the entrance was re-surveyed, that it stands out from among the various accounts of both sides as substantially correct.

Totomi Maru got no further than the western end of the same boom, where she sank, either because she struck a mine, as claimed by the Russians, or because, as stated in Japanese accounts, her captain blew her up under the impression that he was across the entrance.

At 2.40 a.m., the third group, consisting of the *Yedo Maru*, *Otaru Maru*, and *Sagami Maru*, approached the harbour. The commander of the first-named vessel was killed by a shell as he neared the mine-field. Sub-Lieutenant Nagata at once took charge, but the *Yedo Maru* did not get beyond the western end of the eastern mine-field where she blew up and sank. The *Otaru Maru* escaped the mine-field and broke through the boom at its western end. Following much the same course as the *Mikawa Maru*, she passed beyond that ship, but as her helm had been disabled by gun fire she anchored and was blown up. Meanwhile the captain of the *Sagami Maru* seeing the state of confusion into which the blockships had been thrown, and appreciating the danger to which they would be exposed if he were to drop his mines as had been intended, threw them overboard before approaching the entrance. Then, after crossing safely over the mine-field, he passed the eastern boom through a breach, which had probably been made by the *Sakuru Maru*, and came abreast of that ship. At that point he also destroyed his ship under the impression that he had reached the entrance to the harbour.

At 3.10 a.m., the last group, the *Aikoku Maru* and the *Asagao Maru*, appeared. The former ship struck a mine and sank in the eastern field; while the latter ran ashore under Electric Cliff with her steering gear damaged. These were the last two vessels to arrive, and with their disappearance the attack came to an end. Four remain to be accounted for. As soon as Captain Hayashi* realized that most of the ships under his command had not received his order to suspend operations he proceeded to follow them in. When five miles from Port Arthur the steering gear of his ship, the *Shibata Maru*, was disabled, and by the time the necessary repairs were effected daylight had appeared and his opportunity was past. The *Nagato Maru* and *Kokura Maru* had received Captain Hayashi's order, and the last ship, the *Fusan Maru*, had broken down before leaving the Combined Fleet and had therefore taken no part in the night's work.

Thus only eight ships had made the attempt. Owing to the mines, the obstacles, and the tornado of shell from the guardships and

* Captain Hayashi was killed at the battle of Nan Shan on the 26th May on board the *Chokai*.

forts, none of the eight had succeeded in getting within three or four cables of the entrance, but some of the survivors of the blockships were convinced that they had reached their goal and even reported that they had done so. The fate of the crews, although glorious, was terrible. Very many were killed or wounded by the shell fire; and of those who survived this ordeal few escaped. The destroyers and torpedo boats, remaining under fire, searched the seas with the utmost gallantry, until daylight, and succeeded in recovering sixty-three men, of whom twenty were wounded. The strong wind from the south-east was driving in a heavy sea, and against it the survivors had to make their way in boats which in some cases had been damaged by the enemy's guns. Others remained clinging to the masts and rigging of the sunken ships, and in the morning were found by the Russians in a semi-frozen condition, unable to resist but unwilling to be taken. Still others, according to the Russian accounts, succeeded in reaching the shore, where they refused to surrender and continued to fight against overpowering odds until they were killed.

Failure of the attempt to block the harbour.

In the rest of the fleet the casualties were few. While engaged in the work of rescuing survivors from the blockships, torpedo boat No. 67 was struck by a shell, which wounded three of her crew and damaged her engines. Seeing that she was unable to steam, No. 70 came to her assistance and towed her out of range of the guns, which were still firing upon her. The torpedo boat *Aotaka* also had her engines damaged and a man killed, and the torpedo boat *Hayabusa* had one man killed.

In the morning Admiral Togo brought his battle fleet on to the scene about 8.30 a.m. The weather was thick, and the entrance could not be distinguished, but two blockships were found outside, one of which was the *Shibata Maru*. Gradually the gunboats, destroyers, and torpedo boats assembled, bringing in their reports from the survivors of the night's work. From their accounts Admiral Togo came to the conclusion that the harbour was at last blocked, and when he saw no signs of any vessels coming out, as had been the case on previous occasions, he felt justified in reporting to Japan that the third blocking expedition had been successful. This we now know was far from being the case. Indeed it cannot be said that the third expedition had gone so near to success as the second, but the conditions had been infinitely more difficult. The sudden change in the weather, which had caused the ships to lose touch and thus to make their effort singly or in groups instead of

in one rush, had contributed to the failure of the attempt. Then again, the mine-fields, booms, and sunken vessels had all had their share in frustrating the Japanese plans. Lastly, it must be remembered that except for the case of the *Merrimac* in the Spanish-American war, on which they were admittedly founded, these attacks were a new factor in naval warfare; and it has yet to be proved that in the face of a well-defended fortress there is any reasonable chance of their success. Certainly no finer example of dash and self-sacrifice was ever shown, by any nation at any period of history, than that which was displayed by the Japanese on the morning of the 3rd May, 1904.

CHAPTER XI.


THE BATTLE OF THE YA-LU.

(Plans 2 and 3.)

THE story of the third attempt to close the exit from Port Arthur has led us to anticipate events to some extent, and we must now retrace our steps to the River Ya-lu, where Lieutenant-General Zasulich was preparing to oppose the passage of the Japanese First Army. The position which had been taken up by the Russian commander extended from a point some four miles to the west of An-tung, through Chiu-lien-cheng to a bend on the Ai River a short distance beyond the Kuan-tien-cheng road. Opposite the centre at Chiu-lien-cheng the valley measures from three to four miles in width, and consists of a sandy plain broken up into many islands by the maze-like branches of the Ya-lu River and its tributary the Ai Ho. The ground in the valley is open and there is no cover except behind the patches of low trees and scrub which grow on the islands of Kintei and Oseki, or under the banks of the several channels of the river. That it was not intended to offer a very obstinate resistance to the crossing seems probable from the fact that the position covered a front of twenty miles, and that the high ground north of Wiju at the confluence of the rivers was merely held by an outpost. At that point is a rocky height called Tiger Hill, half a mile in length and five hundred feet high, which has the appearance of an isolated feature rising from the river bed, although in reality it is a southern offshoot from higher ground, with which it is connected by a col or neck. Posted on this hill artillery, up to the limit of its range, could frustrate any attempt to cross the valley except by night, while the same locality, if in the hands of the Japanese, would serve as a pivot from which to operate against either flank or the centre of the Russian position. Of this position only that portion which lies north of Chiu-lien-cheng was to be subjected to attack. Between that village and Ching-kou numerous spurs are thrown out towards the river from the high ground in

The Ya-lu
position.

BATTLE OF THE YA-LU.



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VIEW LOOKING ACROSS THE YA-LU & AI RIVERS TOWARDS THE RUSSIAN POSITION
GENERAL KUROKI'S HEADQUARTERS DURING THE BATTLE

rear, whence they drop steeply until they meet the valley, and usually terminate in knolls varying from one hundred and fifty to two hundred feet in height. At the foot of the spurs were infantry entrenchments, placed with a command of about twenty feet over the sandy plain in front. These works, which might easily have been made almost invisible by utilizing broken ground, were conspicuous at a distance to the naked eye and consisted of breastworks revetted with boughs, with a trench in rear. Epaulments for twelve guns had been prepared on the high ground west of Chiu-lien-cheng but, like the infantry defences, they were not concealed and moreover they lacked solidity. Lateral communications were difficult, and for guns were only possible along indifferent tracks, while the line of retreat was limited to a single road.*

The main strength of the position lay in its extensive field of fire, and in the obstacles afforded by the rivers in front of it. Of these rivers the Ai, which was ninety yards in breadth and rarely more than four or five feet deep, ran at a distance varying from three hundred to eight hundred yards from the Russian trenches. The Ya-lu flowed in two streams, both of which were unfordable. The southern channel averaged two hundred and thirty yards in breadth and the main stream three hundred and eighty yards.

The date upon which the attempt to force the passage of the rivers was to be made was selected so as to coincide as nearly as possible with the landing of the Second Army, whose intended movements were communicated to General Kuroki in the following message:—

“The Second Army will begin its landing at the mouth of the Ta-sha Ho† on the 1st May, and its disembarkation will take about forty-five days. The First Army will therefore advance as far as Tang-shan-cheng (midway between An-tung and Feng-huang-cheng) where it will entrench itself and wait until the Second Army has finished its disembarkation. The two armies will then cooperate.” These instructions were received on the 17th April, and the Japanese, who had crossed the Ya-lu in face of the Chinese in 1894, were fully aware of the difficulties which had to be overcome. It was of the first importance that for the next ten days the strength of the attack should be concealed, and that the point of passage should be hidden from the Russian general in order that he might continue to maintain the wide front taken up by his troops. This object could only be accomplished by making

* It would seem that a track leading through Liu-chia-kou to Feng-huang-cheng was also intended to be used.

† In the Kuan-tung Peninsula.

feints by sea as well as on land, and by utilizing every artifice that ingenuity could devise. The advanced guard, as it approached Wiju, erected screens of *kao-liang* and trees at every point where the road passed over high ground south of the town. This precaution was necessary, because at those points the road was exposed to view from the right bank of the Ya-lu, and troops and guns could have been counted as they moved along it. On arriving near the Ya-lu, the three divisions* of General Kuroki's army were kept in the neighbourhood of Wiju, hidden in the low ground between the banks of the river and the heights to the south. To each division a section of the river bank was allotted for purposes of defence, and the sentry line, which was always kept concealed, ran along the left bank of the southern channel. No one was permitted to ascend the high ground on this bank, and the utmost care was exercised to hide all movements from the Russians.

During this period also, the Sasaki detachment was recalled from Chyangsyong, but one battalion of infantry,† one squadron, and a mountain battery were left there as a flank guard to the army. The remainder of the detachment rejoined the 12th Division on the 29th April.

North of the Ya-lu, General Zasulich had assumed command on the 22nd April, and on the 26th, in accordance with his orders, the Russian troops‡ were disposed as follows :—

Russian troops
on the Ya-lu.

At An-tung, under Major-General Kashtalinski—

2½ battalions of the 10th Regiment.

2 companies of the 24th Regiment.

1st/3rd and 2nd/3rd Batteries.

1 machine gun company.

Mounted scouts of the 9th, 10th, and 11th Regiments.

In all, approximately, 2,580 bayonets, 400 scouts, 16 field guns, and 8 machine guns.

At Chiu-lien-cheng, under Major-General Trusov—

12th Regiment.

22nd Regiment.

* For the order of battle of the Japanese First Army see Appendix D.

† Believed to have been the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment; it was recalled in time for the battle of the Ya-lu, and was replaced by three battalions of Guard *Kobi* troops under Colonel Yoshida.

‡ All the infantry and artillery were East Siberian units. I/22nd stands for 1st Battalion, 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment; and 3rd/6th Battery, for 3rd Battery, 6th East Siberian Artillery Brigade.

2nd/6th and 3rd/6th Batteries.

Mounted scouts of the 12th and 22nd Regiments.

In all, approximately, 5,200 bayonets, 240 scouts, and 16 guns.

At Tien-tzu, in reserve—

9th Regiment.

11th Regiment.

3rd/3rd Battery.

In all, approximately, 5,200 to 5,400 bayonets and 16 guns.

From An-ping-ho to Hsiao-pu-hsi-ho, forty miles up the river, watching the left flank, under Colonel Kartsev*—

6 squadrons of the 1st Argun Cossack Regiment.

5 squadrons of the Ussuri Cossack Regiment.†

1 battalion of the 24th Regiment.

1 company of the 10th Regiment.

1 mountain battery.

In all, approximately, 1,250 sabres, 1,000 bayonets, and 8 mountain guns.

From Ta-tung-kou, at the mouth of the Ya-lu, to Ta-ku-shan, watching the right flank, under Major-General Mishchenko—

1st Chita Cossack Regiment.

2½ squadrons of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment.

1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Battery.

2¾ battalions of the 21st Regiment.

1st/6th Battery.

In all, approximately, 1,100 sabres, 2,400 bayonets, 8 field, and 6 horse artillery guns.

In addition, the following units were in rear, guarding the line of communication, viz.—

2 companies of the 24th Regiment, at Feng-huang-cheng.

2 companies of the 24th Regiment, from Ta-ku-shan to Hai-cheng.

2 companies of the 24th Regiment and 1 company of the 10th Regiment, from An-tung to Lien-shan-kuan.

The combatant strength of the above troops of the Eastern Force‡, excluding the seven companies on the line of communication, amounted to some 16,000 bayonets, 2,350 sabres, and 650 mounted scouts, with 48 field guns, 8 mountain guns, and 6 horse

* This force was at one time under Colonel Trukhin, but the command was taken over by Colonel Kartsev some days before the battle of the Ya-lu.

† One squadron of this regiment was detached further up the Ya-lu with Colonel Madritov's detachment.

‡ For the order of battle of the Eastern Force, see Appendix D.

artillery guns. The extreme front watched by this force extended from Pi-tzu-wo through Ta-tung-kou to Hsiao-pu-hsi-ho, a distance of about one hundred and seventy-two miles. The line of retreat was to be on Feng-huang-cheng, but the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment was to fall back on Hai-cheng.

About this time, General Kuropatkin's dispatches to his subordinate commander on the Ya-lu are full of interest. In one he shows anxiety regarding the difficulties of retreat by the single road leading to Feng-huang-cheng, and points out the necessity for keeping it in good repair; in others he enquires whether the position at that place has been fortified, what measures have been taken to destroy supplies on retirement, and draws attention to the undesirability of any trophies falling into the hands of the Japanese. He seems to have been fully aware of General Zasulich's detailed dispositions, for he refers to the necessity of avoiding the inter-mixture of units of the two divisions, and expresses the hope that the distribution of troops, down to companies, under the command of General Kashtalinski, has been made "not contrary to the opinion of that general officer." In one of his later dispatches, received shortly before the battle, he concludes with the hope that the enemy will be resisted with the necessary firmness, but also with prudence, and reminds General Zasulich that he is posted on the Ya-lu "not for a decisive action with the enemy in superior numbers." On the 25th April, he reiterates his instructions that General Zasulich's duty is to delay the crossing of the Japanese, and to observe their numbers and organization; that he is not to allow himself to be involved in an unequal combat, but should retire slowly, keeping in close touch with the enemy.*

The Japanese, on their side, had lost no time in adding to their information regarding the enemy's numbers and position. Spies, scouts, and officers with telescopes posted on the heights behind Wiju all served a useful purpose. Their task was much facilitated by the lack of concealment on the part of the Russians, who not only showed themselves on the high ground across the river but watered their horses at the Ai Ho, and exercised them on the sandy flats in the river bed. The temptation to punish them for their temerity by opening fire with artillery, although great, was resisted.

* There is good reason to believe that General Zasulich had conflicting orders. On the one hand, General Kuropatkin wished him to fight a rear guard action, while on the other, Admiral Alexeiev pressed him to offer a vigorous resistance.

By the 22nd April, the strength of General Zasluch's force was estimated at 5,000 cavalry, 15,000 infantry, and 60 guns, and the general line of his entrenchments and the nature of the defences about An-tung were known.*

Up to the 24th, no definite knowledge of the river had been gained, while the changes which had occurred in its channel since it was crossed in 1894, made the existing maps useless. The old fords could no longer be found, and points which had then been out of rifle range were now exposed to fire.

By the 25th, a considerable quantity of bridging material had been accumulated, but a certain amount, which had been sent round by sea, was prevented by the enemy from ascending the river to Wiju. At the same time it served to fix General Zasluch's attention on his right flank, and to deceive him as to the intended crossing higher up the stream. But the reconnaissance of the main channels of the Ai and the Ya-lu could not be completed so long as the Russian outposts held the Kyuri, Oseki, and Kintei Islands.

On the evening of the 25th, therefore, six Japanese batteries were placed in positions whence they could shell the islands and could assist in an infantry attack. Two batteries of the Guard artillery were posted at Syohodong, two more were near Genkado, and two batteries belonging to the 12th Division were near Ryumonken. Two gunboats, two armed steamers, and two torpedo boats from the Hosoya squadron steamed up the river to take part in the operations and, at 9.45 p.m., two battalions of the 2nd Division crossed in pontoons to Kintei Island, where they landed without opposition, and the 2nd Pioneer Battalion immediately began to throw a bridge across the river at Syohodong. This success was followed up at 4 a.m. on the 26th, when the outpost battalion of the Guards started to cross the river in pontoons and some adapted junks. All went well until mid-stream was reached, when a Russian sentry hearing the splash of oars set fire to some huts and discovered the approaching danger.† Volleys were poured upon the boats, killing and wounding several men, but the rowers kept their course and, when the shore was reached, the Russians were driven off with a loss of eighteen killed and wounded. Both Kintei and Kyuri Islands were now in Japanese hands, and

* It will be observed that the Japanese estimate of the Russian numbers only exceeded the actual force present on the 22nd April by 1,000 men. The estimate of guns was two less than the actual number.

† Some accounts state that the sentry set fire to torches which had been prepared.

these reverses led the Russians to withdraw their outposts from Tiger Hill, although they still retained possession of the village of Chukodai, which lies opposite to Wiju. There they were permitted to remain for the present, but the Japanese occupied Tiger Hill and were able to push their outposts forward to the left bank of the main stream, as well as to send across scouting parties which interrupted communication between the Russian detachment at An-ping-ho and General Zasulich's head-quarters. The reconnaissance of the river could now be undertaken, and work was forthwith begun on the necessary bridges, of which ten were eventually constructed. Their aggregate length amounted to 1,630 yards,* one-third of which was built of regular pontoons, the remainder of materials obtained locally, or brought from the landing place at Rikaho.

The bridging party at Syohodong was shelled by about six Russian guns posted north-east of Chiu-lien-cheng. The fire was accurate, but its effect was very slight and, as the Japanese were determined not to disclose their arrangements, they did not consider it necessary to reply, although the work of construction was considerably delayed and was not completed until the 27th. During the night of the 27th-28th, a shorter bridge was built a little lower down stream to carry guns; and between the 26th and 28th four others, A, B, C, and D, were thrown across to Kyuri Island. These last played an important part in the movement which preceded the attack, as the double means of passage which they afforded permitted wheeled traffic to come and go continuously, but the bridge at Syohodong may have been merely a blind, for no further

* DETAIL OF BRIDGES CONSTRUCTED.

	Length.		Nature.	Time taken in Construction.
		Yards.		Hours.
Bridge to Kintei Island ...	256	Trestle ...	45	
Bridge to Kintei Island ...	87	Trestle ...	8	
Bridge A	122	Trestle ...	16	
Bridge B	116	Trestle ...	13	
Bridge C	37	Trestle ...	} 9	
Bridge D	33	Trestle ...		
Bridge E	257	Pontoon ...	8	
Bridge F	99	Pontoon (?) ...	8	
Bridge G	336	Trestle ...	10	
Bridge at Suikuchin ...	287	Mostly pontoon	13	
Total length... ..	1,630	

use was made of it. All the bridges were subjected to artillery fire from time to time, but since shrapnel shell alone was used none of them were destroyed.

Although the Russians had fallen back from Tiger Hill on the 26th, they still held the high ground to the north of it, and kept their sentries posted on the right bank of the Ya-lu. Little was known about this district but, as the plan contemplated by the Japanese involved a march across it, the Chinese inhabitants were examined and reconnaissances involving considerable risk were made by officers. From these sources it was ascertained that the ground, although difficult, was not impassable, and that it could be traversed by troops lightly equipped and also by mountain guns. Armed with this information the actual point for crossing the Ya-lu could be fixed. At Suikuchin, north of Wiju, the river runs in two channels; and contrary to expectation the stream on the northern, or Russian, side was found to be the shallower. To throw a bridge to the island would not be difficult, and meanwhile a covering position could be taken upon the hills in front by troops sent across the river in pontoons. It was decided, therefore, that the 12th Division should cross at Suikuchin, and that the attack of the First Army should be delivered on a front from Chukodai to Sa-lan-kou on the Ai Ho.

For the proper timing of this movement, the 12th Division had to cross the Ya-lu one day before⁶ the other troops, an operation which involved its temporary isolation. It was felt, however, that the risk would not be great, for the Russians still maintained a passive attitude and did not seem to be affected by the movements on their left. Moreover, their attention had been drawn to the right by the appearance of the detachment from Admiral Hosoya's squadron on the 25th and 26th.*

At 10 a.m. on the 28th April, General Kuroki issued orders for the attack to take place on the 1st May.

- (1) On the 29th, the 12th Division was to cross the Ya-lu at Suikuchin and was to advance to Nan-huang-kou.
- (2) On the 30th,

The 12th Division was to advance to the line Hsia-ling-tao-kou—hill 955, and was to push out a detachment to hill 630.

* There also appears to have been a small detachment of infantry of the 2nd Division at Yongampo, see Plate 5.

The 2nd Division was to assemble east of Wiju, near Shasando, by 10 p.m. and, starting at midnight, was to march by bridges C, A, E, and F to Chukodai Island* ; but the artillery was to occupy its position on Kintei Island.

The Guard Division was to assemble between Wiju and Hibokudo and was to follow the 2nd Division. A portion was to occupy Oseki Island, and the main body was to assemble north-east of Genkado.

The howitzers were to cross to Kintei Island and were to take up positions which had been prepared.

- (3) On the 1st May, the troops were to be in position at dawn, The 12th Division from Hsia-ling-tao-kou along the left bank of the Ai Ho to near Li-tzu-yuan. A detachment was to be sent towards Chiao-chia-kou.

The 2nd Division from Hu-shan to I-ho-chien at the south end of Chukodai Island.

The Guard Division from Li-tzu-yuan to Hu-shan, moving behind the 2nd Division.

The reserve, which consisted of two infantry and two cavalry regiments, was to assemble on Kyuri Island and to advance to Oseki Island, with the exception of one battalion which was to act as escort to the guns on Kintei Island.

It will be observed that, in accordance with these orders, the 2nd and Guard Divisions would follow the same route. This procedure, although liable to cause delay, was necessary, because the main stream of the Ya-lu was broad and in close proximity to the enemy, and the pontoons available were only sufficient for a single bridge. The 2nd Division was to lead, for the distance to be marched by it was somewhat greater than that to be traversed by the Guards, who were not required to be in position at such an early hour as the troops on their left.

To carry out its orders and cross the Ya-lu on the night of the 29th, the 12th Division began preparations for bridging the river at an early hour on that date, and to protect the engineers engaged in the work three batteries were placed in position near Chukyuri.

* This island was to be reached by crossing the two bridges E and F—constructed on the 30th April—and by passing immediately north of Tiger Hill.

The Russian troops at this point originally consisted of five companies of infantry (one battalion of the 24th Regiment and one company of the 10th Regiment), six mountain guns, and three squadrons of the Ussuri Cossack Regiment. This detachment formed part of Colonel Kartsev's flank guard and was under the command of Colonel Lechitski; but, on the morning of the 27th, that officer received orders from General Zasulich to retire to Hung-shih-la, or even to join Colonel Kartsev near Hsiao-pu-hsi-ho, if Li-tzu-yuan were occupied by the Japanese. On the morning of the 28th, Colonel Lechitski, in view of the continued presence of the Japanese on Tiger Hill and of reports that more were crossing further north, decided that the time to retire had come. He therefore withdrew with two companies of the 24th Regiment and four mountain guns to Hung-shih-la; one company of the 24th Regiment was sent to watch the roads from Hsia-ling-tao-kou, while the remainder of the detachment (two companies of infantry, two mountain guns, and three squadrons of cavalry) remained at An-ping-ho under Lieutenant-Colonel Gusev.

When, at 11 a.m. on the 29th, the Japanese moved forward to the river bank, covered by the fire of their batteries at Chukyuri, they encountered but little opposition, and by 2 p.m. a battalion of infantry was safely established on the right bank. In the face of greatly superior force Colonel Gusev fell back, with his infantry and guns, upon Colonel Lechitski at Hung-shih-la, and at the same time sent his cavalry to join the remainder of the left flank detachment under Colonel Kartsev. As soon as General Zasulich received news of the activity of the 12th Japanese Division he decided to send a battalion of the 22nd Regiment and four guns of the 3rd/6th Battery to join Colonel Lechitski. This reinforcement would, it was hoped, be sufficient to force the Japanese back across the Ya-lu, for the movement of the 12th Division was still regarded as a mere feint. This view of the situation was apparently shared at the army head-quarters, for when a report of what had occurred was sent to General Kuropatkin, he replied that the detachment at An-ping-ho seemed to have fallen back too hastily and too far, and that it was important not to lose touch of the enemy. According to his view the Japanese operations against General Zasulich's left were wanting in that energy which usually betokens a movement more serious than a mere demonstration. Nevertheless, he impressed upon his subordinate the necessity for keeping

Movements of
the Russian
flank guard.

The crossing of
the Ya-lu, the
29th April.

a careful watch along the whole front of his position, and for preparing to meet a serious attack upon his left and centre, a counsel which was reiterated in a later dispatch. However, the order to reinforce Colonel Lechitski appears to have been delayed, for it was not at once carried into effect, and on the 30th it was countermanded. Meanwhile the passage of the river by the leading troops of the Japanese 12th Division had been immediately followed by the construction of a bridge across the main stream of the Ya-lu. At the site selected the river was two hundred and twenty yards wide, twenty-four feet deep, and flowed with a velocity of about four miles an hour. Numerous anchors were required to keep the pontoons in position, and, as military material was not forthcoming in sufficient quantities, some native junks were used.

On this date, the 29th, while the rest of the First Army was waiting for the 12th Division to establish itself on the right bank, a small force of Russians suddenly assumed the offensive further south. At 4 p.m., a battalion of the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, the mounted scouts of the 10th and 12th Regiments, and two guns of the 3rd/6th Battery crossed the valley of the Ai from opposite Li-tzu-yuan and, supported by artillery fire from Po-te-tien-tzu, forced the Guards' outpost company on Tiger Hill to fall back to Kyuri Island. The retreat was conducted in good order, and, as the enemy did not show himself over the brow of the hill, only a few shells were fired by the Guard Artillery. The loss of the hill in no way affected General Kuroki's plans, but prevented bridge E from being made during the night of the 29th, as had been intended, and to facilitate its rapid construction on the following day, materials were collected near Genkado.

The same night, with a view to assisting the 12th Division to occupy its allotted position on the right of the army, the artillery of the 2nd Division and the howitzers crossed the short bridge leading to Kintei, and were entrenched before daybreak in the sandy soil of that island. In order effectually to conceal the howitzers, screens of drift timber and trees were placed a short distance in front of the batteries; great care was also exercised lest the general view of the landscape should appear altered from the Russian side. Water was sprinkled in front of the batteries to keep down dust, platforms were erected, hidden in trees on the flanks, whence officers could watch the fire effect, and two observation posts connected with the batteries by telephone were placed upon the hills south of Wijū. These posts and the batteries were furnished with duplicate maps of the enemy's

position, divided into squares, so that observers might direct the fire of the howitzers upon any point where a suitable target appeared. So well were the howitzers hidden, that on this date and on the 1st May not a single Russian shell reached them. As a further precaution both the howitzers and the guns of the 2nd Division were to remain silent on the 30th April. Their orders, however, allowed them to fire if a good opportunity arose, or to reply if the enemy opened a cannonade.

On the morning of the 30th April, the Russians who had occupied Tiger Hill on the previous evening were observed to be busily engaged in entrenching themselves, whereupon the
The 30th April. artillery of the Guard Division opened fire. No reply came from the enemy's guns, whose custom it had been to shell the Japanese daily about 7 a.m. At 10 a.m., some Japanese infantry in two or three boats began the survey of the main stream opposite Chukodai, and at 10.30 a.m. the 2nd/6th Battery, posted on the high ground north-east of Chiu-lien-cheng, opened fire upon them. The guns and howitzers on Kintei Island replied, and in half an hour the Russian artillery was silenced.* About 11 a.m., four guns from the 3rd/6th Battery opened fire from the knoll east of Ma-kou, but were silenced by a few rounds from three batteries of the Guard Artillery, which had advanced to Kyuri Island at 4 a.m.

While this artillery duel was in progress the 12th Division was approaching its allotted position. The bridge at Suikuchin was to have been ready at midnight, but unexpected difficulties delayed its completion until 3 a.m. on the 30th. At that hour the division began to cross in three detachments; and at 6.20 a.m. the leading troops, the 14th and 46th Regiments and a battery of artillery, under Major-General Kigoshi reached the further bank. One company was left in An-ping-ho, and the remaining troops were divided into two columns. The right column marched south-west towards the Hu Shan ridge, where it arrived soon after 11 a.m., while the left column marched down the river bank. About noon the hill 955 was reached and a party was at once pushed out to the height 630. Immediately behind General Kigoshi's brigade, General Sasaki crossed the bridge, and forded the western branch of the river with the 47th Regiment, a squadron of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, and at 5.30 p.m. he occupied the high ground east of Hsia-ling-tao-kou. By 1 p.m. the remainder of the division

* The casualties in the 2nd/6th Battery during the bombardment were 5 officers and 26 men killed and wounded.

reached Nan-huang-kou, where a halt of some hours was made before moving up into line with the other troops.

As the advance of the 46th Regiment threatened their retreat, the Russians on Tiger Hill retired about midday, and the covering party of the Guards immediately retook possession of the hill, where they came into touch with the left of the 12th Division. The Japanese movement was also reported to General Kashtalinski, who had replaced General Trusov* in command of the troops at Chiu-lien-cheng. That officer forthwith dispatched half of the I/22nd Regiment to Ching-kou, to join the other half of the same battalion and the two guns of the 3rd/6th Battery, which had been posted there on the 28th to guard the left flank. At the same time he reported the situation to General Zsulich, who informed him in reply that the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment was on its way to join him from Tien-tzu, and that he was to maintain his position.

The retreat of the Russians was the signal for work to begin on the bridges at E, F, and G, and by 8 p.m. all except the last were ready. During the day arrangements were made to transport the artillery of the 2nd Division across the main stream of the Ya-lu, in order that it might support the attack of the infantry of that division at a range closer than was possible from its position on Kintei Island. To bridge the stream, which opposite the batteries was five hundred yards in width, was impossible, and it was decided therefore to send the guns across at night on pontoon ferries, of which twenty-one were constructed behind Genkado and floated down to Kintei Island. Such was the difficulty of the operation, due to the necessity of working in the dark, that by daybreak on the 1st May only three batteries and the battalion of infantry forming the escort had crossed and entrenched themselves.

At 7 p.m. on the 30th April, the 2nd Division moved off from Shasando,† and by 10.30 p.m. had reached Oseki village, leaving the bridges clear for the Guard Division which was following. At 2.30 a.m., the 2nd Division again moved forward and crossed the bridge to Tiger Hill, after which Chukodai Island was reached by fording one of the channels of the Ai. By daybreak on the 1st May this division was entrenched in the open within two thousand yards of the Russian position, the batteries which had been ferried across the

* General Trusov had fallen sick on the 28th.

† The 2nd Division had been ordered originally to march at midnight (see p. 116), an hour which must have been altered subsequently to 8 p.m.

main stream being posted on its left immediately north of Chukodai village. Further north, the Guards, whose march had been delayed by the necessity of using the same bridge as the 2nd Division, reached their allotted ground about 5 a.m. and likewise entrenched themselves; while on their right stood the 12th Division, which had also moved down from the high ground to the left bank of the Ai Ho. Three days' supplies for the whole army had been collected, and on the 30th April the base at Rikaho was closed, the boats being ordered to proceed to the south of An-tung, where they would await the issue of the battle.

The blow which had been preceded by such elaborate and deliberate preparations, was about to fall. Frequent warnings from the Russian commander-in-chief and reports from General Kashtalinski had not availed to impress General Zasluch with the danger on his left, and he still seems to have clung to the belief that the Japanese would land an army on his right. For this mistake he was not altogether to blame. Colonel Kartsev with a considerable force of cavalry had been posted on the upper Ya-lu for the express purpose of watching the movements of the Japanese right. But during the 30th, instead of keeping in touch with the enemy, he not only fell back from the river without attempting to harass the enemy's advance, but also failed to inform his superiors of the action which he had taken. Moreover the naval feints near the mouth of the Ya-lu, which were repeated on the 29th and 30th April, and the appearance of vessels in the offing, served their purpose, and the main portion of the Eastern Force still remained massed at Tien-tzu and An-tung, while three Japanese divisions were quietly concentrating against the opposite flank.

The battle was to be fought on a front from Chiu-lien-cheng to Ching-kou and here General Kashtalinski, who had been ordered to maintain his ground had, on the 30th, disposed his troops as follows*:

* See Plan 2.

The troops of the left section were distributed as follows:—

- (a) On the high ground north-east of Ma-kou—
10th and 11th Companies of the 22nd Regiment.
- (b) In rear of (a)—
3rd/6th Battery (6 guns only; 2 guns of this battery had been detached to Ching-kou with the I/22nd Regiment).
- (c) North of Po-te-tien-tzu—
7th Company of the 11th Regiment, and 12th Company of the 22nd Regiment.
- (d) Further up the Ai Ho, separated from the rest of the force south of it by a gap nearly 2,000 yards wide—
5th Company of the 22nd Regiment.

Distribution of
the Russian
troops.

Right Section. From Chiu-lien-cheng to Yao-kou, under Colonel Tsibulski.

- 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the 12th Regiment.
- 3 companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment.
- 1 company of the 2nd Battalion of the 24th Regiment.*
- 2nd Battery of the 6th Artillery Brigade.

Left Section. From Ma-kou through Po-te-tien-tzu to Ching-kou, under Colonel Gromov.

- 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the 22nd Regiment.
- 1 company of the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment.
- 3rd Battery of the 6th Artillery Brigade.

Thus a force of little more than seven battalions and sixteen guns was distributed over a front of some six miles, and was about to bear the whole brunt of the Japanese attack. Both the batteries had been subjected to Japanese artillery fire, and the 2nd/6th Battery, which had lost several officers, had withdrawn on the night of the 30th to a position about one mile west of Chiu-lien-cheng. Moreover, the bombardment had not been without effect upon the infantry, and at 11 p.m. on that date Colonel Tsibulski, who commanded the 12th Regiment, pointed out to General Kashtalinski that the shells of the Japanese guns of position were quite "unbearable, and that he could not guarantee the quiet withdrawal of his men from their trenches if fire were specially directed upon them, on the following day."† He

(e) Sectional reserve, behind the right flank—

6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Companies of the 22nd Regiment.

The troops of the right section were as follows :—

(a) On the right, south-west of Chiu-lien-cheng—

5th, 6th, and 8th Companies of the 11th Regiment, and 8th Company, 24th Regiment.

(b) North of Chiu-lien-cheng—

2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 9th, and 12th Companies of the 12th Regiment.

(c) In rear of (b) as local reserve—

7th and 8th Companies of the 12th Regiment.

(d) Sectional reserve—

1st, 5th, 10th, and 11th Companies of the 12th Regiment and the machine gun company.

(e) About a mile west of Chiu-lien-cheng—

2nd/6th Battery.

* This company had been called up from the line of communication in order to take part in the battle.

† According to a Russian authority, the 12th Regiment had suffered, on the 30th April, a loss of 3 officers and 20 rank and file killed and wounded.

added that the Japanese were undoubtedly in superior force, and that there was every reason to expect an assault. Upon this General Kashtalinski dispatched a telegram to General Zasulich at San-cheng-kou, in which, after a brief description of the bombardment, he suggested that his force should occupy the heights behind Chiu-lien-cheng during the night, leaving outposts in the advanced trenches with orders to fall back at daylight. General Zasulich replied that the troops were at no point to evacuate the ground occupied, but that he had decided that in the event of a bombardment, they were to leave outposts on the original positions and to withdraw to the nearest heights with a view to taking cover, but not of retiring. At 3 a.m. on the 1st May, a report came in from the 12th Regiment that the sound of wheels on the islands and of guns crossing bridges was audible, and it became evident that the Japanese were preparing to attack. No change was, however, made in the strength of the groups at An-tung and Tien-tzu, except that the machine gun company was sent to General Kashtalinski.

When day broke a thick fog hung over the valley between the opposing armies, but about 6 a.m. it began to lift, and the Japanese howitzers opened fire. At first no reply came from the Russian side, and for a brief space it seemed to the Japanese as if the enemy had fallen back. Suddenly the six guns near Ma-kou replied, but in a few minutes they were silenced, and the whole of the Japanese artillery was turned against the shelter trenches of the infantry.

The attack of the Japanese had originally been planned to begin with the turning movement of the 12th Division on their right, where the least resistance was expected, and so soon as its advance had sufficiently developed the Guard and 2nd Divisions were to move. But, about 7 a.m., as the Russians brought no other artillery into action after the battery near Ma-kou had been silenced, General Kuroki, who had taken up his position near Genkado, ordered a simultaneous advance of all three divisions.

At the word of command the Japanese rose from their trenches and surged across the space between them and the enemy, their dark blue uniforms rendering them conspicuous objects on the yellow sandy plain. No shot greeted their thick line of skirmishers until the Ai Ho was reached, when the Russians opened a heavy fire of volleys at distances varying from 1,500 to 1,200 paces. To cross a swiftly-flowing river whose waters run breast-

The Japanese advance to the attack.

high is, under no conditions, a very simple matter, but the same operation performed under a hail of bullets by troops burdened with arms and ammunition* makes the preservation of order extremely difficult. Thus by the time that the Japanese had arrived in mid-stream their formations were disorganized, and the men, crowded together in places, were suffering many losses, some of the wounded being drowned. Nevertheless the advance was steadily pursued, and on reaching the further bank individual fire was opened. During the infantry advance the divisional artillery kept up the bombardment of the Russian infantry position, while the howitzers, still using indirect fire, searched the ground in rear of it.

While crossing the river, the 2nd Division, whose attack brought it opposite the right section of the Russian position from Chiu-lien-cheng to Yao-kou, suffered considerable loss, more especially on its left, which for a time was held in check. But the 4th and 29th Regiments, which formed the right, were able to push on and succeeded in forcing the Russians to leave their trenches and to fall back to a second position on the hills in rear, exposing themselves as they did so to the fire of the Japanese artillery. The 6th Company of the 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiment tried to cover the retreat by a bayonet charge, but the Japanese skirmishers, giving way before it, cleared the front of their reserves, whose fire drove it off. The advance was then continued, and the safety of the Russian battery, which though out of action had remained in position, became endangered.

While the right of the 2nd Division was progressing, the left began again to move forward and threatened to surround Colonel Tsibulski's force. This danger was observed by General Kashtalinski, whose left section, under Colonel Gromov, was already falling back. About 8.30 a.m., therefore, he ordered Colonel Tsibulski to withdraw his troops to a position† behind the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream, where he hoped to be able to delay the Japanese advance against his right. This position had been previously selected and General Zasulich himself, after conferring with General Kashtalinski, had decided that the time to occupy it had arrived. The operation of withdrawal was difficult, for the right of the Japanese 2nd Division

* The 12th Division carried lightened knapsacks. The Guard and 2nd Divisions carried spare ammunition and rations in the blue cloth holdall worn *en bandoulière*, but discarded their knapsacks before the attack.

† This position, which is several times referred to in the narrative, was situated on the high ground immediately west of the words Han-tu-ho-tzu R. on Plans 2 and 3.

had made considerable progress, but was carried out under cover of the fire of the 2nd/6th Battery and of the machine gun company.

On the right of the 2nd Division the advance of the Guard Division brought it opposite the left section of the Russian line of defence, whose baggage had been sent back to Ching-kou. The 3rd/6th Battery, which had reserved its fire for the infantry attack, was silenced by the Japanese artillery, and the right of the Guard Division soon penetrated between Po-te-tien-tzu and the 5th Company of the 22nd Regiment, imperilling the position of the troops further south, who were fully engaged with those immediately in front of them. To restore the situation by bringing up fresh troops was impossible, for the sectional reserve was too far distant and its help was urgently required on the right.

At this juncture, a report was received that the Japanese were coming on in force against the left flank. Thereupon Colonel Gromov rode in that direction and saw some five or six hostile battalions advancing from the heights on the left bank of the Ai Ho, about one mile north-east of his position. It appeared evident to him that the enemy's main attack was directed against Po-te-tien-tzu, and that the 5th Company of the 22nd Regiment could not prevent the threatening movement. About 8.30 a.m., therefore, he decided to recall that company, throw back his left, and take up a position on the ridge which runs parallel to the Ching-kou road, where he hoped to be joined by the I/22nd Regiment and the two guns of the 3rd/6th Battery. Orders were sent to the sectional reserve to occupy the ridge and cover the retirement of the fighting line, the left of which would fall back first. Scarcely had these orders been dispatched when the commander of the 3rd/6th Battery reported that the right of Colonel Gromov's section of defence was turned and that his guns could no longer remain in their present position. The inner flanks of the Guard and 2nd Divisions had both broken through the Russian front between Yao-kou and Ma-kou, and the battery was in imminent danger of capture. It was therefore ordered to fall back, and the 7th Company of the 22nd Regiment, from the sectional reserve, was detailed to act as escort. The three remaining companies of the sectional reserve began, about 9 a.m.,

* General Kashtalinski had directed Colonel Gromov, in the event of serious action, to send his transport to Ching-kou, whence he was to retire by Liu-chia-kou. From the latter place Feng-huang-cheng can be reached by a road which is practically parallel to the An-tung-Feng-huang-cheng highway.

to withdraw to the ridge in rear, being followed by the 5th and 12th Companies of the 22nd Regiment, which had formed the left of the firing line.

Meanwhile the 3rd/6th Battery, accompanied by its escort and by the 10th Company of the 22nd Regiment which had originally been posted in front of it, had begun to retire; Retirement of Colonel Gromov. but so steep was the ground over which it had to move that the guns had to be unlimbered and man-handled one by one down the western slope of the abandoned position, an operation which was carried out under heavy rifle fire from the Japanese on the left bank of the Ai Ho. When, shortly after 9 a.m., the battery reached the lower ground it must have found the road leading northward to be impassable or already commanded by the enemy's fire, for instead of making for Ching-kou it proceeded in a southerly direction towards Chiu-lien-cheng. This movement was observed by Colonel Gromov, who directed it to turn about in the direction of Po-te-tien-tzu and thence to move on Ching-kou. At this point the battery seems to have outstripped its escort, whose strength had been augmented by the 7th Company of the 11th Regiment and the 11th Company of the 22nd Regiment, which had joined it on the march. On reaching Po-te-tien-tzu the commander found the road to Ching-kou blocked by the enemy and decided to retire by Chiu-lien-cheng. The guns were once more turned about and proceeded towards Ma-kou, near which place they were captured by the 3rd Regiment of the Japanese Guard Division.

In the meantime, Colonel Gromov, after dispatching orders to the battery, had grown anxious lest his own line of retreat should be intercepted by the advancing Japanese, and had decided not to hold a second position, but to retire with his five remaining companies to Ching-kou.* The Russian detachment at that place faced the right wing of the 12th Division, whose advance was slow, for the men were much fatigued by their exertions since crossing the Ya-lu on the night of the 29th April. Moreover, the left battalions of the division had to cross the Ai Ho at a point where the water was deep, and, though no enemy opposed

* The 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 12th Companies of the 22nd Regiment. The 7th and 10th Companies, after becoming separated from the guns, joined Colonel Gromov on the march, while the 7th Company of the 11th Regiment and the 11th Company of the 22nd Regiment turned westward across the hills. The 7th Company, 11th Regiment, made its way to Tien-tzu, and the 11th Company, 22nd Regiment, took part in the fighting which occurred later in the day near Ha-ma-tang.

them, the heights at Fang-tai-tung-tzu were not reached till nearly 9 a.m.

When the 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment and the mountain battery which formed the extreme right of General Kuroki's army reached Tuan-shan-tzu, the I/22nd Regiment and the two guns of the 3rd/6th Battery finding their flank threatened began to retire. This movement was perceived by Colonel Gromov, who, while falling back with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions* of that regiment, had observed some six or seven Japanese battalions pushing forward over the heights north of Po-te-tien-tzu. No sooner did the two Russian guns come into view, crossing the hill south of Ching-kou in the direction of Lao-fang-kou, than he decided to incline westward and to take up a position on the saddle over which runs the road between those two places.

The general situation at this period as regards the Russians was as follows: In the original disposition seven battalions and sixteen guns had held the front from Chiu-lien-cheng to Ching-kou. Of this force the greater portion of the right section and the detachment at Ching-kou had succeeded in retiring in fair order, while of the remainder, which was under Colonel Gromov's command, six guns had been captured and two battalions, greatly shaken, had fallen back. To delay the enemy's further advance, General Kashtalinski had at hand the 12th Regiment, the 5th, 6th, and 8th Companies of the 11th Regiment, the 8th Company of the 24th Regiment, the 2nd/6th Battery, and the machine gun company. All of these troops had been engaged, and with them he now proceeded to take position on the right bank of the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream.†

On the right at An-tung nothing had occurred beyond the appearance in the river of a Japanese flotilla which had shelled the Russian position on that flank and had engaged the attention of the artillery. The three battalions posted near An-tung, and the reserve of five battalions and eight guns at Tien-tzu, had remained inactive and had taken no share in the battle on their left.

* The 11th Company of the 3rd Battalion was not present, having fallen back independently after accompanying the 3rd/6th Battery when it first retreated towards Chiu-lien-cheng.

† The withdrawal to the position on the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream was covered by the 5th and 6th Companies of the 11th Regiment and the 8th Company of the 24th Regiment. After carrying out the duty assigned to them these companies fell back to Tien-tzu. The 8th Company of the 11th Regiment remained with the 12th Regiment.

On the Japanese side, the 2nd Division was concentrating in the neighbourhood of Chiu-lien-cheng with the general reserve, which had advanced at 8 a.m., on its right at Suribachi Yama; the Guards were on the hills between Yao-kou and Po-te-tien-tzu; the left wing of the 12th Division was on the hill north of Po-te-tien-tzu, and the right was climbing the ridge west of Fang-tai-tung-tzu. The artillery was placed as follows: Two batteries of the 2nd Division had forded the river opposite Chiu-lien-cheng and were close to that place; the remaining batteries of the division were in position at the southern extremity of the island of Chukodai. The 12th Artillery Regiment had also crossed to the right bank of the Ai Ho, and the howitzers remained on Kintei Island. The Guard Artillery which was to have crossed the Ai Ho near Tiger Hill by an improvised bridge, was left on Hu-shan since the bridge had not been completed.

The Japanese had captured the Russian first position about 9 a.m., and General Kuroki then decided to advance to the line of the Ha-ma-tang River, and with this object fresh orders were at once issued. The reserve, which was now christened the "Pursuing" Detachment," was to advance along the main Feng-huang-cheng road. The Guards were to occupy the hills about Ha-ma-tang. The 2nd Division was to move to An-tung; and the 12th Division was to march south to Ta-lou-fang, sending a detachment towards Liu-chia-kou. The 12th Division had already anticipated these orders and, after driving off the Russian detachment at Ching-kou, immediately pushed southward along the road to Ha-ma-tang. The Guard and 2nd Divisions were, however, stubbornly opposed by General Kashtalinski in his new position behind the Han-tu-ho-tzu and found that they could not advance until the artillery could be brought up to their support. This delay was just sufficient to enable General Zasulich to draw in the troops on his right flank. At 9.35 a.m., the commander at An-tung had been directed to withdraw immediately to Tien-tzu, after burning the supplies collected at the former place. When the order reached him his force was somewhat scattered, the 2nd Company of the 10th Regiment and two guns of the 1st/3rd Battery being at San-chia-kou, some five miles to the south-west; while posted on the flanks and on the island of Kanshi were the mounted scouts of the 10th and 24th Infantry Regiments. Orders were sent to the detachment at San-chia-kou to retire direct to Tang-shan-cheng on the road to Feng-

Situation of the Japanese about 9 a.m.

Second phase of the battle.

huang-cheng, and by noon the troops at An-tung were falling back to Tien-tzu. To cover the retirement the two battalions of the 11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and the battery were sent from Tien-tzu to join General Kashtalinski on the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream, and that officer was told that he must resist the Japanese advance until the troops on his right had made good their retreat. For the next two hours the position in the centre remained unchanged, for the Japanese were awaiting the arrival of their artillery, but to the north the position of the Russian troops was more difficult, for the Japanese 12th Division was advancing as quickly as circumstances would permit, and of this danger General Kashtalinski was still ignorant.

About 11 a.m., the 1st Battalion of the Japanese 14th Regiment and six guns issued from the village of Ching-kou, but their further advance was checked by Colonel Gromov, who was posted north of Ta-lou-fang and was joined almost at the same moment by the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Regiment. More Japanese troops could be seen on the right bank of the river, and Colonel Gromov decided to make good his retreat, while there was yet time, through Lao-fang-kou and Liu-chia-kou. He first sent off his wounded, then the two guns and the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 10th Companies and was preparing to follow with the rest of his command, when, about 1 p.m., an officer of General Zasluch's staff rode up and ordered him to retreat by Lao-chou-tun. Colonel Gromov then marched the remnant of his force to that place, passing through it about 1.30 p.m., and reaching the line of communication without further loss.*

As soon as he had brought his troops through Ching-kou, General Kigoshi ordered the 24th Regiment to advance on Ha-ma-tang and to occupy the hills north-east of that village.

Rear guard
action near
Ha-ma-tang.

Hoping to cut off the main body of the enemy from their line of retreat on Feng-huang-cheng, the colonel of the 24th Regiment told off one battalion to advance at once, leaving his other two battalions to re-form after their fight and to come on as quickly as possible. One battalion of the 46th was to follow the 24th. At 12.30 p.m., as the leading Japanese troops arrived within a mile of Ta-lou-fang, two bodies of Russians were seen to be retiring covered by a rear guard. These were Colonel Gromov's troops, and it was not until 1.40 p.m.,

* As the eleven companies with Colonel Gromov all reached the Feng-huang-cheng road through Lao-chou-tun, it would seem that the four leading companies were recalled from the direction of Liu-chia-kou.

when the battalion of the 46th Regiment had come up on the right of the 24th and the Russian rear guard had retired, that the advance could be resumed. Then, at 2 p.m., another body of about a thousand Russians appeared on the hills north-east of Ha-ma-tang, and the 12th Division was again checked. These fresh troops were the reinforcements for General Kashtalinski, who had evacuated his second position and was now retiring on Ha-ma-tang. Between 11 a.m. and noon, while General Kashtalinski was waiting for the two battalions of the 11th Regiment to arrive, an assistant-surgeon of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division had reported to him that the 22nd Regiment on the extreme left was routed, and that the Japanese had occupied Liu-chia-kou. Up to this moment no anxiety had been felt regarding that flank, for no reports had been received from Colonel Gromov,* who was believed still to be holding Ching-kou. General Kashtalinski at once dispatched towards that place the mounted scouts of the 12th Regiment, who shortly afterwards reported that a Japanese column, in strength about a regiment of infantry, was moving from Ching-kou on Lao-fang-kou, and that a force of cavalry was also visible in the same direction. General Kashtalinski then rode out himself, and finding that his left was seriously threatened, sent orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Linda, his chief staff officer, who was with the troops on the right bank of the Han-tu-ho-tzu, to retire at once to Tien-tzu. At this moment the 11th Company of the 22nd Regiment, which had been with Colonel Gromov's guns, happened to come up and was posted on some high ground facing north, whence it was ordered to delay the enemy's advance; and about the same time orders were sent to the two battalions of the 11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which were coming from the reserve to occupy the height 570. These two battalions had already passed through a difficult defile just east of Ha-ma-tang, but as soon as they were met by their fresh orders they turned northward and took up the required position. The battery, which was following the infantry, was, at the same time, ordered to return through Ha-ma-tang to the Feng-huang-cheng road, for the ground was difficult even for the movement of infantry, and it was felt that the guns would hamper rather than assist the retreat.

A little after 2 p.m., as its eight wagons reached the northern mouth of the gorge, about 1,000 yards south-east of Ha-ma-tang,

* Colonel Gromov dispatched a report at 12.15 p.m., in which he stated that he was retiring, but it was not received by General Kashtalinski until about 4 p.m.

they came under fire from the 5th Company of the Japanese 24th Regiment, which had outstripped the other units of the 12th Division and had reached the north-west slopes of the group of hills that overlook the road. The movement was continued at a trot, and the wagons made their way in safety to Tien-tzu, but the guns, which were following, soon lost several horses and, as it seemed impossible to retire under the enemy's fire, the commander decided to bring them into action in support of the two battalions of the 11th Regiment, which were engaged with the Japanese 24th Regiment, and were covering the defile through which General Kashtalinski must retire.

When Colonel Linda received General Kashtalinski's order to retire to Tien-tzu, he moved his troops off in the following order : first the companies of the 12th Regiment which had been in reserve, next the machine gun company and the 2nd/6th Battery, escorted by the 8th Company of the 11th Regiment, then the remainder of the 12th Regiment, of which the 5th Company formed the rear guard. As they approached the defile they were fired upon, and the machine gun company, without waiting for orders, took post on the southern slopes to cover the entrance from that side. General Kashtalinski also detached two companies from his column to strengthen his rear guard, and these were followed shortly afterwards by three more companies. In this way the column gained the defile and was just debouching from the northern end when the 12th Regiment came under long range fire from the north-east of Ha-ma-tang. The scouts advanced towards the enemy, and covered by their fire the regiment was able to continue its march to the Feng-huang-cheng road. The 2nd/6th Battery, which was following the infantry, on passing the south-eastern slopes of height 570 where part of the 3rd/3rd Battery was already in position, found itself exposed to a heavy rifle fire from the north and halted under cover of a slope. Colonel Linda then came up, and, recognizing the impossibility of continuing the movement by the road, decided to withdraw by a circuitous route leaving height 570 in a southerly direction. The battery moved off but after covering about two thousand yards found the ground too steep for further movement, and returned to join the 3rd/3rd Battery.

The fighting soon became very severe, particularly on the left of the Japanese 24th Regiment where the 5th Company was losing heavily. This company had pushed forward with great gallantry in front of the remainder of its battalion and might have been

annihilated but for the timely arrival of three batteries of the 12th Division and of the leading troops of the Guard and 2nd Divisions.

As already explained the movements of these two divisions had been delayed by the difficulty of transporting the guns across the Ai Ho, but when the Russians began to evacuate the position on the Han-tu-ho-tzu stream General Kuroki, who was at Suribachi Yama, at once gave orders for the advance to be resumed.

About 2 p.m., the Guards and the "Pursuing Detachment" moved across the Han-tu-ho-tzu. Two hours later they drove the Russian rear guard out of Chuan-shan-tzu, and forced it to abandon four guns, which had been swung round to face the attack from the east; but for some time longer they could not take possession of their prize and the guns remained derelict between the combatants. Seeing that the resistance was weakening the 12th Division, supported by the guns, now made a determined attack upon the 11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and drove it off the hills north of Ha-ma-tang. The 2nd Guard Brigade and the "Pursuing Detachment" then advanced against the six or seven hundred men who were still holding out on the high ground south-east of the village, about point 420, and soon after 5 p.m. drove them down into the arms of the 46th and 24th Regiments. There the remnant of the rear guard was at last forced to surrender, and eleven field guns and seven machine guns fell into the hands of the Japanese.

This disaster to the Russian arms may partly be attributed to Colonel Gromov's failure to keep General Kashtalinski informed of his movements* and of the advance of the Japanese 12th Division. At the same time it must not be forgotten that by its gallant action the Russian rear guard had performed its allotted task. For while it held the hills round Ha-ma-tang the main body was falling back towards Feng-huang-cheng covered by the 10th Regiment and the two guns of the 3rd/6th Battery from Ching-kou.

At Tien-tzu the wagons of the 3rd/3rd Battery and portions of the 11th, 12th, and 22nd Regiments succeeded in joining the retreating column, and soon after nightfall Tang-shan-cheng, a post on the line of communication, was reached. On the following day the whole force was concentrated at Feng-huang-cheng, with the exception of the 9th and 10th Regiments and the

* Colonel Gromov was afterwards tried by court martial and eventually shot himself.

batteries which were left at Pien-mien to check the pursuit; but beyond sending out a few cavalry patrols the Japanese made no attempt to follow up their victory.

The losses in officers and men suffered by the Russians* in the battle of the 1st of May are not accurately known, but some fourteen hundred dead were buried by the Japanese, and about six hundred prisoners, many of whom were wounded, were taken. In addition to these, some wounded were carried from the field by the Russians, whose total casualties probably amounted to not less than three thousand of all ranks, or about three times those of the Japanese. Of the twenty-four guns of the three Russian batteries which were engaged, twenty-one fell into the hands of the Japanese, while eight machine guns and nineteen ammunition wagons were included among the spoils of war.

* For losses of the Japanese and Russians, see Appendix D.

CHAPTER XII.

THE LANDING OF THE JAPANESE SECOND ARMY IN MANCHURIA.

(Strategical Map 2, and Plan 4.)

THE victory of the Ya-lu had cleared the air, and had relieved the Japanese Imperial head-quarters of much anxiety. East and West had met for the first time under equal conditions of armament and organization, and all the moral effect of success in the first encounter was with the army of Japan. General Kuroki was able to hold his own; the occupation of Korea, the first objective of the land campaign, was assured; and the Imperial head-quarters could now turn their attention towards Port Arthur. The morning of the 3rd May brought yet more welcome news to Japan; for on that day, as the result of the third blocking expedition, Admiral Togo cabled saying "the harbour entrance appears to have been completely blocked to the passage of cruisers and larger vessels."

The early successes of her fleet had given Japan temporary command of the sea, and had enabled her to land her troops in Korea unmolested, but so long as the Russian naval base of Port Arthur, and the fleet which had taken refuge there, remained effective, there was no permanent security for the Japanese over-sea communications; for the dockyard afforded the necessary means for repairing many of the damaged Russian ships, and the announcement of the intended dispatch of the Baltic Fleet to eastern waters was evidently more than a mere threat. To blockade Port Arthur and at the same time hold off the Baltic Fleet was a task beyond even Admiral Togo's power to perform, and the Russian fleet in the Far East must be dealt with before the reinforcements could arrive from Europe. Apart, moreover, from its naval importance, the moral and political value attached to the possession of the Kuan-tung Peninsula must not be underrated. The capture of Port Arthur and the destruction of the fleet would assure to Japan the command of the sea, the permanent safety of her maritime communications with the theatre of war, the wiping out of the insult put upon her by the coalition of

European nations in 1895, as well as the power to ensure the correctness of China's attitude of neutrality. The loss of the fortress would, also, be a blow from which Russian prestige in the East could scarcely hope to recover.

Admiral Togo's message was, therefore, the signal for a great movement of troops by sea to the shores of the Liao-tung Peninsula.

While General Kuroki had been deploying his troops of the First Army upon the frontier of Korea, the Second Army under General Baron Oku, consisting of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions and the 1st Artillery Brigade, had been quietly shipped from Japan to Chinampo, where it now lay on board some seventy transports, whose moorings in the Pingyang Inlet occupied about eighteen miles of water. Orders for the mobilization of the Second Army had been issued on the 6th March, and by the middle of April the units had assembled at the appointed ports of embarkation, whence, as transports became available, they sailed to the rendezvous in groups of four or five ships. Although not actually under convoy, each transport carried a naval officer and a complement of signalmen, who communicated at fixed points with the cruisers protecting the route.

On the 24th April, Admiral Togo and General Oku met at the naval base which had been established in Korea, and an important interview took place on board the *Mikasa* when all the details of disembarkation were finally settled. The immediate task of the force, which was ultimately to form the left wing of the armies converging on Liao-yang, was the isolation of Port Arthur; and the first step was to select a suitable landing place at no great distance from the fortress. By the strategic requirements the choice was limited to the area between the Bay of Ta-lien and Ta-ku-shan, but throughout the whole of those hundred and thirty miles the water is very shoal and the coast provides no sheltered anchorage at a convenient distance from the shore. Near the Bay of Ta-lien the foreshore is better, the currents weaker, and the rise and fall of the tide less than in the neighbourhood of Ta-ku-shan; moreover, the Elliot Islands furnished suitable points of assembly for the transports, and the future movements of the Second Army would be greatly facilitated by a near approach to the fortress, although the danger of attack by sea would be proportionately greater. On the whole, therefore, the conditions favoured a landing in the western rather than in the eastern section of the chosen area, and everything pointed to the vicinity of Pi-tzu-wo, where the Japanese 1st Division had

The choice of a landing place for the Second Army.

landed in 1894. That actual place, however, suffers from the usual disadvantage of the southern coast of Manchuria, for the foreshore shelves very gradually and extensive mud flats, nearly two miles wide, are exposed at low water. For these reasons Pi-tzu-wo was rejected, and the vicinity of Hou-tu-shih, near the mouth of the Ta-sha Ho, where the water is deeper, was selected.

This spot was fairly well-known as the result of the experience of the earlier war, and any further reconnaissance after the opening of hostilities would have attracted the attention of the Russians, who had a force only some eighteen miles distant at Pu-lan-tien, and another at Chin-chou about twenty-five miles from Yen-tai Bay. The Japanese general staff, however, was no doubt aware from Admiral Togo's reports that the Chin-chou force was engaged in fortifying the isthmus at Nan Shan, from which fact it was reasonable to infer that any offensive movement, or active defence, from that direction was not contemplated by the Russians. In fact the nearest force, from which serious opposition might have been forthcoming, was a hundred miles distant, at Ta-shih-chiao.

But although the situation on land was favourable for the disembarkation at Hou-tu-shih, there appeared to be more than a possibility of interference by sea; and when selecting a landing place within sixty miles of the enemy's fleet, the Japanese fully recognized the risk they ran. On the 3rd May, the first group of sixteen transports sailed from the Pingyang Inlet, so timed as to arrive off Hou-tu-shih* at daylight on the 4th May. Two cruisers led the line, others held position on the exposed flank, and one brought up the rear. The fleet was delayed by boisterous weather, and was obliged to shelter under the lee of the Elliot Islands from 1 p.m. on the 3rd until noon on the 4th, when it sailed for Hou-tu-shih, where a few Cossacks of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Regiment were observed, but no resistance was encountered either by sea or by land. As the transports approached the coast they were drawn up in three lines and were taken to their anchorage close inshore where, even if the ships were sunk, their upper works would remain above water. In one respect they were distinctly fortunate. On several occasions the Japanese had encountered floating mines at sea, and they must have known that large numbers had been laid off the coast of the Kuan-tung Peninsula. Deep and Kerr Bays, as well

* Hou-tu-shih soon proved to be a most unsuitable landing place, and on the 9th the transports were moved to San-chia-tzu, about four miles further west.

as Ta-lien Wan,* were defended in this way, but for some unknown reason the vicinity of Pi-tzu-wo had been neglected, although the Russians were fully aware that the Japanese had landed there during the war with China. Nevertheless, Admiral Togo's task of protecting the disembarkation was exceedingly difficult, for if any of the vessels in Port Arthur were to succeed in getting to sea unobserved, they might create havoc among the unarmed transports. Hitherto, the Japanese battleships had kept well away from Port Arthur during the night, so as to be out of reach of torpedo craft; but the presence of the transports on the coast now demanded that the fleet should be in a position instantly to bring to action any hostile vessels which might leave the harbour, and it was largely with this object that the naval base had been established in the Elliot Islands. Now, if ever, there was a great opportunity for the Russian destroyers, twelve of which vessels were perfectly ready to go to sea, and although at the beginning of May there were only eight and a half hours of darkness, great injury might have been inflicted by a night attack on either the battleships or the transports. In anticipation of some such action Admiral Togo kept a force of destroyers and torpedo boats watching the port from sunset to sunrise; but in order to cover the entrance it was inevitable that the Japanese should be dispersed, while the Russians as they issued from Port Arthur would be concentrated. As a further protection to the anchorage the fairway between the mainland and the Elliot Islands, a distance of eight miles, was blocked by booms, nets, dummy mines, patrolboats, and guardships at anchor.

At 5.30 a.m. on the 5th May, a naval landing party, consisting of six officers and about a thousand men, who had come from Chinampo in two improvised cruisers, reached the shore and took up a covering position. A flag was then hoisted, and two battalions of the 3rd Division, already in the boats, at once proceeded to the shore, closely followed by the military landing staff, the infantry replacing the seamen who were then withdrawn.† As more troops of the 1st and 3rd Divisions reached the beach, infantry and cavalry were added to the covering force. The fighting units of the 3rd Division were disembarked by the evening of the 10th, and those of the 1st Division by the 13th.

* Ta-lien Wan, or the Bay of Ta-lien, is apt to be confused with the town of Ta-lien-wan. This is one of the difficulties of Chinese nomenclature, and the difference should be noted.

† The Second Army was clothed in blue at the time of its landing. *Khaki* was taken into wear about the beginning of June.

On the 8th May, General Oku and the head-quarters of the Second Army landed and, on the 10th, the 4th Division began to disembark, its point of assembly being the village of Ma-chia-tun. Although a strong south-east wind was blowing, and the sea ran high, the work of disembarkation was carried on day and night, the transports sailing independently for Japan as soon as they were cleared.* By the night of the 13th, the three divisions with their artillery and cavalry were all on shore; but as the Second Army had taken the field without either field hospitals or supply and ammunition columns, which were to follow on the next voyage of the transports, no distant operations were possible. Meanwhile the 1st Division held a position from Ma-chia-chang on the Li-lan Ho to Chih-chia-fang. The 3rd Division continued the line to the Ta-sha Ho. The 4th Division was still about Ting-chia-tun. With the last group of transports from Pingyang Inlet came the cable ship which completed the extension of the cable from Korea, thus establishing direct telegraphic communication with Imperial head-quarters at Tokio.

While the Japanese were thus engaged in landing unmolested, the defenders of Port Arthur were discussing the advisability of making an attack by sea; and, as was almost invariably the case, there was some difference of opinion among the superior officers. The following extract from the account written by Captain Bubnov explains to some extent the apparent indifference of the Russians to all that was going on around them:—

“On the morning of the 5th May,” writes Captain Bubnov, “we received information of the arrival of forty transports off Pi-tzu-wo, and on the evening of the same day we learned that the disembarkation of the Japanese troops had begun. It was obvious, therefore, to all that the siege of Port Arthur from the land side was now inevitable.

“Delay was impossible. The Viceroy could not remain in a besieged fortress. Admiral Skrudlov was already on his way from Europe, but in two or three days Port Arthur would be cut off, and the fleet would be left without a chief, for none of the

* About 3,000 yards of shore were available for landing purposes. The transports had to lie about three miles off the shore. There was no shelter from the prevailing wind, while close inshore there were many rocks.

At high water the troops landed at wharves, constructed in the first instance by the engineer battalion and subsequently by civilian carpenters from Japan. At low water the lighters were grounded and the troops waded ashore, the guns and wagons being run along planks over the sterns or sides of the lighters and hauled ashore. The ammunition was carried.

junior flag officers of the squadron were considered suitable for this appointment.

“It was decided that Rear-Admiral Vitgeft, the senior flag officer, should be left in command of the fleet. He was a very hard worker, but in no way was he a fighting admiral, for he would not take any responsibility on his shoulders; nevertheless, he was a loyal servant. The remaining admirals retained their appointments.

“By command of the Emperor, the Viceroy left at 11 a.m. on the 5th May. Before his departure he summoned the officers commanding both flotillas of destroyers, and said that they must attempt something to interfere with the landing of the Japanese. At this time there were twelve destroyers fit for such an expedition. The moon was at its last quarter, the distance to Pi-tzu-wo was about ninety miles, and there were about eight and a half hours of darkness.

“Having weighed all this, we told him that it was hardly likely that the Japanese transports would remain at their anchorage for the night; probably they would put to sea as evening came on and in any case the landing place would be protected by a double or triple cordon. Even if we were to succeed in cutting through this cordon and effecting anything, we should be on the further side of Dalny at daylight, and unless we were then supported by several of our larger ships, nothing would result except a morning action of the destroyers with the Japanese escorting vessels. Should we not encounter the transports, it was still desirable that our destroyers should be protected by cruisers. ‘Well,’ said the Viceroy, ‘talk it over with Admiral Vitgeft.’ He then went off to his train.

“On the 6th, after he had left, the Viceroy telegraphed to Admiral Vitgeft, giving the plan of attack which he thought should be made by the destroyers on the Japanese transports. Admiral Vitgeft would not, however, undertake any responsibility personally. Instead, he held a meeting of all the flag officers and captains, who proceeded to draw up and sign a memorandum, of which the purport was that, ‘in view of the small number of serviceable ships now available, and the abundance of enemy’s mines in the roadstead, a sortie of the squadron might mean annihilation, in which case the fleet, when it arrived from Cronstadt, would meet with no support from Port Arthur. Secondly, that the dispatch of destroyers alone, without support from the larger vessels, was considered objectless and would probably be fatal to them.’ This brief summary of the contents of the memorandum was telegraphed to the Viceroy; but, at the same time, Admiral Vitgeft did not

entirely give up the idea of displaying some activity at sea, and Rear-Admiral Reitzenstein was charged with the duty of working out a scheme for combined operations of the cruisers and destroyers to last several days. On two or three occasions, when the scheme had been drawn up, the admiral called together the officers commanding the flotillas of destroyers and the cruisers; but when the moment came for putting it into execution it was found that, for one reason or another, the cruisers could not go out, and after a time the matter was dropped. The destroyers used to go out alone, but to no great distance."

A similar inability to adopt any decided line of action seems to have existed among the military commanders in Manchuria, for the Japanese were allowed to complete their disembarkation without interference from the Russian land forces, which at this date were distributed as follows:—*

Lieutenant-General Zasulich, after his defeat upon the Ya-lu, was falling back from Feng-huang-cheng to Lien-shan-kuan, whither reinforcements were on their way from Liao-yang to his support. To secure General Zasulich's left flank, Major-General Rennenkampf, with portions of his Trans-Baikal Cossack Division, in all three battalions, seventeen squadrons, and fourteen guns, was to operate in the neighbourhood of Sai-ma-chi†; while on his right flank Major-General Mishchenko, with eleven squadrons and a horse battery, watched the area between Feng-huang-cheng and Hsiu-yen as well as the coast line between An-tung and Pi-tzu-wo, where he came in touch with a mixed force under Major-General Zuikov, the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division.

It will be remembered that at the end of April, the bulk of General Mishchenko's force stood between An-tung and Ta-tung-kou, with two and a half squadrons of the Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment watching the coast line between the latter place and Pi-tzu-wo. On the 1st May, after the defeat of the Russian force on the Ya-lu, General Mishchenko fell back towards Feng-huang-cheng, in accordance with previous instructions from General Zasulich, and appears to have lost touch with the coast line for some days. Meanwhile, General Kuropatkin decided that General Mishchenko should not retire beyond Sha-li-chai, where he would be in a position to watch the coast, and also to close the road running from Ta-ku-shan to Hai-cheng through Hsiu-yen. General Mishchenko's brigade returned to the last-

* See Appendix C.

† See Chapter XVII.

named place towards the middle of May, but his original retirement had left the coast unwatched at a critical time, with the result that undue credit was given to exaggerated native rumours which were received in Liao-yang concerning Japanese landings near Ta-ku-shan.

The 1st Siberian Corps stood about Kai-ping and Ta-shih-chiao, covered by the advanced force under General Zuikov between Wa-fang-tien and Te-li-ssu. That officer's command consisted of five battalions of East Siberian Rifles, of which one was at Pu-lan-tien, the 2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Battery, and a company of Mounted Scouts. From Kai-ping to Chin-chou the railway was guarded by four companies and four squadrons of the 4th Brigade Trans-Amur Frontier Guards with a mountain battery, all of which troops were scattered in isolated posts along the line. In Port Arthur, Lieutenant-General Stessel commanded a force of about 30,000 combatants,* including the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment which was holding the walled town of Chin-chou and the works on the Nan Shan isthmus to the south. The Army Reserve under General Kuropatkin was at Liao-yang. The troops which were available to operate against the Japanese Second Army were, therefore, those belonging to the "Southern Force," under Lieutenant-General Stakelberg, and the garrison of Port Arthur under General Stessel. From such orders as have been published it would appear that no scheme of co-operation between the two commanders had been devised, and that their zones of responsibility were not very clearly defined. The general line of conduct to be followed by the garrison in case of a landing was, however, laid down by General Kuropatkin in a letter which he wrote to General Stessel on the 23rd April, and upon which that officer's instructions to his subordinates were based. This letter was of such importance that it is here reproduced verbatim.

* The detailed distribution of General Stessel's forces were as follows:—

The 7th East Siberian Rifle Division and the 15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment were in Port Arthur with detachments at Hsiao-ping-tao, Pigeon Bay, Louisa Bay, and other points on the coast.

The 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was on the Nan Shan position with a detachment near Kerr Bay.

Two battalions of the 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, one Reserve battalion, and the 3/4th Battery were at Ta-lien-wan.

One battalion of the 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment with half the 2/4th Battery was at Nan-kuan-ling Junction, with one company at Hsia-chia-kou-tzu.

The 14th and 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, with 1/4th, 4/4th, and half of the 2/4th Batteries were at Dalny.

“From information received by me it appears that the Japanese First Army, consisting of four divisions under Marshal Kuroki, has landed in Korea and reached the neighbourhood of the Ya-lu. A landing of Japanese forces in strong numbers may therefore shortly be expected both in the Bays of Korea and Liao-tung, and extensive operations either against Port Arthur or against our main army around Liao-yang.”

Russian plan of campaign.

“Should the enemy content himself with merely operating against Port Arthur, then in all probability he will endeavour to effect a landing in the Kuan-tung Peninsula and seize the Nan Shan position. If he should succeed in doing so, the Manchurian Army (as soon as it has received sufficient reinforcements to warrant its assuming the offensive) will advance to the relief of Port Arthur along the southern portion of the railway line. In order that the operations of our army in rear of the enemy may be as rapid as possible, I intend to make use of the railway for the conveyance of troops southward; it is, therefore, absolutely imperative that those portions of your army corps which will be compelled to retire in a northerly direction, after the landing of the Japanese, should become my advanced guard. They should, therefore, retire along the railway, so as to contain the enemy and cover the detraining of my troops on the line.

“In the event, however, of the enemy directing his efforts against our Liao-yang forces it is practically certain that a more or less large number of troops will advance across the Feng-shui Ling, in which case you are ordered to endeavour to attract the attention of the Japanese to your own forces and to draw off a part of his troops southward, so as to lighten my task. To carry out this plan it appears to be advisable to detach not less than a brigade of infantry and two batteries, with some mounted scouts, with orders to advance in the direction of Kai-ping until they come into contact with the enemy.”

On receipt of this letter General Stessel at once communicated the commander-in-chief's wishes to Major-General Fock, the commander of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, who was guarding the land approaches to Port Arthur, and added the following memorandum of his own views on the situation:—

“(1) If a landing in force should be made south of the Nan Shan position, and should the 5th Regiment be driven back (which is most improbable) then it should retire in a northerly direction along the railway, and endeavour to join hands with our main army. On getting into touch with the latter it will then act as an

advanced guard to the main army. Personally, I think the best course would be for you to order the advanced guard (*i.e.*, the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment) to hold the position, and to assume the offensive as soon as the main army approaches. Otherwise our strongly fortified position will be lost.

“(2) In the event of the enemy marching on Feng-huang-cheng with all his forces, then, in order to assist the operations of our main army on the Fen-shui Ling you should detach a brigade, the 13th and 14th Regiments, and two batteries, under your personal command and advance to Kai-ping so as to draw off some of the enemy. Having accomplished that duty you should again retire to the Nan Shan position.

“(3) Should the landing be at Dalny, the 14th Regiment, if unable to oppose it, should retire gradually, with other units* towards Port Arthur so as to reinforce the garrison, for in this case an attack on the fortress itself may be expected.

“(4) Should the landing take place between Dalny and Port Arthur you should attack the enemy's rear.”

From this correspondence it would appear that a landing near Pi-tzu-wo was hardly contemplated, and that the appearance of General Oku's army so far north was a complete surprise to the Russian commanders.

On the afternoon of the 4th May, Cossacks reported the appearance of Japanese transports in the offing, and next morning General Zuikov directed Lieutenant-Colonel Rantsev, commanding the rifle battalion at Pu-lan-tien, to watch the disembarkation. Sending one company and a scout detachment towards Pi-tzu-wo, Colonel Rantsev went himself with two companies in the direction of Yen-tai Bay, and that evening was able to report his estimate that 10,000 Japanese troops had landed. Returning on the 6th May, he fell in with Japanese infantry already established at San-chia-tun. What version of this affair reached the Russian head-quarters at Liao-yang is not known, but a telegram was dispatched the same day by General Kuropatkin's chief of the staff directing General Zuikov to withdraw his force northward, together with the Frontier Guards, making a night march covered by his cavalry. Hsiung-yao, sixty miles north of Pu-lan-tien,

* It is not quite clear whether the troops in the Nan Shan position were meant to be included.

was to be reached in two marches, the railway being used so far as accommodation permitted; the troops entrained were to proceed as far as Liao-yang. The evacuation of that place was actually begun, and large quantities of stores were loaded on to trains. There seems little doubt that at this period Russian counsels were to some extent divided. It has always been believed that from the first General Kuropatkin was in favour of concentrating his troops at Harbin until his organization was complete, and that he was overruled by superior authority, perhaps upon the recommendation of the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeiev.*

With the disaster on the Ya-lu and the disembarkation near Pi-tzu-wo, General Kuropatkin's original inclination had apparently reasserted itself, but Admiral Alexeiev arrived from Port Arthur on the 6th May, and it may have been due to his influence that the orders for the evacuation of Liao-yang were cancelled on the 11th.

The necessity for the hasty abandonment of the railway between Pu-lan-tien and Wa-fang-tien is not clear, for it assisted the Japanese to interrupt communication between Port Arthur and the north. On the 6th May, one and a half battalions of infantry and a detachment of engineers of the Japanese 3rd Division damaged the railway line at Pu-lan-tien, after a skirmish with the Frontier Guards at that station.† As the troops approached the railway, a train was seen steaming north and fire was opened upon it; but when the flag of the Geneva Convention was hoisted it was allowed to pass. The Japanese detachment fell back on the 7th,‡ as it was deemed inadvisable to remain unsupported across the Russian line of communication. On the same day a battalion and some engineers, also of the 3rd Division, occupied Pi-tzu-wo in co-operation with the navy, driving out some two hundred Russian cavalry who fell back on Wa-fang-tien.

Meanwhile, General Zuikov, in accordance with his orders,

* See, however, the report by Major-General Flug, on "The Strategic Distribution of the Forces in Manchuria," p. 405.

† The Japanese did not intend to destroy the railway line, as they contemplated making use of it later in their operations against the Russian field army. They therefore confined themselves to minor damage of rails. Another account states that the Japanese failed to cut the telegraph wires, owing to their being made of extra thick steel.

‡ Communication with Port Arthur was re-opened later, for a train carrying artillery ammunition succeeded in reaching the fortress on the 10th May, the line being repaired sufficiently to permit its passage, and on the following day a train of sick and civilians passed north. Pu-lan-tien was finally occupied on the 14th May by two Japanese infantry battalions and two squadrons of cavalry,

concentrated his detachments and retired north, leaving only two squadrons of the Primorsk Dragoons and two squadrons of the Frontier Guards to observe the enemy. On the 8th May, detachments of the Japanese 3rd Division again cut the line and telegraph at Lung-kou, midway between Pu-lan-tien and Chin-chou, and discovered a strong body of hostile troops near Shih-san-li-tai. This force, which consisted of the 1st Brigade of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, had been pushed forward under the command of General Fock with the intention of making a reconnaissance; but on the disappearance of the Japanese in a north-easterly direction the operation revolved itself into an extended tactical exercise, which lasted until the 10th. On that day the greater part of the brigade returned to camp, leaving three battalions at Shih-san-li-tai as an advanced guard. A few days later information was received in Port Arthur that the Japanese army was moving south, and for the second time General Fock was ordered to clear up the situation. On the 15th May, part of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division was again moved forward but was attacked early on the following morning by the Japanese 1st Division, to which the 13th Artillery Regiment and five battalions* from the 4th Division were attached, under General Oku in person. By 3 p.m. on the 16th, the Japanese had gained the heights of Shih-san-li-tai, as well as those east of Chin-chou, about Mount Sampson. The Russians fell back under cover of artillery fire with a loss of eleven officers† and one hundred and seventy-nine men killed and wounded, while that of the Japanese was one hundred and seventy-one.

By this action the first phase of General Oku's task had been brought to a successful conclusion; the Kuan-tung Peninsula had been isolated from the north, and communication between Port Arthur and Liao-yang was finally severed. Now, however, the Second Army was between two bodies of the enemy and General Oku felt that he was not sufficiently strong to attempt any further offensive movement.

He therefore decided to await the arrival of the 5th Division from Japan, and in the meanwhile he disposed his forces as follows:—

- (1) General Oku, with the 1st Division and the 7th Brigade from the 4th Division (less three battalions attached

* Viz., 3 battalions from the 7th Brigade and two battalions of the 9th Regiment of the 19th Brigade. These troops and a company of engineers were under Lieut.-General Ogawa, the commander of the 4th Division.

† Including Major-General Nadyein, the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division who was wounded.

to the 19th Brigade), and one regiment of the 1st Artillery Brigade, faced the Russian lines at Chin-chou and Nan Shan, and detached a battalion of the 2nd Regiment and a troop of cavalry to Sai-tzu-ho to protect his left flank.

- (2) The 3rd Division, the remainder of the 4th Division, and two regiments of the 1st Artillery Brigade held Pu-lan-tien and the line of the Ta-sha Ho ready to meet possible danger from the north.

While General Oku had been gradually feeling his way on land, the Japanese fleet had been engaged in clearing the Russian mines from the bays nearer to Port Arthur. There was every reason to believe that the Nan Shan position would be strongly held, and there seems to have been an idea that if Kerr Bay could be cleared the advance of the Second Army might be assisted by landing the Naval Brigade, which had originally covered the disembarkation of the troops, on the Tai-ku-shan Peninsula.

The sweeping operations began on the 12th May, and soon proved to be distinctly hazardous for, in addition to the dangerous nature of the work, the vessels engaged upon them were sometimes exposed to the fire of Russian field guns. The *Itsukushima*, *Nisshin*, and *Miyako* bombarded the coast while four flotillas of torpedo boats swept for mines. They were joined soon afterwards by a fifth flotilla of torpedo boats which began to take soundings along the shore of the bay. Although a small body of Russian cavalry was seen, and fired upon, the work proceeded without interruption, and a small party from one of the torpedo boats cut a telegraph wire which ran close to the western shore of the bay. Some mines were discovered on the eastern side and, in endeavouring to destroy one, torpedo boat No. 48 was blown up and sunk with a loss of fourteen men killed and wounded. On the 14th, while similar operations were in progress, the *Miyako* struck a mine and sank in twenty-three minutes.*

In addition to these operations on the eastern side of the peninsula, a force consisting of the *Akashi*, *Akitsushima*, *Chiyoda*, *Suma*, *Oshima*, *Akagi*, *Uji*, and the 14th Torpedo Boat Flotilla was sent round to the Gulf of Liao-tung under Rear-Admiral Togo to reconnoitre towards Chin-chou and Kai-ping and if possible to produce the impression that a landing was

* According to a Russian account, the buoys which had been placed by the Japanese to show the channel which had already been swept, were moved during the night by a Russian Naval Reserve officer and some volunteers. There were 21 casualties including 2 seamen killed.

intended on that side. On arriving off Kai-ping about midday on the 16th, some troops were observed and were fired upon, but with what effect is not known. Chin-chou Bay was visited on the following day, after some mine-sweeping operations, and the gunboats were sent up to the head whence they opened fire upon the railway bridges and upon a military train in which, as it happened, General Stessel was returning from an inspection of the Nan Shan position. The Russian commander continued his journey on horseback until, on the retirement of the Japanese, he was overtaken by the train. Rear-Admiral Togo's cruise was, however, marred by one misfortune. On the night of the 16th-17th, while returning from Kai-ping to Chin-chou, his vessels ran into a thick fog, and about 1 a.m. there was a collision between the gunboats *Akagi* and *Oshima* in which the latter was so severely damaged that, although none of the crew were lost, it was impossible to save her, and she sank in about an hour and a half.

A few days earlier a much more serious disaster had befallen the Japanese navy off Port Arthur, where watchers on shore had observed that the hostile vessels were in the habit of cruising between certain well defined limits. These points had been carefully noted by Captain Ivanov, of the mine-laying ship *Amur*, who thought he saw his way to inflicting a blow which would be

some compensation for the loss of the *Petropavlovsk* and other vessels. On the 14th May, his chance came. On that morning there was a low-lying fog to seaward and the Japanese vessels kept further

from Port Arthur than usual. The *Amur* quietly slipped out and, although she could see the masts of the Japanese ships above the fog, succeeded in laying unobserved a number of mines about ten miles to the south-eastward of Lao-tieh Shan,* and in returning to harbour without creating any suspicion. Next morning, just before 10 a.m., three Japanese battleships approached the port and proceeded to patrol in exactly the usual manner. The Russians on the look-out had not long to wait. About 10 a.m., a dull far-off explosion was heard, and the heights on shore and the rigging of the ships were soon crowded with spectators. At such a distance few details could be seen, but the Japanese ships were observed to be in difficulties and to be lowering boats. Two more reports were heard, the second being very loud, and watchers on Golden Hill saw an immense explosion in one of the Japanese ships followed almost immediately by the disappearance of the vessel. It could

* It may be noted that these mines were placed in the open sea, well outside territorial waters and quite possibly in the track of peaceful vessels bound to or from Newchuang.

be seen that another vessel was in difficulties with a heavy list, and had the Russian admiral been in a position to follow up his advantage a great opportunity offered itself. Fortunately for the Japanese, Admiral Vitgeft was a different type of man from his predecessor, Admiral Makarov, and no preparations had been made to attack if the mine-laying should prove successful. Of the battleships only the *Poltava* had steam up; but she was not allowed to go out for fear of Japanese mines, and the Russian admiral contented himself with sending off sixteen destroyers "to worry the damaged battleship, but not to attack." However the commander of the 2nd Flotilla of Destroyers seems to have made an attempt to get ahead of the Japanese battleships with a view to making an attack from that direction; but the ^{open} appearance of some hostile cruisers and the distance from Port Arthur, now fifteen miles, decided him to give up the attempt, and to make for the protection of the shore batteries. His destroyers were fired upon by both battleships and cruisers, but all returned in safety. According to the Russian account, the Japanese used time fuzes with their shells, which strewed the decks with a hail of fragments but caused little damage and no loss of life.

From later accounts we learn something of what had actually occurred to the Japanese battleships. It appears that the second sub-division, consisting of the *Hatsuse*, *Shikishima*, and *Yashima* were on blockade duty that morning. Soon after reaching their usual cruising ground the *Hatsuse*, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Nashiba, struck a mine which disabled her helm. The other ships at once turned away, but they were not to escape, and a few minutes later the *Yashima* also struck a mine, or possibly two mines together. When the first explosion occurred preparations were made for taking the *Hatsuse* in tow, but before they could be completed she struck a second mine which, taking effect amidships, seems to have exploded one of her magazines. The effect was somewhat similar to that on the *Petropavlovsk*. An enormous cloud of smoke and steam arose and the *Hatsuse* disappeared in about a minute and a half. Few, if any, of those below at the time escaped but Admiral Nashiba and about two hundred of the crew, of whom many were severely injured by the explosion, were picked up by the other ships. The admiral's evil fortune did not end there, for towards evening the dispatch vessel *Tatsuta*, to which he transferred his flag, ran into a fog and went ashore on the westernmost of the Elliot Islands where she remained for a month.

Had the Russian battleships followed up their first success they must have found a certain prey but, as they failed to do so

the Japanese tried hard to get the *Yashima* to a place of safety and for some hours her fate remained in the balance. In spite of everything that could be done, however, the water gradually gained and some hours later she was abandoned in the neighbourhood of Encounter Rock. It is said that, before leaving, the ship's company were assembled on the quarter deck and the flag slowly lowered with a royal salute. Three "banzais" were then given and the crew ordered into the boats. At this time the ship had a very heavy list and was so low in the water that her starboard net shelf was submerged. Soon afterwards she sank.*

In the early hours of the same day, the Japanese fleet had sustained yet another loss, not on this occasion due to any act of the enemy. A squadron of cruisers under Rear-Admiral Dewa, which had been employed in blockading Port Arthur, got into a thick fog to the southward of the Liaotung Peninsula. At 1.40 a.m., while making a turn, the *Kasuga* ran into the port quarter of the second class cruiser *Yoshino*. The ram of the *Kasuga* struck the *Yoshino* with great force just abaft the engine room, and the latter vessel rapidly made water, heeled over to starboard, and began to settle down aft. Efforts were made to get out collision mats, but they were of no avail and she sank in deep water. On account of the thick fog the other ships were unable to render much assistance, and only about ninety of her crew were saved. The fact of her listing over to starboard when struck on the port side is remarkable, but well authenticated.

Even this was not the last of the Japanese misfortunes, for on the night of the 17th May, while on guard duty, the destroyer *Akatsuki* struck a mine and sank immediately. The other boats of her flotilla rescued most of her crew, but all the officers and sixteen men were lost. Thus in the course of little more than three days the Japanese navy had been deprived of two battleships, a second class cruiser, a destroyer and a gunboat. Except in the case of the *Hatsuse*, the loss of life had not been great, but the fact that the Japanese were absolutely devoid of reserves with which to make good their casualties made the loss of material doubly serious, and henceforward Admiral Togo was compelled to treat his precious battleships even more carefully than before.

The losses had, however, less serious consequences than might have been the case since, for the time being at all events, all idea of offensive action by the Russian fleet had been given up. The work of sweeping for Japanese mines in the roadstead outside

* The loss of this vessel was successfully concealed for many months.

Port Arthur continued through May, and after the 18th more electro-contact mines were laid, to supplement those already in place, as a defence against blockships. A number of men belonging to the navy were also employed in improving the defences of the fortress, and the guns from the cruisers *Dzigit*, *Razboinik*, and other inefficient ships, as well as some from the rest of the fleet, were mounted in batteries on the land side.

On the 18th May, two flotillas of destroyers, consisting of twelve boats, were sent out from Port Arthur to reconnoitre Hsiao-ping-tao and Ta Ho Bays,* and to endeavour to find out if the latter had been mined by the Japanese. They left at 10 a.m., and while one of their number steamed south to keep a look out, the remainder went to Hsiao-ping-tao; but on being warned by the look-out boat that the Japanese were in sight, they returned to Port Arthur. As the Japanese squadron, consisting of two cruisers and a number of destroyers, had also been seen from the shore, the *Novik* was sent out to support the Russian destroyers, which returned without being interfered with. This was the first occasion on which any Russian vessel larger than a destroyer had been seen outside the harbour by the Japanese since the last blocking expedition. That night the same flotillas were again sent out to Ta Ho Bay, with the somewhat vague idea that they might be available for attacking Japanese blockships. As the Russian destroyers left the harbour the shore searchlights were extinguished. The Japanese destroyers, which were keeping watch outside, replied by turning on their own; but although the opposing flotillas must have been within a short distance of one another, the Russians were not discovered, and at daylight they returned to Port Arthur without having seen the enemy. About midnight on the 19th—20th the Japanese sent an expedition of gunboats, destroyers, and torpedo boats which succeeded, under a heavy fire from the shore batteries, in dropping between fifty and seventy mines in the roadstead.

* The original idea seems to have been that the Russian destroyers should lay mines in the former bay, but this had been given up.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE BATTLE OF NAN SHAN.

(Strategical Map 2, and Plan 5.)

AFTER his successful skirmish with General Fock's division General Oku was left with his outposts facing the Russian position at Nan Shan. He had not long to wait for his reinforcements, for the second group of transports, carrying the 5th Division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, began to arrive from Japan on the 15th May, and by the 23rd the last ship had come up.

The difficulties inseparable from landing on an open beach were aggravated by the fact that at low tide all stores had to be carried on men's shoulders across a muddy fore-shore from a quarter of a mile to two miles wide. On the other hand, recent successes had so far strengthened the Japanese position, that haste was no longer the first necessity, and something could be sacrificed to other considerations. For these reasons night work, which would have entailed the burning of lights and so have invited attack, was abandoned, and the transport flotilla retired to the base in the Elliot Islands at the end of each day's work. Moreover, on the 19th May, the Japanese 10th Division began to disembark at Ta-ku-shan.* These troops were to fill the gap between the First and Second Armies, and to protect the former's flank and the latter's rear. It was also hoped that their arrival would still further mystify and mislead the Russian army head-quarters as to the real intentions of the Japanese.

About this time the knowledge of the Russian forces which had been gained by the Second Army was as follows. While the disembarkation was in progress, some twelve or thirteen hundred troops were known to be in the neighbourhood of Ta-shih-chiao, holding all important points on the railway to the south. Wa-fang-tien was apparently the centre at which the greater number of these railway guards was concentrated; reconnoitring parties were occasionally pushed towards Pu-lan-tien, but no indications of a

* See Chapter XVI.

movement in force were observed. At Shih-san-li-tai part of the of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, the whole of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and eight guns, had been encountered and forced to retire, part on Chin-chou and part on the position at Nan Shan, where field works were being constructed with great energy. From Chin-chou, which was held by a small Russian garrison, reconnaissances were sent out from time to time, but there was reason to hope that the care exercised by General Oku to conceal his strength and dispositions would prevent them from gaining any useful information.

With the reinforcements which were now on shore it was felt that General Oku was strong enough to take his next step in advance; and he was, therefore, ordered by the Japanese Imperial head-quarters to gain possession of Ta-lien-wan and the harbour of Dalny, so as to secure a convenient landing place as a base for future operations. But to do so he must first drive the Russians from their fortified position south of Chin-chou. At 10 a.m. on the 21st May, the following orders were issued from Tsu-chia-tun:—


- “(1.) The 3rd Division will move on the 22nd from Chih-chia-fang so as to arrive on the 23rd at Sai-tzu-ho, proceeding thither through Erh-la-ping-tun. It will replace the detachment of the 1st Division at Sai-tzu-ho. One regiment of infantry,* one regiment of cavalry (less one squadron), and a battalion of artillery will be left behind under the command of the general officer commanding the 5th Division, and a battalion of infantry under the commander of the 1st Artillery Brigade.
- “(2.) The 4th Division will move on the 22nd by the Fu-chou—Chin-chou road so as to arrive at Shih-san-li-tai on the 23rd. On reaching that place it will find the 7th Brigade and the 13th Artillery Regiment, and will hold the heights to the west of the village. One battalion of infantry,† and one regiment of cavalry (less one squadron) will be left at Pu-lan-tien under the command of the general officer commanding the 5th Division.
- “(3.) The 1st Division will occupy, by the 23rd, a line from Chin-chou to Lao-hu Shan (Mount Sampson), and will maintain connexion with the 3rd and 4th Divisions.
- “(4.) The 1st Artillery Brigade, less the 13th Regiment, will advance on the 22nd from Tsu-chia-tun through Lung-ko-tien to Tung-tao-chia-ka. (See Strategical Map 2.)”

* 34th Regiment.

† The 2nd Battalion, 38th Regiment.

NAN SHAN.

PLATE 10.



VIEW OF THE RUSSIAN POSITION FROM THE JAPANESE H.Q.

"A" TO "B" WAS ATTACKED BY THE JAPANESE IIIrd DIVISION, "B" TO "C" BY THE Ist,
AND "C" TO "D" BY THE IVth DIVISION.

At the same time General Ueda, commanding the 5th Division, received the following order:—

“The general officer commanding the 5th Division, with the detachments of the 3rd and 4th Divisions allotted to him, the force now landing, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, will occupy a line from Pu-lan-tien along the Ta-sha Ho so as to protect the rear of the Second Army during the southerly movement. The 5th Engineer Battalion will be attached to the 1st Artillery Brigade.”

In accordance with these orders, the several groups occupied their assigned positions on the 23rd, the 3rd Division arriving after a march of thirty-five miles over bad roads. Army headquarters moved to Liu-chia-tien (about seven miles north-east of Chin-chou) on the 22nd.

Within a few miles of the positions which the Japanese Second Army now held, the Kuan-tung Peninsula narrows to an isthmus, which separates an arm of the bay of Ta-lien on the east from that of Chin-chou on the west.

The Nan Shan position.

This isthmus lies some thirty-five miles north-east of Port Arthur, and is an important strategical point covering the roads to that place and to Dalny, as well as the junctions of the Ta-lien-wan* and Dalny branches with the main southern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Measured from high-water mark east to west its extreme breadth is 3,500 yards, but on both sides there is a muddy foreshore the extent of which varies, according to the condition of the tide, from 1,500 to 2,000 yards. On it is a block of hills stretching almost from sea to sea, and rising to over three hundred feet. Here the Russians had resolved to bar the Japanese advance, and to delay, if not to prevent, the investment of Port Arthur.

The ground which they decided to hold for this purpose, known as the Nan Shan position, may be described as a group of hills forming a rough circle rather over a mile in diameter, and presenting to the north three marked salients, each of which is separated from its neighbour by deep ravines. The central and eastern spurs are, however, connected at several points by cols. Viewed from the north, these three features appear to form a single salient, due partly to the inclination of the outer ones towards that in the centre and partly to their lying, with regard to one another, somewhat in echelon.

Nature and art had made this side of the position wellnigh impregnable; for the slopes are bare and glacial-like, the field

* Ta-lien-wan is also called Liu-shu-tun.

of fire is extensive, and, on the day of battle, a network of barbed wire confronted the assailant as he advanced to the attack.

The eastern side, with a double border of wire* and mines, was even more formidable, for while its slopes were favourable for rifle fire, its defenders were well protected from hostile guns, and were to be aided by an improvised Russian gunboat in the bay. This vessel was safe from molestation by the Japanese, for on the 9th February, the day following the torpedo attack upon the fleet outside Port Arthur, the Russians had taken steps to render Ta-lien Bay unapproachable from the sea. Mines had been thickly sown, especially near the entrance, and a battery of heavy guns had been erected on the promontory near the town of Ta-lien-wan.


On the other hand, although the defence of the western flank of the position had been somewhat neglected, barbed wire had been stretched across the mouths of the ravines which, here as elsewhere, are both numerous and deep. The muddy foreshore of Chin-chou Bay is more extensive than that of Hand Bay on the east, and could be subjected to heavy cross fire both from the main position and from batteries on the Nan-kuan hills. It would appear, therefore, that the Russians in making their preparations for defence, not only regarded an attack from this direction as highly improbable but also omitted to take into consideration the effect that might be, and was, produced by enfilade fire from Japanese war vessels.

Since the 11th February considerable labour had been expended in preparing the position. Five years earlier, at the time of the Boxer rising, the Russians had placed a garrison in Chin-chou and had constructed two redoubts, twelve batteries, and some shelter trenches on the Nan Shan heights, for the defence of which a garrison of two battalions and some ninety guns were allotted. During the summer of 1903 the ground was carefully examined and a further scheme was prepared. Three forts were to be erected on the heights themselves, and another was to be placed on the low ground on either flank. All these forts were to be connected by a ditch, the whole forming a minor fortress, but the sudden outbreak of hostilities occurred before the defensive scheme had been carried into effect.

On the 3rd February, 1904, the position was inspected by Major-General Kondratenko and some officers of engineers, when it was found that the works which had been made in 1900 had fallen into disrepair and were now of little value. Proposals, drawn

* The barbed wire entanglements averaged from 17 to 21 feet in width.

RUSSIAN POSITION AT NAN SHAN




- Battery No 1..... 8 Field Guns
- " " 2..... 4-3-4" Chinese Guns
- " " 3..... 4-4" Guns
- " " 4..... 2-3-4" Chinese "
- " " 5..... { 4-6" Guns
6-6" Howitzers
- " " 9..... 4 Field Guns
- " " 10..... 6 Field Guns
- " " 11..... { 2-3-4" Chinese Guns
4 Field Guns
- " " 12..... No Guns
- " " 13..... 2 Field Guns
- " " 14..... 2-3-4" Chinese Guns
- " " 15..... 8 Field Guns

Redoubt No 2..... 2 Field Guns

Note. 1-6" Canet Gun was mounted later in battery No 13.

There were no guns in batteries Nos 6, 7 and 8, which are therefore not marked on the sketch.



up with the view of remedying defects, were at first rejected by the Council of the Kuan-tung Province, which refused to furnish the necessary funds,* but when war broke out a few days later orders were issued for the immediate execution of the work. The new defences consisted for the most part in repairs to the old redoubts and batteries, all of which stood on more or less commanding points. Some of the batteries were converted into closed works, and a few more, as well as lunettes to hold a company of infantry, were added. Especial care was devoted to the southern side of the position, as it was fully expected that the Japanese would effect a landing at some point between Port Arthur and Chin-chou. Shelter trenches, of which the lowest line was practically continuous, were constructed on the hill-sides in two, three, and, in places, even in four lines, but some bore the appearance of having been constructed as cover for supports or reserves rather than for the firing line. Within the gun batteries, which were connected by telephone, were splinterproofs, blindages, and traverses; a dynamo, in rear of the highest battery, supplied power to the searchlights which swept the front by night. A few roads existed, but these were better suited to facilitate the mounting of the artillery than the passage of reinforcements, which would have been greatly exposed in using them. Water was procurable from wells, and the supply was increased by metal tanks filled before the battle.

These defences were constructed in a period of forty working days,† but owing to cold weather and occasional storms, they were not completed until the 1st April. Between that date and the day of the battle of Nan Shan, supplementary casemates were made, and a shelter trench which ran towards the sea on the western flank was dug by order of General Fock.

In spite of all the labour which had been expended, the position was in some respects defective, and as late as the 19th‡ May

* The first estimate amounted to 19,000 roubles (£1,900), but the ultimate cost of the defences, hurriedly constructed, was 80,000 roubles (£8,000).

† The two battalions of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment carried out the work, assisted by Chinese coolies, who at one time numbered 5,000 men. The 3rd Battalion of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment did not arrive at Chin-chou from Russia until the beginning of April.

‡ On this date a letter from General Kuropatkin, dated the 17th May, was brought by sea to Port Arthur. In it General Stessel was informed that General Zuikov's detachment had been withdrawn, and the message went on to say "Our Frontier Guards will, no doubt, be able to hold the station at Te-li-ssu, whence they will harass the enemy. The cavalry has retired to Hsiung-yao-cheng and Kai-ping. Our Manchurian Army is preparing to fight the three Japanese armies. It appears that one division of the Japanese Second Army has entrenched itself at Pi-tzu-wo. We are

opinions were divided as to whether it should be held or dismantled. The defences lacked concealment, and were in certain places exposed to reverse and enfilade fire; on the western flank sufficient precautions had not been taken against a turning movement; communications were bad, and the ground was unfavourable for counter-attack. On the other hand, every movement of the attack was clearly visible for several miles; the defenders had a magnificent target while they themselves were hidden from view and generally protected from fire. Had the earthworks been less conspicuous, the assailants would have found it more difficult to ascertain the distribution of the Russian troops and guns.

In addition to the guns shown on the accompanying plate, there was one battery of four old 3·4-inch field guns near Ta-fang-shen, and another of two 4·2-inch guns whose extreme range was 9,300 yards, on the Ta-lien-wan promontory. From the main position only sixteen guns could fire in the direction of Chin-chou Bay,* and they could hardly expect to cope successfully with those of the Japanese flotilla which took part in the action; for the armament of the ships consisted of fifteen guns varying in calibre from 10·2-inch to 4·7-inch, with a large number of lighter guns.

As an advanced post the walled city of Chin-chou was held by one and a half companies† of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, with some scouts and four old pattern field guns. The total strength of this garrison was not more than 400 men.

expecting the disembarkation of the Third Army on the coast between Kai-ping and Newchuang. Yesterday there was a feint of a landing near Kai-ping. If, on the other hand, the Japanese leave a containing force to watch the Manchurian Army and throw their main body against the Kuan-tung Peninsula, I shall assume the offensive as soon as I am sufficiently strong to hold off the armies advancing from the Ya-lu and from the direction of Kai-ping respectively. I envy the simple and glorious task which will fall to the lot of the splendid army of the Kuan-tung Peninsula should it be called upon to bear the heaviest of the fighting. If it were not for the question of supply, I should feel perfectly at ease no matter how great were the forces directed against you. It appears highly desirable that General Fock's troops, and the guns on the Nan Shan position, should be withdrawn in good time; otherwise it will be a case of more trophies, perhaps 40 guns, falling into the hands of the enemy. A calamity which would have a most depressing effect on the troops."

* It is said that when Admiral Makarov inspected this position on the 9th March, he was asked whether he considered that enfilade fire could be brought to bear upon it from the ships in Chin-chou Bay. His reply was non-committal, but he advised that some heavy calibre guns should be placed in the western front.

† 10th Company and half of the 9th Company. The half of the 9th Company was sent to reinforce Chin-chou, at 11 p.m., on the 25th May.

On the morning of the 24th May, when all the divisions of the Japanese Second Army were in position awaiting the order to attack, a message was received from Admiral Togo to the effect that if the weather were clear the gunboats *Tsukushi*, *Heiyen*, *Akagi*, and *Chokai*, with a flotilla of torpedo boats, would co-operate by shelling the Russian position on the 25th and 26th May. General Oku therefore decided to delay his attack until the 25th, and at 1 p.m. issued the following orders :—

Naval co-operation.

General Oku's orders. Plan 5.

- “(1.) The 1st Division (less one regiment of infantry) will move under cover of night and occupy, by 3.30 a.m. on the 25th, a line stretching from a point five hundred yards north-east of Chin-chou, through Hsiao-chin Shan, to Tang-wang-tun. Part of its artillery will take up such a position, under cover of darkness, as will allow it to fire on Chin-chou without interruption from the enemy's guns. The main body of the division will occupy a covered position, and will make all preparations for attack in co-operation with the 13th Artillery Regiment.*
- “(2.) The 4th Division, keeping touch with the right of the 1st Division and making use of the Fu-chou—Chin-chou highway, will move under cover of night and occupy, by 3.30 a.m. on the 25th, a line as far westward as Lung-wang-miao. Part of its artillery will take position so as to fire on Chin-chou without interference from the Russian guns. The main body of the division will take up a covered position and make all preparations for attack.
- “(3.) The 3rd Division, under cover of darkness, will move to the district south of Lao-hu Shan and occupy Wang-chia-tun by 3.30 a.m. on the 25th. The main body of the division will take up a covered position and prepare for attack. Two companies of infantry will be attached to the 1st Artillery Brigade.
- “(4.) The 1st Artillery Brigade (less the 13th Regiment) and the 5th Engineer Battalion (less one company) will follow the line of march of the 3rd Division and take position in the neighbourhood of Sai-tzu-ho and prepare for action. Two companies of infantry of the 3rd Division will be attached to the brigade.”

* Attached to the 4th Division, *vide* para. 2 of Army Orders of the 21st May (p. 152).

As already stated General Oku's design was to attack on the 25th, but two causes, the failure to capture Chin-chou and the non-arrival of the promised war vessels, combined to prevent him from doing so.

Before daylight the troops had moved into the positions ordered, and at 8 a.m. army head-quarters reached the hill near Shih-san-li-tai. At 5.50 a.m. portions of the 1st, 4th, and 13th Artillery Regiments opened fire upon the garrison of Chin-chou, and the Russians replied from Nan Shan. The artillery in Chin-chou was quickly silenced, and an attempt to storm the gates was made by infantry and engineers of the 4th Division, but there was no concealment, and as the troops showed little of the dash they displayed on the following day the attack failed. The day was dull and stormy, and since no gunboats had appeared in Chin-chou Bay by 3 p.m. General Oku decided to postpone the attack until the early hours of the 26th, and then, if need be, taking advantage of the darkness, to carry it out unassisted by the naval guns. At 3.30 p.m. the following orders were issued:—

First assault
on Chin-chou.

- “(1.) The 1st Division will keep its present position, and at 4.30 a.m. to-morrow will move to a line running from the south-east point of Chin-chou, through Chi-li-chuang, to about 500 yards south of the latter village, and will attack the enemy.
- “(2.) The 4th Division, keeping touch with the 1st Division, will move at 4.30 a.m. to the nameless stream near the south gate of Chin-chou, and will attack Nan Shan on its western side as if to surround it from that direction. Chin-chou will, if possible, be occupied by midnight to-night.
- “(3.) The 3rd Division, keeping touch with the 1st Division, will move from its present position at 4.30 a.m. and endeavour to reach a line from Yen-chia-tun to Yao-chia-tun, and will attack the eastern face of Nan Shan as if to surround it.
- “(4.) The whole of the artillery of the army will be under the command of the chief artillery officer and, from positions decided upon by him, will open fire at 4.30 a.m. and assist the infantry advance.
- “(5.) The reserve of the army will bivouac at Cheng-chia-tun, and will time its march so as to reach Hsiao-chin Shan by 4.30 a.m.”

At 7 p.m. the naval flotilla,* which had been forced to take refuge from the stormy weather at a temporary anchorage, approached Chin-chou Bay in readiness for the bombardment of the morrow. All preparations for the struggle upon which the Second Army was about to enter were now complete, a struggle less costly yet, perhaps, more obstinate than any other in which it took part in Manchuria. But the delay was turned to good account by the defence. General Stessel had always been anxious that the flanks of the Russian position should be protected by light draught vessels from the fleet. On the eastern side this was easy to do, and during the night of the 25th, the *Bobr* and two destroyers made their way unobserved to Ta-lien Bay. There the mine-field protected them from molestation by the Japanese fleet, and, as events proved, they were able to render great assistance to the troops. On the western side, however, the conditions were different for, in spite of the attention which had been paid to mining operations, Chin-chou Bay had been almost neglected, and any small vessels which had gone there must have fallen an easy prey to the enemy.

The night of the 25th was dark, and as the troops of the 4th Division were forming for the attack on Chin-chou a thunder-storm burst, accompanied by a high wind and heavy rain, which rendered movements over the slippery ground extremely difficult. Shortly before midnight a party of engineers of the 4th Division, closely followed by four battalions of the 19th Brigade,† approached the south gate of the city. The storm was then at its height, and the frequent flashes of lightning disclosed the coming danger to the Russian sentries on the walls. Nevertheless the engineers succeeded in laying a mine, but before they could spring it they were overwhelmed by heavy rifle fire. Attempts to capture the gate by climbing on buildings adjoining the walls also failed.

* Name.	Draught.	Armament.
Akagi	10 feet ...	One 4·7-inch, five 12-pr., four 3-pr., and two 2½-pr. guns.
Heiyen	16 ,, ...	One 10·2-inch Krupp, four 4·7-inch, two 3-pr., six 2½-pr., and two 1-pr. guns.
Tsukushi	15 ,, ...	Two 10-inch, four 4·7-inch, two 9-pr., and four machine guns.
Chokai	10 ,, ...	Three 4·7-inch and two machine guns.
4 torpedo boats	Two 3-pr. Q.F. guns each.

† The 19th Brigade had only four battalions present. The 2nd Battalion of the 38th Regiment was with the 5th Division near Pu-lan-tien, and the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Regiment formed the reserve of its own division.

In consequence of this reverse, neither the artillery of the 4th Division nor that of the 13th Regiment could occupy the intended positions, and were forced to remain on the heights north of Chin-chou, while the infantry of the 7th and 19th Brigades retired to the high ground east of Lung-wang-miao.

No combined assault by the troops of the 4th and 1st Divisions had been ordered—a measure scarcely necessary considering the smallness of the garrison—but when General Matsumura, whose brigade was moving forward to attack Nan Shan, became aware of the difficulty experienced by the 4th Division, he sent a battalion of the 1st Regiment against the east gate of the town. Under cover of its fire the gate was blown in by four engineers all of whom were badly wounded, and at 5.20 a.m. the infantry forced its way into the town while the enemy retired to Nan Shan by the southern gate, losing heavily from the fire of the 4th Division and leaving behind four field guns.*

The delay caused by this diversion on the right of the 1st Division, and by the musketry fire from the ramparts of the city, prevented its columns from occupying the allotted position until 6 a.m. Meanwhile the 3rd Division, in two columns, the right consisting of the 5th Brigade (less one battalion), the left of the 18th Regiment (less two companies), had occupied the appointed line, where some entrenchments had been thrown up, and the troops were kept concealed awaiting the order to attack.

Under cover of darkness, the 14th and 15th Regiments of the 1st Artillery Brigade, and the artillery of the 1st and 3rd Divisions had taken up positions along the lower slopes of Mount Sampson, while the guns of the 4th and 13th Artillery Regiments had been posted on some high ground west of the railway line.

Such were the dispositions of the Japanese for the attack upon the Nan Shan heights. On the other hand, the disposition of the Russian troops was as follows:—

Dispositions
of Russians
at Nan Shan.

(a) In the trenches and redoubts on Nan Shan under Colonel Tretyakov—

2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 12th Companies of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.†

* The garrison of Chin-chou was ordered to fall back to the trenches on the Nan Shan heights; the unwounded men of the 9th Company were posted between the 4th and the 8th Companies; the survivors of the 10th Company took position on the right of the 5th Company.

† The 1st Company of this regiment formed part of the Legation Guard in Peking.

Scout detachments of the 13th and 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiments.

In local reserve, the 11th Company of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

In general reserve, two Companies of the 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

In all, approximately 2,700 bayonets.

(b) On the right flank—

1st Battalion, 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, in trenches along the shores of Hand Bay.

The Reserve Battalion of the 4th Division at Ta-lien-wan.

2nd and 3rd Battalions, 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, near Lower Nan-kuan-ling.

3rd Battery, 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, and one battery 2.5-inch guns on the Ta-lien-wan heights.

(c) On the left flank—

The 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment (less two companies), just west of Upper Nan-kuan-ling.

(d) In the centre, between (b) and (c)—

The 1st and 2nd Batteries of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, and the 1st and 2nd Batteries of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.

(e) At Nan-kuan-ling Junction (west of the Nan Shan plan)—

The 15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment with one company at Cape Robinson, and one at Hsia-chia-kou-tzu.

(f) At Dalny—

The 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment with the 4th Battery of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.

General Nadyein (in command of the 2nd Brigade 4th East Siberian Rifle Division) commanded the whole force on the 26th May until General Fock arrived later in the day; while Colonel Tretyakov, of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, was in command of the troops occupying the Nan Shan heights.

General Oku had intended to begin the bombardment at 4.30 a.m. on the 26th, but the morning was foggy and the summit of Nan Shan did not become visible till shortly after 5 a.m. Twenty minutes later the 15th Regiment of Artillery opened fire, speedily followed by all the remaining

Artillery duel. The Russians replied from more than fifty guns of various

calibre, the shooting of both the heavy and the field guns being remarkably good.

At 6 a.m., the Japanese flotilla entered Chin-chou Bay, and shortly afterwards its guns joined in the cannonade. For a time, in spite of great superiority, no impression was made upon the Russians, but about 7 a.m. their fire showed signs of slackening.

Meanwhile the infantry attack was in progress. The 4th Division, deploying at the hill east of Lung-wang-miao, pushed forward west of Chin-chou city, the first line of the Japanese infantry 19th Brigade on the left reaching the vicinity of attack.

Kao-chia-kou at 7.10 a.m. On its right, though considerably in rear, was the 7th Brigade, for the narrow front of the attack forced the greater part of the troops to cross the sandy beach, from which the tide was now receding, under a heavy fire from the defenders. The advance of the infantry allowed the 4th and 13th Artillery Regiments to move forward, and at about 7.30 a.m. they came into action on the western side of Chin-chou and opened fire at closer range.

The Russians, seeing themselves threatened by an attempt to turn their left, withdrew four field guns from Nan Shan to the high ground south of Ssu-chia-tun, whence they opened fire upon the advancing infantry. By 8.30 a.m., the leading troops of the 4th Division, in spite of the heavy fire of guns and rifles, succeeded in reaching the ruined mud walls of an old barrack midway between the enemy's entanglements and the hamlet of Kao-chia-kou; and a few minutes later two more Russian field batteries were withdrawn from Nan Shan with the object of coming into action more effectively from the south-west.

At this juncture, the commander of the Japanese flotilla, either inferring that a general retirement was about to follow or perhaps on account of the ebbing tide, moved his vessels out of the bay to a point whence he could command the road and railway leading to Port Arthur. This enabled some of the guns, which he had kept in check from his former position, to turn their fire against the Japanese 4th Division. About 9 a.m., the artillery of the 4th Division advanced in closer support of its infantry to a position south-west of Hsi-kuan-wei. Most of the guns on the main Russian position had now ceased to trouble the attack, but the two batteries which had fallen back soon opened fire from the direction of Upper Nan-kuan-ling, and their fire, combined with that of the infantry, caused the right of the 4th Division its heaviest loss. The flotilla was therefore recalled by signal from General Oku and ordered to resume the bombardment of the

main Russian position. By 10 a.m. its guns were again in action, and about this time two battalions of the 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment had been moved to Tun-hsi-la-fang to oppose a possible landing. For an hour the vessels continued to shell the heights until the state of the tide compelled the two largest gunboats again to steam out to sea.

In the centre of the attack the 1st Division had reached its appointed position at 6 a.m., but was forced to wait, under heavy fire, until the divisions on its right and left came up in line. Fortunately the troops were able to throw up some cover with their light entrenching tools, and this, though slight, greatly reduced their losses. At 8.20 a.m., the progress of the 4th Division on his right, and the gradual weakening of the Russian artillery fire decided Prince Fushimi to order an assault. Supported by the divisional artillery at Hsiao-chin Shan, and the guns of the 4th Artillery Regiment near Chi-li-chuang, a determined effort was made to close with the enemy. The first line, rising from behind its slender cover, rushed to the front and, although suffering heavy losses from machine gun and rifle fire, reached a point near the station. At 9.20 a.m., General Oku sent up two battalions of the 3rd Regiment from the general reserve to reinforce the right; but further progress was impossible, and the position of the 1st Division, which had drawn upon itself the concentrated fire of the defence, became so serious that, at 10.30 a.m., the 1st and 14th Artillery Regiments were pushed forward to closer range.

On the Japanese left and facing the eastern front of the position the 3rd Division, which had deployed upon its appointed line before daylight, remained concealed until, at 7.50 a.m., General Oshima ordered the first line to advance. Here, as elsewhere, the ground to be passed over was very open, and the nearer the enemy's position was approached, the more the left flank became exposed to enfilade fire from Russian infantry at Chi-chia-tun, and from the guns south of Ta-fang-shen. Nevertheless the Japanese pushed forward little by little, and by 9 a.m. their right and centre had passed the railway and were close to the line of Russian obstacles.

The Russians now reinforced their right, and, half an hour later, brought a field battery into action south of Ta-fang-shen, while the gunboat *Bobr** coming into the bay south of Huang-tu-ai at 10 a.m. harassed the left and rear of the Japanese for about

* The armament of this vessel was one 9-inch, one 6-inch, one 2½-inch, six 9-pr., two 3-pr, and four machine guns. She arrived at 8 a.m. and returned to Dalny by noon.

four hours and forced their batteries to change position. General Oshima could get no further, and nothing remained but to wait till the fire of the supporting artillery should render an assault practicable.

At 11 a.m., the remaining battalion (less one company) of the 3rd Regiment was sent up from the general reserve by the army commander.*

The attack had thus failed everywhere, but the tenacious assailants, though unable to advance further, clung to the ground which they had won. Many attempts were made by isolated groups to clear a path through the barbed wire against which the high explosive shell had no effect, and officers and men nobly but vainly sacrificed themselves. Frequent telephone messages reached head-quarters, telling of the almost desperate situation of the first line, but no reserves remained to give fresh vigour to the attack, and the supply of ammunition for the guns was getting low.

But the defenders were no better off than the assailants. The Russian artillery ammunition had begun to run short as early as 8 a.m.; about 9 a.m., one battery was compelled to cease fire, and after 11 a.m. only two guns were able to take any active part in the defence, all the others having exhausted their allowance of one hundred and fifty rounds. Meanwhile Colonel Tretyakov, commanding the troops on the heights, had used up the whole of his small local reserve, *i.e.*, the 11th Company of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, on the right flank. During the early part of the fight this officer, in common with his superiors, seems to have felt convinced that the main Japanese attack would be delivered by the 3rd Division. The consequence was that when the 4th Division, moving along the beach, began to outflank his left, the only reserves available were one company and the band of the 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

The situation at midday was therefore as follows. The Japanese had failed all along the line in their attempts to carry the Russian position by assault, but were able to hold their own. They had received great assistance from the fire of the vessels in Chin-chou Bay, but the supply of ammunition for their field guns was beginning to fail. There were no fresh reserves. Of the whole Russian force avail-

* Some reports say that a force of Russian infantry, carried on five steam launches, attempted to land at Huang-tu-ai about this time but was repulsed; the best Russian account makes no mention of this attempt, but all the officers of the two destroyers which left Port Arthur with the *Bobr* were decorated for work done in launches during the battle.

able, only a small portion, about eleven companies and a few scout detachments, had been actually engaged, but it had kept off three divisions for seven hours. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 13th Regiment had been moved to Tun-hsi-la-fang to oppose a possible landing from the gunboats. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 14th Regiment had also been moved forward, and were in position near Ta-fang-shen, with one company, the 8th, on the right flank of the main position. With the exception of the company at Cape Robinson the whole of the 15th Regiment seems to have been moved to Hsia-chia-kou-tzu, for about 9.30 a.m. General Fock went there to see Colonel Gryaznov, its commander, before going to Ta-fang-shen, where he arrived about 1 p.m. Artillery ammunition was practically exhausted. The left flank of the defence had, quite unexpectedly, proved to be the point of greatest danger; but the ebbing tide now forced the *Bobr* to return to Dalny, and the right flank was deprived of her support. It would appear however that, in spite of the lack of artillery ammunition, the Russian situation was the more favourable. Indeed, a telegram which was dispatched by General Nadyein to Port Arthur about this hour gave rise to premature rejoicing in the town.

For three hours longer the Japanese were unable to make any progress and their prospects began to look hopeless, yet General Oku's determination never faltered. At 3.30 p.m., he ordered a fresh assault to be made, preceded by a heavy artillery fire of half an hour's duration. Engineers were to lead in order to cut the wire entanglements, and a determined effort was to be made to take the position regardless of loss. This renewed attack, however, was no more successful than the earlier one, although three separate attempts were made to push it home; but the 3rd Division, before giving way, managed to cut the wire of the electrically-controlled mines which lay between it and the Russian shelter trenches.

As the Japanese continued to threaten the left flank, General Nadyein sent for two battalions from the reserves, but General Fock, who was at Ta-fang-shen, did not respond, and to this lack of support the ultimate loss of the position must be largely attributed.

At 5 p.m., two batteries of the Japanese 1st Division were moved forward in order to shell a portion of the Russian works and to overwhelm the deadly machine gun fire poured thence upon the infantry. In spite of this assistance, the position of the 3rd Division, whose left was partially enveloped by the enemy's infantry and artillery on the high ground east of Nan-kuan-ling,

was growing worse. An hour later the position of the 1st and 3rd Divisions was practically unchanged, but the 4th Division had drawn closer to the Russian left, driving back the 5th and 9th Companies of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which had lost about half their numbers from artillery fire. The commander of the Russian defences on that side had again asked for reinforcements about 4 p.m., and at last, about 6 p.m., two companies of the 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment arrived. Of these, half a company was sent to the support of No. 8 Company in the centre. During all this time the Japanese 4th Division was steadily fighting its way closer, and the sun was almost setting when the men of the 7th Brigade pushed their way breast-high through the waves at a greater distance from the position than in their earlier attempt. Then, changing direction towards the main position, they forced their way into the ravines, captured redoubt No. 9 which was held by the 5th Company, and drove the Russians from Batteries 11 and 13 just as the one and a half companies of the 14th Regiment came up in support. The seizure of these important points, which commanded the line of retreat of the troops in the trenches, opened the way to other successes on this flank, and uncovered the rear of the centre and right. Almost simultaneously the 1st and 3rd Divisions, pushing to the front, succeeded in passing the line of obstacles which had so long been held against them.

The gallant 5th Regiment and the few companies which had come to its assistance were overwhelmed by numbers, and the defence now crumbled. Driven back from point to point, the Russians blew up their powder magazine at Ta-fang-shen and retired to San-shih-li-pu in the direction of Port Arthur, and at 7.20 p.m. the flag of the Rising Sun floated upon the summit of the hard-won hill. Some of the guns which still had ammunition came up and opened fire upon the disordered crowds of fugitives, causing them heavy loss. The 1st Cavalry Regiment was ordered to move from its position east of Chin-chou, and, pushing due south, to follow up the enemy; but broken ground and darkness soon stopped the attempt to pursue.

At 8 p.m., General Oku ordered his exhausted infantry to bivouac on the captured hills, holding the ground from Chin-chou Bay on the west to Hand Bay on the east, while the whole of the artillery was directed to remain in the positions which it then occupied. At last, when the fight was over a flotilla of Russian destroyers was sent out from Port Arthur to attack the Japanese

vessels in Chin-chou Bay. The result was not encouraging, for after passing Pigeon Bay the *Vnimatel'ni* struck a submerged rock and was abandoned, while the remainder of the flotilla returned without finding the Japanese ships.

The battle had lasted fourteen hours, and had been won by nothing but hard fighting. The ruthless determination of the Japanese commanders to carry out their task regardless of loss, the refusal of the infantry to admit the possibility of failure, and the boldness of the artillery support were characteristics of the Japanese fighting. Yet the sacrifice might perhaps have been unavailing had the Russian commander put his whole strength into the fight and employed, in a vigorous counter-stroke, some of the four regiments which he kept at his disposal, and were never seriously engaged. On both sides the casualties were heavy in proportion to the numbers; of the three thousand Russians actually engaged over seven hundred were buried on the field, and twenty-three officers and men were taken prisoners,* while of the Japanese four thousand eight hundred and eighty-five officers and men were killed and wounded.† Ninety-two guns, including ten machine guns, fell into the hands of the Japanese.

On the morning of the 27th May, a mixed brigade of the 1st Division, under Major-General Nakamura, was pushed forward to occupy Nan-kuan-ling Junction‡ and Ta-lien-wan, while the remaining troops reformed in the vicinity of Nan Shan, where they were joined during the day by two ammunition columns and a supply column. The Russians had, meanwhile, hastily evacuated Dalny during the night of the 26th, blowing up as they went the bridges on the branch railway connecting that town with Nan-kuan-ling Junction. The bulk of their forces fell back towards Port Arthur, covered by a small rear guard, which ultimately retired as General Nakamura advanced. Having reformed his troops and replenished his ammunition, General Oku issued orders on the 29th May for the occupation of a line across the Kuan-tung Peninsula, four miles west of the branch railway line to Dalny. The bulk of the 4th Division remained at Chin-chou, while the 1st and 3rd Divisions and the 1st Artillery Brigade, with a portion of the 4th Division (two battalions of infantry, one battery of artillery, one squadron, and one engineer company) advanced on the 30th, driving back small parties of

* A Russian account states that the trenches and works were held throughout the day with a loss of only 450 men, but that in the retreat 650 were killed and wounded.

† See Appendix E.

‡ South-west of the Nan Shan plan (No. 5).

Russians as they took up the positions assigned to them. Dalny, which had suffered severely at the hands of marauding Chinese since the hasty Russian evacuation, was occupied by troops of the 1st Division without opposition.

The Bay of Ta-lien was now in Japanese hands, with the port of Dalny equipped with wharves, graving docks, workshops, electric plant, and all the requirements of a first-class commercial harbour, none of which the Russians had injured; but it was several weeks before its waters were sufficiently cleared of mines to permit the safe entry of ships, and both troops and stores continued to be landed on the beach near Pi-tzu-wo. No insuperable difficulty had been experienced in supplying the Second Army from its base; but the task of keeping up divergent lines to the 5th Division, as well as to the main army, had severely taxed the resources of the line of communication, and had emphasized the need of a base connected by rail with the advanced depot. The navy was, therefore, urged to clear a channel as soon as possible to Ta-lien-wan which became the chief base of the Second Army during its advance northward to Liao-yang, Dalny being left to the Third Army and to the siege trains required for the bombardment of Port Arthur.

On the 26th May, the day of the battle of Nan Shan, Admiral Togo formally declared the blockade of the Liao-tung Peninsula.

Naval operations. It is somewhat surprising that this step had not been taken sooner, as hitherto Port Arthur had remained open to neutral ships; but the somewhat stringent regulations with regard to contraband, and the well-known danger from mines, had been sufficient to deter all but a few Chinese junks. Moreover, it was not until the fortress had been cut off on the land side, and a close investment was imminent, that prices rose sufficiently to induce neutral merchant vessels to run the risks inseparable from an attempt to enter the harbour. Great as those risks undoubtedly were, there were always men ready to take them, provided that the prospective gains were sufficiently attractive; and on almost the last day of the siege the *King Arthur*, a vessel of nearly 6,000 tons, successfully ran the gauntlet of the Japanese fleet.

So far as naval operations were concerned, the last days of the month of May were occupied in the usual mining operations. On the 27th the *Amur* laid forty-nine mines off Ta Ho Bay without interference; and during the night of the 29th-30th, four Japanese gunboats and two flotillas of destroyers mined the approaches to Port Arthur under a heavy fire from the forts. One gunboat was struck by a shell, which wounded an officer and killed three men.

On the following morning the Japanese destroyers approached the harbour with a view to stopping Russian sweeping operations, but were driven off by the *Otvazhni*.

NOTE.—Since the actual effect on the battle of Nan Shan of the fire from the Japanese ships has been much discussed, the following information received from the Russian General Staff is of considerable interest: "The position was not evacuated owing to the effect of the fire from the Japanese gunboats, but by an order from General Stessel, which was given owing to General Fock having reported the situation to be extremely critical. The fire from the Japanese warships was stopped at about 2 p.m. and the position was evacuated at 6.45 p.m."

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ADVANCE NORTHWARD OF THE JAPANESE SECOND ARMY
AND THE BATTLE OF TE-LI-SSU (WA-FANG-KOU).

(Strategical Map 2 and Plan 6.)

DURING the month of May little of importance had occurred in other parts of the theatre of war, as both combatants were still awaiting reinforcements. The Japanese forces in the field had been strengthened by the 10th Division, the nucleus of the Fourth Army, which disembarked near Ta-ku-shan on the 19th May and following days; and by the 11th Division which landed in Yen-tai Bay, ten miles south of Pi-tzu-wo, between the 24th and 30th of that month, thus bringing General Oku's command up to five divisions or about 75,000 men.

On the 1st June the 1st and 11th Divisions were placed under Prince Fushimi until the 6th, when General Baron Nogi arrived from Japan to take over the command of this force, which remained in front of Port Arthur.*

Meanwhile the 5th Division, with certain detachments from the 3rd and 4th Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, was still engaged in watching the line Pu-lan-tien to Pi-tzu-wo. It was now joined by the 3rd and 4th Divisions and by the 1st Artillery Brigade. The 4th Division and the 1st Artillery Brigade reached Pu-lan-tien, the left of the line, on the night of the 2nd June; the 3rd Division arrived on the following day and took post on the right.† The whole force was placed temporarily under General Ogawa, commanding the 4th Division, who was ordered to entrench himself securely.

Meanwhile on the Russian side the Xth Army Corps had begun to leave Europe on the 10th May, and on the 15th of that

* This force was greatly reinforced later and was known as the Third Army. Its further movements are described in Chapter XVIII and succeeding chapters. The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Divisions formed the Second Army under General Oku; only one battalion of the 6th Division arrived in time for the battle of Te-li-ssu.

† Three battalions of infantry and a battalion of artillery were left behind for a few days by the 3rd Division.

month the 4th Siberian Army Corps, *i.e.*, the 2nd and 3rd Siberian Divisions with their artillery, began to detrain at Liao-yang. The railway was very busy bringing up the troops of this corps until the 24th May, ten trains arriving daily.

At the beginning of June the positions of the various troops in the field were, therefore, as follows:—*

Distribution of the opposing forces at the beginning of June, 1904.	Opposed to the Japanese Second Army under General Oku was Lieutenant-General Stakelberg with approximately 3,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry, and 100 guns. His advanced cavalry was at Teli-ssu and the remainder of his force was distributed between Kai-ping, Newchuang, and the neighbourhood.
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In front of the Japanese First Army under General Kuroki were Lieutenant-General Count Keller and Major-General Rennenkampf with approximately 3,600 cavalry, 23,000 infantry, and 90 guns.

Between these two groups and opposed to the 10th Japanese Division was Major-General Mishchenko with a Cossack brigade of 3,000 sabres and one horse battery (6 guns). He was supported by two infantry regiments at the Fen-shui Ling and by the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division at Hsi-mu-cheng.

At Liao-yang, in rear of his three advanced detachments, was General Kuropatkin with the reserve of the army, which, including three regiments at Mukden, numbered approximately 6,000 cavalry, 36,000 infantry, and 120 guns. The 31st Division had arrived at Liao-yang from Europe, but the remainder of the Xth Army Corps and the Orenburg and Ural Cossack Divisions were still on the railway.

A small independent detached force of cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Madritov was operating in the mountains on the east, while on the west a mixed force under Major-General Kossakovski was at Ta-wan watching the valley of the Liao Ho.

In addition there were the Ussuri Army about Vladivostok, and the garrison of Port Arthur which need not be considered at present.

The disposition of these forces, as well as the conduct of the operations which were about to begin, were largely dictated by the

Topography of Southern Manchuria.	topography of the theatre of war. The most important features are the two ranges, the Hsiung-yao Shan and the Fen-shui Ling range, which cross Southern Manchuria from south-west to north-east and which barred the advance of the Japanese armies to Liao-yang. Further to the north is the Ta Ling ridge, which lay on the flank
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* See Strategical Map 2.

of General Kuroki's communications during the later stages of the operations.

The main object of the Japanese strategy was to concentrate every available man against the Russian force at Liao-yang, and to do this it was necessary to use as many lines of advance as possible. Unfortunately for them the roads were few and bad, but the best were:—

(1) From Port Arthur to Liao-yang ;

(2) From Hsiu-yen to Hai-cheng by the Fen-shui Ling ;

(3) From Feng-huang-cheng to Liao-yang by the Mo-tien Ling.

On these roads were placed the Second, Fourth, and First Japanese Armies, awaiting the order to advance.

The northern spurs of the main ranges separated the Russian forces in the east from those to the south-west ; while the southern spurs interposed between the various Japanese armies, rendering lateral communication extremely difficult. In places the mountains rise to a height of 3,500 feet, with precipitous slopes and narrow valleys, presenting serious obstacles even to the movements of infantry. To the west, between the mountains and the sea, there is a strip of less intricate country about fifteen miles in width, through which runs the Port Arthur railway, and up which General Oku's army was to advance. Even there the country was ill-suited to the action of cavalry in mass and of artillery, though infantry could manœuvre with little difficulty. It will be seen, therefore, that the Japanese were restricted by natural features to certain clearly defined lines of advance, and that the First and Fourth Armies had to force their way across lofty mountain ranges, the passes through which were in the hands of the Russians.

The climatic conditions also had an important bearing upon the strategy of the future movements. During the summer months the mountain passes were open and the passage of troops was possible, but at that season the country to the west was often flooded, and the valley of the Liao Ho became little better than a morass. During the winter, on the other hand, the low country west of the railway was frozen hard and could be traversed by both cavalry and artillery.

To resume the narrative of operations, the Russian army, which had much to contend against, was still suffering from divided counsels in high places. General Kuropatkin was anxious to avoid any offensive movement until the arrival of reinforcements should give him numerical superiority, while Admiral Alexeiev insisted that some effort should be made immediately for the relief of Port Arthur.

Determined therefore to assume the offensive, Admiral Alexeiev

had, on the 19th May, placed before General Kuropatkin two alternatives: (a) to contain the Japanese Second Army by sending a portion of his troops to oppose it, while the bulk of his army pushed General Kuroki back across the Ya-lu; (b) to hold General Kuroki at bay and drive the Second Army into the sea.

Apart from insufficiency of transport, which alone made an advance through the mountains against General Kuroki impracticable, the former course had other disadvantages and could lead to no decisive result. General Kuropatkin therefore, influenced perhaps by the news of the loss of the Nan Shan position, indicated on the 27th May that he had chosen the latter. Next day he met General Stakelberg at Hai-cheng and personally gave him his orders. A few days later instructions were received by telegraph from St. Petersburg, where a council of war had been assembled, upholding Admiral Alexeiev's contention that the relief of Port Arthur was imperative and directing the dispatch of an expedition for that purpose.

The total force available for this movement was the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Siberian Army Corps and two European brigades, or in all seven infantry divisions, and one Cossack division. Several causes, however, particularly the fear of offensive Japanese action in the east, operated to reduce these numbers to five infantry divisions and a weak cavalry division of sixteen squadrons. But General Kuropatkin did not think it advisable to employ the whole of these numbers; and General Stakelberg's command, as finally constituted, consisted of his own 1st Siberian Army Corps, the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Infantry Division, the 9th Regiment of Siberian Infantry (from the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Siberian Division) and a composite cavalry brigade, in all about 35,000 men, with 94 guns.

The cavalry brigade, commanded by General Samsonov, was at this time marching southward to reoccupy the section of the railway line which had been somewhat hurriedly abandoned by General Zuikov at the beginning of the month. The strength of the brigade was 1,600 sabres, 100 rifles, and 6 guns, and consisted of the following troops:—

Primorsk Dragoon Regiment	5	squadrons.
8th Siberian Cossack Regiment	5	„
Scout Detachment of 13th E.S.R. Regiment			$\frac{1}{2}$	„
Frontier Guards*	$2\frac{1}{2}$	„ and $\frac{1}{2}$
2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Battery			6	guns. [company.]

* $1\frac{1}{2}$ squadrons and $\frac{1}{2}$ company of Frontier Guards had been left in Te-li-ssu by General Zuikov and joined General Samsonov's advanced troops on their arrival at that place.

Rumours of an intended southward movement had already reached General Oku, and on the 30th May he had sent forward Major-General Akiyama with the 1st Cavalry Brigade, supported by some infantry of the 5th Division, to reconnoitre to the north of Wa-fang-tien. On the previous day General Samsonov's brigade had reached Wan-chia-ling, and on the 30th the advanced cavalry of both sides was approaching Te-li-ssu.*

On reaching Chu-chia-tien, General Akiyama's advanced guard of the 14th Cavalry Regiment reported that Wu-chia-tun, a hamlet lying north of a defile about two and a half miles south of Te-li-ssu, was occupied by the enemy. Orders were at once sent to deploy, dismounted, east of the railway on the heights which command the valley of the Fu-chou River.

The force which had thus checked the Japanese advance was one and a half squadrons and half a company of Frontier Guards, which had formed the garrison of Te-li-ssu until the arrival of General Samsonov's brigade. As soon as it was known that they were engaged, they were reinforced by three squadrons of dragoons. The rest of the Russian force proceeded at a walk until the battery cleared the defile of Pan-la-shan when it trotted forward to Te-li-ssu. There General Samsonov, hearing that the Frontier Guards were still holding Wu-chia-tun, sent his other squadron of Frontier Guards and his scout detachment down the valley of the Fu-chou Ho to take the Japanese in flank, and rode forward in person to join his three advanced squadrons on the heights at Lung-wang-miao.

As the Japanese could be seen holding the southern edge of Wu-chia-tun and the high ground on either flank, General Samsonov ordered his horse battery to take position on the heights held by the dragoons. The steepness of the slopes made this movement appear impossible,† and the battery came into action immediately south of the railway bridge over the Fu-chou River, where it was joined by the rest of the main body. At 1.30 p.m., the Frontier Guards at Wu-chia-tun, who had been joined by a few troopers of the Primorsk Dragoons, began to fall back. The Japanese were at once ordered to pursue, and the 2nd Squadron 13th Cavalry, with drawn swords, crossed the railway embankment followed at some distance by the remainder of the regiment. The 2nd Squadron came up with the enemy south of Lung-wang-

* This place was known as Te-li-ssu by the Chinese and Wa-fang-kou by the Russians. The Japanese name is Tokuriji.

† The officer commanding this battery seems to have overestimated the difficulty of his task, as three Russian batteries were in action on these very heights on the 15th June.

miao, when the Russians, keeping up their fire until the Japanese were within some fifty yards, charged them in line at open order. During the ensuing mêlée two squadrons of the 8th Siberian Cossacks came up and charged the left of the Japanese squadron.* The main body of the Japanese cavalry was now at hand, and at 3 p.m. the Russians drew off towards Te-li-ssu covered by the fire of their dismounted squadron.

As soon as information that the cavalry was engaged reached the commander of the brigade of the 5th Division in front of Pu-lan-tien, he dispatched two companies in light marching order to its assistance; two more companies and two battalions were sent up later, but before the latter reached La-tzu-shan the enemy had been repulsed. From this date General Akiyama had under his command a battalion of infantry and two mountain batteries, while General Samsonov was reinforced at Te-li-ssu on the 31st May by the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, which was sent by rail from Kai-ping. †

Daily reconnaissances were carried out by both sides, and on the 3rd June there was another skirmish north of Wu-chia-tun. On that date General Samsonov undertook a reconnaissance on a somewhat larger scale, his force consisting of four and a half squadrons, a battery of horse artillery, and a battalion (the 3rd) of the 36th East Siberian Rifles. The greater part of the cavalry advanced down the right bank of the Fu-chou Ho against the heights west of Wu-chia-tun, while the infantry moved against Lung-wang-miao, pushing back the Japanese patrols and outposts. The battery, with an escort of two squadrons, remained in rear. After one and a half hours' skirmishing the Russian infantry occupied the Lung-wang-miao heights but could get no further, for the village of Wu-chia-tun with the high ground to the east was held by Japanese infantry entrenched, while further west the Russian cavalry sent down the Fu-chou valley found the way barred by three Japanese squadrons. At 5 p.m., the horse battery came up and opened fire from the high ground

* This is the only instance of cavalry shock action which occurred during the war, and it is said that the Russians used their lances with great effect.

† The Japanese official statement of losses from 30th May to 2nd June is :—

	Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
1st Cavalry Brigade and 5th Division	1 26	4	53

The Russians give their own casualties on 30th May as 2 officers and 35 men killed and wounded.

east of Lu-chia-kou upon the Japanese infantry, which withdrew deliberately towards Chu-chia-tien. At 6 p.m. the Russians also retired, followed by the shells from a Japanese mountain battery which came into action south of Wu-chia-tun.

Insignificant as were the operations on the 3rd June, both sides gained information of considerable value. On the one hand General Samsonov concluded, from the presence on the field of mountain artillery, that a stronger body of troops from which reinforcements had come up was not far distant; on the other hand General Akiyama learned that the leading infantry of the 1st Siberian Army Corps had reached Te-li-ssu.

In consequence of this information Lieutenant-General Ogawa, commanding the 4th Division, directed the withdrawal of the cavalry brigade. Sending off the battalion and the batteries in the evening to rejoin their divisions, General Akiyama started from Chu-chia-tien at 2 a.m. on the 4th June for La-tzu-shan, leaving patrols to keep touch with the enemy. The Russians did not follow up, and on the 5th June General Akiyama fell back to the north-west of Pu-lan-tien, whence he kept a watch towards Te-li-ssu and Fu-chou.

The retirement
of the Japanese
cavalry.

On the Russian side General Samsonov had been further reinforced by the arrival of three squadrons of the 4th Siberian Cossacks and two squadrons of the 5th Siberian Cossacks, which brought the force under his command to nineteen squadrons, one horse battery, one half company of Frontier Guards, and three battalions of infantry.

On the 4th June, General Oku was officially informed of the probable arrival, on the following day, of General Nogi, to take command of the Third Army operating against Port Arthur. He, with the 4th, 5th, and 3rd Divisions, in order as they stood from left to right, the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 1st Artillery Brigade, was therefore free to devote his whole attention to repelling General Stakelberg's advance; but, pending the complete organization of his line of communication and the landing of his trains, he was unable to assume the offensive and decided to await the Russian attack. In view of the unsuitability of the country along the railway, the cavalry brigade, strengthened by two squadrons of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment from the 3rd Division was moved towards the right flank. In addition to the Second Army, General Oku at this time had under his command a naval contingent of a thousand men with six field guns, which held the extreme right of his entrenched position.

The strength of the force which thus barred all access to Port Arthur from the north seems to have been strangely underestimated at the Russian head-quarters, for on the 7th June General Kuropatkin issued the following order to General Stakelberg:—

General Kuropatkin's orders to General Stakelberg.

“Your Excellency's Army Corps is detailed with the object of drawing upon itself the greatest possible number of the enemy's forces and thereby weakening his army operating in the Kuan-tung Peninsula.

“Your advance, therefore, against the enemy's covering troops must be rapid and energetic, in the hope of crushing his advanced detachments should they prove to be weak in numbers.

“In the event of your encountering superior strength decisive action will be avoided, and in no case will you allow the whole of your reserves to become engaged until the conditions are entirely clear.

“The object of our southerly movement is the capture of the Chin-chou (Nan Shan) position, and thereafter an advance on Port Arthur.”

It is, of course, obvious that an expedition dispatched under such a complete misapprehension of the difficulties which it was certain to encounter was foredoomed to failure; and these difficulties were still further increased by the commander-in-chief declining, for the present, to allow his subordinate to concentrate his command. Under such circumstances “rapid and energetic” action was impossible, and General Kuropatkin's lack of decision can only be explained by the theory that he was still acting under pressure from above and against his own judgment.

In preparation for this advance the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division was trained to Te-li-ssu, arriving there on the 5th June; General Stakelberg arrived on the same day and at once ordered General Samsonov to occupy a fortified position about five miles further south. Between the 5th and the 8th, General Stakelberg personally reconnoitred a position north of the line Wu-chia-tun—Wa-fang-wo-pu, which was then fortified by impressed Chinese labour.

On the 6th June, General Oku knew that the Russian cavalry screen had been pushed south of Wa-fang-tien, that two squadrons were advancing towards his right flank, and that parties extended westward to the Fu-chou road. It was, therefore, probable that the Russians meant to relieve Port Arthur. As soon as it became clear that the enemy was committed to this undertaking, orders were received from the Japanese Imperial head-quarters

for active operations to be begun by forces in other parts of the theatre of war, with the object of disconcerting and weakening the detachment detailed for the relief of Port Arthur by threatening its communications.

On the 8th June, the 10th Division and a brigade of Guards occupied Hsiu-yen,* and, on the 7th and 8th, the 6th Cruiser Division† bombarded the coast between the Kai-ping promontory and the mouth of the Hsiung Ho. A south-bound train was sighted about seven and a half miles north of Hsiung-yao-cheng, but when the hostile ships were seen it immediately steamed back. Some prisoners captured by the squadron stated that two regiments of infantry and a regiment and a half of cavalry with eight guns had arrived at Te-li-ssu and Wa-fang-tien between the 28th and 31st May, thus corroborating to some extent the reports, already received from the Chinese, that there were about five thousand Russians in that district. These movements by land and sea had the desired effect of keeping the bulk of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division in Kai-ping.

On the 7th June, Lieutenant-General Simonov, formerly commanding the Siberian Cossack Division, arrived at Wa-fang-tien and took over command at that place, but apparently General Samsonov still held an independent command of the advanced guard, which consisted of sixteen squadrons and one Cossack battery. This force was now at Wa-fang-tien, with outposts five miles further south on the line Ma-chuan-tzu—Hsiao-chia-chen—Chih-chia-tun; independent posts were also established in Fu-chou and Chu-chia-kou. The extreme length of the front from east to west was nearly thirty miles, and included almost all the roads which led northward from the Japanese position.

On the 9th, two Japanese squadrons drove in an advanced post and penetrated to within three and a half miles of Wa-fang-tien station, and it was not until five Cossack squadrons and five guns were brought up that they were forced to retire. On this day General Oku's intelligence department estimated the Russian force opposing the Second Army at rather more than two divisions, with three or four regiments of cavalry. Similar reconnaissances were carried out on the 10th and 11th against the eastern flank of the

* See also Chapter XVII, p. 254, for General Kuroki's movements at this time.

† This division consisted of four cruisers, and two gunboats; four torpedo boats were also present but took no part in the bombardment.

Russian line, and General Oku, hoping to find out the effect produced by the occupation of Hsiu-yen and the bombardment of Kai-ping, issued orders for his divisional cavalry to clear up the situation in front of their respective divisions on the morning of the 11th. Each divisional commander was directed to send forward an infantry battalion in support. The result of this reconnaissance showed that the Russian cavalry screen east of the Ta-sha Ho had been somewhat retired, but that the outposts towards Te-li-ssu had been again strengthened by infantry.

In contrast to this accurate information General Kuropatkin seems still to have been ignorant of the strength of General Oku's army, but he had heard from General Mishchenko that the troops advancing from Ta-ku-shan had halted, and were fortifying a position near Hsiu-yen. On the 10th and 11th June, he received news of the withdrawal of the Japanese ships, which had menaced General Stakelberg's line of communications from the Gulf of Liao-tung. These two pieces of information seem to have relieved him of a good deal of anxiety; for on the 12th, in the course of a personal interview which took place at Kai-ping, he at last gave General Stakelberg leave to concentrate his command. Two battalions of the 33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment and two batteries were at once moved to Te-li-ssu, but the remainder of the 9th East Siberian Division was still held back until relieved by units of the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division.

On the 13th June, the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Division, with two of its batteries, came up, and on that date General Stakelberg had under his command nineteen squadrons, twenty-five and a half battalions (including two companies of Frontier Guards with General Simonov) and ten batteries. After his interview with the commander-in-chief he returned to Te-li-ssu at 1 p.m. on the 13th June, but before arriving there he received a report from his cavalry that the Japanese were advancing from Pu-lan-tien with 20,000 men. Although he looked upon the movement as a mere reconnaissance in force, and considered the estimate to be much exaggerated, he nevertheless sent an urgent message to General Kuropatkin requesting that the remainder of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division and other reinforcements might be hurried forward. His wishes were in part complied with, and some of the troops arrived in time for the battle of the 15th June, but others only reached the front when the 1st Siberian Army Corps was in full retreat.

So far from the report being exaggerated the importance of the Japanese advance was by no means fully realized, for it was

the commencement of the great converging movement of the First, Second, and Fourth Armies, which was to culminate in the battle of Liao-yang.

It was a fundamental principle of Japanese strategy, that the enemy must never be permitted to dictate the course of the operations, and, on the 13th June, when General Stakelberg was almost within striking distance, General Oku moved out to the attack.* On that date, moving in three columns,

The advance of the Japanese Second Army. Plan 6. the 3rd Division on the right, the 5th in the centre, the 4th on the left, and repulsing small hostile forces, the Second Army occupied a line extending from Tai-ping-chuang through La-tzu-shan to

Wu-chia-tun (S.) on the Fu-chou road, while head-quarters reached Yu-chia-tun† from Chih-chia-fang.† It so happened that on the night of the 12th a reconnoitring party of two Cossack squadrons, some mounted scouts, and a dismounted Cossack squadron had left Wa-fang-tien with the object of breaking through the Japanese outposts in front of Pu-lan-tien. This party had unexpectedly encountered the Second Army on the march and had reported to General Stakelberg as already related.

The fighting on the 13th was unimportant (the Russian loss was said to be one officer and ten men wounded), but the troops suffered greatly from the heat. At 7 p.m. the following orders were issued from the Japanese head-quarters:—

- “(1) The army will advance to-morrow with the object of repulsing the enemy on the line Ssu-chia-chou—Liu-chia-kou (E).
- “(2) The 3rd Division (less one regiment) leaving the line Tou-chia-tun—Yen-chia-tun at 5 a.m., and keeping to the east of Yen-chia-tun, Chuang-hsiao-fang, Chu-chia-tien, will advance to the line Ssu-chia-chou—Lung-wang-miao.
- “(3) The 1st Artillery Brigade (less one regiment) will be attached to the 3rd Division, and will assemble by 5 a.m. at Kuan-chia-tun.
- “(4) The 5th Division (less two sections of cavalry and one regiment of infantry) will leave the line Hou-chia-tun—San-chia-kou at 5 a.m., and keeping touch with the left of the 3rd Division will advance to Chu-chia-tien and

* General Oku's supply trains reached him on the 12th June, but there is reason to believe that he would have marched without them if necessary, sooner than await attack.

† These villages are south of the Te-li-ssu plan (No. 6).

try to occupy a line from Lung-wang-miao to Liu-chia-kou (E).

- “(5) The 4th Division will move from Wu-chia-tun (S.) at dawn, and, keeping in the district west of the line Hsiao-fang-shen-shan—Liu-chia-kou (W.), will march to the Fu-chou Ho. There it will halt and will prepare to operate against the enemy’s right flank and rear, keeping a careful look-out to the north.
- “(6) One regiment of the 1st Artillery Brigade will leave Kuei-ma-chiao* and join the 4th Division by the Fu-chou road.
- “(7) The 6th Infantry Regiment (less one battalion), and the 11th Infantry Regiment and two sections of the 5th Cavalry Regiment, will form the army reserve, and will assemble by 5.30 a.m. at Lin-chia-tun.”

General Stakelberg's position at Te-li-ssu. Away to the north a different spirit was manifesting itself, for General Stakelberg had decided to abandon the offensive and to await the Japanese attack in the position he had selected south of Te-li-ssu.†

On the morning of the 14th, his troops were disposed as follows:—

Western Section (west of the railway), under Major-General Kondratovich—

33rd and 36th Regiments (5 battalions).

3rd and 4th Batteries of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.

Eastern Section (east of the railway),* under Major-General Gerngross—

1st East Siberian Rifle Division (12 battalions).

1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Batteries of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.

At Te-li-ssu station, in reserve, under Major-General Glasko—

2nd Brigade of the 35th Infantry Division (8 battalions).

Two batteries of the 35th Artillery Brigade.

Of these troops, the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, and the 1st Battery of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade arrived early on the morning of the 14th ;

* This village is south of the Te-li-ssu plan (No. 6).

† It should, however, be noted that according to one account General Stakelburg was on the point of continuing his southward march when his advanced guards were suddenly attacked.

they were at first kept in reserve on the left, but were brought into action to repel the attack of the 34th Regiment, belonging to the Japanese 3rd Division, which took place soon after midday. The 34th and 45th Regiments of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, and the 9th Regiment of the 3rd Siberian Infantry Division, were still coming up by train.

In preparation for the coming struggle General Simonov's detached force was withdrawn from the front, and the cavalry was ordered to take up a position west of Ta-fang-shen to cover the right flank of the corps and to watch the roads from Ta-fang-shen to Huang-chia-tun and Chun-chia-tun. The baggage train was sent to the north, and the reserve ammunition was brought up to Te-li-ssu.

It will thus be seen that while the Russians had a whole division and four batteries to the east, and a weak brigade with two batteries and a strong force of cavalry to the west of the railway, the Japanese had one division and a cavalry brigade to the east of it, and two whole divisions to the west.

On the 14th, the several Japanese divisions moved as ordered, the 3rd and 5th keeping touch with each other, while the 4th Division struck north-west in the direction of the Fu-chou Ho; at 5 a.m., General Oku left his quarters of the previous night and came to Lin-chia-tun, where the reserve of the army had assembled. Here he received a report from the 6th Division, stating that some troops had disembarked west of the mouth of the Ta-sha Ho, and orders were sent for them to march without delay to La-tzu-shan. Meanwhile the 3rd and 5th Divisions had driven back some small parties of the enemy, and by noon they were in touch with the main body of his advanced guard, in strength about one mixed brigade. This detachment, which was entrenched on rising ground east of the railway overlooking the valley up which the Japanese were advancing, finding itself opposed to superior forces, retired round the eastern slopes of a range of hills, and two hours later the first gun was fired from the centre of the Russian position at Lung-wang-miao. This led to a heavy artillery fire on both sides, during which the Russian position from Ta-fang-shen to Lung-wang-miao was reconnoitred and the strength of the defenders was estimated at under three divisions. At 3 p.m., the cannonade was at its height, the Russian commander disclosing the position of nearly all his guns, while only those of the Japanese 3rd Division were in action. About the same hour a detachment of infantry and artillery from the 5th Division occupied the hill north-west of Lung-chia-tun.

The beginning
of the battle.

While the artillery duel was in progress, the right of the Japanese line, the 34th Regiment, attacked the 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment on the heights about Wa-fang-wo-pu. The 2nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment was brought up to assist the 1st, and together they repelled the attack, which cost the latter regiment fourteen officers and a hundred and fifty men killed and wounded. General Stakelberg arrived about 3 p.m., and received a verbal report from General Gerngross that the attack had been repulsed, and that reinforcements from the general reserve were not required.

A little later the 13th and 15th Artillery Regiments, belonging to the Japanese 1st Artillery Brigade, opened fire against the Russian centre, but neither they nor the infantry produced any definite result before sunset, when the 3rd and 5th Divisions held a line running from Ssu-chia-chou through Lung-chia-tun to Wu-chia-tun (W.). During the day the Japanese head-quarters moved to Wa-fang-tien, which was reached at 3.30 p.m.; and the cavalry brigade, on the extreme right, to which a battalion of infantry and a battery of mountain guns were attached, marched from Wang-chia-tun on the left bank of the Ta-sha Ho to Sha-pao-tzu. On the other flank, the 4th Division marched at 5 a.m. and by noon assembled on the left bank of the Fu-chou Ho, where, covered by a line of outposts on the high ground across the river, it halted for the night. The divisional cavalry and a detachment of infantry occupied Fu-chou city during the day, finding that a squadron of Russian cavalry which formed the garrison had just left.*

Meanwhile General Stakelberg returned to Te-li-ssu about 4.30 p.m., and ordered General Glasko to march at once with the reserve brigade of infantry to Tsui-chia-tun (two and a half miles south-east of Te-li-ssu), and there to place himself under the orders of General Gerngross.

General Glasko reached his destination at 6 p.m., and sent out two detachments to reconnoitre the ground in his front and to act as outposts. One detachment, a battalion of the 139th Regiment and four guns, occupied the saddle south-east of Fu-ching-fen at 7.20 p.m. without resistance. The second detachment, under Colonel Petrov, one battalion of the 139th, one battalion of the 140th, and four guns, finding a Japanese battery in position south of Wa-fang-wo-pu, came into action 1,500 yards north of that place. The main body of the brigade bivouacked for the night between Tsui-chia-tun and Fu-ching-fen.

* See also p. 191.

It would appear that General Stakelberg had carried away from the battlefield an entirely erroneous impression of the state of affairs. There had been no reports of engagements west of the railway, and the attack of the 3rd Division, which had been checked without very great difficulty, led him to believe that the bulk of the Japanese army was opposed to his own left. He therefore decided to make a counter-stroke on the 15th, and it was for this purpose that he moved up General Glasko's brigade, thus placing more than three-quarters of his force in the eastern section of his position. His only remaining reserves, available for employment in the western section should the necessity arise, were the troops still coming up by rail. Of these the 34th,* 35th, and two battalions of the 9th Regiment arrived at Te-li-ssu during the night of the 14th; the remaining two battalions of the 9th were detained at a point some three miles north of that station when the retreat had already begun.

On the other hand, at the conclusion of the fighting on the 14th, General Oku's information led him to believe that he was opposed by not much more than a single division. He therefore decided to attack without delay, and at 11 p.m. he issued the following orders :—

- “(1) The 5th Division will advance to-morrow before dawn from the neighbourhood of Wu-chia-tun (W.) and attack the enemy at Ta-fang-shen, but will delay its further movement up the Fu-chou valley.†
- “(2) The 3rd Division, keeping touch with the 5th Division, will advance as soon as the attack by the latter has begun to make itself felt.”

The following order was dispatched to the commander of the 4th Division‡:—

“As no danger is to be anticipated from the direction of the valley of the Fu-chou River, you will detach a force of at least one brigade of infantry, which will attack the enemy's

* The leading battalion of the 34th Regiment was also sent up to join General Glasko's brigade.

† The 5th Division was apparently to await the arrival of the 4th Division.

‡ The 4th Division was at this time about 13 miles distant from Army head-quarters, and the order was sent off at 11 p.m. General Oku was anxious that it should not fail to be delivered, and directed two staff officers to carry it by different roads. The order reached its destination at 5 a.m., 15th June.

right flank to-morrow and help the advance of the other divisions."

On the morning of the 15th, the Japanese 11th Regiment rejoined the 5th Division so that the only reserve remaining under General Oku's own hand was two battalions of the 6th Regiment. There was, however, good reason to believe that the leading troops of the 6th Division would arrive before very long.

Looking northward from the bivouac of the Second Army and following the road which skirts the railway and the Hou-tou Ho, a line of hills, or, as it might be termed, a barrier range, from 600 to 1,000 feet in height, blocks the view. Two peaks rise from it, steep and bare, and between them is a gap through which the railway, road, and river pass; its breadth at both exits is half a mile, its length the same, and its width in the centre about a quarter of a mile. The hills on either side are inaccessible for field artillery. To the west and at the extremity of the range is another gap of greater width, through which the Fu-chou Ho takes its course. Directly fronting the former, or railway, gap, and 2,000 yards from its central point, a long spur called Lung-wang-miao juts out westward towards the river, and in front of it are villages among trees. On this spur—the main Russian gun position—were twenty gun pits, and below them infantry trenches. North-eastward from the hill east of the railway gap, which is itself an outlying feature of the main range, the position followed in a curve a line of more or less commanding points to Fei-chia-tun. Along this front, trenches for infantry and pits for eight more guns were prepared, some of the former facing east and north to guard against a flank attack. After passing through the railway gap and turning to the north-west, it is seen that the valley through which the Fu-chou River flows is flat, open, and heavily cultivated. For about two miles north it continues so, but gradually narrows towards the little village of Te-li-ssu which gave its name to the battle. A short distance north of the point where the river disappears into the western gap is the village of Ta-fang-shen, situated at the southern extremity of a spur thrust out from the range which flanks the valley on the western side. This village and the hill above were held by the Russians, but the main position of their right was one and a half miles further back, across the range, and followed a well-marked feature. Here were placed twenty gun pits, while infantry, separated from them by a deep ravine, held a somewhat similar line in front; and, in the valley, between the right and the artillery on Lung-wang-miao, were pits for twenty guns and more

The battlefield
of Te-li-ssu.

infantry entrenchments. From east to west the position measured about eight and a half miles.*

The plan of the Japanese commander was to assail the Russian left and left centre with the 3rd Division, and, with the 5th Division and part of the 4th, to turn their right, while the cavalry brigade was to operate upon the eastern flank.†

About 2 a.m. on the 15th, shots rang out from the Russian position, creating an alarm and causing some of the troops to discharge their rifles in every direction. Some noise, made by the Japanese in strengthening their position under cover of darkness, had apparently led to the belief that they were stealing forward to the attack and had caused the outbreak. After this incident the remainder of the night passed quietly, but when day broke a heavy mist hung over the valleys of the Fu-chou and Hou-tou and enabled the Japanese infantry, which had actually begun to move shortly after midnight, to approach unseen close to the Russian position. At 5.30 a.m. the weather cleared, and the Japanese 3rd Artillery Regiment at Wang-chia-tun opened fire, to which the Russian guns replied. The 13th Artillery Regiment took post upon the left of the 3rd, directing its efforts against Lu-chia-kou and Lung-wang-miao, and the 15th Artillery Regiment, in position further to the south, fired upon the latter place and upon Ta-fang-shen.‡

On the Russian side the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division had, during the night, made some changes in its dispositions. On the high ground at Lung-wang-miao was the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment with the 3rd and 4th Batteries of the division. Of the 4th Regiment nine companies were in shelter trenches, while two were kept in reserve and one company remained as baggage escort. The 3rd Battery was in position behind the natural cover of the ridge, so placed as to bring an indirect fire on the ground in front; and the 4th Battery, which had suffered heavily owing to

* When inspecting the position on the 13th June, General Stakelberg drew the attention of the several artillery commanders to the necessity of posting their batteries in covered positions. The opinions of the artillery officers differed on this point, the majority—especially the senior officers—asserting that artillery could only fire from covered positions at stationary objects. Notwithstanding the fact that some battery commanders openly protested against this view, they were overruled by the senior officers, and gun positions were prepared for direct laying. However, one battery at Lung-wang-miao appears to have used indirect fire on the 15th.

† The minor part played by this brigade is a noticeable feature of this battle.

‡ The Russians state that the Japanese batteries fired from "covered positions." It seems probable, therefore, that the guns had taken position during the night and that gun pits had been made.

its occupying a conspicuous position on the previous day, now took up the emplacements of the 2nd Battery. The latter had been withdrawn and, together with the 1st Battery which was in reserve, had been sent to join General Glasko's brigade. The remainder of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division was posted on the left flank of the position ready to attack, the 2nd and 3rd Regiments holding the front line with the 1st Regiment as a reserve in rear of the centre.

Orders had been issued by General Stakelberg during the night of the 14th, describing how the counter-stroke against the Japanese right was to be carried out by the troops under Generals Gerngross and Glasko.* According to these orders the operation was to begin between 1 a.m. and 2 a.m. on the 15th, or in any case before daybreak on that date; but the exact hour at which the troops were to move was left to the discretion of General Gerngross, who was directed to come to an understanding on the subject with General Glasko. On receiving his instructions General Gerngross intimated to the commander of the 1st Siberian Army Corps that he proposed to move at daybreak, *i.e.*, about 4 a.m. Although the decision as to time was a matter left to his own discretion, he appears to have expected that some expression of approval would be received from head-quarters. Thus delay occurred, and, when it was at length decided to advance, the co-operating troops of General Glasko's force had not arrived. That officer also was in doubt as to the hour at which the corps commander intended that the movement should begin. During the night he had received an order from General Stakelberg, dated Te-li-ssu 6 p.m. 14th June, which stated that a battalion of the 34th Regiment was on its way to join him and that, in communication with General Gerngross, he was to attack the right flank of the Japanese. On receiving this order General Glasko sent an orderly officer to the head-quarters of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, and received the following reply from General Gerngross, "I am on the road Wu-chia-tun—Wa-fang-wo-pu. If the corps commander should order the attack for daybreak, we may reckon on victory." General Glasko now sent two orderlies to the head-quarters of the 1st Siberian Army Corps, requesting further orders for the 15th, and was merely

* Lieutenant-General Zhilinski, formerly chief of the Viceroy Alexeiev's field staff, states that the operation orders issued by General Stakelberg for the 15th June were not embodied in one general order, but took the form of separate memoranda indifferently worded. Units were in ignorance of the general situation, with the result that there was a lack of cohesion, and confusion ensued.

directed to disturb the enemy by means of scout detachments and to ascertain his positions; both of which duties had already been carried out.*

Thus when day broke the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division and General Glasko's brigade still stood fast, the latter having been joined during the night by a battalion of the 34th Regiment and by the 1st and 2nd Batteries from General Gerngross's command.

When, soon after, the Japanese guns opened fire on the Russian position, General Glasko was forced to come to a decision, and at 6.40 a.m., after a prolonged discussion with his staff, he decided to advance. The detachment on the saddle to the south-east of Fu-ching-fen was reinforced to a strength of two battalions and was ordered to advance by Cheng-chia-tun and Kou-yin to take the Japanese in rear. The other detachment, under command of Colonel Petrov, which was reinforced by a third battalion, was to advance at once to Wa-fang-wo-pu, whither the remainder of the brigade would follow. While instructions for these movements were being issued, an order came from General Gerngross directing General Glasko to attack, and stating that he would be supported "from the heights." Scarcely had the march begun, when yet another order, which ran as follows, was received from the corps commander:—"If the Japanese advance with superior force against our centre or in any other direction, the corps will fall back slowly to Wan-chia-ling. In this case Major-General Glasko will hold the line Kou-chia-tun—Tsui-chia-tun as long as possible, in order to give the troops falling back by Te-li-ssu time to traverse the defile north of Tsui-chia-tun. Should the Japanese retire, the troops will halt, and await further orders." The situation was thus still further complicated. The corps commander, influenced no doubt by General Kuropatkin's instructions of the 7th June, now gave definite orders that if the Japanese should advance in any direction the Russian troops were to fall back, while should the Japanese retire no pursuit was to be undertaken. The orders omitted all mention of an intention to attack, and General Glasko was again in doubt as to his proper line of action.

Meanwhile, about 7 a.m., Colonel Petrov's column had become engaged, and, although the Japanese east of the railway had not yet moved from the positions held by them during the previous night, General Glasko seems to have fallen back and occupied the line from Kou-chia-tun to Tsui-chia-tun.

The troops of the Japanese 3rd Division were at this time occupy-

*. See p. 183.

ing a line from Ching-chia-hsin-an-tun, through the height south of Ssu-chia-chou to Chang-tien Shan, waiting until the bombardment on their left had taken effect, and while in this state of inaction they were suddenly attacked. General Gerngross, relying upon the support of General Glasko's brigade, had advanced with his three regiments between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. The attack progressed but slowly, for the only Russian guns which were at first in a position to support it were those of the Frontier Guard mountain battery, posted south-west of height 1,250. Nevertheless, the operation was pushed with great determination, and General Oshima's troops were forced to remain in the rough shelter trenches which had been thrown up on the rocky ground they had held since midnight.

While the 3rd Division was thus engaged, the Japanese troops west of the railway were pushing forward. By 5 a.m., the 5th Division, whose guns had crossed to the right bank of the Fu-chou River, occupied a line from Wang-chia-tun to the east of Yang-chia-tun, driving back the Russian dismounted cavalry, some of which retired north-westward and some directly north. At this time Lieutenant-General Ueda, commanding the 5th Division, was in ignorance of the precise position held by the Russians in front of his men, but from the east, in the direction of the 3rd Division, came the sound of heavy firing and the condition of the troops engaged in that quarter was reported to be dangerous. Placed in such circumstances, General Ueda, without hesitation, resolved to press forward and to assail the enemy's right flank. On the right, the 42nd Regiment was directed against the weak Russian detachment occupying the line between the heights north of Ta-fang-shen and the village of Lung-kou. The left was ordered to advance upon the latter place, and about 9 a.m. drove back part of General Simonov's cavalry division, a movement which threatened the flank and rear of the 1st Battalion of the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and caused it to withdraw towards the right of the Russian batteries north of San-hsi-erh. To support the 1st Battalion, General Kondratovich had meanwhile sent the 2nd Battalion along the ridge between San-hsi-erh and Lung-kou, and these fresh troops engaged the Japanese 21st Regiment as it issued from the latter village.

The danger to the Russian right flank was now becoming serious, for part of the cavalry division had fallen back in a north-westerly direction towards Hui-chia-tun, while the main body, contrary to orders, had retired towards Te-li-ssu. By 9.20 a.m., the hill

Japanese 3rd
Division attacked
by General
Gerngross.

Attack by the
Japanese 5th
Division.

north of Lu-chia-kou was lost, and the ground to the east was attacked, with the result that, about 10 a.m., the Russian troops were forced to relinquish the village of Ta-fang-shen and the height commanding it. The guns of the Japanese 5th Division, following behind the advancing troops, came into action on the height first taken, and engaged the enemy's artillery at Lung-wang-miao and on the high ground west of Li-chia-tou, which was delaying the forward movement of the infantry. The 13th and 15th Artillery Regiments soon came up in support of the mountain guns and took position east and south-west of Wang-chia-tun, their combined efforts completely crushing the fire of the guns on Lung-wang-miao.*

To assist the attack of the 5th Division other troops were coming up from a westerly direction, for the order sent to the commander of the 4th Division on the previous night had reached him at Hsiao-ssu-chia-tun at 5 a.m. on the 15th, in sufficient time to allow of his helping materially in the battle. At 6 a.m., a squadron of cavalry, a company of engineers, a battalion of artillery, and the 19th Infantry Brigade, the whole under Major-General Ando, left Pan-chia-tun and, after a stiff march through a hilly region, arrived at Yang-chia-tun at 9 a.m. Here they came into communication with the left of the 5th Division, and half an hour later reached the heights south-west of Ma-chia-fang-hsin, just as the Russians at Sung-chia-tun were beginning to fall back. As no precautions appeared to have been taken by the enemy to meet an attack from the west, General Ando detached a portion of his force with orders to move as quickly as possible to the high ground north-east of Ma-chia-fang-hsin, and with the remainder he opened fire upon the position in front of him.

About 10 a.m. the 2nd Battalion of the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and two companies belonging to another battalion of that regiment, finding themselves exposed in front and flank to the attack of the Japanese 21st Regiment, while their rear was threatened by General Ando's troops, fell back, and about the same hour the left of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division began to waver. The news that the attack was developing on his right had reached General Stakelberg some time earlier, and at 10.30 a.m. he ordered the 35th East Siberian Rifle Regiment to reinforce the troops on the heights east of Tung-lung-kou. That regiment had just reached its

* The Japanese artillery commander then turned his fire on to the Russian gun teams, with the result that the guns could not be removed, and thirteen of them were captured. The remainder were withdrawn by the help of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

desired position when General Ando's batteries opened fire upon it, and before it could be fully deployed it came under the attack of the infantry of the 19th Brigade from Tung-lung-kou, while its left was so seriously threatened by a portion of the 21st Regiment that it seemed improbable that it could maintain its ground.

It was now about 11 a.m. when General Stakelberg received a report, sent in by the cavalry five hours earlier,* that strong Japanese forces were advancing on Te-li-ssu from a south-westerly direction. To restore the situation only four battalions were available, namely two battalions of the 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and two of the 9th Siberian Infantry Regiment which had just arrived by rail at Te-li-ssu. These troops the corps commander, who had remained on the right of the position, himself led towards the advancing Japanese, but the pressure of the attack was growing momentarily stronger, and about 11.30 a.m., before the two battalions of the 9th Siberian Infantry Regiment had reached the ground allotted to them, a general order to retire was issued.†

While everything was giving way before the Japanese attack west of the railway line, the condition of the 3rd Division, east of it, had not improved. The ground held by its right was only maintained with difficulty in face of a series of small but fierce counter-attacks, which were focussed on and around the village of Wa-fang-wo-pu. Again and again the Russians, who had brought up to their front line three regiments of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, flung themselves against their obstinate opponents with the utmost intrepidity, and at one point the hostile lines approached so close to each other that, when ammunition gave out, stones were freely thrown by both sides. Report after report reached General Oshima, announcing the critical condition of his troops who, from the nature of the ground, could only be supported by a totally inadequate force of artillery. Every battalion, except the single one held in the divisional reserve, being hotly engaged, reinforcements were asked for from headquarters, and at 9.40 a.m. General Oku dispatched one battalion, the half of all that he had retained under his own command.

* See also p. 426. The attack of the Japanese on the 14th June was unexpected. No telegraph or telephone lines had been erected on the position, and great delays occurred in transmitting messages by orderlies.

† In this attempt to save the day General Stakelberg had two horses shot under him.

This reinforcement came up opportunely, for General Glasko's brigade was once more moving towards the scene of action. Some time before 10 a.m. an officer of the general staff from corps head-quarters had arrived with an order directing General Glasko to advance against the Japanese right flank and to support the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division. Accordingly three battalions and a battery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Perfilev, moved forward by Cheng-chia-tun, while the main body of the brigade* marched to Wa-fang-wo-pu. Again co-operation between the two forces on the Russian right was doomed to failure. General Gerngross, who from early morning had watched the Japanese attack west of the railway line, had seen the gradual retirement of the detachments of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division from the high ground north of Ta-fang-shen. Soon after 10 a.m. the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which faced the "railway gap," had come under a heavy flanking fire from the guns and rifles of the 5th Division. This fire had lasted for about an hour, during which the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment had suffered many casualties. Towards noon the regiment, probably influenced by the withdrawal of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment on its right, began to waver, upon which the Japanese advanced towards the village of Wu-chia-tun. This movement, coupled with the non-arrival of General Glasko's troops, led General Gerngross, on his own initiative, to order his division to retire, and instructions to that effect were given soon after noon.†

Shortly before this the two detachments from General Glasko's brigade, near Wa-fang-wo-pu and Cheng-chia-tun, had at last begun to deploy, for their advance had been delayed owing to the difficulty experienced in bringing up the guns over broken ground. Colonel Perfilev's column found before it the three squadrons of the 3rd Japanese Cavalry Regiment, which were dismounted on the right flank of the 3rd Division. Against these he pushed the attack and gained some slight advantage, but supports were at hand, for the Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade, which had passed the night at Sha-pao-tzu, had marched northward at an early hour and, on hearing the sound of guns on its left, had dismounted and prepared to join in the fight. Part moved north-west towards

* Six battalions and three batteries. It will be remembered that the brigade, consisting of eight battalions and two batteries, had been joined by a battalion of the 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and by the 1st and 2nd Batteries of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division.

† The corps commander's order to retire did not reach General Gerngross till evening.

Ching-chia-hsiao-tun, to help the 3rd Cavalry Regiment, and the remainder turned against Fei-chia-tun. The brigade, though suffering very little loss, was greatly retarded by the enemy's field gun fire, and its situation caused its commander some anxiety until the advance of Colonel Perfilov's force was brought to a standstill between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m., when General Glasko's brigade was still on the line from Wa-fang-wo-pu to Cheng-chia-tun, where it had come under fire from the Japanese right flank battalion. Though unbeaten, the attack was arrested when it was seen that the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division was already falling back.

Meanwhile the Japanese 3rd Division, reinforced by the remaining battalion of the army reserve,* pressed forward, and about 2 p.m. four of its batteries passing through the "railway gap"—no longer swept by projectiles—took position on Lung-wang-miao, where thirteen deserted guns were found, and thence raked the valley to the north, causing the four regiments of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, which had lately confronted it, heavy loss. General Glasko now received the corps commander's order to retire by the roads through Tsui-chia-tun and Cha-tao-fang. His retreat was covered by a rear guard, which the Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade drove from the heights near the former place about 3 p.m.

Turning once more to the Russian right, the retreat in that quarter of the field had begun about midday. Under General Stakelberg's directions the troops were skilfully withdrawn from the position. The 36th Regiment, which was most exposed, first retired, followed by the 33rd and then by the 34th Regiments; while the 35th Regiment, assisted by the 2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery, which frequently changed position to prevent the Japanese from obtaining the range, brought up the rear.

The cavalry division, as already stated, had fallen back some hours earlier, thus laying bare the right flank of the 35th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. The greater part had retired by Te-li-ssu, while a portion had withdrawn towards Wu-chia-tun,† following the route by which the corps commander had directed that any retirement should take place. About 10.50 a.m., when the commander of the Japanese 4th Division heard that the Russian mounted troops were falling back, he sent towards Wu-chia-tun

* This battalion was replaced by the I/23rd of the 6th Division which came up a little after 2 p.m.

† North of the Te-li-ssu plan (No. 6); see Strategic Map 2.

two companies* and a battery of field artillery, the remainder of the division pursuing its way to Sung-chia-tun. The detachment sent to Wu-chia-tun fell in with the Russian squadrons moving towards that place, and taking them by surprise, forced them to retreat by Chiao-chia-tun.†

From all sides the Japanese were now closing in, while the Russian commander endeavoured to stay their advance to gain time for his troops to clear the defile at Te-li-ssu. West of the railway the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division continued its retreat, its rear guard holding the heights west of Te-li-ssu, and covering the entrainment of the wounded at the railway station. Further north, a battalion of General Ando's brigade seized the high ground at Lung-tang-ho, and thence pressed forward to cut the railway line. At this juncture, about 2 p.m., the two remaining battalions of the 9th Siberian Infantry Regiment arrived by train at the railway siding of Yang-chia-tun, whence they were hurried into the fight and successfully checked the threatening movement.

East of the railway the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division retired under the fire of the Japanese artillery, the three regiments furthest from the Fu-chou River being driven eastward into the mountains where isolated parties were taken prisoners later. Of these units the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment was forced to leave the men's knapsacks, which had been discarded before going into action, while the Frontier Guard mountain battery lost four of its guns.

For a time the road to the north was blocked at the Pan-lashan defile by the ill-timed march of transport, between which and the Japanese was the main body of the cavalry division, supported by a company of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. Fortunately for the Russians, their retreat was covered by a blinding storm of rain which began to fall about 3 p.m., and effectually prevented the Japanese artillerymen from laying their guns. Shortly afterwards the victorious troops ceased to pursue, for the men were exhausted with the efforts of the day, ammunition was running short, and the ground near and beyond Te-li-ssu is of a nature unsuited to the action of mounted troops. Two squadrons were, however, sent forward to observe the retiring enemy, and behind them a line of outposts was established covering the bivouacs of the Second Army. On the left, the 19th Brigade of the 4th Division remained on the hills south-west of Te-li-ssu; the rest of the division, which reached Chien-mei-tun at 4 p.m.,

* From the II/8th Regiment.

† North of the Te-li-ssu plan (No. 6); see Strategic Map 2.

halting there, with two companies of the 1st Battalion of the 37th Regiment about ten miles from Fu-chou on the Kai-ping road. In the centre, about Li-chia-tou, south-west of Te-li-ssu, was the 5th Division, while the 3rd Division on the right bivouacked east of the river at Lao-hsiao-kao.

The inability of the Japanese to follow up their victory greatly favoured the Russians, who made their way northward, covered by a rear guard consisting of the bulk of the cavalry division and the Cossack batteries. The 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, which was joined by the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, covered the fourteen miles to Wan-chia-ling without a halt, and thence moved into bivouac about two miles north of the railway station. The 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, keeping to the east of the railway line, reached Wan-chia-ling about 11 p.m. and on the following day came up abreast of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division. The 2nd Brigade, 35th Infantry Division, which had begun to fall back about 2 p.m., followed in rear of the 1st Siberian Army Corps, and halted on reaching the village of Wan-chia-ling, some three miles south of the railway station of that name.

Thus the attempt to relieve Port Arthur had resulted in signal failure and, while the Japanese had suffered only one thousand and sixty-four casualties, the Russians had lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners more than three times as many.*

* See Appendix F.

CHAPTER XV.

CONTINUED ADVANCE OF THE JAPANESE SECOND ARMY, AND THE
BATTLE OF TA-SHIH-CHIAO.

(Strategical Map 2, and Plan 7.)

AFTER the victory of Te-li-ssu, which secured for the Japanese the defiles debouching on to the plain of Hsiung-yao, the Second Army halted for four days, during which it was reinforced by the remainder of the 6th Division under Lieutenant-General Okubo. Meanwhile the cavalry moved north by the road which runs parallel to the railway, and about 4 a.m. on the 17th June occupied Wan-chia-ling. Some twelve hours earlier the 1st Siberian Army Corps had marched thence in two columns, with orders to proceed by Hsiung-yao to Kai-ping, distant about forty miles, reaching the latter place in three days' time. The western column under General Kondratovich, consisting of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division with the 9th Siberian Infantry Regiment, one and a half squadrons of cavalry, and half the 1st East Siberian Sapper Battalion, took the road along the railway; while the eastern column under General Gerngross, consisting of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, a squadron of cavalry, and the 2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery, followed a parallel route further to the east. Covering the movement of these two columns was a rear guard under General Samsonov,* formed of the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Infantry Division,† the remainder of the cavalry, two squadrons of Frontier Guards, and the 3rd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.

The departure of the Russian troops from Wan-chia-ling had not been intended to take place until the 17th June, but

* Lieutenant-General Simonov had been replaced by Major-General Samsonov.

† In the original Russian order for the movement, the 2nd Brigade 35th Infantry Division is shown with three batteries. Two batteries only, however, were present at the battle of Te-li-ssu. In the same order, batteries which had lost some or all of their guns at that battle are mentioned as complete units.

Retirement of
the Russians
to Kai-ping.

it seems probable that the movement of a portion of the Japanese 10th Division towards Kai-ping,* which took place about this time, led to its being hastened. The first stage of the march, which

began on the evening of the 16th June, was carried out in some disorder. As night fell, the troops, shaken by the conflict of the previous day, saw danger where none existed and, seized with panic, fired upon each other. Indeed to such an extent was the habitual stolidity of the men and their commanders overcome, that some shots fired by a Cossack detachment, about 3.30 a.m., caused the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, with which General Stakelberg marched, to deploy and remain halted in position until daybreak. At length about 9 a.m. on the 17th June, worn out, hungry, and dejected the troops reached their halting place at Hsiung-yao, where they remained until the following day.

By 7.15 p.m. on the 17th, an eastern flank guard under Major-General Maximovich, consisting of a regiment of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, eight field guns, and half a squadron, had been dispatched to Tung-chia-tun, seven and a half miles north-east of Hsiung-yao, with instructions to remain there until further orders. These troops were intended to keep the Japanese in check, should they advance from the east, until the main body of the 1st Siberian Army Corps had made good its retirement when General Maximovich was to withdraw to Kai-ping. General Stakelberg had been ordered to concentrate at that city without delay and there to reorganize his force ; and at 2 p.m. on the 18th, the main body, still formed in two columns, marched northward from Hsiung-yao. To the south, the cavalry under General Samsonov was ordered to watch the region through which the Japanese Second Army was expected to march, and to hold a line from the coast to the valley of the Pi-li Ho on the east, where touch was to be maintained with General Mishchenko's mounted troops.

By the 20th June, the 1st Siberian Army Corps and the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Infantry Division were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Kai-ping, but, although the latter force had only marched in on the morning of that day, it was hurried north a few hours later to a point near Ta-shih-chiao.† South of Hsiung-yao some trivial cavalry skirmishing had taken place on the 18th June, but no indication that the Japanese were contemplating an immediate advance had been observed. Want of

Concentration of
the 1st Siberian
Army Corps at
Kai-ping.

* See Chap. XVI.

† This brigade was withdrawn from General Stakelberg's command and was not present at the battle of Ta-shih-chiao.

ammunition and difficulties of supply had prevented General Oku from following up his late antagonist, and a heavy fall of rain had made the roads over which his troops must march almost impassable. The Second Army was at this time practically dependent upon provisions brought to the front by Chinese carts from the central depot at Pu-lan-tien, for though the Russians had left some three hundred railway wagons at Ta-lien-wan and Dalny, they had been careful to remove all locomotives. Supply by means of local transport was far from satisfactory; vehicles were not forthcoming in sufficient numbers, and many of the carters, frightened by the fighting at Te-li-ssu and unwilling to serve for hire beyond the environs of their homes, broke their contract and deserted. The strategical situation, however, demanded that the Second Army should advance simultaneously with the two forces east of it, which were about to make a forward movement, for it was important that all three should work in concert, though widely separated. Steady pressure exerted upon several points of the front held by the Russians, who, like the Japanese, were suffering from transport difficulties, would, it was hoped, create doubt in General Kuropatkin's mind as to where his greatest danger lay, and lead him to disperse his troops rather than to throw the mass of them in any one direction.

On the 19th June, therefore, the Second Army resumed its northward march, an advanced detachment and the 1st Cavalry Brigade occupying Hsiung-yao on the afternoon of the 21st. The main body of the army was obliged, by shortness of supplies, to halt south of that place, covered by a line of outposts whose front extended from the coast-line on the west to a point on the high ground some twenty-four miles east of Hsiung-yao.

On the 25th June, a detachment of the 5th Division, consisting of a troop of cavalry, a battery, and a battalion, was sent in a north-easterly direction to cover the right flank of the army and endeavour to gain touch with Major-General Tojo's column from the Ta-ku-shan army.

The cavalry on both sides displayed activity, and skirmishes took place almost daily, but until the 6th July no movement of importance was initiated. By that date the problem of supply was nearing a solution. The rolling stock taken from the Russians had been organized in trains of about ten wagons, which, in the absence of mechanical traction, were pushed by gangs of men, thirty to each vehicle. In addition to the railway line, Chinese carts still plied from Pu-lan-tien to the

Causes delaying
advance of the
Second Army.

Advance of the
Second Army.

Supply.

front through Fu-chou and Te-li-ssu, but road and rail did not suffice to meet the daily needs of the Second Army and at the same time to allow of the collection of a food reserve. Land transport for the moment had attained its limits, and those charged with the duty of provisioning the army next turned their thoughts towards the sea. It was at first proposed to send transports laden with supplies through the Straits of Pei-chih-li, past the entrance to Port Arthur. These vessels, escorted by a portion of the fleet, were to land their stores at some point on the coast near Hsiung-yao, whence carts would take them to the Second Army. This project, which would have simplified the commissariat difficulty, was abandoned as, owing to the reappearance of the Russian battleships on the 23rd June,* no fleet escort could now be spared. But in place of the transports some eighty Chinese junks were hired and sent through the straits to Chin-chou Bay, where they were loaded with supplies brought by cart across the isthmus of Nan Shan from Ta-lien-wan. After the 11th July they plied regularly between Chin-chou, Hsiung-yao, and other points on the coast line further north.

Thus by the first week in July the Second Army, reinforced by the 6th Division, was again in a condition to advance, and on the 6th July its four divisions began to move towards Kai-ping. On the 2nd and 3rd July, the Russian cavalry had noticed no change in the dispositions of the Japanese; but on the 4th, it was observed that their forces had increased, while on the 5th attempts to elucidate the situation had been repulsed by mounted troops which had been pushed forward all along the line.

About 9 a.m. on the 6th, part of the 5th Division, which had taken the place of the 3rd on the extreme right of the Japanese line,† attacked some 1,600 Russian infantry, who were holding a ridge about two and a half miles north and north-east of Ssu-fang-tai, and forced them to retire. The main body of the army encountered little opposition on this date and halted for the night on a line extending from Chin-chia-kou, west of the railway, to

Advance of the
Second Army
resumed.

* On the 23rd June, the Russian fleet made a sortie from Port Arthur which is fully described in Chapter XVIII. The Japanese were completely surprised by the reappearance of the battleships *Pobyeda*, *Retvizan*, and *Tsesarevich* which had been repaired, and rendered the Russians superior in strength to the blockading fleet. It is hardly too much to say that for a few hours the course of the campaign hung in the balance, until, for some unknown reason, the Russian fleet returned to harbour without bringing on a general action. As the result of this sortie it was necessary to make the blockade very much closer. See also the telegrams to the commanders of the Japanese Fourth and First Armies on pages 231 and 257.

† Presumably because it had mountain artillery suitable for employment on the eastern flank.

Erh-tao-ho on the east, a part of the 4th Division occupying the heights at Tsu-chia-tung. On the 7th, the centre column dislodged a hostile force from the neighbourhood of Sha-kang-tai, and at noon the four divisions held a front from Li-chia-kou, on the right, to the hills near the sea coast east of the village of Ta-wang-hai-chai, with outposts some five miles south of the Russian main position at Kai-ping.

The city of that name stands on the right bank of the Kai-ping River and is dominated on its northern side by a semi-circle of hills which rise at a short distance from its walls. According to the reports of natives

Russian position
at Kai-ping.

some 20,000 Russians under General Stakelberg

held the ground near the city, while 12,000 more were posted in the neighbourhood of Hai-shan-chai. Further north, in and around Ta-shih-chiao, was another force under Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev, reinforcements for which were continually arriving from Liao-yang. A reconnaissance made by the Second Army on the 8th showed that the Russian right was placed at Hai-shan-chai, while the left stood on the heights near Hsi-tai. It was observed that for some miles south of the hills overlooking the city the ground was level, and that in advancing to the attack the Second Army would be much exposed to the fire of the Russian artillery. Advantage was therefore taken of the hours of darkness to cross the level ground, and at 5.30 a.m. on the 9th July the Japanese artillery opened fire upon the enemy near Kai-ping. His forces, of which a considerable portion had been already withdrawn towards the north were then attacked in front and on both flanks by all four divisions, and by 8 a.m. the heights north of

The Russian
retirement
from Kai-ping.

the city were secured by the Japanese. Thence the Russian rear guard consisting of a single division,* fell back to a position astride the railway

some five miles north of the Kai-ping River, where resistance was maintained until 3 p.m., by which hour most of its guns were silenced. The casualties† on both sides during the day were inconsiderable, for the Russian general, who was aware that the Japanese were coming on with four divisions and a cavalry brigade, withdrew his troops in good time and with perfect regularity.

* Part of the 1st and 9th East Siberian Rifle Divisions, some twenty squadrons and six batteries.

† The Japanese losses on this date are not precisely known, but it is understood that they were about 140 of all ranks. Their losses from 5th to 9th July were 22 N.C.O.'s and men killed, 6 officers and 137 N.C.O.'s and men wounded. General Stakelberg returned his losses on the 9th as 1 officer killed, and 5 wounded, and about 200 N.C.O.'s and men killed and wounded.

From the 10th to the 22nd July, the Second Army remained in the vicinity of Kai-ping holding a fortified line four miles north of that place and exchanging fire with the Russian cavalry and horse artillery, which frequently appeared before the outposts. During this period supply arrangements were improved, and junks, keeping level with the main body of the army, landed their stores on the coast, whence they were carried in carts to Kai-ping, seven miles distant. Thus, by the 15th July, the troops no longer lived from hand to mouth, and though heavy rain had fallen continuously for forty-eight hours, making the road almost impassable, supplies for twenty days for five divisions* had been collected at the front. While halted near Kai-ping, news was received of the Russian attack and repulse at the Mo-tien Ling on the 17th July† and information was obtained that the enemy, whose force opposing the Second Army had now increased to nearly four divisions, was in position near Ta-shih-chiao. He was reported to be holding a strongly entrenched line of defence, extending from Niu-hsin-shan to Tai-ping-ling. The position was important as it covered the railway junction of the Newchuang branch and the main line. The possession of Newchuang and the junction would simplify the troublesome question of supply for the Japanese, and determined resistance might therefore be expected.

At 11 a.m. on the 20th July, orders were issued for the advance, but owing to a heavy fall of rain that afternoon, the movement, which was intended to have taken place on the 22nd, was postponed for twenty-four hours. The 5th Division was to retain its position on the right of the army; further west would be the 3rd Division, then the 6th, and on the extreme left flank the 4th Division; while the cavalry was to move beyond the 4th Division and reconnoitre the Russian right and rear.

At 4 a.m. on the 23rd, the Second Army left the vicinity of Kai-ping. North of that city, on both sides of the main road and stretching to the sea coast, is an extensive plain studded with villages of varying size. At the time of the battle this plain was covered with *kao-liang*, which though not fully grown, had attained to a height of about six feet and afforded some degree of concealment. Some difficulty was experienced by the troops whose march led between Hua-lin Shan and the valley of the Tung-ta

* From a supply point of view the personnel of the Second Army was at this time equivalent to five divisions.

† See Chapter XVII.

Ho, towards the Russian left wing which was heavily entrenched. Here a succession of hills extended up to the position, and the intervening valleys afforded no cover, while the recent heavy rains had converted the ground on either side of the river into a sea of mud. Before nightfall, however, the Japanese had taken up a line extending from Wu-tai Shan on the left, through Hua-lin Shan, to Liu-chiao-tien on the right, in readiness for the next day's operations. The resistance offered by portions of the 1st and 4th Siberian Army Corps had not been serious, but the Japanese 4th Division had met with some opposition and had repulsed a mixed force of cavalry, infantry, and horse artillery. Tang-chih, on the Russian left, had been taken by some troops of the 5th Division, but they were forced by superior numbers to relinquish it at nightfall.* At 10 a.m., staff officers had been sent forward from army head-quarters to reconnoitre, and according to their reports the Russians were assembling their troops at Ta-shih-chiao and were in position from the hill north of Tai-ping Ling, through Ching-shih Shan and Wang-ma-tai, to Niu-hsin-shan. The front held extended for about ten miles from east to west, and, on the several hills that marked it, redoubts for infantry had been constructed, while the intervening spaces had been prepared for rifle and artillery fire. The approaches to the entrenchments were protected by wire entanglements, abattis, and mines and signs were not wanting that far greater care and more labour had been expended upon the defences near Ta-shih-chiao than upon those from which the Russians had been forced at Te-li-ssu. The infantry entrenchments, however, were plainly visible to the naked eye at some distance, but the gun positions were so skilfully disguised as to defy detection by the Japanese artillerymen. The lessons of Nan Shan and Te-li-ssu had not been altogether lost, but the ground lent itself better to concealment than was the case at the two earlier battles.

Meanwhile the Russians had daily been expecting the further advance of the Japanese. General Kuropatkin had himself selected the position on which the next stand was to be made, and had given orders for it to be fortified. The 1st Siberian Army Corps had fallen back slowly upon the 4th Siberian Army Corps, and the combined force had been placed under the command of General Zarubaiev. In an order issued on the 19th July, this officer had detailed the positions to be occupied by the troops in case of attack; and on the 23rd, in accordance with this order, the Russian rear guard, belonging to the 1st Corps, retired

* This statement is taken from a Russian account. The Japanese deny that Tang-chih was entered by them until the 24th.

before superior numbers of Japanese to the line Liu-pai-ta-ssu—Lin-chia-tun. At the same time the main body of the 1st Corps took up its allotted post on the line Tien-chia-tun—Ching-shih Shan, while the cavalry moved out to the assistance of the rear guard. About 10 a.m., the Japanese brought thirty-six guns into action at Ma-kuan-tsui against the Russian centre, and at 4 p.m. forced the rear guard to retire to the main position.

At 1.30 p.m., General Zarubaiev received a report from General Mishchenko, who had been forced back from Hsiu-yen by the Japanese 10th Division, that the enemy was advancing from Pan-chia-fu on Meng-chia-tun where there was about a brigade of infantry; and that a force of about one regiment had pushed into the valley of Hsiao-ko-pu. At the same time information was received from General Stakelberg that an infantry division, with artillery, was advancing by the defile south of Tu-lao-po-tien.

From these reports General Zarubaiev's staff concluded that at least three Japanese divisions were advancing to the attack, as follows:—

Between the railway and Lin-chia-tun, one division.

In the Tu-lao-po-tien defile, one division.

On the line Meng-chia-tun—Hsiao-ko-pu, one division.

The position of the reserves had not been ascertained, but they were assumed to be near the Japanese right.

The Russian rear guard was not followed up as it fell back, and General Zarubaiev was able, undisturbed, to make his final preparations for the battle which must take place on the following day.

On the morning of the 24th his troops were
Disposition of the distributed as follows:—
Russian troops.

(a) On the Tai-ping Ling position, under
Major-General Shileiko—

Tobolsk* Regiment (less 2 companies with Major-General
Mishchenko).

11th and 20th Horse Artillery Batteries.

2nd Battery 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade.

These troops were in position east of the Tang-chih—Tai-ping-ling—Ying-feng-chai road, and were drawn up as follows:—

In the centre, 2nd Battery 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade and
the 20th Horse Artillery Battery. On the right of the

* 9th Tobolsk Regiment of 1st Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division
(4th Siberian Army Corps).

batteries was the 1st Battalion Tobolsk Regiment; on the left the 5th and 6th Companies of that regiment. Further to the east stood the 11th Horse Artillery Battery and the 4th Battalion of the Tobolsk Regiment; the 3rd Battalion was in reserve behind the left flank.

All the units, except the reserve, which was under cover in a hollow, were in shelter trenches fronting towards Tang-chih.

West of the road, but also under Major-General Shileiko—

1st Battalion Semipalatinsk* Regiment.

2nd Battalion Semipalatinsk Regiment.

Both battalions were in shelter trenches.

(b) On the central position, under Major-General Oganovski†—

4th Battery 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade, in trenches on a saddle about two-thirds of a mile south of Pai-chai-tzu.

4th Battalion Barnaul‡ Regiment, covering the battery.

2nd Battalion Barnaul Regiment, to the left front of the 4th Battalion.

1st Battalion Barnaul Regiment, in local reserve in rear of the right flank.

These troops held the main position, but in advance, maintaining connexion between the Tai-ping Ling and the 1st Siberian Corps, were—

1st Battalion Tomsk§ Regiment, on the heights north-west of Ta-fang-shen.

4th Battalion Tomsk Regiment, on the heights south of Ying-feng-chai.

(c) At Pai-chai-tzu, in reserve in rear of the central positions—

2nd Battalion Tomsk Regiment.

3rd Battalion Tomsk Regiment.

(d) In the valley west of Pai-chai-tzu, and forming the general reserve of the 4th Siberian Army Corps—

3½ battalions Omsk|| Regiment.

3rd Battery 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade.

(e) On the line Tien-chia-tun—Yung-an-tun—San-chia-tzu—

1st Siberian Army Corps.

* 11th Semipalatinsk Regiment of 2nd Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division.

† Commanding 2nd Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

‡ 12th Barnaul Regiment of 2nd Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division.

§ 8th Tomsk Regiment of 2nd Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

|| 10th Omsk Regiment of 1st Brigade 3rd Siberian Infantry Division.

- (f) At Huang-ta-ssu, the army reserve—
 7th Krasnoyarsk* Regiment.
 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.†
 35th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.†
 1st and 4th Batteries 9th East Siberian Artillery
 Brigade.‡

On the western flank was the cavalry brigade under Major-General Kossakovski, who had succeeded Major-General Samsonov in the command; on the eastern flank was Major-General Mishchenko's cavalry brigade.

The troops were ordered to be prepared for action at 4 a.m.; they were not to occupy the trenches, but were to be in readiness under cover on the rear slopes of the hills; a precaution which it was hoped would render it more difficult than in previous battles for the Japanese to obtain accurate information, through Chinese spies, as to the distribution of the defenders.

Turning now to the Japanese, General Oku's orders for the attack, issued on the evening of the 23rd, were:—

General Oku's orders for the attack on the 24th. “(1) The army will attack the enemy to-morrow on the high ground immediately to the west of the Tai-ping Ling.

“(2) The 3rd Division—less 2 squadrons of cavalry with the cavalry brigade, and 1 regiment of infantry in the general reserve—will leave its position between Shih-ku-ao and Hua-lin Shan at 4 a.m., and will attack the enemy's defences on a front extending from 2,000 yards west of the Tai-ping Ling to the hill north of Shan-hsi-tou.§

“(3) The 5th Division will leave its quarters at 4 a.m. and, keeping communication with the right wing of the 3rd, will attack the enemy at the Tai-ping Ling. It will watch the right flank of the army, more especially towards Chien-tzu-lao-kou.

“(4) The 6th Division—less 2 squadrons of cavalry with the cavalry brigade and 1 regiment of infantry in the general reserve—will march from Li-chia-tun at 4 a.m., and

* Of 2nd Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

† Of 9th E.S.R. Division.

‡ This distribution is taken from General Zarubaiev's report, but is far from being complete; it should be compared with the order of battle in Appendix G. The way in which some units were subdivided is very remarkable.

§ No hour appears to have been assigned for the movement of this division. Doubtless it was clearly understood.

keeping touch with the left of the 3rd Division, will attack the enemy on the hill north-east of Kan-chia-tun. This division will take particular care to protect the front of its left wing.

- “(5) The 1st Artillery Brigade—less the 14th Regiment attached to the 4th Division—will take up a position near Hua-lin Shan at 4.30 a.m., and will open fire at daybreak against the hill west of the Tai-ping Ling and Wang-ma-tai.
- “(6) The 4th Division will take up a position near Wu-tai Shan and will hold it in strength as a protection for the left flank of the army. No advance will be made therefrom until it is observed that the general attack elsewhere is succeeding. The 14th Regiment of Artillery is attached to this division.
- “(7) The 1st Cavalry Brigade will cover the left flank of the army beyond the 4th Division.
- “(8) The general reserve—18th and 23rd Regiments of infantry—will be at Tu-lao-po-tien by 4 a.m.
- “(9) Army head-quarters will move at 3.30 a.m., and will proceed to the hill 2,500 yards north-east of Tu-lao-po-tien.”

In accordance with these orders the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Divisions resumed their advance on the morning of the 24th, but the 4th Division with the 14th Artillery Regiment remained halted at Wu-tai Shan. The earliest glimmerings of daylight revealed the movements of the enemy to the Russian outposts, and the troops of the 4th Corps moved at once into the trenches. At 6 a.m.,

the first Japanese gun opened fire. In a few minutes two batteries were in action on the crest south of Pao-lo-pu, followed a little later by another battery somewhat further to the east. They were answered by indirect fire from the 2nd and 3rd Batteries of the 9th Siberian Brigade, which were posted behind some rising ground near the village of Yung-an-tun, aided by the 4th Battery of the 1st Brigade south of Pai-chai-tzu. In this section of the battlefield the ground was perfectly open, and the fighting took the form of a great artillery duel. On the Japanese side the attack of the 6th Infantry Division was not pushed with great vigour, thus allowing General Stakelberg to keep the defending infantry under cover instead of in the trenches. Nevertheless, at 1 p.m., apparently under the impression that the main efforts of the Japanese were directed against the 1st Corps, he sent word to General Zarubaiev that if he should be compelled to occupy the trenches, he

would suffer heavy loss, and that, in his opinion, this would not be in accordance with General Kuropatkin's plan of campaign.* In these circumstances he considered it his duty to advise a retreat.

General Zarubaiev replied that a retreat was impossible by daylight, but that he would consider the question of carrying it out at nightfall.

By 2 p.m., the Japanese had thirteen batteries in action against the 1st Siberian Corps, twelve of which, the 13th and 15th Artillery Regiments, concentrated their fire against the two batteries of the 9th Siberian Brigade. For nine hours and a half these two batteries held their own against greatly superior numbers. So well were they concealed, both by the rising ground and by the millet crops, that the attack failed to inflict any serious loss upon them, and so stubborn was their resistance that the infantry advance was easily checked. At 8.30 a.m., the firing line of the 6th Division pushed forward, and about noon occupied the hills north-east of Kan-chia-tun, but it was quite unable, in spite of the support of the artillery, to make any further progress. About 3 p.m., the two Russian batteries were reinforced by the 4th Battery of the 1st East Siberian Artillery Brigade from the reserve, and were thus enabled to maintain the unequal duel till nightfall. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Batteries of the 1st East Siberian Artillery Brigade, though belonging to the 1st Corps, co-operated loyally throughout the day with the 4th Corps in repelling the attacks of the 3rd and 5th Japanese Divisions.

As soon as the 6th Division had occupied Kan-chia-tun, the 4th Division advanced to Hsiao-chia-tzu. There it was checked for a time by the Russian cavalry under General Kossakovski and by the 3rd Trans-Baikal Cossack Battery, but about 3 p.m. the appearance of a Japanese brigade near Kuan-tien-pu caused the enemy to retire to Hsiao-chia-tzu. At the close of the day's fighting, the 4th Division held a line from Liu-pai-ta-ssu to Niu-chia-tun, while its own artillery and the 14th Artillery Regiment were in position at Pao-lo-pu and near Hsiao-chia-tzu. At 8 p.m., General Oku had sent the 23rd Infantry Regiment from the general reserve to the 6th Division, with orders to take position between that division and the 4th, so as to give additional strength to the latter's right. Information had come in that a strong force of the enemy had assembled before sunset near Chiao-tai-pu and Tien-chia-tun, and a counter-attack upon the left of the Second Army seemed probable.

Throughout the day the Japanese cavalry brigade, with its

* For an explanation of this reference to General Kuropatkin's plan of campaign see p. 423.

main body at Huang-lu-tsui, kept a watch upon that flank, but nothing of importance occurred. About noon a portion of the Russian mounted troops with a battery of horse artillery moved south to Li-chia-wo-feng, whence fire was opened upon the 14th Artillery Regiment near Hsiao-chia-tzu. The guns attached to the 1st Cavalry Brigade replied, and about 1 p.m. the enemy withdrew towards the north. No further attempt was made against the left flank of the Japanese, and the action of their cavalry upon the 24th was altogether of a passive nature.

In the hills to the east the fighting was of an entirely different character from that which has been already described.

Here, between 7 and 8 a.m., the 5th Division, supported by the 3rd, moved against the Russian left, and occupied the high ground west of Tang-chih. No sooner had the division taken up this line than the Russian concealed batteries on the Tai-ping Ling, and at Pinhan-kou and Cheng-chia-kou opened a heavy fire to which its own mountain guns were unable to reply.

The 3rd Division now came up on the left of the 5th, and about 11 a.m. the attack was renewed. The 1st Battalion of the Tomsk Regiment was forced to retire from its advanced position north-west of Ta-fang-shen, and to fall back upon the main position held by the troops under General Oganovski. The hill which it had held was at once occupied by Japanese infantry and artillery, and a heavy fire was brought to bear upon the 4th Battery of the 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade and upon the battalions of the Barnaul Regiment about Cheng-chia-kou. So severe was the pressure against the centre that General Oganovski appealed to General Shileiko to turn his artillery against the troops advancing from Ta-fang-shen. The co-operation between the two sections of the defence was perfectly effective, and General Oganovski's request was promptly complied with. The 2nd Battery of the 1st Artillery Brigade and two guns of the 11th Horse Battery changed front to the south-west; a little later the 20th Horse Battery was sent to join the Semipalatinsk Regiment west of Ying-feng-chai. But the danger from the attack was by no means over, and at about midday one battalion and the 3rd Battery of the 1st Artillery Brigade were brought up into the firing line from the reserve of the 4th Corps.

The advancing infantry was thus exposed to the fire of six batteries of field artillery, three of which were armed with quick-firing guns, as well as to that of the 20th Horse Artillery Battery (Q.F.), and two guns of the 11th Horse Artillery Battery (56

guns in all, 32 of which were quick-firers). Against these the Japanese were able to bring into action the six batteries of mountain artillery belonging to the 5th Division, and six batteries of field artillery with the 3rd Division, or a total of seventy-two guns, which, though superior in numbers, were inferior both in range and rapidity of fire to those of the defenders. Nevertheless, at 2 p.m., the army commander sent word that the attack on the Tai-ping Ling must no longer be delayed. The field guns of the 3rd Division, therefore, came into action at 3.30 p.m. from positions in rear of the infantry line, and, in conjunction with the mountain guns of the 5th Division, opened upon the enemy. Again the infantry advanced to the attack, but the fire of the artillery was of no material assistance. The supports of the 5th Division were now sent up to join the first line, and the troops strove to press forward, regardless of the enemy's guns. As they approached the hostile trenches they were met by a withering rifle fire, which first checked the attack and then brought it to a standstill. The 5th Division then ceased its efforts to close with the enemy, but the guns on both sides kept up a fierce duel until sunset.

At 5 p.m., fresh troops were added to the firing line of the 3rd Division, and the impetus given by their arrival sent the whole forward to some commanding ground further north. General Oganovski replied by bringing the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Tomsk Regiment up into the fighting line. One of the foremost Japanese battalions now boldly attempted to take the hill held by the Barnaul Regiment under Colonel Dobrotin, but was met by a determined charge and driven off the ridge. Here for a time it remained, separated from the defenders only by a score of yards, but at length it was repulsed by a counter-attack, and was forced to seek refuge in the valley beneath.

Since from the first General Oku had kept but two regiments in his general reserve, he had no fresh men to throw into the fighting line as the day wore on, for he could not part with the only troops available to meet a possible counter-attack. Again and again the attack was renewed, but the Siberian infantry and artillery stood firm. At 7.30 p.m., the 34th Regiment and a battery were taken from the Russian reserve and brought up to strengthen the position held by General Oganovski. About the same time a contemplated counter-attack by the Tobolsk Regiment was abandoned, as the troops were needed to reinforce the Semipalatinsk Regiment, which was sorely pressed. Elsewhere the attack had been suspended, yet the fight between the 3rd

Japanese Division and the right of the 4th Siberian Corps went on while the bulk of the infantry of both sides remained inactive. At sunset the only remaining Russian reserves were six battalions of infantry and one battery of artillery, but the efforts of the Japanese infantry had failed to dislodge a single Russian battalion from the main position; and no effort had availed to compensate for the lack of adequate artillery support. At the same hour, General Oku had but a single regiment in hand, for the 23rd, as already related, had been sent to strengthen the left wing.

Thus the frontal attack of the Second Army, supported by two hundred and fifty-two guns, had made but little impression upon the Russians, whose artillery, at the highest estimate, fell short of half that number of pieces. The skilful use of ground by the Russians kept the positions of their guns hidden from the more numerous artillery of the Japanese, who, in order to support the infantry advance and to counteract the longer ranging weapons of their adversary, were forced to make frequent changes of position at the cost of casualties in men and horses. The Russian army had, indeed, much reason for satisfaction at the result of the day's fighting. For fifteen hours it had withstood the assaults of its formidable, and hitherto successful, opponents; while the brunt of the attack had been borne by a reserve division. Yet all the self-sacrifice and courage of the troops were to be wasted, and the battle was to be decided, as many other battles have been, by events beyond the immediate scene of action and by the character of the rival generals; for while the Japanese were preparing to renew the attack General Zarubaiev was beginning to retire.*

As night fell, the commander of the Japanese 5th Division, dissatisfied with the part which his troops had taken, and rightly judging that their fruitless efforts to capture the Taping Ling had by no means quenched their ardour, applied to General Oku for leave to attack the position under cover of darkness, and asked that the 3rd Division might co-operate. The request met with approval, and orders were then issued to the effect that the attack would be resumed at 4 a.m. on the following day, but that the 4th and 6th Divisions must await the result of their own artillery fire before advancing. These orders were however, never executed, for at 8.30 p.m., as soon as the moon rose, the infantry of the 5th Division—without the assistance of the 3rd, which was withdrawn at the

* For further explanation of this retreat see p. 211.

last moment—silently stealing down the hill-side and crossing over the valley that lay between it and the goal, mounted the slopes upon the further side, and rushing forward delivered an assault from three points upon the hill west of the Tai-ping Ling. Under a heavy fire the works of the first line were captured, and by 9.30 p.m. those of the second and third lines fell with little opposition. The men of the 3rd Division, joining in the attack in the early morning, captured Pin-han-kou, and shortly afterwards took possession of the hill north of Shan-hsi-tou, thus securing the ground which had defied all efforts on the previous day. There they assembled, and at noon advanced and occupied a position east and west of Pai-chai-tzu.

To the west, the artillery of the 6th Division opened fire at 6.40 a.m., and, as no reply came from the enemy, some infantry occupied the hill north of Pei-wang-chia-tzu while another force went further, and by 10 a.m. held the ground north-east of Pai-hu Shan. The advance of the 6th Division was followed at 8 a.m. by that of the 4th, which at 1 p.m. held the line from Pai-hu Shan to Niu-hsin-shan.

This success was lightly gained, for the night attack was opposed only by a Russian rear guard. General Zarubaiev, considering that he had not sufficient fresh troops available to justify him in renewing the contest next day, and influenced, perhaps, by hearing that the Japanese Fourth Army was advancing from the east, had begun to retire at nightfall. Shortly after 11 a.m. on the 25th his reserves passed through Ta-shih-chiao, and when a detachment, which had been sent in pursuit by the Japanese 6th Division reached that place at 3.10 p.m., it found that the stores which had been collected there were on fire and that the main body of the enemy was far beyond its reach. The Japanese therefore contented themselves with establishing an outpost line about four miles further north, and by midnight the 3rd and 4th Divisions and the main body of the 6th Division were assembled at Ta-shih-chiao. The 5th Division went into quarters at Wang-shan-kou, while the cavalry was still on the left flank at Ta-ping Shan, which it had occupied at 1 p.m., sending a squadron to seize Newchuang.

Thus the two Siberian army corps which had held the position south of the railway junction at Ta-shih-chiao withdrawn unmolested, the 1st Corps covering the retirement of the 4th which had borne the brunt of the attack and had become somewhat disorganized. General Zarubaiev reached Hai-cheng on the 27th July and halted there, covered by the cavalry which held the ground twelve miles south of that city.

The losses suffered by the Russians in this battle are said to have been twenty officers and six hundred non-commissioned officers and men killed and wounded, but from independent sources they have been estimated to amount to two thousand killed, wounded, and missing. One battalion—the 12th Siberian (Barnaul) Infantry Regiment—suffered a loss of forty per cent. of its numbers. The casualties of the Japanese, on the other hand, although they attacked the Russians in a strongly defended position, amounted, from the 23rd to the 25th July, to only one thousand and forty-four killed and wounded of all ranks.*

From the 25th to the 31st July the Second Army halted at Ta-shih-chiao, its cavalry keeping touch with that of the Russians to the south of Hai-cheng and with the Japanese Fourth Army on its right. Newchuang had been occupied by the detachment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade on the evening of the 25th July, and troops sent to replace it arrived there on the following day. About midnight on the 24th the Russian garrison† had marched out and had retired towards Liao-yang, after setting fire to all buildings in the neighbourhood of the railway station and sending all rolling stock to Ta-shih-chiao. A Russian gunboat, the *Sivuch*,‡ and four armed launches steamed up the Liao Ho, the former being blown up by her crew on the 2nd August, while the latter proceeded to Liao-yang or Tieh-ling. Three days after the port had been occupied by the Japanese, the gunboats *Tsukushi*, *Atago*, and *Uji*, with four torpedo boats, were sent to the Liao Ho, and the work of clearing the harbour of mines was promptly begun. On the 28th July, the Japanese 5th Division was dispatched from Ta-shih-chiao through Tang-chih to join the Fourth Army, a distance of some thirty miles through hilly country. This division arrived in time to take part in the action at Hsi-mu-cheng,§ which was fought on the 31st July, relieving a Guard Brigade which had left earlier in that month to rejoin its own division under General

* See Appendix G.

† The Japanese state that at the time of the evacuation of Newchuang, the garrison consisted of 500 cavalry, 4,000 infantry and 10 guns. From another source it would seem, however, that there were only some 2,000 men of all ranks.

‡ This boat was in dock at Newchuang at the beginning of the war, and remained there assisting in the laying of mines and in the defence of the port. In May her guns were removed and sent to Harbin, but were replaced later, and were still on board when she was blown up. Her crew then went to Liao-yang.

§ See Chapter XVI.

Kuroki, who engaged the Russians successfully at Yang-tzu Ling—Yu-shu Ling on the 30th–31st July.*

General Oku, knowing that the greater part of the force with which he had been engaged at Ta-shih-chiao had retired north-eastward, marched against Hai-cheng at 4 a.m. on the 1st August. Moving in three or four parallel columns the Second Army drove back several small bodies of all arms, to the total strength of about one division, and occupied the town during the afternoon of the 3rd.† It was then found that although the Russians had carefully fortified the surrounding hills,‡ they had withdrawn their main body to An-shan-chan, twenty-two miles to the north-east, where they had taken up a position covered by two divisions. The railway bridge over the river which skirts the city walls had been left intact, but a number of store-houses near the station were in flames. These were in great part saved from total destruction, and a considerable quantity of provisions was rescued.

The Fourth Army reached the vicinity of Hai-cheng almost simultaneously with the Second Army, and occupied the ground which lies to the eastward of that city. As the result of the successes which had been gained all along the Japanese line the front of the three armies had been reduced from 140 to 45 miles, the passes over the Hsiao Shan and the Fen-shui Ling had been wrested from the Russians, and the two western armies were no longer separated.

* See Chapter XVII.

† Niu-chuang was also occupied on this day.

‡ The hills round Hai-cheng had a special interest for the Japanese, since in 1894–5, they had held them successfully against the Chinese.

CHAPTER XVI.

OPERATIONS OF THE JAPANESE FOURTH ARMY AND THE ACTIONS
AT HSIU-YEN, THE FEN-SHUI LING, AND HSI-MU-CHENG.

(Strategical Map 2, and Plans 8, 9, and 10.)

It has been already mentioned that, besides the armies under Generals Kuroki and Oku, the Japanese had thrown into Manchuria a third force, which had begun to land near Ta-ku-shan on the 19th May. This force, which was to consist at first only of the 10th Division under Lieutenant-General Kawamura, was known later as the Fourth Army, and was intended to operate between the First and Second Armies, linking them together and rendering them assistance should necessity arise. Great care was taken by the Japanese to conceal from the Russians its organization and strength. As soon as its mobilization, for which orders were issued on the 16th April, was completed the troops moved to Kobe, where they had been ordered to embark. Only a limited number of transports* could be collected, for the disembarkation of the Second Army was not yet complete, and it was therefore decided to dispatch the 10th Division to its destination in three groups. Of these, the first was composed of nine battalions of infantry, four mountain batteries, a squadron of the 10th Cavalry Regiment, and the 10th Engineer Battalion; the second group consisted of the remainder of the fighting units of the division, and took with it, as did the first troops, the regimental transport and one month's supplies; while the third group comprised troops for the line of communication, the remainder of the transport, and miscellaneous stores.

On the 9th and 10th May, the leading portion of the division, with head-quarters, embarked on board eleven transports which sailed in twos and threes to an appointed rendezvous off Chinampo. By the 17th May, the convoy was assembled there, and final arrangements were made by the naval and military authorities for

Landing
of the 10th
Division.

* Nineteen steamers, of 54,932 gross tonnage, exclusive of two steamers allotted to the harbour commander for purposes of communication.

a descent upon the coast in the neighbourhood of Ta-ku-shan. The actual point selected for this operation was Nan-chien, a place on the western side of a promontory fifteen miles south-west of Ta-ku-shan, which had been reconnoitred by Admiral Dewa's squadron on the 4th May. The foreshore, as at Pi-tzu-wo, consists of mud flats, of which a large expanse is exposed at low water, and, under certain conditions of wind and tide, landing by boats becomes impossible. Yet no better place was available,* and, at dawn on the 19th May, the gunboats of Rear-Admiral Hosoya's covering squadron creeping close inshore, opened fire on some Russian scouts who were keeping guard along the coast. The convoy, which had left Korea on the 17th May, had arrived at dusk on the evening of the 18th, and had anchored at a distance of about ten miles from the shore, when boats had been got out and everything made ready for the landing. The larger launches had previously been dispatched from Chinampo to the mouth of the Ya-lu, whence they now sailed along the coast to an island situated south of Ta-ku-shan. While the gunboats were firing on the Russian scouts a party of five hundred bluejackets landed at the neck of the promontory, and took possession without opposition. On a signal that the landing was successful, the transports moved in to their second anchorage, distant some three miles from the shore, and the disembarkation of the troops began. The landing was unopposed, and by the evening of the first day six battalions, a battery, and a company of engineers were on shore. Encouraged by his good fortune, General Kawamura decided to concentrate his division as quickly as possible at Ta-ku-shan, and, with this object, he dispatched a covering force of one regiment of infantry under Major-General Marui to Wang-chia-tun. A detachment from this regiment was sent to Kuan-chia-tun to watch the approaches from Hsiu-yen; and a company from the main body of the division was sent to Ling-chia-to-tzu (south-west of Ta-ku-shan) to watch those from the north-west and to protect the road from Nan-chien to Ta-ku-shan. These movements began early on the 20th May, and the troops reached their allotted positions the same evening.† The next day (21st), hoping to secure the occupation of the Ta-ku-shan plain, General

* Notwithstanding its inconvenience, Ta-ku-shan continued to be used by the Fourth Army as a base until October, 1904.

† A few days before the arrival of the 10th Division, a party from the First Army had reached Ta-ku-shan by sea, and had established a telegraph station at that place; thus, in order to put General Kawamura in telegraphic communication with the First and Second Armies, it was only necessary to connect this station with the existing cable between the Pingyang Inlet and Pi-tzu-wo.

Kawamura reinforced General Marui with a squadron, two batteries, and a company of engineers. The main body of the covering force was concentrated near Wang-chia-tun, and detachments were sent to occupy the line Kuan-chia-tun—Ta-chia-lu, and the hills at Hsiao-yang-ho. Another battalion was sent to watch the line Wa-kou—Li-chia-tun, its head-quarters remaining near Chang-chia-tun.

Meanwhile the weather was not unfavourable for the disembarkation and, in spite of the defects of the landing place, all went smoothly, thanks to the exertions of the naval directing officer and the hard work of the transport department. By the fourth day six battalions, one squadron, two batteries, and three companies of engineers had been landed; and by the twelfth day the whole of the first group had disembarked. Since, however, it was calculated that thirty more days might be required for the concentration of the complete division,* the general officer commanding, in view of the possible necessity for an early advance, hurried on the landing of the troops, and established supply depots at Ta-ku-shan and Tu-cheng-tzu so as to be ready to move when called upon.

When the first troops, consisting of the 20th Regiment, were put on shore, it was known that General Mishchenko's Trans-Baikal Cavalry Brigade was gradually moving southward from its head-quarters at Hsiu-yen, while another force of cavalry, under Major-General Chirikov†, was posted on the Japanese left, at a point to the north of Chuang-ho. At the end of April, General Mishchenko's troops had been distributed as follows:—

Disposition of
the Russian
troops.

- (a) At Chien-san (about 16 miles south-west of An-tung)—
 Head-quarters of the Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade.
 1st Chita Cossack Regiment (six squadrons, one of which was detached to Ta-tung-kou, and to a point on the Ya-lu midway between that place and An-tung).
 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.
- (b) At Ta-ku-shan—
 2½ squadrons, 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment.
 1st Battery, 6th East Siberian Rifle Division.
 2¾ battalions, 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

* The actual time required proved to have been greatly over-estimated for the whole division was on shore by the 9th June.

† This officer commanded the 2nd Brigade, Siberian Cossack Division.

(c) Watching the coast line between Ta-ku-shan and Pitzu-wo—

2½ squadrons, 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment.

In all, approximately, 1,100 sabres, 2,400 bayonets, 8 field and 6 horse artillery guns.

The brigade had remained in these positions until after the battle of the Ya-lu when, in accordance with General Zasulich's instructions, General Mishchenko had ordered a retirement in the direction of Pien-men. Before he had reached that place he had received orders from General Kuropatkin that, in view of rumours of an intended Japanese landing, he was to move his force to the neighbourhood of Sha-li-chai, whence he could watch the coast and block the route from Ta-ku-shan through Hsiu-yen to Hai-cheng. To support him in carrying out these duties, the 18th Regiment of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division was pushed forward from Hai-cheng to the Fen-shui Ling,* whither the 21st Regiment and the 1st/6th Battery, which had taken part in the retirement towards Pien-men, were also sent. Thus, towards the middle of May, the Russian troops nearest to the projected point of landing of the Japanese Fourth Army, consisted of eleven squadrons and six horse artillery guns, supported by two infantry regiments and one field battery; and in order to carry out his instructions General Mishchenko had distributed his command, retaining under his own hand only two squadrons of the 1st Chita Cossack Regiment and the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.

About 7 p.m. on the 20th, the 3rd Squadron of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment, which was reconnoitring towards Ta-ku-shan, arrived near Wang-chia-tun, where it was surprised by General Marui's infantry and lost thirty officers and men.† Other minor engagements followed between patrols sent out to reconnoitre by both sides, but no attempt was made by General Mishchenko to interfere with the disembarkation of the 10th Division; for between him and Ta-ku-shan was General Marui's force, covered by the divisional cavalry and forming a screen through which the Russian reconnoitring parties could not penetrate. On the 26th May, a patrol of the

* This pass was known as the Ta-Ling (or Dalin) by the Russians, and is so called in most foreign accounts. The Chinese rendering of the Japanese name has been adopted here. Neither name is to be found on Chinese maps. This pass must be distinguished from two others of the same name further east.

† The Russian losses were: 1 officer and 9 men killed; 2 officers (both taken prisoners) and 19 men (4 of whom were taken prisoners) wounded. The Japanese had only one man killed,

Japanese 10th Cavalry Regiment moved up from Kou-lien-ho towards the Lao Ling, where it was joined on the 30th by a troop of cavalry and two companies of infantry. On the 31st, a reconnaissance was made which showed that the pass was held by the Russians, and the little force fell back and joined General Marui's detachment at Kou-lien-ho.

Affairs were still in this condition when news was received in Tokio that a strong Russian force was advancing against the Second Army. The reports from Europe, combined with information obtained in the field, left no doubt as to the intention of the enemy to undertake an offensive movement, and the

General Stakel-
berg's advance
southward.

Japanese expected that they would have to fight a decisive battle in the near future. Imperial head-quarters decided that the 10th Division should participate in the forthcoming operations, by moving against the Russian communications and, on the 3rd June, General Kawamura received orders to hold himself in readiness to advance towards Kai-ping at any moment; in the meanwhile he was to collect transport and provisions at points as far forward as possible. As a preparatory step

Counter move-
ment of the 10th
Division.

General Kawamura decided to occupy Hsiu-yen at once; and General Kuroki decided to assist him by sending a detachment from the First Army to Erh-tao-yang-ho.* About 10 p.m. on the 4th June, fuller information of the Russian movement reached General Kawamura from the Second Army, and he then heard that "the strength of the enemy who has advanced south of Kai-ping is at least one division of infantry and one brigade of cavalry. His main force is concentrated near Liu-chia-tun (15 miles north-east of Fu-chou). Our cavalry brigade has been in touch with the enemy since the 30th May. There is no strong force of the enemy near Fu-chou. The Second Army will try to divert the enemy towards Pu-lan-tien, and intends to deliver a counter-attack with its whole strength. The fight should take place on the 5th June."

The situation in front of the 10th Division at this time was believed by the Japanese to be as follows. At the Fen-shui Ling a mixed force of the enemy was busily preparing a position, entrenching itself and making no signs of advance; General Mishchenko, with twelve squadrons, one horse artillery battery, and, at most,

* The strength of this detachment, which was under General Asada, the commander of the 1st Guard Brigade, was a brigade of infantry, two field batteries, two squadrons of cavalry and one company of engineers. General Asada was instructed to place himself under General Kawamura's orders as soon as it was necessary to co-operate with the 10th Division.

one or two battalions of infantry was near Hsiu-yen, two or three squadrons being continually in collision with the advanced troops of the 10th Division at Ta-chia-lu and Ho-chia-pu; the main body of General Chirikov's brigade was at Tang-chia-tun, and he was continually moving small bodies towards Chuang-ho and Chin-tsui-tzu. As this information, derived from prisoners and spies, was considered fairly reliable, General Kawamura did not think it necessary to employ his whole force (12 battalions, 3 squadrons, 5 batteries), but preferred to await the arrival of General Asada at Erh-tao-yang-ho and then to order him to attack Hsiu-yen from Ta-hu-ling, while his own advanced force under General Marui (4 battalions, 1 troop cavalry, 3 batteries, 1 company engineers, $\frac{1}{2}$ sanitary detachment) operated against the same place from the south. The main body of the division, which for convenience of supply was concentrated about Kuan-chia-tun, was held in readiness to advance at short notice.

To reach Hsiu-yen two routes were available. One road, trending north-westward from Ta-ku-shan, strikes a tributary of the Ta-yang Ho at Tu-cheng-tzu, and follows it for about ten miles. It then turns northward, and after passing over an intervening ridge descends to Kou-lien-ho, beyond which place it crosses the Lao Ling and debouches into the plain round Hsiu-yen. The other route lies at first on the right bank of the Ta-yang Ho, then crosses the stream by an indifferent ford south-west of Sha-li-chai, and leads up the left bank by Ta-hu-ling to Hsiu-yen. Of these, the former was chosen for the northward march, for although the alternative route joins the road to Feng-huang-cheng near Sha-li-chai, thus opening up communication with the First Japanese Army, it is longer than the road through Tu-cheng-tzu, and troops moving along it could not directly cover Ta-ku-shan. Moreover, the mixed brigade under General Marui was already in position on the road which it had been decided to follow, and was now ordered to advance to Kou-lien-ho, while behind it the remainder of the 10th Division was assembling at Ta-ku-shan.

On the 3rd June, simultaneously with the Japanese preparations to advance, General Mishchenko sent out eight squadrons of cavalry and two guns to reconnoitre towards Kou-lien-ho. About 1 p.m., the advanced guard of this force, consisting of three squadrons of the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment,* met and engaged the Japanese.

* The 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment and one or more squadrons of the 5th Siberian Cossack Regiment had joined General Mishchenko by this date, bringing his strength up to about twenty squadrons with six guns.

Shortly afterwards the main body of the Russian cavalry and the two guns arrived, and fighting was continued until 6 p.m., the Russians maintaining their ground, though losing the commander of the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, as well as two officers and thirteen men. During this day, by carefully concealing their strength, the Japanese led General Mishchenko to infer that their main body was still at Ta-ku-shan.

On the 4th, however, three Japanese batteries were reported to be in movement towards the Russian right,* whereupon General Mishchenko withdrew his force and concentrated it on the Lao Ling. On the same day he received information that a detachment of Japanese infantry from Feng-huang-cheng had occupied Sha-li-chai, whence it had pushed forward into the valley of the Ta-yang Ho towards Hsiu-yen. These troops were the advanced guard of the mixed brigade under General Asada, which had left Feng-huang-cheng on the 6th June to co-operate, by way of the valley of the Ta-yang Ho, in the capture of Hsiu-yen. This movement of troops upon his left caused so much uneasiness to General Mishchenko that, on the 5th June, he withdrew from the Lao Ling and reported what was happening to head-quarters, whereupon General Kuropatkin sent the 1st Brigade, 2nd Siberian Infantry Division, to Hsi-mu-cheng.

The converging movement of the Japanese troops actually began on the morning of the 6th June, when General Asada left Feng-huang-cheng. His cavalry reached Sha-li-chai that evening, and his main body bivouacked on the line Shih-ya-tien—Tao-wo-pu-tzu, where, at 5 p.m., a message was received from General Kawamura saying, "I intend to attack the enemy near Hsiu-yen on the 8th. I look to you to protect the right flank of the division from the direction of Ta-ying-tzu† and to co-operate in the attack on Hsiu-yen." The independent cavalry of the 10th Division (2 squadrons, with 1 company of infantry) also moved on the 6th and advanced towards Hsiao-tzu and San-tao-hu-ling-kou, establishing touch with General Asada's cavalry at the foot of I-men Shan the same evening. The force under General Marui commenced moving on the 7th, and its leading troops reached the line Tung-i-chia-tun—Chu-chia-tun—Kan-chia-tien, while its main body arrived at Ho-chia-pu. The same day the independent cavalry of the division reached Tung-ta-kou, four miles south of

* The Japanese state that no movement of artillery took place on this day; the report must, therefore, have been erroneous.

† 10 miles north of Sha-li-chai; see Strategical Map 2.

San-tao-hu-ling-kou, while the main body of the division remained round Hsiao-yang-ho and south of that place. In order to superintend the line of communication, divisional head-quarters remained at Tu-cheng-tzu, but General Kawamura advanced to Tung-fang-hsin, where, at 11 p.m., he received the following message from General Asada, whose detachment had reached the line I-chia-pu-tzu—Erh-tao-yang-ho: "In order to produce any real effect in the decisive battle about to be fought by the Second Army, it is necessary that we should deal the enemy in our front a severe blow; but as he is at present some distance away from us, to surround and annihilate him will be difficult. I therefore suggest that I should advance as far as San-tao-hu-ling-kou on the 8th, and that I should attack him from the east and north on the 9th in cooperation with the Marui detachment." This suggestion did not meet with the approval of the commander of the 10th Division, who considered it inadvisable to postpone the attack for twenty-four hours, as the enemy had only a weak force of cavalry and a few horse artillery guns; indeed it was even doubtful whether he had not begun to withdraw northward on the 7th. Further, the situation in front of the Second Army required that General Kawamura should attack without delay. But even if he had approved of General Asada's suggestion it was too late to act upon it, for General Marui's force had already begun its movement on Hsiu-yen. He therefore adopted the only possible course, and sent word that General Asada was to continue his advance and to overcome his difficulties as best he could.

General Mishchenko had now in front of him two mixed brigades, consisting in all of four and a half squadrons, ten battalions, and five batteries, three of which were mountain batteries. Against this force which, according to the reports of his reconnoitring parties, numbered twelve battalions and four batteries, with cavalry, he could only bring some eighteen squadrons of Cossacks and six guns. Of his mounted troops about six squadrons were employed in reconnoitring, and the actual numbers available were between 1,500 and 1,600 men. With these he took up a position on the 7th on the high ground to the south and east of Hsiu-yen, watching both the route up the valley of the Ta-yang and that by the Lao Ling; at the same time he dispatched his transport some distance to the rear.

Everything on the Japanese side was now ready for the combined attack upon General Mishchenko's force. On the morning of the 8th, General Marui's detachment pushed forward; his advanced and flank guards drove back small parties of the Russian cavalry, and, by 11 a.m., occupied the high ground

north of Hung-chia-pu-tzu, while the main body of his force deployed on the south side of that village. There it came under the fire of the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery, which was posted west of Hsiu-yen, while, on a line of heights before it, were some six squadrons of the 1st Chita and 7th Siberian Cossack Regiments. Part of the Japanese advanced guard was now directed to attack, but, on moving forward to carry out his orders, the commander reported that his artillery could not reach the Russian guns which commanded the valley of the Ya Ho. General Marui therefore decided to postpone the attack until the following day. Meanwhile, on receipt of General Kawamura's reply, General Asada, in order not to be late in delivering his attack on the 8th, sent on his independent cavalry from Tung-tao-tzu-kou* via Hung-chi-ying to Tao-chia-pu-tzu and divided the remainder of his command into four columns.†

At 11.30 a.m., while the left column was making a short halt in the vicinity of Shang-ying-tzu, a report was received which stated that part of the 10th Division was engaged with some six hundred cavalry near Ta-hu-ling. The Russian troops on this portion of the field at first consisted only of one squadron of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment, which held the saddle immediately east of Hsiu-yen over which the road from Shang-ying-tzu runs; but as the Japanese pressed forward to attack, three more squadrons of the same regiment were brought up in support.

* East of the Hsiu-yen plan (No. 8); see Strategical Map 2.

† (a) Flank Guard—

1st Battalion, 1st Guard Regiment, to remain at Hung-hua-ling, two miles north-west of I-chia-pu-tzu, and to protect the right rear of the advance.

(b) Right Column—

1st Battalion, 2nd Guard Regiment, to march at 6.30 a.m. from Erh-tao-yang-ho viâ Tung-tao-tzu-kou—San-tao-hu-ling-kou and to cut the enemy's line of retreat at Leng-chia-wei-tzu.

(c) Centre Column—

1 troop, Guard Cavalry Regiment.
2nd and 3rd Battalions, 1st Guard Regiment, to march at 6.30 a.m. from Tung-tao-tzu-kou viâ San-tao-hu-ling-kou to Huang-chi-kou.

(d) Left Column, under Major-General Asada—

1 troop, Guard Cavalry Regiment.
2nd and 3rd Battalions, 2nd Guard Regiment.
2 batteries, 1st Battalion, Guard Artillery Regiment.
3rd Company, Guard Engineer Battalion.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Guard Bearer Company, to march at 6.30 a.m. from Pao-tai-ti-hsia viâ Chao-chia-pu-tzu (respectively two and five miles north-west of Erh-tao-yang-ho) and Ta-hu-ling on Hsiu-yen.

On receiving this report, General Asada at once ordered his command to advance, and dispatched five companies of infantry to take part in the fighting. These troops, in co-operation with the right flank guard of General Marui's force, almost enveloped the enemy at Ta-hu-ling and by 2.30 p.m. forced him back to the westward. The left column then moved forward towards Hsiu-yen, but, on debouching on to the saddle west of Ta-hu-ling, it came under a heavy fire from the Russian horse artillery guns posted west of the former place. At this time, the two batteries of field artillery with the left column, delayed by the difficulty of the road, were a considerable distance to the rear, while the mountain battery with General Marui's force, which had come into action on the heights south of the town, had been silenced. General Asada, therefore, decided that it was advisable to postpone the attack until his right column had worked its way to the north of Hsiu-yen. Soon afterwards General Mishchenko, seeing that the retirement of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment had imperilled the situation of his troops south-west of the town, and hearing that a battalion of Japanese infantry was advancing against his line of retreat, ordered a general retirement towards the north. This Japanese battalion belonged to General Asada's right column, which, after driving back some weak detachments of Cossacks, succeeded at 4 p.m. in occupying Leng-chia-wei-tzu. It then advanced towards Shih-chia-pu-tzu, a movement which made the Russians hasten their retirement and caused some disorder in their ranks. Perceiving the enemy's condition, the centre Japanese column pressed forward rapidly from Cheng-tung-kou, while the left column, which was in close touch with the troops on its right, advanced against the south of Hsiu-yen. Hearing the musketry fire of General Asada's detachment and noticing that the Russians south of Hsiu-yen were changing their position, General Marui realized that the attack from the east was developing, and ordered a battery to move up to the hill north of Hung-chia-pu-tzu and to open fire on the enemy on the spur south of Hsiu-yen. At 4 p.m., he observed that the hostile artillery had begun to retire,* and promptly ordered a general advance. The Russian cavalry had by this time fallen back to the bed of the river, north of Hsi-pei-ying-tzu which was held as a defensive position, covered by two squadrons of the 1st Chita Cossack Regiment from the reserve, and by the horse artillery guns posted on the heights

The capture
of Hsiu-yen.

* The Japanese account states that the artillery was "followed by the infantry." It seems probable, however, that these were dismounted cavalry, for no Russian infantry were present.

west of Hsiu-yen. But the Japanese pressed on and, by 5.20 p.m., General Mishchenko's troops were hurrying in disorder to the rear, some taking the Hai-cheng road, but the greater number following that leading to Kai-ping. Those who took the latter road were assembled some miles north-west of Hsiu-yen, and during the night marched to join the remainder on the direct route to Hai-cheng.

The Russian losses in this action were insignificant, as were those of the Japanese,* whose force greatly out-numbered that of their antagonists.

This success furnished General Kawamura with a convenient centre for carrying out the preparations necessary for his further movements. On the day following the action, the detachment under General Asada was disposed so as to cover Hsiu-yen from the direction of Huang-hua-tien and Hsi-mu-cheng; General Marui watched the routes from Kai-ping and the south-west, while the remainder of the 10th Division moved up the line of communication and concentrated in the neighbourhood of the town. No further advance could for a time be undertaken, for although the Second Army was about to move from Pu-lan-tien against the 1st Siberian Army Corps, General Kuroki was still at Feng-huang-cheng, where circumstances had compelled him to remain halted for several weeks. Moreover, the Russian movement against General Oku had not been pushed energetically, and the battle which the Second Army had expected to take place on the 5th was still delayed. Imperial head-quarters therefore ordered the 10th Division not to advance from Hsiu-yen for the present. On receipt of these instructions, General Kawamura, bearing in mind the necessity of collecting supplies and the presence of General Chirikov's brigade in the plains to the south, determined to concentrate his command at and about Hsiu-yen, and to perfect its organization. The delay was not unwelcome, for so bad were the roads which constituted his line of communication that his transport had not been able to work as rapidly as he had expected, and shortly after the capture of Hsiu-yen he found it necessary to distribute his command as follows :—

Disposition of General Kawamura's force. (a) The Guard Mixed Brigade, east of Hsiu-yen and holding the line Tao-chia-pu-tzu—Tung-chia-pu-tzu.

* Japanese losses :—

Killed	5 men.
Wounded	1 officer, 29 „

Russian losses :—

Killed	3 men.
Wounded	2 officers, 17 „

- (b) The 20th Brigade (less the 20th Regiment) and three batteries, west of Hsiu-yen and holding the line Wu-tao-kou—Chao-chia-pu*—Tang-ti.*
- (c) The 1st Battalion of the 20th Regiment near Hsien-chien-chu-tzu with a detachment at Li-chia-pu-tzu* watching the approaches through Hsing-tien.*
- (d) Five battalions of infantry and three batteries concentrated at Tu-men-tzu and to the north of that place.
- (e) Three battalions of infantry and one squadron distributed south of Chang-chia-tun.†
- (f) The train of the division, which had at last completed its disembarkation, south of Tu-men-tzu.
- (g) Divisional head-quarters at Hsiu-yen.

It will be remembered that want of proper transport had hitherto prevented General Oku from undertaking any offensive operations. By the 12th June, the difficulty was at last overcome, and on the 13th he began his northward march. There was, therefore, no further cause for holding back the 10th Division and, in conformity with the general plan for co-operation between the two forces, the Japanese Imperial head-quarters telegraphed instructions to General Kawamura as follows:

Orders for the advance.

“When your transport arrangements admit of it, prepare to threaten the Russian flank and rear,

advancing for that purpose on Kai-ping if necessary. The Asada Detachment will remain at Hsiu-yen to protect the flank and rear of your division from the direction of Hsi-mu-cheng.” These instructions were received at Hsiu-yen on the 13th, and General Kawamura then decided to occupy the passes over the Hsiung-yao Shan, the watershed between Hsiu-yen and Kai-ping, and to concentrate his main force in the valley about Shih-hui-yao-tzu. With this object he dispatched a detachment‡ under General Tojo towards the Hsiu-kai Ling; three battalions of infantry were moved from Hsiu-yen to near Chao-chia-pu; three more battalions and two batteries were transferred from Tu-men-tzu to near Shih-hui-yao-tzu.

General Tojo's detachment halted near Shih-hui-yao-tzu on the 15th. On the 16th a heavy rainstorm made movement impos-

* West of the Hsiu-yen plan (No. 8); see Strategical Map 2.

† 10 miles north of Ta-ku-shan.

‡ This detachment was composed of the 1st Squadron of the 10th Cavalry Regiment, the 10th Infantry Regiment, the 4th Battery of the 10th Artillery Regiment, the 1st Company of the 10th Engineer Battalion, and half a Sanitary Detachment.

sible; but on the 18th his advanced troops drove back some Russian cavalry posts, and the main body established itself on the Ssu-tao-hu Ling, the Lan-kan Ling, and the Hsin-kai Ling. By this time the Second Army had crushed the Russians at Te-li-ssu and had prepared the way for a further advance. It was, therefore, no longer necessary to employ the 10th Division solely in support of the Second Army, and Imperial head-quarters resolved to make use of it to fill the gap between the First and Second Armies. With this object the following instructions, dated the 19th June, were sent to the general officer commanding the 10th Division:—"Your main force will remain at Hsiu-yen, detaching troops to hold the passes leading to Hsi-mu-cheng and Kai-ping. You will collect at least twenty days' supplies in the vicinity of Hsiu-yen, to be ready by the 5th July." As a first step in this fresh movement, General Kawamura decided that when the Second Army had reached Kai-ping he would attack the Fen-shui Ling, which was held by a mixed brigade strongly entrenched.

After their defeat at Hsiu-yen, the Russians had withdrawn slowly in front of the 10th Division and shots had been exchanged daily. Some Russian cavalry, estimated by the Japanese at three or four hundred, were stationed round Huang-hua-tien,* and their patrols appeared now and then at Wang-chia-pu-tzu,† Sung-shu-kou,* and in the plains to the east of the latter place. Until the 17th, General Mishchenko had been north of Hsiu-yen, but on that day he had moved with the bulk of his force to Hsia-ho-ta, leaving merely a covering detachment in his former position. About that day, also, the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment had returned to its own division, and its place had been taken by the 12th (Barnaul) Regiment,‡ belonging to the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Siberian Division. Accurate information of the changes in the Russian dispositions reached the Japanese, chiefly through the Chinese spies; they also heard that a Russian force of unknown strength was at Hsi-mu-cheng, and some prisoners who were captured on the 19th reported that General Mishchenko had been ordered to protect the Russian main body from threats along the Kai-ping and Hai-cheng roads. In confirmation of these reports Russian cavalry, in superior numbers, began to appear in front of General Tojo's detachment on the Hsin-kai ridge, and some infantry and artillery were

* North-east of Hsiu-yen. See also p. 254. The "cavalry" were probably mounted scouts from the 2nd Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

† North-west of Hsiu-yen.

‡ Apparently only three battalions of the Barnaul Regiment joined General Mishchenko.

located by patrols about Shih-men-ling,* Hsia-ho-ta, Shang-hsien-chia-ho-kou, and Chieh-kuan-ting. (See Plan 9.)

Everything seemed to show that the Russians were meditating some enterprise against the left of the Japanese 10th Division, and on the 22nd June, General Mishchenko, who was at Hsia-ho-ta, sent a battalion of infantry and two squadrons, under Colonel Kartsev, to Hsien-chia-ho-kou, where there was already a squadron of the Chita Cossacks. On arrival information was received that the Japanese intended to surprise the bivouac, which was in a spot ill suited for defence; but since it was already late in the evening, all Colonel Kartsev could do was to throw out outposts and order his command to stand to arms at 3 a.m., and to withdraw to Shang-ho-ta. Unfortunately for themselves this order failed to reach the Chita Cossacks, who were caught unawares and suffered heavy loss. On the following day General Mishchenko made a more determined effort to regain some of the lost ground. His force moved out in two detachments—on the left several squadrons of cavalry and a Frontier Guard battery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pavlov, marched against the Japanese right, while Colonel Kartsev, with a battalion of the 12th (Barnaul) Regiment and some more cavalry, was to seize Pei Shan, and to advance against Hsien-chia-ho-kou from the west, supported by the Trans-Baikal Cossack battery at Tang-erh-kou. The left column succeeded in driving the Japanese off the pass just south of Shang-ho-ta; but the right effected little until a second battalion was sent to its assistance. At the same time the remaining battalion of the 12th (Barnaul) Regiment was dispatched to Colonel Pavlov's aid, and under the concentrated fire of these two attacks the Japanese retired to Ssu-tao-kou. On the following day General Mishchenko appears to have occupied the Hsin-kai Ling, the Ssu-tao-hu Ling, and Ta-chu-tun, and to have distributed his troops as follows:—

12	squadrons,	1	battalion	near	Wang-chia-pu-tzu.
6	„	1	„	near	Chieh-kuan-ting.
2	„	1	„	1 horse artillery bat-	tery near Hsia-ho-ta.
4	„			near	Shih-men-ling.

This information was confirmed by spies, and General Kawamura also learned that there was another mixed force near Tang-erh-kou.

The Russians were thus holding a position on the crest of the Fen-shui range, which forms the main watershed between the Bay of Korea and the Gulf of Liao-tung, and which must be

* Four miles south-west of Hsia-ho-ta.

crossed before the Fourth Army could join hands with the Second. Though the slopes of the range are steep and rugged, it can be traversed by wheeled traffic at several points north-west of Hsiu-yen. The principal pass was known to the Japanese by the same name as the range itself, and to cover it the Russians had erected works of a semi-permanent character. So far as the purely local conditions were affected, any further delay in assuming the offensive was obviously undesirable yet the general feared that if he were to take the Fen-shui Ling his division would find itself isolated, and be obliged to occupy a defensive position for some days. He therefore thought it advisable to postpone his attack until the 27th, the date on which he had reason to believe that the Second Army would reach Kai-ping. In the meanwhile he completed all his dispositions for forcing the passage of the mountains, and with this object he re-distributed his troops as follows:—

General
Kawamura's
preparations.

- (a) Major-General Asada's detachment.
 - Guard Mixed Brigade*
 - 2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.
 - 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.
 - $\frac{1}{2}$ an infantry ammunition column.
 - $\frac{1}{2}$ an artillery ammunition column.
 - 1 field hospital.
- (b) Colonel Kamada's detachment.
 - 1 battery, 10th Artillery Regiment.
 - 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 40th Regiment (less one company).
 - 1 section, 10th Engineer Battalion.
- (c) Major-General Marui's detachment.
 - $\frac{1}{2}$ of the 10th Cavalry Regiment.
 - 1 battery, 10th Artillery Regiment.
 - 1 battalion, 20th Regiment.
 - 39th Regiment.
 - 2 sections, 10th Engineer Battalion.
 - $\frac{1}{2}$ Bearer Company, 10th Division.
- (d) Major-General Tojo's detachment.
 - 1 squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
 - 2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.
 - 10th Regiment.
 - 1st Battalion, 40th Regiment.
 - 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.
 - $\frac{1}{2}$ Bearer Company.

* For composition of this brigade, see Appendix H.

(e) General Reserve.

$\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
1st Battalion, 20th Regiment.*

At 4 p.m. on the 24th June, orders for the attack were issued, and the special task allotted to each detachment was made known.

(1) General Asada was ordered to send a small force to watch the road leading from Huang-hua-tien, while the main body leaving Wu-tao-ho-tzu at 7 a.m. on the 26th was to occupy Wang-chia-pu-tzu. On the following day a movement was to be made against the front of the position held by the Russians, with the object of drawing their attention from the turning movement. At the same time their line of retreat was to be threatened from the direction of Yang-pan-kou.

(2) Further west Colonel Kamada was instructed to march on the afternoon of the 25th to the neighbourhood of Li-chia-pu-tzu. On the 26th, he was to advance through Hsu-chia-pu-tzu and Pu-chia-pu-tzu, and on the 27th, in conjunction with the detachment under Major-General Asada, to attack the Russian right from Ta-san-pi-huo.

(3) On Colonel Kamada's left, General Marui was ordered to advance through Ta-chu-tun and Pan-chia-pu-tzu (S.) and to halt east of Chieh-kuan-ting on the 26th, with his advanced troops occupying that village. On the 27th a detachment was to capture the hill 1919, which lies about a mile and a quarter north of Chia-shan-kou, while the main body threatened the Russian line of retreat from the direction of San-tao-kou.

(4) Finally, General Tojo, on the extreme left of the Japanese attack, was ordered to take possession of the ridge running from south of Hsia-ho-ta to the east of Chou-chia-chuang on the 26th, and to detach a party to occupy the Hsin-kai Ling, the Ssu-tao-hu Ling, and the Lan-kan Ling for the protection of General Marui's left flank.

General Kawamura was to be with the general reserve at Wang-chia-pu-tzu on the morning of the 27th June.

To oppose the Japanese 10th Division on the Ta-ku-shan—Hsiu-yen route to Liao-yang, almost the whole of the 4th Siberian Corps had by this time been assembled under its commander, Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev. The 7th and half of the 8th Siberian Infantry Regiments had been brought across from the eastern front,† and the 9th, 10th and 11th Siberian Infantry Regiments had been sent southward from Hai-cheng. For some weeks the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment had been at the

* This distribution, which comes from Japanese sources, does not account for a battalion of the 20th Regiment and a company of the 40th Regiment.

† See also p. 255.

Fen-shui Ling, where it had recently been reinforced by the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division under Major-General Levestam. On the 24th and 25th, news that a hostile advance might be expected over the Hsin-kai and Fen-shui passes reached General Kuropatkin from both General Levestam and General Mishchenko, and decided him to attack the Japanese columns with General Zarubaiev's force as they debouched from the hills. With this intention General Mishchenko's detachment was strengthened on the evening of the 27th by the 7th Siberian Infantry Regiment and the 11th Horse Artillery Battery. The 3rd Siberian Division sent the 9th (Tobolsk) Regiment and a battery to Chu-chia-kou,* the 10th (Omsk) Regiment to Kao-chia-tun,* and the 11th (Semipalatinsk) Regiment to Ku-chia-tzu,* where also General Zarubaiev established his head-quarters. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division, and the 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Divisions, were at Ta-shih-chiao, and a new central group, consisting of the 1st Brigades of the 9th and 31st Divisions had just reached Hai-cheng from Europe. The 9th and 12th East Siberian Regiments were also brought to Hai-cheng from the east, but were almost immediately sent back to Count Keller.†

The strength of the Russian force at the passes on the evening of the 26th June was as follows:—

At the Hsin-kai Ling and neighbouring passes under General Mishchenko‡—

- 7th and 12th Siberian Infantry Regiments.
- 1st Chita Cossack Regiment.
- 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment.
- 11th and 12th Orenburg Cossack Regiments.
- 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Battery.
- 11th Horse Artillery Battery.
- Frontier Guard Battery (four guns).

At the Fen-shui Ling and Pan Ling§ under General Levestam—

- 5th, 6th, and 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiments.
- 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment.
- 1st Battery, 6th East Siberian Rifle Division.
- 2 batteries, 1st Siberian Artillery Division (sixteen old pattern guns).

* See Strategic Map 2.

† See p. 259.

‡ It is possible that the four squadrons of the 5th Cossack Regiment, which had previously been with General Mishchenko, had by this time joined General Samsonov on the right of the 1st Siberian Corps.

§ 12 miles north-east of the Fen-shui Ling (see Strategic Map 2). General Levestam had 8 companies, $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, and $\frac{1}{2}$ battery at the Pan Ling; 12 companies, $\frac{1}{2}$ squadron, and $\frac{1}{2}$ battery were in reserve 5 to 8 miles north of the Fen-shui Ling; the remainder of his force was at the Fen-shui Ling.

To resume the narrative, at 11 p.m. on the 24th, after the Japanese troops had already begun to move, the following order was received from Tokio: "The fact has been proved that the Russian fleet is able to issue from the harbour of Port Arthur. The transport by sea of the provisions which will be required for the combined Manchurian armies after their arrival at Liao-yang is therefore rendered uncertain, and it is not advisable for the Second Army to advance further north than Kai-ping for the present. The battle of Liao-yang, which it was anticipated would be fought before the rainy season, will now be postponed till after it. Arrange your operations accordingly."* At the same time General Kawamura was informed by the commander of the Second Army, who was at this date about thirteen miles north of Te-li-ssu, that his land transport was insufficient for his needs, and that he would be obliged to put off his advance on Kai-ping for some time. Nor could he say when he would be able to undertake a further forward movement. In spite of this change in the scheme of operations, the general officer commanding the 10th Division decided that, as his detachments had already begun to move, he would carry out his original plan.

General Asada's force moved out on the morning of the 26th June along the Hsiu-yen—Hsi-mu-cheng road. At 9.30 a.m., the advanced guard found itself opposed by two or three companies of Russians at Chiao-chia-pu-tzu, but drove them from their position and continued its advance. The same evening the 2nd Guard Regiment reached Ku-chia-pa-tzu, the 1st Regiment reached Wa-fang-tien, and the remainder of the detachment bivouacked about Wu-hsien-fang and Wang-chia-pu-tzu.

At 10 a.m. on the same morning (26th), Colonel Kamada's detachment left Pu-chia-pu-tzu and bivouacked at Ta-san-pi-huo, after having opened up communication with General Asada. A few hostile patrols were encountered during the day.

Meanwhile General Marui's command bivouacked at Ta-chu-tun on the 25th, and reached Chieh-kuan-ting at 2.30 p.m. on the 26th, driving back a few Russian cavalry on the way. Great difficulty was, however, experienced in communicating with General Tojo, and it was not till 5.30 p.m. that General Marui heard that the detachment on his left was held in check by the enemy near Hsien-chia-ho-kou, and was unable to reach its destination. He at once decided that the best means of helping General Tojo was

* It was, of course, the sortie of the 23rd June (see p. 293) which occasioned the dispatch of this message.

to attack a body of the enemy which was holding a position on the hills between Hsiang-yun-tzu and Chou-chia-chuang. The movement was successful, and at 9 p.m. General Marui's advanced guard bivouacked on the hill east of Chou-chia-chuang, with his main body round Kuan-tun.

On the extreme left General Tojo, leaving one company of infantry to hold the Lan-kan and Hsin-kai passes, marched on the afternoon of the 25th toward Hsia-ho-ta, in two columns, and on the morning of the 26th he encountered three companies of the 12th (Barnaul) Regiment which were holding Pei Shan and the pass over which runs the road from Hsiao-hsien-chia-ho-kou to Shang-ho-ta. As the attack developed the remainder of the Barnaul Regiment and the Chita Cossacks came up in support of the outpost companies. At 8 a.m., the Trans-Baikal battery opened fire from the vicinity of Tang-erh-kou, and the Frontier Guard guns came into action on the pass. Thus reinforced the Russian outpost line was easily held. An attack on Shang-hsien-chia-ho-kou also failed, partly owing to the extremely intricate and precipitous country, and General Tojo finally had to content himself with ordering his troops to hold the positions they had gained. The Russians did not venture on a counter-attack, and the Japanese passed the night undisturbed.

Returning now to the Japanese right, where General Asada was conducting the main operations against the Fen-shui Ling, the plan for the attack on the 27th was that the 2nd Guard Regiment, less three companies, should move from the northern side of the Fen-shui Ling against the left of the Russian position, while the 1st Guard Regiment, less half the 3rd Battalion, was to proceed to hill 1600 south-west of San-hsien-fang, and to attract the enemy's attention. To support these movements the four batteries of the Guard and 10th Divisions, to which were attached the two engineer companies, were ordered to take up a position on the hill west of Wa-fang-tien, while near that place General Asada retained as a reserve a troop of cavalry and two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Guard Regiment.

The fighting opened at 5.15 a.m. on the 27th with a duel between the Japanese Guard Artillery, aided by a mountain battery, and sixteen Russian guns in position on Ti-hsiung Shan (N.). The firing was heavy while it lasted, but ceased a little before 6 a.m. when the Russian guns appeared to have been silenced. Although General Asada had received no information from the forces on his left, nor from the 2nd Guard Regiment on his right, he felt that there was nothing to gain by delay and

that he could aid them most effectively by promptly following up his initial success. He therefore ordered the 1st Guard Regiment to attack, while he himself moved forward towards San-hsien-fang at the head of the two companies which constituted his reserve. The 2nd Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment had just succeeded in reaching the western edge of San-hsien-fang when the Russian guns suddenly reopened fire upon it. The Japanese artillery replied, and a hot duel ensued. The hills north-west of San-hsien-fang and some willow woods south of the main road were occupied successfully, but further advance was found to be impossible until the battle should develop elsewhere, and the troops were compelled to remain under cover awaiting a favourable opportunity to resume the attack. They had not long to wait. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment came into line with the 2nd Battalion, and Colonel Kamada's detachment was at hand. It had left its bivouac at 1 a.m., had heard artillery fire away to the north, and had marched to the sound of the guns. The ground to be traversed was very difficult, but by 6.30 a.m., with the help of the engineers, two guns had been got into position on a col south-east of Ti-hsiung Shan (S.). The remainder of the battery followed and immediately joined in the artillery fight. By 7 a.m. the Russian quick-firing battery, which is said to have fired a thousand rounds, was running short of ammunition, and as General Levestam realized that both his flanks were in danger of being turned, he gave orders for a retreat, which began at 7.30 a.m. with the withdrawal of his guns.

The Japanese advance was immediately resumed, but the country favoured the defence, and a body of the Russian infantry was covering the retirement from the hills south of the main road. The two companies in reserve were then brought up and, at 10 a.m., the ridge south of the pass was captured, and from that point heavy infantry and artillery fire was brought to bear upon the Russians, who were retiring in some disorder to Hsi-mu-cheng. Meanwhile the 2nd Guard Regiment had encountered considerable resistance in their turning movement, and only succeeded in reaching hill 2781, two miles north of the Fen-shui Ling, at 11.30 a.m., by which time the Russians had made good their retreat. One battalion from this regiment followed some of the enemy who were retiring towards Hsi-mu-cheng by Yang-la-huo.* Similarly the left detachment, under Colonel Kamada, only reached Wa-tzu-kou at 12.30 p.m., after being held in check for some time by the Russian flank guard, whose sturdy resistance enabled the main body to retire in good order.

* See Strategical Map 2.

It is now time to turn to the two western detachments, whose action had materially lessened the difficulties of the main operations. General Marui's column had bivouacked about Kuan-tun on the 26th, and at 3 a.m. on the 27th his main body left Pan-chia-pu-tzu (N.) for San-tao-kou, arriving at the saddle just west of that village at 7 a.m. There he decided to wait until he should hear the guns of the detachments on his right, and in the meantime he ordered his advanced guard to occupy the hills north of Erh-tao-ho-tzu and San-tao-kou. At the same time he detailed one battalion from his main body to capture hill 1350, west of Ho-ta-ling. The Russian troops detailed for this portion of the defence were half a squadron of the 7th Siberian Cossacks and a battalion of infantry, of which one and a half companies were posted on the slopes south of Ho-ta-ling, one company was half way between Erh-tao-ho-tzu and Ti-hsiung Shan (S.), and the remaining two and a half companies were in reserve north-east of Hsiu-chia-kou.

Till 10 a.m. General Marui heard no firing in the direction of the Fen-shui Ling, but at that hour his attention was attracted by heavy columns of dust in the direction of Sung-ta-tzu. These clouds grew thicker, and at 11.30 a.m., feeling convinced that the Russians were retreating in front of General Asada he advanced on Hsiu-chia-kou, in hopes of intercepting their retreat. The bad roads caused considerable delay, but at 2 p.m. his main body reached Ho-ta-ling, where he found that his flank guard was on hill 1356 facing a body of Russians at La-mu-fang and unable to make further progress. Just at this moment all operations were abruptly checked by a storm, which burst with such violence that the men were unable to see a yard in front of them. When the rain ceased it was found that the Russians had succeeded in retiring from La-mu-fang, and that further pursuit was hopeless. General Marui's column therefore halted in the positions it was then occupying.

Still further south, General Tojo, who, it will be remembered, had made indifferent progress on the 26th, was led to believe, by reports which came in during the night, that the greater part of the force which opposed him had been moved away to the north-east. To prevent the enemy from sending further assistance to the Fen-shui Ling, he decided to attack, and at 5 a.m. on the 27th his guns opened fire. Whilst his left held on to the ground which it had occupied on the 26th to the east of San-tao-ho, his right moved on to the ridge immediately west of Shang-hsien-chia-ho-kou, with the object of driving the enemy from the Pei Shan. This attempt

General Marui's
detachment.

General Tojo's
detachment.

was supported by artillery fire from the hills east of Hsien-chia-ho-kou, and from a battery posted about a mile and a quarter south-east of Chou-chia-chuang. To resist the attack General Mishchenko had posted two battalions of the 7th (Krasnoyarsk) and part of the 12th (Barnaul) Regiment on Pei Shan; the Chita Cossacks were in close support; while the rest of the Barnaul Regiment, a regiment of Orenburg Cossacks, and possibly also the Verkhne-Udinsk Cossacks were in reserve at Mu-ku-huo, two miles north-west of Hsia-ho-ta. Further to the east, about Tung-chang-huo, was Major-General Tolmachev with a battalion of the Krasnoyarsk Regiment, a regiment of Orenburg Cossacks, and some Frontier Guard guns which had previously been on the col just south of Shang-ho-ta. At first the Japanese met with comparatively weak opposition, as the remaining Russian guns which were at Tang-erh-kou were too far off to do much damage, and General Tojo's artillery was able to co-operate closely with his infantry. To remedy this defect General Mishchenko ordered up a section of the 11th Horse Battery to the position which had been vacated by the Frontier Guard guns. Owing to the severity of the Japanese rifle fire this order could not be carried out, but the Russian infantry managed to hold its ground without support. About this time General Zarubaiev, the commander of the 4th Siberian Corps, appeared on the field, but he left the direction of the fight to General Mishchenko, and contented himself with refusing to allow any more troops to be engaged. In the afternoon no progress was made on either side. General Tojo had succeeded in preventing his opponent from sending reinforcements to the Fen-shui Ling, and General Mishchenko had been prevented by his commander from making a counter-attack. The fight terminated about 4.30 p.m. In the evening, after hearing that the Fen-shui Ling had been secured, the Japanese retired to the west of Ssu-tao-kou, and, before morning, General Mishchenko, acting under orders received during the night, gradually withdrew his force west of Mu-kou-huo. These movements were by no means easy, for torrents of rain which fell all night long made the country almost impassable.

The operations of the 26th and 27th had thus terminated favourably for the Japanese, who had secured the passage of the main Fen-shui range with a loss scarcely amounting to two hundred killed and wounded.* Nevertheless, so greatly had the sudden reappearance of the Russian fleet on the 23rd June complicated the naval situation that the movement of Japanese transports had

Movements of
both forces after
the action.

* The Russian losses amounted to 9 officers and 375 men.

to be suspended and the advance of the Second Army was temporarily checked. General Kawamura therefore decided not to follow up his success but to remain in occupation of the line of heights between the Fen-shui Ling and the Hsin-kai Ling and to await an opportunity for a further forward movement. With this object Colonel Kamada's detachment was posted at Ta-chu-tun, that of General Tojo remained at Ssu-tao-kou, while General Asada was recalled to Hsiu-yen to watch the road from Huang-hua-tien. The detachment under General Marui was ordered to hold the Fen-shui Ling and was reorganized so as to consist of the following troops:—

- 1½ squadrons, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.
- 39th Regiment.
- 2nd Company, 10th Engineer Battalion.
- ½ Bearer Company, 10th Division.

Attached.

- 2 batteries, Guard Artillery.
- 2nd Guard Regiment (less three companies).
- 3rd Company, Guard Engineer Battalion.

The troops of the 10th Division and the Guard Mixed Brigade were thus disposed so as to watch the routes by which they would eventually continue their advance.

This delay was of the greatest service to the defeated Russians, for it enabled them to withdraw their forces, and to organize a fresh line of defence at Hsi-mu-cheng to protect the left of the 1st and 4th Siberian Army Corps which were concentrating about Ta-shih-chiao. General Mishchenko, with his cavalry brigade, moved to Tang-chih, while the troops which had fought at the Fen-shui Ling appear to have retired to Hsi-mu-cheng, where they rejoined the remainder of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division. Meanwhile the Japanese infantry and engineers under the command of General Tojo were employed in making the roads over the Hsin-kai and neighbouring passes sufficiently good for light Chinese carts, but the tracks by Ta-chu-tun and Chieh-kuan-ting were only fit for pack animals.

On the 5th July, General Kawamura heard from General Oku that he was about to resume his advance and that he expected to attack the Russians at Kai-ping between the 9th and the 11th. The 5th Division was to threaten the enemy's left flank and to send a detachment to get into touch with the left of the 10th Division. In view of the great strength of Russian forces now concentrated

about Hsi-mu-cheng, estimated at about 25,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry, and 60 guns, General Kawamura decided that he would not move his whole division towards Kai-ping, for to do so would expose General Asada's brigade to attack by greatly superior numbers. He therefore dispatched two detachments on the 9th July, under General Tojo and Colonel Kamada, from Chieh-kuan-ting and Ssu-tao-kou respectively. They were to cross the passes independently, and to effect a junction in the valley of the Ching Ho, whence they were to advance under General Tojo towards Tang-chih. For the third time fighting took place to the north of Hsia-ho-ta; but on this occasion General Mishchenko's force was much weaker than in either of the earlier encounters. On Pei Shan he had the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment supported by the Trans-Baikal battery; on the left, near Hsiang-yung-tzu, he posted the 1st Battalion of the same regiment and the Orenburg Cossack Brigade, supported later by two guns of the Frontier Guard battery. His reserves consisted of the Chita and Verkhne-Udinsk Cossacks and four guns of the 6th Horse Artillery Battery. General Tojo met with strong opposition, and made slow progress; but Colonel Kamada's advance beat down the Russian resistance with the result that the force on Pei Shan had to retire in haste, leaving tents and baggage in the hands of the enemy. By 10 a.m. on the 10th the two columns were in close touch, and were preparing to continue their advance when news was received that Kai-ping had already been occupied by the Second Army. The movement was therefore stopped. A third column was sent towards Hsi-mu-cheng, but returned to the Fen-shui Ling after finding the Russians in considerable force about Yang-la-huo.

From the end of June onwards, the Russians had been pushing troops up into the front line as quickly as they arrived from Europe. On the 26th of that month, General Kuropatkin himself had come to Hai-cheng from Ta-shih-chiao, to superintend the organization of a defensive force on the central line of advance. Every man that could be spared from the Eastern Force under Count Keller* had been withdrawn, and by the 28th of July the 1st Brigade, 2nd Siberian Division from the 4th Siberian Corps, the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division from the 2nd Siberian Corps, and the †2nd Brigade, 31st Infantry Division from the Xth Corps, had been concentrated at and near Hsi-mu-cheng.

The confusion of units, and the breaking up of commands,

* See p. 255; some of these troops were sent back immediately.

† The 1st Brigade of this division remained in reserve at Liao-yang (see p. 261).

caused serious misgivings in the minds of the Russian officers, and unnecessary fatigue to the men.

The Japanese were aware that the 10th Division was no longer sufficiently strong to carry out its task unaided, but since the Ta-ku-shan—Hai-cheng road had proved better than had been expected the Imperial head-quarters had already decided to add to it another division, and so to organize a Fourth Army. With this object the 10th *Kobi** Brigade had received orders to mobilize on the 17th June, and had reached Ta-ku-shan on the 3rd July. On the 11th July it reached Hsiu-yen, and on the 16th General Count Nodzu took over the command of the army at that place. The Fourth Army was now considered to be sufficiently strong for immediate requirements, and on the 22nd, under orders from Imperial head-quarters, the Mixed Brigade of the Guard Division was dispatched by way of Huang-hua-tien to rejoin the First Army. At this time the Japanese Second Army was preparing to attack the Russians who were known to be in position at Ta-shih-chiao.

To ensure perfect co-operation between the various Japanese forces it was necessary that the armies under Generals Oku and Nodzu should move simultaneously. With this object the Fourth Army resumed its advance on the 24th July, and by the 28th the advanced troops of the 10th Division and the 10th *Kobi* Brigade, less the 40th Regiment of *Kobi* infantry in reserve at San-hsien-fang (5 miles south-west of Yang-la-huo), held a line extending from the high ground south of Ying-shu-kou to the vicinity of Chang-chia-pu-tzu; the main body of the army was at La-mu-fang. At 10.30 p.m. on the same date, General Nodzu was informed by Marshal Oyama that the 5th Division, which was then five miles north of Tang-chih, was to join his command, and that he was to capture Hsi-mu-cheng "when opportunity offers."

It was known that, after their defeat at Ta-shih-chiao, the Russians had retired to Hai-cheng, and it was believed that there was a force of about one division near Hsi-mu-cheng holding a position west of, and covering, the main road to Hai-cheng.† From Chin-ta-ssu to the south-east of San-chiao-shan the position was strongly entrenched, with artillery on the hills north and south of Hung-yao-ling and a formidable work on the high ground east of Hsiao-fang-hsin. South of Hsi-mu-cheng, between the roads leading from Hsiao-ku-shan and La-mu-fang, was an advanced

* The 10th *Kobi* Brigade, although organized as a "mixed" brigade, was composed, at this period, of only three regiments, each of two battalions.

† This is the Japanese estimate only. For the full strength of the Russian force in this action see Appendix I.

detachment* which held the ground from Shan-cheng-tzu to Hsia-fang-hsin. General Mishchenko's cavalry brigade, which had fought at Ta-shih-chiao, appeared to be about Miao-erh-kou and Hsi-yang-shu-kou supported by other troops in small numbers; but to the west of San-chiao-shan there were only weak entrenchments.†

Although General Nodzu fully realized that the mountainous country about Miao-erh-kou was not altogether favourable to the movements of large bodies of troops, he resolved to deliver a frontal attack with the 10th Division directly against Hsi-mu-cheng, and with the 5th Division to cut the enemy's line of retreat about Pai-lu-tun.

With this object, orders were issued at 11 a.m. on the 29th July, directing the army to occupy certain positions on the following day, in anticipation of the general attack which was fixed to take place on the 31st. The 10th Division and the 10th *Kobi* Brigade were to push forward on the 30th, and to seize a line extending from Ta-fang-hsin through Shan-cheng-tzu to the hill north of Hsia-pa-fan-kou. On their left, the 5th Division was directed to assemble its main body in the neighbourhood of Hou-shih-la-kou, its advanced troops establishing themselves upon a line extending from the hill east of Su-chia-pu-tzu through Ying-lao-shan (N.) to Wang-chia-pu-tzu (W.). As these dispositions would leave a gap between the two divisions, special care was to be taken to maintain connexion, and telegraphic communication was established from La-mu-fang to Hou-shih-la-kou through Chang-chia-pu-tzu. As a general reserve for the army, the 40th *Kobi* Regiment was directed to assemble at Yang-la-huo, in rear of the Japanese right, whence, as the attack progressed, it was to push forward and pursue as far as a line extending from Hou-chia-tun,‡ through Pai-lu-tun to Erh-tao-kou. General Nodzu intimated that his head-quarters would move at noon on the 30th from Wang-chia-pu-tzu (S.) to Hsiao-ku-shan.

On the night of the 29th—30th July the Russian force under General Zasulich was in position north-west and west of Hsi-mu-cheng. The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division was strongly entrenched from Chin-ta-ssu to hill 787. Two battalions detached from the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division, as well as the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, were immediately south of Hsi-mu-cheng, the remainder of this brigade being in

* Actually the 2nd Battalion of the 5th and 6th Siberian Infantry Regiments.

† General Mishchenko was reinforced on the 28th by 7½ battalions of infantry and some artillery.

‡ About 3 miles north-east of Pai-lu-tun.

reserve near Pai-lu-tun. The 2nd Brigade of the 31st Division and the 4th Ural Cossack Regiment were in reserve at Pai-lu-tun. The force under General Mishchenko was divided into two groups. The Orenburg Cossack Brigade and the 1st Chita Cossacks, with four Frontier Guard guns, were about Miao-erh-kou and on the heights 1130 and 1420, while six and a half battalions, eighteen horse artillery guns, and the 1st Verkne-Udinsk Cossacks held a line astride of the Pa-li Ho near Liang-chia-pu-tzu.

At 2 a.m. on the 30th July, in accordance with the plan arranged, the Japanese 10th Division and 10th *Kobi* Brigade moved forward in three columns and, meeting with little opposition except from guns posted to the west of Hsi-mu-cheng, occupied a line running from Ta-fang-hsin through hill 685 to the hill one and a half miles north-west of Wang-chia-pu-tzu (N.); while the 5th Division, similarly organized, seized the ground which lies immediately north of Su-chia-pu-tzu and Ying-lao-shan (N.), with its left a little to the south of Wang-chia-pu-tzu, where it was in touch with the right of General Oku's army. But there was no attempt to push on any further. On the Russian side, in anticipation of a general attack on the morrow, a reinforcement of two and a half battalions was sent forward from the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Infantry Division to the hill 1020, while two more battalions from the same brigade were posted at Fei-shun, seven miles north of Hsi-mu-cheng. At 4.30 a.m. on the 31st, the 17th East Siberian Rifle Regiment (less three companies) was sent to hill 787, so that the centre of the Russian position was held by the equivalent of about a strong infantry brigade.

For the 31st July, the advance of the Japanese 10th Division and 10th *Kobi* Brigade was ordered to take place at 2 a.m., the force being distributed in three columns* as on the previous day. During the

* Right Column—

- 2 troops, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 1 battery, 10th Artillery Regiment.
- 10th (less 1 battalion) and 11th Regiments, 10th *Kobi* Brigade.
- 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.

Centre Column—

- 1 troop, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 2 batteries, 10th Artillery Regiment.
- 10th Regiment, 10th Division.
- 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.

Left Column—

- 1 troop, 10th Cavalry Regiment.
- 40th Regiment, 10th Division.
- 1 company, 10th Engineer Battalion.

As a reserve for the division two squadrons of cavalry, three batteries and the 20th Brigade were ordered to assemble at Wang-chia-pu-tzu (N.).

night, a battalion and a battery were transferred from the right to the centre column, and at dawn on the 31st the left and centre columns* attacked the Russians on the hill west of

Ta-ping-ling, which was seized by the advanced troops about 9 a.m. The capture of this position did not, however, force the defenders to relinquish hill 787,† to which they clung with great determination supported by guns posted near Chang-san-huo and Hsiao-fang-hsin.

But, as the rearmost troops of the column arrived, the Japanese pushed forward and succeeded in occupying the hill at 11.30 a.m. under a heavy fire of guns and rifles. Prior to this, the 39th Regiment, from the divisional reserve, had been sent by General Kawamura to the extreme left of the 10th Division where assistance was required; but on the way it was met by so severe a fire from a battery posted on the saddle north of Hung-chia-pu-tzu, that it was forced to halt until supported by guns north of Wang-chia-pu-tzu (N.). With this assistance the infantry succeeded in coming into action from Ta-wan-kou, and the three batteries were then ordered up from the reserve.

On the left of the 10th Division, the 5th Division was pressing forward in three columns‡ against the Russian right. Advancing in a northerly direction at 2 a.m., the centre column

* The right column, after occupying the Russian advanced position, had been ordered to unite with the centre column; thus when the attack on the main position took place, there were only two columns, the original left and centre.

† Called by the Japanese Mt. Hyotan.

‡ Right Column—

2 troops, 5th Cavalry Regiment.

2 batteries, 5th Artillery Regiment.

42nd Regiment.

1st battalion, 21st Regiment.

1 company, 5th Engineer Battalion.

Centre Column—

2 troops, 5th Cavalry Regiment.

2 battalions, 21st Regiment.

Left Column—

1 troop, 5th Cavalry Regiment.

1 battery, 5th Artillery Regiment.

41st Regiment.

1 company, 5th Engineer Battalion.

Reserve—

1½ squadrons, 5th Cavalry Regiment to assemble at Chin-chia-pu-tzu.

3 batteries, 5th Artillery Regiment, and 1 company, 5th Engineer Battalion, to take up a position 1½ miles south-east of Ying-lao-shan (S.).

11th Regiment to assemble at Ying-lao-shan (S.).

forced back the hostile outposts and, at 4.30 a.m., captured the hill north of Ying-lao-shan (N.). The right column then advanced towards hill 1130, north-east of Tung-yang-shu-kou, with its artillery on the hill north of Su-chia-pu-tzu. The Russians were soon driven back by artillery fire, and two battalions of the left column then succeeded in occupying the lower slopes of hill 1420, though stubbornly opposed by one or two companies, and by artillery, about Fan-chia-huo-kou. Here it came into touch with a detachment* under Major-General Kodama, which had been dispatched by General Oku to assist in the attack against the Russian right. This detachment of the Second Army, on reaching Pai-tsao-yao, opened fire with its guns on some Russian artillery at Liang-chia-pu-tzu and on some infantry south of that village. At 10 a.m., the Russian infantry retired to the north-west and the artillery took up a new position west of Chuan-wan-tzu.

On hearing that the 5th Division was in possession of the hill 1420, General Nodzu, anticipating that this success would force the Russians to retire, sent orders at 9.15 a.m. to the commander of the 40th *Kobi* Regiment telling him to advance at once. He was informed that the enemy was holding a line from the hill north of Hung-yao-ling to the hill west of San-chiao-shan; and that the route he was to follow lay through Ta-tzu-ho and Ta-fang-hsin, whence, making for Lin-tung-huo, he was to menace the extreme Russian left. One company of the regiment which had been kept at Hsiao-ku-shan was ordered to proceed to hill 1105, where the head-quarters of the Fourth Army were now established.

At the same time, the commander of the right column of the 5th Division ordered his artillery to change position, and to come into action against the Russian battery on hill 1020 which had checked the advance of the 39th Japanese Regiment. So heavy was the fire now concentrated against this battery that it was forced to retire, leaving six of its guns. Meanwhile three batteries from the reserve of the 5th Division, assisted by a company of engineers, were trying to improvise a road up the steep and rocky ascent to the hill 1420; but it was not till 1 p.m. that they succeeded in getting into a position whence they could open fire against some Russian guns which were in action near Miao-erh-kou. These they silenced in about twenty minutes; but in spite of these two misfortunes the Russians were by no means beaten. In front of the centre column of the 5th Division the Russian infantry maintained its ground about Miao-erh-kou; and

* From the 3rd Division. Strength: three battalions of infantry, one troop of cavalry, two batteries, and one company of engineers.

although the battery on hill 1020 was out of action, the guns east of Hsiao-fang-hsin outranged those of the 10th Division, and successfully checked a fresh attempt to advance which was made by the 39th Regiment and by the two batteries which accompanied it. Moreover a strong Russian force was seen to be marching along the valley of the Pa-li Ho towards Chuan-wan-tzu, while the number of guns near Fan-chia-huo-kou was increased to twenty-two.*

Further to the east the 10th Japanese Division, which had captured hill 787 at 11.30 a.m., had been unable to progress. The Russians were still on the hill east of San-chia-tzu and near Chang-san-huo, supported by the fire of forty-two guns.* This check caused the Japanese considerable anxiety as to the safety of their left flank, and gave the Russians time to bring up fresh troops from the rear, until, at 6 p.m., a force amounting to about one brigade† of infantry was pushed into their fighting line. During this time the Russians made several unavailing attempts to recapture hill 787, and a determined attack was delivered by two battalions, supported by a concentrated fire from the guns north of Chang-san-huo and east of Hsiao-fang-hsin. Four separate attempts were made to force the Japanese from their ground in the neighbourhood of San-chiao-shan, but without success. So determined was the attack that the 11th Company of the Japanese 40th Regiment had all but thirty-five of its non-commissioned officers and men killed, while the only officer of the company who survived the action was among the wounded. This fierce struggle was maintained till 7 p.m., when the last of the Russian counter-attacks was repulsed, and the 10th Division bivouacked for the night.

Meanwhile the 5th Division had been less heavily engaged, and its left column, though assisted by the detachment from the Second Army, had done little more than maintain the positions which it had reached at midday.

* These figures are from Japanese sources, and from them it would appear that eight batteries, or the artillery of one division (sixty-four guns) were now in action. Probably the 2/31st Brigade had been reinforced by one brigade.

† According to the Austrian account, compiled from Russian sources, this force consisted of $6\frac{1}{2}$ battalions from the 2nd Brigade 31st Division, and the 1st Brigade 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

‡ The Russian account only mentions an attack delivered by one battalion of the 124th (Voronej) Regiment, under Colonel Lipovetz-Popovich, and states that 75 per cent. of the officers were either killed or wounded. The Austrian account says that the reinforcements from the 2/31st Brigade and the 1/2nd Siberian Brigade had also been placed under the orders of Colonel Lipovetz-Popovich for the counter-attack.

In spite of great inferiority of numbers, the actual result of the fighting up to this point was, therefore, by no means unfavourable to the Russians. The exact number of Japanese troops remaining in reserve is not known, but the returns of the losses and of the ammunition expended show that the 11th, 21st, and 42nd Infantry Regiments, and the 10th Cavalry Regiment were only lightly engaged, while the 20th Infantry Regiment and the 5th Cavalry Regiment did not fire a shot. This caution on the part of General Nodzu, so different from the usual Japanese practice, may have been due to the fact that it was much easier for General Kuropatkin to reinforce his fighting line from Hai-cheng than for General Nodzu to obtain assistance from the Second Army or from any other source.

The Japanese difficulties were, however, solved by the retirement of the Russians, which began by the withdrawal of the troops from Pai-lu-tun about 3 p.m., followed in due course by the infantry and artillery from Chuan-wan-tzu and Fan-chia-huo-kou. The retirement was aided by the attack of the 124th Voronej Regiment, already described, and by the arrival of two battalions from the 2nd Siberian Army Corps sent up from about Hai-cheng. This timely reinforcement checked the Japanese advance and enabled the Russians to withdraw under cover of darkness.

About 4.30 p.m., General Nodzu sent forward a battalion and a half, from the general reserve, with orders to pursue towards Miao-erh-kou, but south of that village obstinate resistance was encountered, and as it was then too late to organize a regular attack the 5th Division bivouacked on the ground which had been taken during the day. On the opposite flank of the Fourth Army, the dispatch of the 40th *Kobi* Regiment towards Lin-tung-huo also proved to be somewhat premature. Nevertheless, by 6 p.m., its two battalions had secured the heights north-west of that place, where they remained during the night, and blocked the main road from Hsi-mu-cheng.

At 4.10 a.m., on the 1st August, General Nodzu sent orders to the commander of the 10th Division pointing out the urgent necessity of forcing the Russians from their position in front of him, and adding that the 5th Division had been directed to assist by sending a portion of its troops towards San-chiao-shan.

At 7.30 a.m., General Kawamura replied to the effect that to continue the attack was, for the time being, impossible, but that his division would hold its ground to the last man. This attitude did not satisfy the commander of the Fourth Army, who insisted that the attack must be renewed and the enemy repulsed by

General Nodzu orders resumption of the attack.

daybreak on the 2nd August. The operation was not, however, destined to be carried out, for the Russians, fearing a resumption of the attack upon their right, had already fallen back towards Hai-cheng.

About 8 a.m., the commander of the 5th Division received a message from General Kawamura in which the difficult situation, as it was believed to be, of the 10th Division was described. General Ueda at once ordered the bulk of his right column to co-operate in the attack, and sent it towards the village of San-chiao-shan, but before that place was reached the detachment found that the Russians had withdrawn. This fact had been discovered some time earlier by the right column of the 10th Division, which had started in pursuit about 6 a.m., followed at 8.30 a.m. by the left column. These troops pushed forward and occupied a line from Shih-chia-wa-tzu to Pai-lu-tun, while the 40th *Kobi* Regiment, which had marched at 5.30 a.m., came up on their right and occupied Hou-chia-tun.* It was followed by the remainder of the Fourth Army, which moved forward and occupied a line running from north-east to south-west through Pai-lu-tun.

In this action, as in the engagements which preceded it, the Fourth Army had received assistance from troops detached either by the First or Second Armies, and although, on the 31st July, it failed to force the Russians from their ground, success had none the less been gained. Its efforts had sufficed to make the enemy relinquish his last position on the road leading to Hai-cheng, whither he had retired with a loss of six guns and many killed and wounded.† The junction with General Oku's force was thus practically accomplished, for only a few miles of road, clear of the enemy, now separated the Fourth and Second Armies.

* About 3 miles north-east of Pai-lu-tun.

† See Appendix I.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE ADVANCE OF THE JAPANESE FIRST ARMY, WITH THE ACTIONS
AT THE MO-TIEN LING, CHIAO-TOU, AND YANG-TZU LING—
YU-SHU LING.

(Stragetical Map 2, and Plans 11, 12, and 13.)

IN the last three chapters the advance of the Japanese Second and Fourth Armies, up to the time of their arrival in the neighbourhood of Hai-cheng city, has been described. It is now necessary to turn to the eastern portion of the theatre of operations, and to follow the movements of the First Army in the same direction. For several days after the successful passage of the Ya-lu, General Kuroki remained halted in and around An-tung. His victory of the 1st May had fulfilled the first requirement of the plan of campaign, and a foothold upon the southern border of Manchuria had been secured. The next phase of that plan was the general advance on Liao-yang of three Japanese armies, but as two of these were not yet in the field the First Army was compelled to remain inactive. In the interval, much had to be accomplished. The routes by which the First Army would march to the point of concentration led through a country difficult at any time for wheeled traffic, and during the rainy season almost impassable. Although the distance to be traversed was not great, it was necessary to hire local transport, and as the number of carts procurable at An-tung fell far short of requirements, troops were detached in the directions of Hsiu-yen and Kuan-tien-cheng, where it was thought that more might be obtained. By this means, sufficient were collected to enable a short advance northward to be made, and by the 10th May, the First Army had taken up positions covering Feng-huang-cheng.* This place, which has a

* The actual occupation of Feng-huang-cheng had taken place on the 6th May, when the Japanese cavalry scouts had met and repulsed those of the Russian rear guard which had fallen back northward. On the 10th, Kuan-tien-cheng, on the Sai-ma-chi road, was taken possession of by *Kobi* troops, under Colonel Yoshida, sent up from Siojo on the Ya-lu, thus serving the double purpose of protecting the Japanese right and threatening the Russian left. The strength of this detachment was 1 section of cavalry, 1 battalion of infantry, and 1 mountain battery.

The Japanese
at Feng-huang-
cheng.

population of some 20,000, is the only town of importance on the Imperial road between Korea and Mukden, and was selected as a centre where supplies for one month for the First Army were

to be accumulated. North of the town the 2nd Division took position, while east and west of it respectively were the 12th and Guard Divisions. In advance of each division, strong parties of infantry were thrown forward to a distance of several miles, while ten miles further to the front a screen of cavalry was established. Supplies were brought from An-tung, at first by cart and afterwards by a line of tramway; and by the middle of June, a reserve sufficient for one month had been collected.

Meanwhile the Russian force under General Zasulich had fallen back to Lien-shan-kuan, covered by a rear guard which had remained at Pien-men till the 3rd May, while some seven miles east of Feng-huang-cheng a company of the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment watched the valley of the Ai Ho. Still further east, Colonel Lechitski had maintained his position at Hung-shih-la until the 3rd May, when, hearing for the first time of the Russian reverse, he had withdrawn his detachment to Chu-chi-lin-tzu.*

Movements of
the Russian
"Eastern
Force" after
the battle of
the Ya-lu.

During these few days great anxiety as to the safety of the "Eastern Force" was felt at the Russian army head-quarters, where news of the reverse on the Ya-lu had been received on the evening of the 1st May. This uneasiness was increased by a report which had been received about the end of April from Lieutenant-Colonel Madritov, who, with a squadron of the Ussuri Cossack Regiment and some companies of mounted scouts, was watching the upper Ya-lu. In this report he stated that a Japanese force was moving in the direction of Chyangsyong, but as no details were given, he created an impression at head-quarters that a strong body of troops was moving by Sai-ma-chi on Mukden. To guard against this danger, and to secure General Zasulich's retreat, such small reinforcements as were at once available were hurried eastward. The first step was to prepare a defensive position about Lien-shan-kuan, which would cover the Mo-tien Ling and protect the principal passes over the mountains. For this purpose a detachment was to concentrate at Lien-shan-kuan by the 3rd May; it was to act under

* See p. 117. During the battle of the Ya-lu a staff officer who was carrying orders to Colonel Lechitski, directing him to retire, was wounded and drowned in the Ai Ho.

the orders of Major-General Romanov, and was composed of* :—

One battalion of the 124th Regiment (2nd Brigade, 31st Infantry Division) from Liao-yang.

One battalion of the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

Three companies of the 139th Regiment (2nd Brigade, 35th Infantry Division) from the Mo-tien Ling.

The 4th Battery of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division.†

Half the 4th Battery of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division.†

The next step was to provide a strong flank guard which would be able to clear up the situation to the east, and at the same time protect the threatened flank of General Zasulich's retiring force. To perform this double task, Major-General

General
Rennenkampf's
flank guard.

Rennenkampf, commander of the Trans-Baikal Cossack Division, with the 2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade and 4th Trans-Baikal Horse Artillery

Battery, was dispatched from Liao-yang to Sai-ma-chi, where he was to be joined by detachments under Colonels Kartsev and Volkov, which had taken part in the battle of the 1st May.‡

A third step was still necessary, namely, to watch the coast-line west of the Ya-lu River ; and for this purpose General Mishchenko

General
Mishchenko's
brigade.

was ordered to move to Sha-li-chai with the 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade, which belonged properly to the Trans-Baikal Cossack Division, and to guard the coast as far as Pi-tzu-wo where he

* It will be observed that this detachment was composed of units, or portions of units, from four different divisions.

† These two batteries, escorted by the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, were already on their way from Liao-yang to Feng-huang-cheng, but were overtaken by an order to halt on reaching Lien-shan-kuan. The guns of the 4th/6th Battery afterwards joined General Rennenkampf, though the date on which they did so is not known.

‡ Three squadrons of the Cossack Brigade were dropped on the road between Liao-yang and Sai-ma-chi to act as mail carriers ; it is not known from which regiments they were taken. The strength of General Rennenkampf's command when concentrated was approximately 2,500 sabres, 2,000 rifles, and 14 guns, composed of :—

2nd Brigade Trans-Baikal Cossack Division, Major-General Liubavin—

2nd Nerchinsk Regiment	} 9 squadrons.
2nd Argun Regiment	

4th Trans-Baikal Cossack Artillery Battery, 6 guns.

Detachment under Colonel Kartsev—

1st Argun Regiment, 5 squadrons.

Ussuri Cossack Regiment, 3 squadrons.

Detachment under Colonel Volkov—

23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 3 battalions.

4th/6th Battery, 8 guns.

would come in touch with the cavalry under General Zuikov.* The remainder of the troops which he had commanded on the Ya-lu were placed under Colonel Kartsev, and took position at Ai-yang-cheng, where they remained until the arrival of General Rennenkampf on the 7th May. Lastly, three squadrons of the 2nd Chita Cossack Regiment, which had left Liao-yang on the 29th April, were ordered to hasten their march to Feng-huang-cheng, where they joined General Zasluch on the 2nd May and remained to guard his front. By these means the line of retreat of the "Eastern Force" was secured and its flanks were safeguarded.

In accordance with his orders, General Rennenkampf left Liao-yang with the 2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade on the 4th May; he took no carts with him, supplies were requisitioned from the country through which the column passed, and the ordinary military precautions were neglected. In this way the forty-five miles to Lien-shan-kuan were covered in two marches, and there General Rennenkampf had an interview with General Zasluch, whose troops were then retiring towards the Fen-shui range.

The precise nature of this interview has never become known, but it is evident that the danger from the east was still held to be serious, for on the following day, the 6th, the Cossack Brigade made a most trying march of thirty miles along the main ridge of the mountains. On the 7th, a junction was effected with Colonel Volkov's detachment at Sai-ma-chi and a defensive position was selected, which was to be held by the infantry and artillery while the cavalry was free to explore the country to the front and flanks. On the 8th, General Rennenkampf was joined by Colonel Kartsev, who had left three squadrons of the 1st Argun Regiment at Ai-yang-cheng. This officer reported that Feng-huang-cheng had been occupied by a large Japanese force, covered by strong parties of infantry and cavalry, and that the advanced troops of another force had reached Kuan-tien-cheng on the 5th May.

To clear up the situation, General Rennenkampf, whose troops had rested on the 8th, moved out on the 9th with seven squadrons of cavalry, one battalion of infantry, one battery of horse artillery, and two field guns, leaving Colonel Volkov with the remainder of his column at Sai-ma-chi. At Ai-yang-cheng he was joined by the three squadrons which had been left behind by Colonel Kartsev, and at noon on the 10th, after a very arduous march, he reached Kuan-tien-cheng, where he learnt that a body of four hun-

* See p. 140.

dred Japanese infantry had left the town, but in what direction was not known. On this day the general himself was accompanied by three squadrons of cavalry; three more squadrons reconnoitred beyond Kuan-tien-cheng, and the remainder of the column was left near the Chan Ling, south-east of Erh-tao-kou, to secure the retreat of the advanced parties.

Nothing was heard from the reconnoitring squadrons, but at 1 p.m. General Rennenkampf received a report from Colonel Volkov, saying that strong detachments of hostile infantry were advancing on Sai-ma-chi. He at once dispatched General Liubavin with orders to pick up the battalion of rifles, two squadrons, and six guns at the Chan Ling, and to return with them to Sai-ma-chi. At 2 p.m., while still halted at Kuan-tien-cheng, a report came in that a strong hostile force was coming up from the south-west. A little later some Japanese infantry was seen, and a brisk exchange of fire, lasting about forty minutes, took place. Meanwhile the three reconnoitring squadrons, which had apparently failed to discover the approaching enemy, were falling back; and, at 3.30 p.m., General Rennenkampf withdrew to the Chan Ling, where he rejoined the two squadrons and two guns which were still guarding his retreat. The retirement was resumed next day, and Sai-ma-chi was reached on the 12th, when it was discovered that the report of an advance in strength against that place had emanated from Chinese spies, and was greatly exaggerated.*

Little information had been gained by this reconnaissance, beyond the fact that Kuan-tien-cheng was in the hands of the enemy; and it is worthy of note, as illustrating Russian methods at this stage of the war, that, though Ai-yang-cheng was still held, no troops were left to watch the movements of the Japanese.

We must now leave General Rennenkampf for a while to follow the movements of Colonel Madritov, who took advantage of the advance of the Japanese First Army to Feng-huang-cheng to make a raid across the Ya-lu into Korea. The moment was well chosen for his enterprise, for, on the 10th May, when he appeared in the vicinity of Anju, the old line of communication of the First Army was being handed over to the troops forming the army of occupation of Korea, and General

Colonel
Madritov's
raid on Anju.

* Though the Russians were unable to ascertain any definite information, it is now known that the Japanese 12th Division advanced to Kuan-chia-pu-tzu on the 10th May; and that on the 12th the divisional cavalry was pushed out along the roads to Sai-ma-chi, Ai-yang-cheng, and Lien-shan-kuan, thus giving rise to this report.

Kuroki was in doubt as to the strength of the force holding the threatened city. Its actual garrison consisted of seventy reserve soldiers under a captain, and some thirty non-combatants who were armed with rifles of men killed at the battle of the Ya-lu. From 7 a.m. on the 10th, this small force held the town and kept the Cossacks at bay until, at 3 p.m., seventy men under an officer who happened to be in the vicinity and had heard the sound of firing, came up from the south and succeeded in joining the defenders. Shortly afterwards, half the now augmented garrison sallied forth from the south-east gate and drove Colonel Madritov's troops back to some high ground, whence they retreated after dark.*

With the exception of these two reconnaissances the Russian troops accomplished nothing during the early part of May, and very little was known of the real strength or dispositions of the Japanese when, on the 17th, Lieutenant-General Count Keller† arrived from Europe to take over the command of the "Eastern Force" from General Zasulich, who then returned to his own 2nd Siberian Army Corps at Hai-cheng.

Returning now to General Rennenkampf, frequent reconnaissances were made from Sai-ma-chi; but on the 21st May the complete exhaustion of supplies in that neighbourhood and a report, received from army headquarters, that the Japanese were moving westward in support of a landing which had been made near Ta-ku-shan, led him to withdraw his infantry (less one company), half a squadron of cavalry, and his horse artillery, about twenty miles to the north-west. Of the remainder of his force part was retained at Sai-ma-chi, while the rest held Ai-yang-cheng with a detachment thrown forward towards Kuan-tien-cheng. On the 23rd, a reconnaissance was made down the valley of the Ai Ho with nine squadrons, which came into contact with Japanese

Movements of
the Russian
flank guard.

complete exhaustion of supplies in that neighbourhood and a report, received from army headquarters, that the Japanese were moving westward in support of a landing which had been made

* The Japanese give the composition of Colonel Madritov's force as one company of mounted scouts of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment, one company of mounted scouts of the 15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, three squadrons of Cossacks, or in all about 500 men. Colonel Madritov, who originally had with him one squadron of the Ussuri Cossack Regiment, was probably joined by two more squadrons of that regiment before undertaking the raid, for it is known that only three squadrons fell back to Kuan-tien-cheng when the Japanese advanced across the Ya-lu. In this affair the Japanese lost 3 men killed and 7 wounded, and the Russians are understood to have had 2 officers and 14 others killed and 35 wounded. The Japanese captured 1 N.C.O., and 1 private soldier.

† Before receiving this appointment Count Keller had no experience of high command. He had spent some years as Director of the Corps of Pages in St. Petersburg, and latterly had been Governor of Ekaterinoslav.

infantry near Ta-pu and were driven back without acquiring any information of value. General Rennenkampf next moved to Ai-yang-cheng, and on the 28th one of his patrols encountered half a squadron of Japanese cavalry supported by one infantry battalion and a mountain battery. Inferring that these troops were the advanced guard of a Japanese division, he ordered a retirement to Sai-ma-chi, which was reached at 6 p.m. There he intended to remain during the 29th, but on that date Chinese spies brought news that the Japanese advanced guard was only some two miles distant.* Thereupon the troops, without waiting to verify the information, marched hastily to Cheng-chang to block the road to Mukden; and a report that three thousand Japanese infantry, with a battery of artillery, had occupied Sai-ma-chi was

Count Keller
ordered to
Sai-ma-chi.

sent to General Kuropatkin, with the result that Count Keller, who from the first had strongly advocated offensive action, was permitted to proceed thither with half a squadron, eight and a half battalions, and two batteries. To replace these troops of the "Eastern Force," the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division was ordered to march at once from Liao-yang to Lien-shan-kuan. By the 2nd June, however, an officer's reconnoitring party had ascertained that Sai-ma-chi was not occupied by the enemy, and that beyond a patrol† no Japanese had visited that place. On the following day Count Keller, to his great disappointment, was recalled to Lien-shan-kuan, while a portion of General Rennenkampf's cavalry reoccupied Sai-ma-chi.

On his return from this abortive expedition, Count Keller distributed his force as follows:—‡

East of Lien-shan-kuan barring the road from Sai-ma-chi—

Redistribution
of the "Eastern
Force."

The 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division and three
batteries, with seven companies about
Erh-tao-fang-shan.

Near Erh-chia-pu-tzu—

Head-quarters of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division,
with the 24th Regiment and one battery.

* The spies had probably encountered the patrol mentioned on p. 253.

† The action of this Japanese patrol had a curiously far-reaching result, for it was magnified into a threat against the Russian line of communication, with the result that the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division was left with the "Eastern Force," and, as has been seen, the force under General Stakelberg, which was to advance for the relief of Port Arthur, was unnecessarily weakened.

‡ The guns lost at the Ya-lu (21) were not replaced until the 15th July, but the 4th Battery of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division had joined the "Eastern Force." It will also be noted that the seven companies of the 31st and 35th Infantry Divisions were no longer with Count Keller (see p. 230).

Near Ma-chia-pu-tzu—

The 22nd Regiment of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, with two guns.

At Ta-wan—

Five battalions of the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

At Lang-tzu-shan—

Three battalions of the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Siberian Infantry Division.

During the period in which the Russian cavalry was displaying this fruitless activity, supply difficulties and the necessity of conforming to the movements of the Second and Fourth Armies, which were not yet ready to move northward, had kept the Japanese First Army halted in the neighbourhood of Feng-huang-cheng. The whole of the month of May was spent in bringing supplies of food from Japan, and in collecting sufficient transport to make a further forward movement. It soon became evident that at least three roads must be used, one by each division. The right division would march by Ai-yang-cheng and Sai-ma-chi, the centre by the main road to Hsueh-li-tien and Lien-shan-kuan, the left by Ta-yen-kou, Erh-chia-pu-tzu, and Chin-chia-pu-tzu. On the 28th May, to facilitate this movement, General

Difficulties of Japanese supply and transport.

Kuroki sent the 14th Regiment, with two batteries and a squadron under General Sasaki, to establish a supply depot* at Ai-yang-cheng, which had been

Occupation of Ai-yang-cheng.

already occupied by a detachment of Colonel Yoshida's *Kobi* troops.

On the 29th, a patrol from this force was sent out northward, a movement which, as we have seen, was the cause of General Rennenkampf's somewhat hasty retirement from Sai-ma-chi. Though no other definite operations were undertaken during this month, the cavalry, closely supported by infantry, was kept well out on the front and flanks and completely frustrated the Russian efforts to obtain information. When, however, it became clear to the Japanese Imperial head-quarters, at the beginning of June, that an effort was to be made to relieve Port Arthur, orders were at once issued for active operations to be begun, and for the First Army to send a detachment to the support of the Fourth Army, which was opposed by a hostile force estimated at about one division.† But the difficulty of supply was still the

* Supplies were brought by boat up the River Ya-lu as far as Shui-tien, whence they were forwarded to Ai-yang-cheng in Chinese carts.

† It was in consequence of this order that the Asada detachment was sent to Hsiu-yen. See Chapter XVI.

ruling factor, and the First Army was not yet in a position to move. In these circumstances, the most that General Kuroki could do was to throw forward detachments which should threaten the troops to which he was directly opposed, and at the same time should raise doubts in General Kuropatkin's mind as to his point of

Dispatch of
General Asada's
brigade to
Hsiu-yen.

greatest danger. With this object the advanced troops of the 2nd Division attacked the Russian outposts on the 6th and 7th, and on the latter date Sai-ma-chi was occupied by a detachment from Ai-yang-cheng commanded by Colonel Yoshida.* On the 6th June, also, General Asada's detachment left Feng-huang-cheng to co-operate with the 10th Division in the attack on Hsiu-yen.

Count Keller appears to have failed completely to grasp the meaning of these movements, and, being badly served by the cavalry, he concluded that General Kuroki was now attempting to turn his right flank from the direction of Huang-hua-tien; an opinion which was strengthened by the knowledge that, in 1895, the Japanese had marched directly from Feng-huang-cheng to Hai-cheng. To guard against this new danger he moved the 11th and 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiments to Ta-wan, and concentrated the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division at Lang-tzu-shan; pushing out advanced parties towards Hsi-mu-cheng and, apparently, towards Hsiu-yen.† Thus for more than a month, while unable to make any forward movement, General Kuroki had succeeded in concealing from his adversary not only his intentions but also his numbers and dispositions, and had thereby done much to facilitate the advance of the Second Army.

At last, on the 10th June, Count Keller received fairly correct information from army head-quarters. On that date he was informed that the Japanese 12th Division was at Sai-ma-chi, and that the 2nd and Guard Divisions were at Feng-huang-cheng. At the same time he was informed of the Russian movement towards Port Arthur.

On receipt of this information he came to the conclusion that the Japanese First Army would probably attempt to move westward. To prevent it from doing so he decided to undertake another offensive movement, and, on the following day, the

* Presumably the Japanese found it impossible to supply a force so far forward as Sai-ma-chi, for it was evacuated on the 9th, and reoccupied by the Russians on the 16th June.

† See p. 226.

11th, he started to make a reconnaissance towards Sai-ma-chi, taking with him the 9th and 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiments and half a battery. The march had hardly begun, when he heard that the Japanese had evacuated Sai-ma-chi on the 9th, and again he retraced his steps without bringing on a battle. It may have been well that he did so, for on the 13th he received orders from General Kuropatkin, who was apparently anxious as to the result of General Stakelberg's expedition, to send six battalions and a battery to Hai-cheng.*

On the evening of the 15th June, when the result of the battle of Te-li-ssu was known at Liao-yang, Count Keller was ordered to send the 11th and 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiments (*i.e.*, the 2nd Brigade, 3rd E.S.R. Division) to An-shan-chan,† and "with the rest of his force to make a demonstrative advance on Feng-huang-cheng." The rest of his force now consisted of the 9th and 10th Regiments of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, the 22nd and 24th Regiments of the 6th East Siberian Division, two battalions of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division, and some field batteries. Deducting the troops required to guard the various passes,‡ Count Keller could only muster seven and three-quarter battalions of infantry. These he divided into two columns, under Major-Generals Romanov and Kashtalinski, and directed them to move out on the 16th by Erh-chia-pu-tzu and Erh-tao-fang-shan respectively. Count Keller with his staff accompanied General Romanov's command. The same evening the two columns concentrated at Hen-chia-pu-tzu, whence they advanced on the 17th to within ten miles of Feng-huang-cheng without encountering any serious opposition. The troops had covered forty miles of difficult country in a day and a half, only to find themselves, wet through and without food, exposed to the attack of a whole Japanese army of whose dispositions they were ignorant. Again nothing had been achieved, and the only course open to Count Keller, who had always considered the undertaking extremely hazardous, was to retire. Tu-men-tzu was reached before nightfall, and on the

* In compliance with this order the 7th and half of the 8th Siberian Infantry Regiments, belonging to the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Siberian Infantry Division and one battery, were dispatched. The remaining two battalions of this brigade and one battery were left for a time to watch the roads from Huang-hua-tien.

† These two regiments were sent back to Count Keller immediately.

‡ Two battalions of the 8th Siberian Infantry Regiment at the Middle Fen-shui Ling. Two battalions of the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment at the San-tao Ling. One battalion at the Mo-tien Ling. One battalion at the East Fen-shui Ling.

18th both columns were back at Lien-shan-kuan. While on the return march Count Keller received news of General Stakelberg's defeat at Te-li-ssu, accompanied by orders from General Kuropatkin that he was to act on the defensive and to cover the left of the main Russian forces.

Count Keller had hardly returned when General Rennenkampf again assumed the offensive, but his movements were perfectly well known to the Japanese, for on the 19th June information was received at Feng-huang-cheng from General Sasaki that a hostile force, numbering some five thousand men, was marching from Sai-ma-chi towards Ai-yang-cheng. The 47th Regiment was at once dispatched to reinforce the 14th, and, by the 22nd June, General Sasaki had under his command the whole of his own brigade, one squadron of the 12th Cavalry Regiment, three mountain batteries, and a company of engineers. A strong position had been prepared, which was to be held by two battalions and three batteries with the remainder in reserve, while the line of outposts was posted two miles to the north-west, astride the Sai-ma-chi road. At 10 a.m. on the 22nd, the Japanese battalion on outpost duty was attacked by a Russian force of infantry and cavalry, with a battery of horse artillery, and withdrew slowly to the main position, which was reached with little loss some four hours later. The Russian guns then opened fire on the prepared position, but the range was accurately known to the Japanese artillerymen, who quickly silenced them and were able to stifle all attempts to reopen later on. The Russian infantry had meantime pushed forward to within a thousand yards of the Japanese position, but, on coming under fire from the trenches, was brought to a halt and was unable to make any further progress. About 5 p.m., the Russian guns, followed by the infantry, were withdrawn, and a somewhat purposeless operation, which may have been merely another reconnaissance, came to an end. Although the opportunity to inflict losses on a retiring enemy appears to have been favourable, no pursuit was undertaken.*

On this same day General Kuroki was informed that it was the intention of the Imperial head-quarters to advance to Liao-yang as soon as possible, and to attack General Kuropatkin at that place. In the same message he was instructed to establish a

Advance of the
Japanese First
Army.

* The Japanese estimate the Russian losses in this affair as 42 killed (22 were found on the ground) in addition to the wounded. Their own losses were 11 killed and wounded, among the former being the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment.

supply depot at Tung-yuen-pu, and to collect in it twenty days' food for his three divisions. The depot was to be ready by the 4th July and was to be protected by a detachment thrown forward to Tsao-ho-kou. However, in view of the strength of the enemy in his front, General Kuroki considered that it would be wiser for him to move forward with his whole force to Sai-ma-chi and the East Fen-shui Ling, rather than to protect so important a post only with a detachment. Already on the 17th a reserve of food and forage sufficient to supply a division for ten days had been accumulated at Ai-yang-cheng, and as soon as the consent of the Imperial head-quarters was received orders were issued for a general advance on the 24th. Suddenly the whole Japanese scheme was upset by the reappearance of the Russian battleships, and the troops of the First Army had hardly completed their first day's march when, at 7 p.m. on the 24th, General Kuroki was informed, in a message almost identical with that sent to General Kawamura,* that "the engagement near Liao-yang will be postponed until after the rainy season" and that "the First Army is to make its dispositions in accordance with this new plan."

There was no longer any urgent need to push forward, but as his troops were already in motion General Kuroki decided not to make any change in their orders, and obtained consent to occupy the Mo-tien Ling. The advance was necessarily made by three separate roads, and even so it was only through the excellent work of the pioneers that the transport was enabled to move at all. With the exception of the main route from Seoul to Mukden the so-called roads were, indeed, little more than tracks following the bottoms of the valleys, along which the troops were compelled to move in single file. The hills on either side rose to heights of from 150 to 600 feet, and it would seem that an enterprising enemy might have delayed the advance, even if unable to check it entirely. But the Russians made no efforts to turn to account the natural advantages which the country gave them, and retired before the advancing Japanese columns without offering any serious opposition. On the 26th June, the date of the advance of the 10th Division against the Fen-shui Ling, the Guard Division† marched to Wang-tai-tzu, the 2nd Division to Kan-chia-tien, while the 23rd Brigade of the 12th Division occupied Tsui-chia-fang, with the 12th Brigade of the same division a short distance north of Ai-yang-cheng.

So far the staff arrangements for the march had met with marked success, largely due to the perfect communication which

* See p. 231.

† Less the Asada detachment.

was kept up between the columns by the cavalry. The army head-quarters and the Guard Division had never been separated by a distance of less than twenty-five miles by road; and from the Guard Division to General Asada's detachment was about fifty miles. Yet, in spite of the indifferent quality of the cavalry horses, all the Japanese commanders were kept fully informed of the movements of the various columns, a fact which provides eloquent testimony to the training of the men and the skill of the officers.* At this point, also, the four field batteries of the Guard Artillery Regiment, which had hitherto been obliged to accompany the 2nd Division, were able to rejoin their own corps, having marched thirty-eight miles over mountain roads in three days.

On the 29th, the Japanese met with further success, for on that date the Mo-tien Ling, and the passes to the east and west of it were found to have been abandoned by the enemy, The occupation of the Mo-tien Ling. and were occupied by the advanced troops without firing a shot. For this the blame must not be laid upon Count Keller. On the 25th he had telegraphed to Liao-yang asking the commander-in-chief whether his previous instructions to retire if opposed by superior force still held good. By the evening of the 26th no reply had arrived, and Count Keller then took upon himself to order a general retreat to Ta-wan. Not long after the troops had been set in motion General Kuropatkin's answer was received, intimating that he considered that retirement was not yet necessary, but giving no definite instructions.† On the next day Count Keller's command had been still further weakened by the withdrawal of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment to Hai-cheng. To find himself deprived of troops at the very moment when his opponent assumed the offensive might well dishearten any commander, but an even more insidious danger was the lack of decision which characterized all the Russian plans, and made itself felt in every quarter of the theatre of war. An instance of the consequences which resulted from this indecision is furnished by the movements of the 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. This regiment had been

* Whether this was the best use to make of the cavalry is another question.

† His reply was worded as follows :—(1) If the enemy are only demonstrating in front of you it is hardly wise to retire on Lang-tzu-shan. What was your estimate of the Japanese forces when you decided to evacuate the passes without fighting? (2) The retreat of the Eastern Force towards Lang-tzu-shan is wholly undesirable. Apart from other considerations it may necessitate moving the Xth Corps to An-ping. Take all precautions to stop the enemy should he endeavour to outflank your position on the Yang-tzu Ling.

ordered to An-shan-chan on the 15th June, but on reaching that place had been at once sent back to Count Keller. On the 26th, it received orders to move to Ta-wan; but while on the march it received another order to retrace its steps and, at 1 a.m., on the 27th, reached the camp at Chin-erh-tun which it had left the previous morning. There it was met by an order from General Kuropatkin directing it to march at once to Hai-cheng. Leaving camp again at 4 a.m. on the 27th, it reached Hai-cheng on the 28th, only to find that it was to move next day to Liao-yang, this time by rail. Arriving there on the 30th, orders were again received to rejoin Count Keller. Similarly the 9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment while on the way to Hai-cheng received orders to march to An-shan-chan; thence it was railed to Liao-yang and eventually returned to Count Keller with the 12th East Siberian Regiment.*

But a more formidable enemy than the Russians was the rain, which fell in torrents from the 27th June to the 5th July.

Rivers overflowed their banks, roads became morasses, and the Chinese carters, whose services had been secured with so much pains, fled in every direction to their homes. For a time the transport of supplies practically ceased, the troops were placed on half rations, and so serious was the situation on the right that to avoid starvation the 12th Division, after consuming all its emergency rations, was ordered to retire twelve miles to Sai-ma-chi, leaving a line of outposts further north. Had the rain continued for forty-eight hours longer the whole army must have retired to Feng-huang-cheng. During this trying period the apprehensions of the Japanese commanders were greatly increased by lack of information. The force opposed to the First Army was estimated at two whole divisions, whereas, as we have seen, Count Keller's command was at one time reduced to the 10th, 22nd, 24th, and two battalions of the 8th Regiments of infantry. A report was also received that a force of between two and three thousand cavalry was moving through the mountains towards Kuan-tien-cheng. From the 5th to the 15th July, no efforts were spared in the endeavour to recall the scattered transport, and, as the road through Ai-yang-cheng had become impassable, a new line of supply had to be established for the 12th Division.

The First Army was now in a very much exposed position, ahead of the armies to the west, and on the 4th July the advanced

* The 11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment also returned about this date, while the remaining two battalions of the 2nd Siberian Infantry Division seem to have been withdrawn to Hai-cheng.

The first Russian attack on the Mo-tien Ling. troops of the Japanese 2nd Division, consisting of a single company of the 30th Regiment, were attacked on the Mo-tien Ling. At 1 a.m. a "reconnoitring detachment," consisting of the 2nd Battalions of the 10th and 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, left Ta-wan under Colonel Lechitski for the Mo-tien Ling. At the same hour three companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment marched out towards Ma-ku-men-tzu. Thence it was to proceed in the direction of the Hsin-kai Ling, acting as a flank guard to the main reconnaissance. The conduct of the operations was entrusted to General Romanov. While it was still dark the 2nd Battalion of the 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment suddenly appeared in front of the Japanese outposts, which were soon engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle. The outpost line was pierced, but the arrival of two other companies of the 30th Regiment, which were thrown against the Russian left, compelled the assailants to retire without ascertaining the strength of the force opposed to them. The 2nd Battalion of the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment came up in support, but the movements of the two bodies were not well timed, for the latter battalion did not arrive until the 10th East Siberian Regiment was in retreat, when it, too, was beaten off. The flanking companies also encountered a patrol of the enemy about a mile and a half south-east of Ma-kou-men-tzu. A sharp engagement resulted in favour of the Russians, but at 5 a.m. Colonel Gornitski withdrew to Ta-wan. The whole affair lasted only a few hours, but the fact that the Russians had ninety-five men killed, and thirteen officers, among whom was Colonel Lechitski, and two hundred and eighty-two men wounded, testifies to the sharpness of the fighting. The Japanese loss was small, only one officer and seventeen men being killed, and two officers and thirty-eight men wounded.

For nearly a fortnight there was no further action on either side. During this period the Xth Russian Army Corps began to arrive from Europe. The head-quarters reached Liao-yang on the 5th July and remained there, but the 9th Infantry Division was at once sent off to the east. The 1st Brigade reinforced Count Keller, and the 2nd Brigade, under Major-General Gershelmann the divisional commander, joined General Rennenkampf, who posted it at Chiao-tou; at the same time the 23rd East Siberian

* Information from Berlin, received by General Kuroki a few days later, stated that these attacks had been delivered by 13 companies under Colonel Rachinski, the object being to clear up the situation on the Mo-tien Ling.

Rifle Regiment was transferred from General Rennenkampf to Count Keller. Of the remaining infantry belonging to this corps [*i.e.*, the 31st Division] the 1st Brigade remained at Liao-yang but was directly under the commander-in-chief, and the 2nd Brigade was already at Hai-cheng. Thus Lieutenant-General Sluchevski,* commander of the corps, remained without any troops until the 20th July. Meanwhile rumours reached the Russian headquarters of a general westward movement of Japanese troops. In all probability these reports had their foundation in General Tojo's reconnaissance towards Kai-ping, and in the action of the detachment under General Asada, both of which have been described in the preceding chapter. It will be remembered that as soon as Kai-ping was occupied by the Second Army, the 10th Division was reinforced and was directed on Hsi-mu-cheng. Some rumour of this change of plan must have reached General Kuropatkin, for, about the same date, it began to be believed at Liao-yang that General Kuroki was meditating a movement by his right against the Russian left. These contradictory reports gave rise to much anxiety, and, in hopes of gaining some definite information, Count Keller was again ordered to assume the offensive.

On the morning of the 17th July, in compliance with this order, he delivered a second attack against the whole front of the Japanese 2nd Division, instead of against the troops holding the Mo-tien Ling only. Three battalions of infantry with half a squadron of cavalry, under Colonel Tsibulski, moved north of the Ta-wan—Hsia-ma-tang road against the Japanese right. Fourteen and a half battalions of infantry with twelve mountain guns, under General Kashtalinski, were directed against the Mo-tien Ling and the Hsiao-kao Ling. Seven battalions, half a squadron, and eight guns under Major-General Ryabinkin remained in readiness at Ta-wan, to act as required; and seven battalions and twelve guns under General Romanov took up an entrenched position near that village, sending a weak flank guard of one battalion and four squadrons to the junction of the roads from the Li-ho Ling and the Hsin-kai Ling. In support of the main operation, General Gershelmann was ordered to make a demonstration from Chiao-tou against the right flank of the position, and for this purpose ten companies of infantry, three squadrons, and two mountain guns were detailed under Colonel

* General Sluchevski was an engineer officer. He joined the army in 1861 and spent the whole of his service with his own corps, until, in 1901, he was appointed to command the Xth Corps without having previously commanded a division.

Zhdanovski, of the 36th (Orel) Regiment, to move on Hsia-ma-tang. Opposed to these forces the greater portion of the Japanese 2nd Division was concentrated at Lien-shan-kuan, covered by outposts holding the mountain passes to the west. On the right were the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 16th Regiment* with three companies on the roads leading to Ta-wan, Hsiao-ku-chia-tzu, and Chiao-tou, supported by the remaining five companies at Hsia-ma-tang; in the centre, holding the Mo-tien Ling itself, were the three battalions of the 30th Regiment with a field battery, and on the left, at the Hsin-kai Ling, were some companies of the 4th Regiment. These troops covered a front of about ten miles, and held the crest line of the main ridge of the mountains, except on the extreme right, where the position was thrown out towards the north.

The attack began at 12.30 a.m. with a collision between the Russian flank guard and a company of the Japanese 4th Regiment on duty at the Hsin-kai Ling. The Japanese advanced to meet the attack and succeeded in driving the Russians back to Ma-kou-men-tzu. Supports were brought up by both sides, until five companies of the 4th Regiment succeeded in repulsing the enemy, now estimated at three battalions, and in establishing themselves on the high ground east of that village.†

The commander of the 2nd Division had not been deceived by this demonstration. On the first intimation of danger the Japanese concentrated at their various alarm posts, and when the main attack was delivered against the Mo-tien Ling at 3 a.m., the Japanese 30th Regiment was already occupying the positions which had been selected for defence, with picquets at the Old and New Temples and outposts as far forward as Li-chia-pu-tzu. The 1st Battalion was posted along the Mo-tien ridge on the south of the main road. The 2nd Battalion held the right section of the defence on the north of the same road, while the 3rd Battalion was in reserve on the eastern side of the pass awaiting orders. In line with the infantry on the ridge north of the road was a battery of field artillery, for which gun pits had been prepared some days previously. At first the Russians met with little opposition, for the Japanese picquets had been ordered to fall back, if they were attacked, upon their supports which were entrenched on the main position.

* The 1st Battalion of this regiment was detached on special duty and took no part in the fight.

† These five companies were assisted by the appearance of a battalion of guards and a battery of mountain artillery, which came up from the direction of the Li-ho Ling and threatened the Russian right, although they took no active part in the fighting. The estimate of the Russian strength at this point seems to be excessive.

Nevertheless, the advance was slow, and at 4 a.m. the Russians had only reached the wooded ridge west of the pass. At 5 a.m., their right had arrived within three or four hundred yards of the position, while the left, which stretched northward along the New Temple ridge, was still at least fifteen hundred yards distant from it. At this moment the right came under fire from the 30th Regiment, but as the attack was still pressed vigorously, two companies were sent up from the Japanese reserve to the highest point of the ridge which had hitherto been left unoccupied. Another company was hurried forward to reinforce the centre, thus reducing the reserve to a single company. From 5.40 a.m., the fire grew heavier on the Japanese left, and it seemed to the defenders that the enemy were receiving reinforcements, while the appearance of two companies on the heights north of the Hsiao-kao Ling about 6 a.m. showed that so far only the right and centre of the attack had been engaged. The Japanese guns were turned against this fresh enemy, and the Russian attack was brought to a standstill. At 8 a.m., a slight fog, which had somewhat obscured the view hitherto, began to lift and in so doing revealed two dense columns of Russians coming up to reinforce the right wing and the left centre respectively. The latter column advanced shoulder to shoulder up the valley between Rocky Hill and the New Temple, offering an ideal artillery target of which the Japanese gunners were not slow to take advantage. The fight continued for another hour, during which neither of the combatants gained any advantage, until, shortly after 9 a.m., the Russians began to withdraw the troops on the left, while those on the right maintained their ground to cover the retreat. Perceiving this movement the Japanese opened fire, rapid and magazine, from guns and rifles, and assuming the offensive took possession of the New Temple and part of the wooded spur to the south. The Russians fell back slowly towards Ta-wan, followed by the Japanese 30th Regiment, which was strengthened at 9.15 a.m. by the arrival of the 3rd Battalion of the 29th Regiment and the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, which had hitherto been in reserve about three miles in rear. The mounted troops left their horses at the Old Temple, and advanced in extended order against some companies which were holding the hill immediately west of Li-chia-pu-tzu. As the main body of the Russians retreated in front of the pursuing infantry through Chin-chia-pu-tzu to Ta-wan, they came under long range fire from the five companies of the Japanese 4th Regiment, whose movements during the morning have already been described. Nevertheless.

the retirement was conducted with almost contemptuous deliberation, and was apparently covered by the fire of the artillery which had taken no part in the attack, for about 2 p.m. a battery near Chin-chia-pu-tzu opened upon the 3rd Battalion of the 16th Regiment on the Hsiao-kao Ling ridge with considerable accuracy. The Japanese retired quickly, and had the gunners then turned their attention to the 30th Regiment, which was offering a tempting target on the ridge west of the wood, they might have inflicted severe loss. A part of the Russian rear guard also occupied the high ground just north of Chin-chia-pu-tzu, and exchanged shots with the pursuers until about 4.20 p.m., when the engagement ceased.

Passing now to the extreme right of the Japanese line, the officer commanding the 16th Regiment at Hsia-ma-tang was informed by telephone of the Russian movement against the Hsin-kai Ling, and at once warned the companies on outpost duty that a general attack was possible. Several hours passed and, at 5.40 a.m., the 6th Company, which was on the Hsiao-ku-chia-tzu road, was attacked by eight companies* of Russian infantry who had made a long night march from the valley of the Lan Ho. For an hour this single Japanese company held its own against greatly superior numbers until, at 9 a.m., two more companies of the same battalion arrived from Hsia-ma-tang. The position was still critical, for the regimental commander had been deprived of the greater part of his 3rd Battalion which he had been ordered to send to the Hsiao-kao Ling, and he had no more than two companies in hand. Fortunately for the Japanese, this battalion was replaced by the 2nd Battalion of the 29th Regiment, which arrived at 4.50 p.m. from the general reserve of the division. The forces were then approximately equal, and after some very sharp fighting the Russians were finally repulsed.

Still further north, the company on outpost duty on the Chiao-tou road was attacked at 11.50 a.m. by eight Russian companies and a squadron of cavalry,* which came up from the direction of Hsiao-ku-chia-tzu. This was probably the detachment under Colonel Zhdanovski which had been sent by General Gershelmann from Chiao-tou. The Japanese outpost company was driven back upon its prepared line of resistance, where it was joined by a company of engineers sent up from the divisional reserve at Lien-shan-kuan. The Russian demonstration was very half-hearted; the attack was not pushed with any determination and, at 12.40 p.m., the assailants began to withdraw.

* These are estimates of the Russian strength taken from Japanese sources; they agree very closely with the actual strength given on p. 261.

Thus all the four attacking columns had been beaten with a loss in killed and wounded of more than one thousand officers and men. Including the 1st Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division (eight battalions), at least eighteen and a half Russian battalions had been employed. On the other hand, the Japanese had brought into action nearly all the infantry of the 2nd Division, the divisional cavalry, one battery of artillery, and a company of engineers; their casualties amounted to four officers and seventy-one men killed, and fifteen officers and two hundred and sixty-five men wounded, or little more than one-third of the losses they had inflicted on their assailants.

Whether the results achieved and the information gained were commensurate with the sacrifices made, can only be known to those in the councils of the Russian commander-in-chief, but General Nishi had been compelled to use a part, at least, of all the units under his command, and this should certainly have revealed the position of the Japanese 2nd Division, and done something to dispel the uncertainty which existed at Liao-yang. If, on the other hand, Count Keller had hoped to recapture the Mo-tien Ling his operation must be pronounced a failure; and if such were indeed his intention it is remarkable that the infantry was not supported by the guns.

On the date upon which the Russian attack against the Mo-tien Ling took place, the Japanese 12th Division was still only a few miles west of Sai-ma-chi. This division suffered even more than the others from bad roads, and, until the 15th July, in spite of liberal pecuniary inducements,* could not procure sufficient local transport to enable it to resume the march, which had been interrupted by the heavy rain. At length by dint of great exertions, these difficulties were overcome; 12,000 military coolies were employed to accompany the advance on this one short piece of road, and on the 18th July the leading brigade, the 23rd, reached the neighbourhood of Chiao-tou.† This village, which was still in the hands of the Russians under General Gershelmann, was of considerable importance, for it lay on the main route to Liao-yang by way of An-ping and close to a good road which, after crossing the Tai-tzu River, leads through Pen-hsi-hu to the Mukden highway. Moreover, until it had been captured, the Second and Guard

* 12 to 16 *sen* (3*d.* to 4*d.*) was paid for every *ri* (2½ miles) over which 2 *to* (about 60 lbs.) of rice were carried. A carter could thus earn 30 *yen* (£3) a day. Free rations were also issued for men and animals.

† This action is called Sihoyen in most of the foreign accounts which have been published.

Divisions could not safely cross the Lan Ho, for their right flank would lie open to attack.

The strategical value of this point had been recognized by General Rennenkampf, who at the end of June had entrusted its defence to Major-General Shatilov with a mixed force, which consisted of the 23rd East Siberian Rifles, the 1st Argun Cossack Regiment, and some old mountain guns, while the remainder of the Cossack Brigade retired by Tao-ting-shan to Hsiao-hsi-erh.* When the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment was replaced by the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, General Rennenkampf attempted to make his way from Hsiao-hsi-erh by Fan-chia-pu-tzu to Chiao-tou. On the 13th July, when north of Fan-chia-pu-tzu he came unexpectedly upon a company of Japanese infantry, and a smart action ensued, during which the Russians lost about one hundred men and General Rennenkampf was wounded. The command of the cavalry then devolved upon General Liubavin, who retired to Hsiao-hsi-erh. About the same date the 2nd Daghestan Cavalry Regiment, the 11th (Pskov) Regiment, and half a battery of artillery belonging to the 3rd Infantry Division, of the XVIIth Army Corps, were sent from Mukden† to reinforce the garrison of Pen-hsi-hu, which already consisted of one battalion of the 1st Siberian Infantry Regiment and two Frontier Guard guns.

To return to the Japanese 12th Division, a reconnaissance revealed the fact that the Russians were present in force, and

The Russian
position at
Chiao-tou.

that they were in position west of Chiao-tou at a point where the valley, through which the road to Liao-yang runs, narrows until it becomes a defile about one and a half miles in breadth.

Further to the east, near the village, the valley is blocked by a long, low spur thrust out eastward from the mountains on the southern side. Across the southern front and round the end of the spur, through a gap between it and the mountains on the north of the valley, runs the Hsi River. Shortly before it enters the gap this stream is joined by another coming from the direction of Sai-ma-chi. Both streams are generally fordable, and their shelving banks afford no cover. The spur at its northern extremity stands about sixty feet above the Hsi Ho, but where it issues from the main range on the south of the valley it rises to a height of about three hundred feet above the plain.

The Russian left and centre held the spur, along the crest of

* This force was at first under Colonel Grekov and was usually known as "Grekov's Detachment."

† These troops, and the garrison of Pen-hsi-hu were under the command of Colonel Grulev.

which were deep and narrow shelter trenches with good communication to the rear; while the right, which for the most part was not entrenched, was placed on the slopes of the high ground bordering the south side of the valley. Pits had been prepared for twice as many guns as actually took part in the action, but the ground for nearly a mile in front of them was dead. Moreover, the millet crop on the plain east of the spur had attained a height sufficient to cover to some extent the approach of an enemy. The line of retreat ran westward through a well-marked defile for about three miles, and the whole position was commanded, at a distance of something under a mile, from a hill to the north-east. The southern and western faces of this height were very precipitous, but from the other directions the ascent presented no serious difficulties; yet the tactical advantage which might have been derived from it does not seem to have been realized by the attack, for no attempt was made to seize it during the night.

While Major-General Kigoshi, commanding the 23rd Brigade, was examining the Russian position, the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 46th Regiment, which formed the advanced guard, received a report from one of his section commanders that a large force of the enemy was retreating towards Pen-hsi-hu. He at once pushed forward in pursuit, but his action proved to be somewhat hasty. He soon found himself involved in a serious action* and was forced to retire to a sunken ditch near Chiao-tou, where the whole of the 46th Regiment, supported by the 2nd Battalion of the 24th Regiment, continued to fight till 9 p.m. During the night the remaining units of the 12th Division took up position as they arrived upon the scene and prepared to carry out their commander's plan for renewing the attack on the Russians, whose force consisted of seven battalions of the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, the 1st Argun Cossack Regiment, thirty-two field and seven mountain guns. The 23rd Brigade was to advance directly against the position, while the 47th Regiment of the 12th Brigade was posted on the Pen-hsi-hu road to oppose a possible hostile movement of Colonel Grulev's troops which were known to be in that direction. The 14th Regiment and the divisional engineer battalion were in reserve under General Inouye.

About 5 a.m. on the 19th, the six mountain batteries of the 12th Division opened fire from two positions, which had been occupied and entrenched before daybreak. The Russian guns replied, and for an

Action of the
Japanese ad-
vanced guard.

Action at
Chiao-tou.

* The 1st Battalion of the 46th Regiment on the 18th July lost 247 killed and wounded.

hour a heavy duel was maintained in which the well-concealed positions of the Japanese guns gave them the advantage. At 7 a.m., while the artillery of both sides was thus engaged, the 14th Regiment, less the 3rd Battalion,* was dispatched through the mountains to the south to make an enveloping movement against the Russian right. Its route lay through a pathless district difficult to cross on foot, and a scorching sun added to the fatigue of the march. Opposite the front of the Russian position the men of the 23rd Brigade worked their way forward in extended order, advancing rapidly in groups of ten or less, and by the afternoon a considerable number had collected under cover of the village of Chiao-tou, where the development of the flank attack was awaited. By half-past two several of the Russian guns had been withdrawn from the main position on the spur, and as the fire grew momentarily slacker the infantry of the 23rd Brigade, which had maintained an intermittent fire throughout the morning, deployed from the village along a sunken lane. At 3 p.m.† half of the Japanese batteries moved forward in support of the attack to a fresh position nearer to the Russian trenches, on which a heavy fire was soon directed. By this time the 14th Regiment, after a tedious march of nearly eighteen miles, during which it had lost its way, had come up opposite the Russian right, where it had been joined by two companies from the 16th Regiment of the 2nd Division. The Russian retreat was now threatened, but for some time these troops were held in check by five companies of the 36th (Orel) Regiment and the mountain guns which were protecting the Russian right flank. The time thus gained enabled General Gershelmann to withdraw his troops from the main position, and by half-past four many of the defenders had left the trenches. Gradually the stream of fugitives increased, and at 5.10 p.m., the whole Japanese line advanced, and occupied the spur.

Meanwhile the commander of the 14th Regiment, observing that the Russians as they retired were reassembling at a point about three thousand yards behind the line of trenches, decided not to follow up by a direct advance but, without attracting notice, to take position on their flank. Here he retained his troops until

* Two companies remained in reserve, the other two joined the troops on the right flank, about which General Inouye was very anxious.

† One account states that about 3 p.m. there was a race, which resulted in favour of the Japanese, to secure the high ground north-east of the position. Another account says that about 8 a.m. on the 19th some men of the Japanese 46th Regiment drove a small party of Russians off this hill and occupied it, with the result that two companies of the 24th Regiment were able to move round behind them and threaten the Russian left.

the holders of the trenches on the spur were making towards the rear, when he suddenly threw himself against them from the south and south-west. This attack came as a surprise, and the Russians being taken at a disadvantage where the ground afforded little cover, suffered heavy loss. Nevertheless, part of their force resisted stubbornly, covering the retirement of the remainder, who fell back in some disorder towards Yu-shu-ling.

The two days' action at Chiao-tou cost the Japanese a loss of five hundred and thirty-one of all ranks,* while the Russian losses were nine officers and three hundred and fifty men killed and wounded, and sixty prisoners. The withdrawal of the guns early in the afternoon of the 19th leads to the conclusion that General Gershelmann intended merely to delay the Japanese advance. If this be so the position which he occupied was not well chosen for that purpose, for, as already mentioned, troops falling back upon Yu-shu-ling would be forced to make their way over open ground exposed to fire for a distance of about three miles. Under such conditions infantry would suffer most, but in spite of this fact, no use appears to have been made of the Cossack regiment, while the field guns, which far outranged the mountain batteries of the Japanese, did little to retard pursuit.

While the main action was in progress the detached force on the Pen-hsi-hu—Mukden road encountered a battalion of infantry and some cavalry. After a skirmish lasting about four hours the Russians retired to the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, with a loss of one killed and thirteen wounded. The Japanese had seven men wounded. By this success the First Army at last succeeded in straightening out its line, and all three divisions were now in favourable positions for the direct advance upon Liao-yang.

During the ten days following the action at Chiao-tou, the main positions of the Japanese troops remained unchanged, but on the 20th July, General Kuropatkin was further strengthened by the arrival at Liao-yang of the leading troops of the 3rd Infantry Division, belonging to the XVIIth Army Corps commanded by Lieutenant-General Bilderling. On the following day the Russian commander-in-chief returned to Liao-yang from Mukden, and at once announced that the Xth Corps, under his personal direction, was to move out against General Kuroki's army.† The 22nd July was employed in handing over

Arrival of the
Russian 3rd
Infantry Division
from Europe.

* Killed, 2 officers and 79 men ; wounded, 17 officers and 433 men.

† The exact object of this movement is not clear. General Kuropatkin had formed no definite plan for a vigorous offensive, but apparently his intention was to attack the right of the First Army should a favourable opportunity arise.

outposts and garrison duties to the XVIIth Corps, and on the 23rd General Sluchevski started for An-ping, where he was to be joined by the 1st Brigade of the 9th Division and by the 121st Infantry Regiment. The troops which had taken part in the battle of Chiao-tou had already retired to Ku-hsia-tzu, where they had been joined by the Terek-Kuban Cavalry Regiment, and thus the only remaining units of the Xth Corps, which were available to accompany General Sluchevski were the 122nd Regiment of the 31st Division, and one regiment of Orenburg Cossacks.

From Liao-yang to Ku-hsia-tzu is a march of about twenty-five miles, and the whole of the Xth Corps, with the exception of the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Infantry Division and three regiments of cavalry, were concentrated on the 24th on the Lan Ho, with outposts on the Shih Shan ridge overlooking Yu-shu-ling. Guarding the road from Mukden, and threatening the right flank of the Japanese 12th Division, was General Liubavin's cavalry, which had joined Colonel Grulev's detachment in Pen-hsi-hu. Six regiments of cavalry and very nearly two whole divisions of infantry under General Kuropatkin in person, were now massed against the Japanese right, but it was decided that no attack could be delivered, as the information about the enemy was not sufficiently definite. In this way four valuable days were wasted, and it was not until the 29th July that any further move was made. On that date the 122nd Regiment was pushed out to Fu-chia Shan, which was held by a Japanese outpost too weak to offer any resistance, and on the same evening General Sluchevski* issued the following orders for the 30th and 31st (See Plan 13):—

Offensive
movement of
Xth Russian
Corps against
Japanese 12th
Division.

General
Sluchevski's
orders.

“La-kou-ling, 29th July, 1904.†

“The enemy's advanced guard, strength about one infantry brigade with 18 guns and 6 squadrons, has occupied Chiao-tou. His main body is reported to be concentrated east of Chiao-tou. In the event of the enemy attacking, the army corps will come into action upon the heights to the east of the village of Men-chia-pu.

* General Kuropatkin had returned to Liao-yang on receiving news of General Zarubaiev's retreat from Ta-shih-chiao.

One account states that General Kuropatkin's final orders to General Sluchevski were, that if the Japanese attempted to advance by Pen-hsi-hu he was to attack with the utmost vigour; if they advanced on Liao-yang he was to oppose them to the last.

† von Tettau, *Eighteen Months with the Russian Army in Manchuria*, vol. i, p. 372.

Advanced Guard.—Lt.-Gen. Mau.

1st Brigade, 31st Infantry	
Division	7½ battalions.
31st Artillery Brigade...	40 guns.
1st Argun Cossack Regiment	1 squadron.
6th Engineer Battalion ...	1 company.

Main Body.—Maj.-Gen. Gershelmann.

1st Brigade, 9th Infantry	
Division	7 battalions.
9th Artillery Brigade ...	40 guns.
1st East Siberian Mountain	
Battery	5 guns.
1st Argun Cossack Battery ...	1 squadron.
6th Engineer Battalion ...	1 company.

Right Flank Detachment.—Maj.-Gen. Martson.

2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry	
Division	8 battalions.
9th Artillery Brigade ...	8 guns.
1st East Siberian Mountain	
Battery	2 guns.
Terek-Kuban Cavalry Regi-	
ment	2 squadrons.
1st Argun Cossack Regiment	½ squadron.
6th Engineer Battalion ...	1 company.

Left Flank Detachment.—Maj.-Gen. Grekov.

34th Syev Regiment	1 battalion.
1st Orenburg Cossack Regi-	
ment	5 squadrons.
1st Argun Cossack Regiment	1 squadron.

“(1) The advanced guard will engage the enemy on the line now occupied by its outposts; that position must therefore be held in sufficient force, and will be fortified without delay.

“(2) The main body will take up a position as follows:—

a. 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division (33rd Elets and 2 Battalions 34th Syev Regiments) east of La-kou-ling.

b. The artillery, escorted by one battalion of the Syev Regiment, near Tun-chia-pu.

“(3) The Right Flank Detachment will cover the work being carried out for the improvement of the road Li-pi-yu—Nan-shan, and will secure the right flank of the army corps with which it will maintain close touch on its left. It will also maintain touch with Count Keller's force on its right.

“(4) The Left Flank Detachment will cover the left flank of the army corps near the village of Liu-hsia-la-tzu,* and will maintain touch with the army corps on its right and with General Liubavin's detachment on its left.

“(5) The Terek-Kuban Cavalry Regiment (4 squadrons) will be in reserve to the 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. The scout detachment with this regiment will maintain touch with the left flank detachment. Captain Kasanovich's scouts will be placed at the disposal of the O.C. 121st (Penza)† Infantry Regiment for the purpose of reconnoitring on the right flank and of maintaining touch with the right flank detachment.

* North of the Yu-shu Ling plan (No. 13).

† The 121st Penza Regiment occupied the right section (south of the Yu-shu Ling) of the position allotted to the 1st Brigade, 31st Infantry Division, to which the regiment belonged.

- “(6) Reports will be sent to the village La-kou-ling.
- “(7) The principal dressing station will be established between the pass west of La-kou-ling and the village Ku-hsia-tzu.
- “(8) Second line transport will be sent back to the village Tun-chia-pu. Each division will detail one company and one section of Cossacks as escort.
- “(9) The Artillery Park Brigade* will take up a position in front of the village of Ku-hsia-tzu.
- “(10) Next for command: Lieutenant-General Mau; Major-General Gershelmann.”


The instructions of the Russian commander laid great stress upon the importance of a methodical advance and of fortifying each successive position as it was captured. In this spirit the Xth Corps entered upon its task. The occupation of Fu-chia Shan on the Russian left was succeeded, on the 30th, by the occupation of the Western Pien Ling on the right by the 35th Regiment, but no attempt was made to follow up these two successful moves, and in spite of the orders the pass was not entrenched.

So far all had gone well with the Russians, but the concentration of so many troops could hardly be kept secret, and the five days' delay had given General Kuroki ample time to make his arrangements. The possible danger to his right flank, separated as it was from his centre and left by fourteen miles of broken mountainous country, had long been foreseen. Now that it had actually arisen the Japanese commander met it, not by reinforcing the 12th Division, as a less determined man might have done, but by a general attack along his whole twenty miles of front. In preparation for the struggle, General Asada's detachment had been recalled from the neighbourhood of Hsiu-yen, and five battalions of *Kobi* troops, with a squadron, a battery, and a company of engineers, had been called up from Feng-huang-cheng and Sai-ma-chi to strengthen the 12th Division.†

The ground over which the battle was about to take place was divided into two distinct sections by an intricate mass of pathless hills, and was traversed throughout its length by the Lan Ho, as it flowed northward to join the Tai-tzu. In the southern section General Kuroki, with the Guard and 2nd Divisions, was opposed

* *i.e.*, Ammunition Column.

† For the *Kobi* troops which were present at the battle of Yu-shu Ling, see Appendix K.



COUNTRY ROUND THE MO-TIEN LING.

VIEW LOOKING WEST FROM NEW TEMPLE.

to Count Keller with the 3rd and 6th East Siberian Rifle Divisions; in the northern section General Inouye, with the Japanese 12th Division, faced General Sluchevski with the Xth Corps, and General Liubavin with a mixed force of all arms. Taking the former section first, the position held by Count Keller formed a rough semicircle, of which the centre was the Yang-tzu Ling. Over this pass ran the direct road from the Mo-tien Ling, through An-ping, to Liao-yang. About a mile west of the crest line, this road was joined by another, which left the valley of the Lan Ho at the village of Chu-chia-pu-tzu and followed the bed of a steep and narrow gully. These were the two roads which the left of the First Army was compelled to use in the next step of the advance on Liao-yang, and hence the importance of the position. Down from the Yang-tzu Ling runs a small stream which joins the Lan Ho at Ta-wan; as it reaches the low ground the valley narrows gradually until, at the point where it joins the valley of the main river, the heights enclosing it, upon which the Russian troops were placed, are but three hundred yards apart. Just at this point the Russian position presented a sharp salient, beneath which there was an area of dead ground distinctly favourable to the attack. Nevertheless, the heights themselves were so rugged and broken that they could only be scaled with the greatest difficulty; and at one point, upon which stood a Russian battery, the southern spur dropped in a sheer precipice eighty feet to the bed of the river. But before the shelter of the dead ground could be reached the Japanese troops must cross the valley of the Lan Ho, from five hundred to one thousand yards in width, and during the passage they would be exposed to the full effects of the Russian infantry and artillery fire. The river itself was not a formidable obstacle, since at that season it was not more than two feet deep; but the various valleys running down to it from the Mo-tien Ling were thoroughly commanded by the Russian guns, which were placed in skilfully selected positions about four or five hundred feet above the stream. The villages in the valley of the Lan Ho were also occupied, but, by a strange oversight, they were not prepared for defence, and the crops were left standing. The position was, on the whole, a strong one, but was suited only to a passive defence for, although means for internal communication had been carefully prepared, it did not lend itself readily to counter-attack.

In a telegram dated the 14th July, General Kuropatkin had given directions that not more than a brigade of infantry, with as little artillery as possible, was to be left to dispute the crossing of

the river. The defence of the main position was accordingly entrusted to the 2nd Brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, supported by no more than twenty-eight of the available guns. To the south, and on the far side of the valley up which runs the road from Chu-chia-pu-tzu to An-ping, was another mountain spur which was held as an advanced post by the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment. At the head of the same valley, a mile further to the west, stood the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment guarding the approaches from the south and watching for a possible turning movement. The 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division was employed partly as a general reserve, and partly in a number of scattered detachments to guard the flanks. The artillery of this division was at Chin-erh-tun.

Twelve miles north of the Mo-tien Ling, General Inouye was facing the Russian Xth Corps. The position he had taken up was peculiar and merits particular attention. On the 19th July, he had gained possession of the ridge at Chiao-tou after a stiff fight. Five miles further west was a second ridge stretching right across the valley of the Hsi Ho from Fu-chia Shan in the north to the Pien Ling in the south. Between these two ridges is a broad and open valley. Into this open stretch of country General Inouye advanced deliberately on the night of the 20th July, and proceeded to construct a deep and solid line of entrenchments in the cultivated plain. At first sight it would appear that there were but two courses open, either to remain on the Chiao-tou position or to advance to the second, or Shih Shan, ridge. But General Inouye thought otherwise, and probably with good reason; for formidable as the Shih Shan is against an attack from the east, it is commanded by heights further west, and could not have been held easily against an attack. Moreover, by entrenching himself in the open he lessened the distance he would have to advance to the assault when the time came, and provided himself with a convenient rallying place should his attack fail.*

Two points remain to be noted. First, that the wings of the Russian army were separated by the valley of the Lan Ho, and were considerably further apart than were those of the Japanese. Secondly, that while General Kuroki held undivided control, Count Keller, General Sluchevski, and General Liubavin all acted independently. Thus the Japanese commander, though inferior in strength to his opponents, was in a much better position to manœuvre; and it will be seen that while the attack was a

* Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any reliable map of the country between Hsia-ma-tang and the Pien Ling.

perfectly combined operation, the defence lacked both cohesion and control.

General Kuroki's plan may be summed up as follows:—

- General Kuroki's
plan of attack.
- (1) To turn the enemy's right flank with the Guard Division.
 - (2) To attempt to hold the troops on the heights about Ta-wan to their positions by demonstrating with the 2nd Division.
 - (3) To concentrate detachments from the 2nd and 12th Divisions against the enemy on the Pien Ling.
 - (4) To drive in the left of the Xth Corps at the Yu-shu Ling with the remainder of the 12th Division.

To carry out the first of these operations the Guard Division left its bivouacs in three columns* at 10.45 p.m. on the night of the 30th July. The left column marched all night and well into the following day. By noon it reached a point about two and a half miles north-west of Han-chia-pu-tzu where it found itself confronted by four battalions of the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, posted in an extremely strong position. The Japanese were greatly fatigued by their long march, and beyond a little skirmishing, in which one man was killed, these battalions did nothing for the rest of the day. The field battery which was attached to this column could not accompany it over the very rough ground, and was ordered to return to the mouth of the Pa-pan Ling, where it came into action later.

The Japanese
left column.

- * Left column, under Major-General Asada, to move viâ Ma-chia-pu-tzu—
- 3 battalions of infantry less 1 company (2nd Guard Regiment).
 - 2½ troops of cavalry.
 - 1 battery of field artillery.
 - ½ company of engineers.

- Centre column, under Colonel Yamada, to move viâ the Pa-pan Ling—
- 3 battalions of infantry (1st Guard Regiment).
 - 3 troops of cavalry.
 - 1 battery of mountain artillery (borrowed from the 12th Division).
 - ¾ company of engineers.

- Right column, under Major-General Watanabe—
- 5 battalions of infantry.
 - 1½ troops of cavalry.
 - 5 batteries of field artillery.
 - 2 companies of engineers.

Of the right column, three battalions of the 4th Guard Regiment with three field batteries were to march viâ the Hsin-kai Ling to Ma-kou-men-tzu, while two battalions of the 3rd Guard Regiment and two field batteries were to move viâ the Li-ho Ling into the Shui-ta-yang-tzu valley, by a road which had been made practicable for field guns during the previous afternoon. Divisional head-quarters, with the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Guard Regiment in reserve, was to follow the centre column.

Meanwhile the centre column advanced into the valley of the Lan Ho under cover of darkness, and when day broke on the morning of the 31st, it found its way barred by two or three companies of Russian infantry which were holding the villages of Ku-chia-pu-tzu and Han-chia-pu-tzu, as well as the hills above them. Aided by their mountain battery the Japanese cleared the villages, and by midday they reached a point a mile and a half north-west of Han-chia-pu-tzu, and less than a mile east of General Asada's detachment. Colonel Yamada then placed himself under the command of his brigadier, but his troops remained throughout the day under the fire of two Russian batteries, which, however, did not inflict much damage, as their casualties amounted only to about sixty.

Although the turning movement of the 1st and 2nd Guard Regiments failed to produce any great result, it had the effect of simplifying the task of the right column; for the Russians were prevented from reinforcing the troops near Shui-ta-yang-tzu and Chu-chia-pu-tzu. At 7.50 a.m., the two batteries with the 3rd Guard Regiment advanced into the valley of the Lan Ho and engaged the Russian guns south of the Yang-tzu Ling. The Japanese artillery was inferior to that of their enemy both in range and in rapidity of fire, and by 8.20 a.m. the gunners were compelled to leave their guns in position while they themselves took cover, whence they emerged at frequent intervals throughout the day to take part in the action. At 9 a.m., the infantry attack began with the advance of one company of the 2nd Battalion 3rd Guard Regiment, covered by the fire of the remainder of the battalion, against the south side of Shui-ta-yang-tzu. The valley was here about six hundred yards wide and covered with crops. The river was crossed successfully and, at 9.30 a.m., the village was entered from the south, but the Russians held on to the northern edge for some time longer. As soon as a lodgment had been effected, the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Guard Regiment crossed the valley near Ku-chia-pu-tzu and worked its way northward along the face of the hill held by the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment, until it reached the village of Shui-ta-yang-tzu, where it was joined by the company from the 2nd Battalion which had crossed previously. By 10.30 a.m., the firing line was occupying a spur with its left just below the crest of the main position, where it was sheltered from the Russian artillery, and was supported by the fire of the three remaining companies of the 2nd Battalion, which were still

on the eastern side of the valley.* The men were exhausted by their exertions, for the heat was very great, and both rest and food were required before the advance could be resumed. During this lull the 3rd Battalion was joined by the mountain battery and by two companies of infantry from the centre column. The mountain guns at once opened a flanking fire on the Russian batteries south of the Yang-tzu Ling, and claim to have put three guns out of action. About the same time, 11.50 a.m., four guns of the battery which had been sent back from the left column came into action just north of the village of Ku-chia-pu-tzu, and shelled the ridge which runs north-east towards Chu-chia-pu-tzu. Aided by these reinforcements, the infantry attack was resumed at midday, and the defenders were driven back to the last spur south of the Chu-chia-pu-tzu—An-ping road. The combatants were now holding two spurs connected at their western extremities by the main range of hills, and separated elsewhere only by a deep gully, which varied from two hundred to four hundred yards in width. If the Japanese attempted to cross the ridge on their left they came under fire from the Russian guns; if they attempted to traverse the gully they were met by enfilade fire from the vicinity of Chu-chia-pu-tzu and from the crest line. The shooting of the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment was very good, and although the Japanese were able to hold their own without difficulty they were quite unable to make any further advance.

During all these hours the 4th Guard Regiment stood fast near Ma-kou-men-tzu awaiting news from General Asada's brigade.

The 4th Guard Regiment. The field telephones had broken down, and as the Japanese carried no equipment for visual signaling General Watanabe was ignorant of the fact that the greater part of the 3rd Regiment had crossed the river. However, at 1 p.m., believing that the whole of his column was on the eastern side of the valley he gave orders for a general advance against the hills near Yang-mu-lin-tzu, the 4th Regiment to follow the 3rd. About 3 p.m., while waiting for this attack to develop, he received similar orders from the divisional commander who had just heard that the turning movement against the Russian right had failed, and had sent three companies from the reserve to assist the 3rd Regiment near Shui-ta-yang-tzu. Still General Watanabe thought it better to wait until he saw some signs of an advance on his left, but at 5 p.m. hearing heavy firing to the north he decided to send forward the 4th Regiment without any more delay. Two

* These three companies did not move from their original position until midnight, when they crossed the river and found that the Russians had retired.

battalions therefore advanced directly against Yang-mu-lin-tzu. The village was only lightly held, and the Japanese after passing through it succeeded in capturing a knoll some eight hundred yards further to the south-west about 6 p.m. The defenders, who belonged to the 23rd and 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, then fell back to the main prepared position where they remained until nightfall. This attack by the 4th Guard Regiment owed such success as it achieved largely to the action of the 2nd Division on its right. Until news was received that General Asada's attack had failed, the action of the 2nd Division was confined to an artillery bombardment, directed principally against the Russian batteries north of the Yang-tzu Ling. When, however, it became evident that the Guard Division could make no further progress, the 2nd Division was ordered to move against the heights north of Ta-wan. Four battalions from this Division had already been sent to help the 12th Division against the Russian Xth Corps, and half of the 16th Regiment was three miles away to the north watching the right of the division with the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. Six and a half battalions were, therefore, all that remained, and of these six were at once sent forward. Two battalions of the 29th Regiment moved south of the Mo-tien Ling—Yang-tzu Ling road; four more battalions advanced just south of Tien-shui-tien.

Here, as in other parts of the field, the Russian troops made but a feeble attempt to hold their advanced positions, and retired slowly to the main ridge, and the battery which had been posted all day on the spur south-west of Ta-wan moved off shortly after 5 p.m. In other respects this attack also failed to make any real impression, and the troops bivouacked with the full intention of renewing the attack in the morning. But although the Russians had held their own successfully throughout a long day, they had suffered a heavy loss through the death of their gallant commander, Count Keller, who was killed about 2 p.m. He was succeeded in the command by General Kashtalinski, who arrived on the position at 7 p.m., and having made himself acquainted with the situation, proposed to call up part of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division from the reserve. About 10 p.m., however, after holding a council of war, General Kashtalinski decided to retire, a course which hardly seems to have been necessitated by the tactical situation at the close of the fighting on the 31st. The defenders had employed only the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division. Another whole division, the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, had been held in reserve, while the Japanese had but two battalions which had not yet been committed to the

attack. It appears that General Kuropatkin sent a telegram, which was received late at night, advising the commander of the "Eastern Force" not to use up the troops in reserve, since the direction of the enemy's attack had not yet revealed itself. But this telegram seems only to have arrived after General Kashtalinski had decided to abandon the field. It is possible that he may have been influenced by information of the Russian retirement from Hsi-mu-cheng in front of the Japanese Fourth Army, and by the result of the fighting at the Yu-shu Ling, where the Xth Corps had been very roughly handled.

It will be remembered that the 35th Regiment, belonging to the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, occupied the

Yu-shu Ling. The Russian right flank detachment at the Pien Ling. Western Pien Ling on the 30th July. Later, it was reinforced by the remainder of the brigade, a battery of field artillery, two mountain guns, two and a half squadrons of cavalry, and one company of engineers; the whole under the command of

Major-General Martson. At the Pien Ling, this force, which was known as the right flank detachment, was in a position to block two roads which cross the mountains lying between the Hsi Ho and the Lan Ho, and to guard the right flank of the main body on the Shih Shan and Fu-chia Shan heights. Moreover, had the Russian advance been continued it might have been able to interpose between the right and centre of General Kuroki's army. The brigade was, therefore, in a good position strategically; but it was somewhat isolated and had not taken the precaution to entrench itself. For this neglect it was to pay dearly. The existence, but not the strength, of the detachment was known to the Japanese, and General Kuroki decided to concentrate against it four battalions from his 2nd Division, and such troops as could be spared from the 12th Division.

In accordance with this plan, the 14th Regiment, two battalions of the 47th Regiment, a mountain battery, a squadron of cavalry and a company of engineers, under Major-General Sasaki, left their bivouac near Chiao-tou at 3.30 a.m. on the 31st July. At 5.30 a.m., the 14th Regiment came into contact with three companies of the

General Sasaki's attack on the Pien Ling. 35th Regiment posted just north of the Eastern Pien Ling. As soon as the Japanese battery opened fire the Russians retired to the Western Pien Ling, which was held by two battalions of the

35th Regiment and eleven companies of the 36th Regiment. At 7.30 a.m., the Japanese commander, who was still ignorant of the numbers opposed to him, brought up one battalion of the 47th Regiment from his reserve and advanced to the attack. For some

reason General Martson's guns were still in the neighbourhood of Li-pi-yu, with the result that when the Japanese battery again came into action, about 8 a.m., it was free to devote all its attention to the infantry. Being without artillery, General Martson replied by bringing up his reserve (four companies of the 35th Regiment and five companies of the 36th Regiment) and attempting to envelop the Japanese left. In this he was unsuccessful. The Japanese held their own on the threatened flank and, supported by their artillery and by their last reserve battalion, they pressed the attack vigorously against the Russian left. By 10 a.m. the Russian troops holding the hills north of the pass had been defeated, and finding his retreat endangered, not only by General Sasaki but also by General Okasaki coming up from the south, General Martson gave orders for a retreat.

As the retiring Russians passed down the narrow defile to Li-pi-yu they were caught in flank by the troops which had been detached from the 2nd Division.* Leaving their camp at Hsia-ma-tang at 1.30 a.m., these four battalions had marched all night through very difficult country. At 7.30 a.m., when about two miles south of the Pien Ling, the Japanese advanced guard was fired upon by some Russian troops which were guarding General Martson's right flank. For nearly two hours the Russians held their ground, but soon after 9 a.m. began to retreat towards Li-pi-yu, followed by the Japanese advanced guard, whose strength was now about two battalions. On reaching the Russian position, the Japanese saw the main body of General Martson's brigade making its way down the valley from Pien Ling. The rest of General Okasaki's detachment then came up and, moving off to a commanding position west of the road, poured a heavy fire into the retreating columns at close range. In places the path was so narrow that the Russians could not move more than four abreast, and so steep were the hill-sides that they were quite unable either to deploy for attack, or to make any effective reply to the Japanese fire. In this short space the losses suffered amounted to five or six hundred killed and wounded, and the remainder of the column was only saved by the arrival of four squadrons of the Terek-Kuban Cavalry Regiment which appeared on the heights above Li-pi-yu. These fresh troops checked the Japanese advance with rifle and machine gun fire until 2 p.m., when General Martson's infantry had succeeded in reaching the Lan Ho, where orders were received from General Sluchevski to "occupy the heights right and left of Li-pi-yu at any cost." General Martson felt

* 30th Regiment, and 2nd Battalion, 16th Regiment.

compelled to reply that his troops were quite worn out, and were unable to protect the flank of the main body. They were therefore replaced by two battalions of the 33rd Infantry Regiment and were withdrawn to La-kou-ling, where they remained in reserve.

While General Okasaki was thus completing the work of defeating the Russian right flank detachment, General Sasaki's first intention was to advance towards Li-pi-yu, and at 12.45 p.m. the two battalions of the 47th Regiment started in pursuit of the enemy. However, about 2 p.m., the Japanese commander was informed that, in co-operation with the Okasaki detachment, he was to advance against the right flank of the enemy who was opposing General Inouye near the Yu-shu Ling. The pursuit was then stopped, but it was not until 6 p.m. that the 14th Regiment and the battery of artillery were ready to move towards the North Pien Ling. Another hour passed before the two battalions of the 47th Regiment returned and, although General Sasaki was at last able to comply with his orders, it was already too late for him to produce any effect upon the fight between the main bodies of the Xth Corps and the Japanese 12th Division.

The disposition of General Sluchevski's corps has already been given in his orders for the 30th and 31st July.* The Japanese troops available for the attack, after deducting the force detailed for the capture of the Pien Ling, consisted of General Kigoshi's brigade, one battalion of General Sasaki's brigade, four mountain batteries, one field battery,† three squadrons of cavalry, and five battalions of *Kobi* troops. Of the above, the cavalry, supported by the *Kobi* troops, was employed on the right flank, watching the detachment under General Liubavin known to be about Pen-hsi-hu. The duty of attacking the position was entrusted to General Kigoshi, and the only general reserve retained was the single battalion of General Sasaki's brigade.

At 4 a.m. on the 31st July, General Kigoshi's brigade advanced to the attack. The 24th Regiment moved south of the Hsi Ho, against the Russian right on the Shih Shan ridge; while the commander of the 46th Regiment sent the 1st Battalion against

* The orders to the advanced guard were not carried out in their entirety, as only 2 batteries (16 guns) were brought up to Shih Shan. The remainder of the artillery (64 field and 5 mountain guns) remained near Tun-chia-pu. One account places 3 batteries on Shih Shan.

† It may have been this field battery which was lent to the 12th Division in exchange for the mountain battery sent to the Guard Division. See footnote, p. 275.

The Japanese
attack on the
Russian position
Fu-chia Shan—
Shih Shan.

Fu-chia Shan, the 2nd against the height 500, and kept the 3rd Battalion in reserve. The 24th Regiment occupied Lien Shan without opposition, but between that point and the Russian position at Shih Shan was an open valley, over which it was not thought advisable to advance until General Sasaki, after defeating the brigade at the Pien Ling, should be able to turn the right of the main position. For reasons which have already been given, this assistance was not forthcoming, and the 24th Regiment took no further part in the action.

North of the river, the battalion which was advancing directly against Fu-chia Shan reached the foot of the hill under cover of darkness. There the men were able to lie down, in a convenient area of dead ground, while waiting for the development of the attack upon their right. As day broke the camp of the 122nd (Tambov) Regiment, which lay below hill 500, was alarmed by the sound of firing to the east. Such men as could be collected at once hurried up to the high ground, some making for hill 500 and others for Fu-chia Shan. The latter party was successful, but the former found itself forestalled by the Japanese, who had surprised a piquet a few hundred yards from the main position. A sharp fight ensued, but the Russians were slowly driven back into their camp, which then offered a splendid target to the Japanese riflemen. Notwithstanding the disadvantage at which they had been taken, there was no panic among the Russian soldiers, and most of those who had not joined in the attempt to seize the hills, as well as three companies of the 121st Regiment sent across the river, were soon in position on the next ridge to the west, whence they covered the retreat of their comrades. Some of the Japanese now began to make their way along the neck which connects the hill 500 with Fu-chia Shan, and at the same time the 2nd Battalion which had been waiting at the foot began to scale the height. The position was strong and the attacking infantry made little progress, but as the light improved the Japanese gunners near Chin-chia-pu-tzu were able to realize what was going on, and at once opened fire upon the hill. The Russian guns replied from Shih Shan, but their fire was not very effective, as difficulty was experienced in locating the position of the Japanese artillery. Nevertheless, it was not until 8.50 a.m. that the defenders were forced to retire to hill 300, and even then the Japanese found that the crest of Fu-chia Shan was swept so effectively from Shih Shan by rifle and artillery fire that they were compelled to remain under cover on the eastern slopes. The artillery advanced to a second position, and one battery, the 3rd, managed to reach the neck at the northern end of Fu-chia Shan.

There, however, it was exposed to the fire of sixteen Russian field guns, and as there was not sufficient room for other batteries to come to its support it was quickly withdrawn. There was no further infantry attack either against hill 300 or against the Shih Shan ridge.

At 10 a.m., General Sluchevski reinforced his left with two battalions from the reserve, one belonging to the 33rd and one to the 34th Infantry Regiment. About the same time General Inouye sent up his reserve battalion to strengthen his front line, but from noon until 3 p.m. there was a pause in the fighting, due entirely to the great heat. When the battle was resumed Colonel Klembovski, who was in command of the Russian troops on hill 300, asked for further reinforcements, and another battalion of the 34th Regiment was sent to his assistance. About the same time a battalion of the Guard *Kobi* Brigade came to the assistance of the 46th Regiment, but as no attack was made by either side the struggle resolved itself into a simple fire fight, and when night fell the troops were occupying the positions they had held since 9 a.m. Gradually the firing ceased, and the Japanese

The Russian retreat. bivouacked, like their comrades of the 2nd and Guard Divisions, with every intention of renewing the battle on the morrow. With this object gun pits were constructed on Fu-chia Shan, but the labour proved unnecessary, as General Sluchevski felt that he was not sufficiently strong to continue the fight, and retired to a second position which had been prepared near Tun-chia-pu. In adopting this course, he was influenced partly by the disaster at Pien Ling, partly by a false report* received from his cavalry that Japanese infantry and artillery were turning his left, and partly by the retirement of the "Eastern Force" from the Yang-tzu Ling on his right. The retreat was carried out in good order, covered by a rear guard of ten battalions and two batteries stationed on the heights about Li-pi-yu under General Ryabinkin.

This rear guard was attacked by General Okasaki on the morning of the 1st August, but, after performing its task successfully, it also withdrew in good order across the Lan Ho.

Thus, although the Russians suffered no serious reverse, except at the Pien Ling, the battle had resulted in a victory for the Japanese at all points. The First Army succeeded in advanc-

* This report is remarkable since the left flank of the Xth Corps should have been rendered perfectly secure by the presence of General Liubavin's detachment. Beyond making two very feeble threats against the Japanese right, this detachment took no part in the fight and did not influence the result in any way.

ing twelve miles on the road towards Liao-yang, and gained possession of the valley of the Lan Ho. Moreover, owing to the slaughter at the Pien Ling, the losses sustained by the attack were very much less than those inflicted upon the defence.* In the Xth Corps alone two thousand of all ranks were killed, wounded, or missing, while the casualties of the Japanese 12th Division together with the detachment from the 2nd Division amounted only to eleven officers and four hundred and thirty non-commissioned officers and men. On the left wing the Japanese losses were under five hundred and fifty, and those of the Russian "Eastern Force" were less than four hundred. These successes, however, were not followed up, and by the 2nd August the Xth Corps was concentrated on the line An-ping Ling—Kung-chang Ling, where it came in touch with the "Eastern Force" on the heights north-east of Lang-tzu-shan. For the next three weeks the Japanese and Russian forces remained facing one another, separated by only six miles of mountainous country. During this period the "Eastern Force" was renamed the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, and, together with the Xth and XVIIth Corps, was placed under the command of General Baron Bilderling, who was entrusted with the defence upon the "Eastern Front."

As the result of the operations which had taken place during the months of May, June, and July, the Russian Forces had been pushed back to within sixteen miles of Liao-yang, and at the beginning of August they were occupying an extended position east, south, and south-west of that town. They were divided into two main groups, the Eastern and the Southern, under Generals Bilderling and Zarubaiev, who also commanded the XVIIth (European) and the 4th Siberian Army Corps respectively. The 2nd Brigade of the 31st Infantry Division now joined the Xth Corps and formed the extreme left of the Eastern Group on the north bank of the Tai-tzu Ho; while the extreme right of the group was drawn back west of Lang-tzu-shan to Hsiao-hsi-kou on the Hsi-ta Ho. The greater part of the Southern Group was in a strongly fortified position at An-shan-chan with its left at Ku-san-tzu. The gap of twelve and a half miles between these two bodies of troops was watched by General Mishchenko's cavalry brigade which had its head-quarters at the Miao Ling until the 19th August, when it was withdrawn to Liao-yang to rest the men and horses after their exertions in the field, and was replaced by

The field armies during August, 1904.

* See Appendix K.

two mixed detachments under Major-General Tolmachev and Colonel Count Trubetskoi.*

At the same date the Japanese forces also formed two main groups, which were separated by over thirty miles of very mountainous country. On the right, General Kuroki with the First Army had established himself on the Lan Ho with his left about Ta-wan and his right division within twenty-five miles of Liao-yang. Thirty-five miles south-west of that town the Second and Fourth Armies were holding a line from Niu-chuang† village to Fei-shun with a small detachment pushed out north-east to Tieh-shan-tun. The Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade was watching the left of the Second Army, while the communications of the First Army were protected by the Guard *Kobi* Brigade under Major-General Umezawa at Chiao-tou. Two other *Kobi* battalions were at Cheng-chang, and a small detachment was holding Hsiao-hsi-erh. These reserve troops were rendered especially important by the presence of General Liubavin's Cossacks who were now at Sanchia-tzu with an outpost pushed forward to Pei-ling-pu-tzu, and of the garrison of Pen-hsi-hu under Colonel Grulev. Still further east on the crest of the Ta Ling was the detachment under Colonel Madritov,‡ with an observation post at Ching-ho-cheng, watching the road from Cheng-chang to Mukden.

For the next three weeks these positions remained practically unchanged, but during this time the work on the lines of communication was very heavy. Advanced depots for the First Army were established at Chiao-tou, Lien-shan-kuan, and Tung-fang-liu-ho, and by the 15th August reserve supplies sufficient for seven days, in addition to the eight days' rations on divisional charge, had been accumulated. Meanwhile the base of the Second Army was shifted to Newchuang as soon as the Liao River could be cleared of mines, but the line of communication of the Fourth Army still ran from Ta-ku-shan through Hsiu-yen. The final advance on Liao-yang was to have begun on the 18th August, but the

* The composition of these detachments was :—

General Tolmachev's—

2 battalions, 19th E.S.R. Regiment.

5 squadrons, Orenburg Cossack Regiment.

Count Trubetskoi's—

4 squadrons, 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment.

1 battalion, 19th E.S.R. Regiment.

1 battalion, 20th E.S.R. Regiment.

$\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Battery, 5th E.S.R. Artillery Brigade (4 guns).

† This village must be distinguished from the port of Newchuang at the mouth of the Liao Ho.

‡ This detachment had been strengthened by the addition of one battalion of the 2nd (Chita) Infantry Regiment.

Japanese plans were again interfered with by very heavy rain which fell from the 14th to the 17th. The rivers came down in flood, and all the bridges were destroyed; during the 17th and 18th the Russian troops on the "Eastern Front" were completely cut off from Liao-yang, but the inconvenience caused to the Japanese was considerably less than had been the case in June, and it is more than probable that the real cause of inaction was a natural desire to await the result of the attacks on Port Arthur, which were begun during the concluding days of July and continued throughout the following month.

During this period the 11th *Kobi* Brigade arrived from Japan, and the Russian army was increased by the arrival of the 5th Siberian Army Corps which began to detrain at Mukden on the 10th August; but except for two small reconnaissances, one on either flank, no active operations were undertaken. On the 6th August, a Russian force bombarded and burned the village of Ken-chuang-tzu, driving back some troops of the Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade and capturing some pack animals. The Russians followed the Japanese to about three miles south-east of Ken-chuang-tzu and then withdrew. On the same day General Liubavin, who had left San-chia-tzu on the 5th with the 2nd Nerchinsk and 2nd Argun Cossack Regiments and a battery of artillery, was repulsed in front of Cheng-chang by some Japanese infantry estimated at two battalions. A few days later Colonel Madritov's post at Ching-ho-cheng was fired upon by Japanese, and although these events were of no real importance they served to maintain the anxiety as to the possibility of a Japanese advance upon Mukden.

This, therefore, was the position of affairs immediately before the resumption of the active operations which ended in the battle of Liao-yang. But, although the situation was at last comparatively clear, it is important to note two mistakes which were made in the Russian estimate of the strength of the Japanese armies. The 9th Division which was in front of Port Arthur was believed to be with the First Army, and the 8th Division which was still in Japan was believed to be with the Fourth Army.

Here the troops under Generals Kuropatkin and Oyama must be left for the present, for while following the Japanese advance to Liao-yang the story has got far ahead of the events which were happening simultaneously in other parts of the theatre of war.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OPERATIONS IN THE KUAN-TUNG PENINSULA DURING JUNE, 1904.

(Charts 3 and 4, and Plan 14.)

WHEN General Oku turned his back upon Port Arthur at the beginning of June, 1904, the Japanese 1st and 11th Divisions were left in the Kuan-tung Peninsula under General Nogi, and to them was entrusted the task of reducing the fortress. The port of Dalny had then been occupied and the work of clearing the Russian mines from Ta-lien Bay had already been begun. The distance from Dalny to Port Arthur in a direct line is about twenty-three miles, but the country is so broken and mountainous that the railway is compelled to make a very wide detour, and for part of its length follows the northern coast-line. Three good roads traverse this southern extremity of the Kuan-tung Peninsula, and a network of Chinese tracks, hard but narrow, covers the country between them. In the low ground the soil is sandy; with the result that in wet weather unmetalled roads quickly become morasses, and in dry weather the dust is very trying for men and animals. Water is found in many of the valleys and can nearly always be obtained from wells of no great depth, but it becomes scarce soon after the close of the rainy season of July and August. Among the mountains, villages are small and scattered, but on the low ground, where cultivation is universal, they become larger and are found at closer intervals. In the immediate neighbourhood of Port Arthur, especially to the west, the plain is everywhere dotted with houses. During the summer months the heat is at times oppressive, but in winter the climate is fine and bracing except during the occasional northerly gales, when the cold becomes intense.

Such was the country through which, for the second time, a Japanese army was to march to the capture of Port Arthur, but on this occasion the difficulties were to prove infinitely more serious than those which had been overcome ten years previously. Then the garrison had consisted of fourteen thousand Chinese troops,

The movements
of the Japanese
Third Army.

of whom only three thousand had any fighting value; now it was composed of two East Siberian divisions supported by formidable fortress artillery. In 1894 the fortress was captured, after less than twelve hours' fighting, with a loss of eighteen killed and two hundred and fifty wounded; in 1904 the same result was achieved, but only after one of the most memorable sieges in history, in the course of which more than sixty thousand Japanese were either killed or wounded. For the present, however, the formidable nature of the task was hardly realized, and when, on the 6th June, 1904, General Nogi assumed command of the Japanese Third Army, the value of permanent defences held by determined men had yet to be learned.

Although Dalny had been somewhat hurriedly evacuated after the battle of Nan Shan, the Japanese advance was now opposed by the 14th, 15th, and 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiments and by two battalions of the 28th East Siberian Rifle Regiments. These troops were holding a line from Shuang-tai-kou on the north to Yu-pi-la-tzu. There it turned back sharply to height 1154, whence it followed the crest of the hills almost as far south as the village of Han-chia-tun; then, taking a turn to the south-east, it included Lao-tso Shan, called by the Russians the Green Hills, and eventually reached the sea opposite Lung-wang-tang. In front of this line, which was known as the "position of the passes," the mounted detachments and outposts were pushed forward to Chien-mu-jih, Pan-tao, Lan-ni-chiao, Ta-shih-tung, Wai-tou Shan, and Shuang-ting Shan; while the conspicuous peak of Chien Shan was held as an advanced post by the 10th Company of the 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment with two 2·5-inch guns. In reserve were the 5th and 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, the former of which had suffered heavily at Nan Shan, and the 4th Reserve Battalion with four batteries of artillery.*

General Nogi did not yet feel himself sufficiently strong to attack this position, and, while awaiting reinforcements, he also took up a defensive line from An-tzu Shan to Ta-tzu Shan. On the right was the 1st Division and on the left was the 11th Division, which had replaced the 3rd. The 22nd Brigade of the 11th Division had one regiment in trenches on either side of the main Ho-kou road, and the 10th Brigade held the heights south-east of Li-chia-tun. With the former brigade there were two mountain batteries; one on a knoll north-west of Ta-tzu Shan, the other immediately

* With the exception of the two battalions of the 28th Regiment the troops of the 7th E.S.R. Division were manning the defences of Port Arthur.

north of the main road and south-east of height 892. The rest of the divisional artillery was further to the rear.

For the next three weeks the situation remained practically unchanged, for although the Russians from their observation post on Chien Shan had watched the departure of the 3rd Division for the north, they do not seem to have realized the weakness of the investing force. On the other hand, the Japanese, misled, perhaps, by the events of 1894, appear to have disregarded the fact that every day the land defences of Port Arthur were growing stronger.

Meanwhile the repairs to the damaged Russian ships were nearing completion. The skilled workmen who had arrived from

Europe had nearly finished their work, and in a short time the Russian fleet, except for the loss of the *Petropavlovsk* and *Boyarin*, would be as strong as at the beginning of the war. What was to be its future rôle? To decide this all-important question a naval council of war was assembled on the 27th May, immediately after the defeat at Nan Shan, at which it was agreed that the fleet should assist in the defence of the fortress to the last and should then put to sea. This decision was communicated to Admiral Alexeiev, probably by a runner through the Japanese lines and then by telegraph, and the same message stated that no less than thirty 6-inch guns, fifty 12-pounders and fifty other small guns had already been landed from the ships. About the 1st June a reply was received from the Viceroy who, as usual, advocated a more active policy but gave no definite orders. While acknowledging that it was part of the duty of the fleet to assist in protecting Port Arthur, he urged that it should put to sea and fight a decisive action.

Three days later, stirred by this advice, Admiral Vitgeft assembled on board his flagship a second council, at which Generals Stessel and Smirnov with the heads of the various departments of the garrison were present; and from them he inquired what help was expected from the fleet. With one exception, the military authorities seem to have taken an entirely departmental view of the situation and, while urging that the fleet should go out and prevent the Japanese from landing more troops, were most unwilling to return the guns lent from the ships. General Smirnov alone is said to have advised the more spirited policy of leaving Port Arthur to defend itself, attempting to effect a junction with the Vladivostok cruisers, and combining in one determined effort to obtain command of the sea. Apparently no clear decision

was arrived at, for on the following day, the 5th June, the same question was again discussed at a naval council of war in which the flag officers and captains of ships took part. On this occasion the deliberations resulted in a recommendation that a sortie should be made after the 13th June, the estimated date for the completion of the repairs to the ships. On the strength of this decision preparations were at once begun for going to sea on the 14th, but whether the fleet was to sail with the definite purpose of forcing an action on the Japanese, or with some other object, has never become known. Again one dissentient voice was raised, and on this occasion the captain of the *Sevastopol* pressed for an immediate sortie with such ships as were available, on the ground that delay only increased the danger from mines and blockships. Although the Russians were not aware of the fact, all idea of using blockships to close the exit from Port Arthur had been abandoned since the failure of the last attempt, and the Japanese were now devoting all their energies to keeping in the Russian fleet by means of mines. For that purpose five small steamers were fitted up to carry fifteen mines apiece, and were armed with 12-pr. guns. Mining and sweeping operations were now almost continuous, and for the latter duty port steamboats, boats of the fleet, and even steam dredgers were pressed into the Russian service. On the 2nd June, the *Amur*, escorted by the *Novik* and some destroyers, made an attempt to mine Hsiao-ping-tao Bay, but was frustrated by the appearance of the Japanese in force. On the 4th June, a Russian steam hopper was blown up while sweeping for mines outside Port Arthur, and on the night of the 6th the Japanese sent a mining expedition into the roadstead. One of the mine layers was struck by no less than eight shells, but the mines were successfully dropped and the result fully bore out the contention of the captain of the *Sevastopol*; for on the 7th yet another council of war was held which reversed the decision arrived at only forty-eight hours before, and preparations for going to sea were stopped. But it was not until the 15th, the day after the date originally fixed for the sortie, that the *Lieutenant Burakov* was sent to Newchuang with a message to the Viceroy in which, while acknowledging the necessity for the fleet putting to sea, it was stated that delay was inevitable until sweeping operations were complete.

This Japanese mining expedition was followed by others, but on the 11th June some Russian destroyers took advantage of a fog to put to sea. Six went to the westward and rounded Lao-tieh Shan, but returned without accomplishing anything; while three others

encountered the Japanese 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, which was protecting sweeping operations near Cap Island, and turned back after exchanging a few shots. On the 14th, another sortie was made by the *Novik* and ten destroyers, with the intention of driving off some Japanese destroyers and torpedo boats which, in co-operation with a reconnaissance in force by the army, were bombarding the right of the Russian position near Hsiao-ping-tao. In this venture they were successful, but on sighting the *Chitose* the Russians returned to harbour. Two days later the *Novik* and some destroyers again put to sea, this time escorting the *Amur*, which had orders to lay mines off Lao-tieh Shan. Either in leaving or returning to harbour the *Amur* struck one of the sunken blockships and was so much damaged that she was disabled for some time, and her place was taken first by the merchant vessel *Bogatvir* and subsequently by destroyers. On the 18th the *Novik*, *Otvazhni*, and *Gremyashchi*, with eight destroyers bombarded the left of the Japanese position from Hsiao-ping-tao Bay, but on this day the dull monotony of the proceedings was at last broken by the receipt

of Admiral Alexeiev's reply to the message which had been dispatched on the 15th. This communication was read out to the senior officers of the fleet assembled on board the flagship, and proved to contain an order that the fleet was to put to sea and engage the enemy, choosing the most favourable opportunity and taking every precaution.

On the following morning the ships' heads were turned towards the entrance, and the gullet was cleared of booms and nets. Coal and stores were taken in, and a channel was swept outside the harbour. Most of the guns which had been landed were replaced, and on the 20th the ships were ordered to raise steam and be ready to get under weigh at noon. When all was prepared the following order was issued by Admiral Vitgeft:—


“By order of Admiral Alexeiev the squadron, having completed the repairs to the ships which were damaged by the enemy before war was declared, will now put to sea so as to afford assistance to our comrades on land in defence of Port Arthur. With the help of God and St. Nicholas the wonder worker, who is the protector of mariners, we will endeavour to fulfil our duty loyally and conscientiously and to defeat the enemy, who have already lost some ships by striking our mines. The little gunboat *Bobr* has shown us what can be done in very difficult circumstances. May God be with us.”

Nevertheless, at 10 a.m., the flag officers and captains were unexpectedly summoned on board the *Tsesarevich* and at 10.20 a.m. the signal was made to bank fires. It seems that Admiral Vitgeft's intention was to pass the night at sea, and to return and defeat the Japanese fleet off the Elliot Islands on the following morning. But since the state of the tide on the 20th did not permit him to leave the harbour until the afternoon, there would not be sufficient daylight left to get beyond the range of torpedo attacks before darkness set in; and for this reason the departure of the fleet was postponed at the last moment. The hour of sailing was now fixed for 2 a.m. on the 22nd when the tide would be favourable, but during the early part of that night the Japanese, although fired upon by both guardboats and batteries, succeeded in laying about thirty more mines. This entailed further sweeping operations on the following day, and at midnight a signal was again made deferring the departure. Finally it was settled that the squadron should begin to leave its moorings early in the morning of the 23rd, and to prevent further interference by hostile mining operations, two gunboats, the *Vsadnik* and *Gaidamak*, with eight destroyers, were sent out. It so happened that the Japanese did send in a mining vessel, but the Russian destroyers, which had gone some little distance, failed to see her. They, however, fell in with the escorting destroyers, and an engagement took place in which the *Boevoi* was struck by two shells, one of which entered the engine room and pierced a steam pipe. Her commander was wounded, one engine was disabled, and her wheel ropes were damaged. The Japanese, however, do not seem to have observed her difficulties, for the whole affair was attended with much confusion, and by 10 a.m. she made her way back to harbour by means of the remaining engine. The *Vuinoslivi* was also struck aft and returned to harbour to repair damages; so successfully was the work accomplished that she was able to accompany the squadron to sea in the morning.


Meanwhile the mine layer was observed from the shore but, owing to their own vessels being outside, the batteries would not fire without authority from the admiral. As the necessary permission was not forthcoming in time to interfere with her, the mine layer completed her work undisturbed, and thereby greatly influenced the events of the following day; for the fresh sweeping operations which were entailed caused much delay in getting the squadron to sea.

At 4 a.m., when it was yet hardly daylight, the Russian ships began to move out of harbour. The arrangements were that the

SKETCH SHOWING ORDER OF SHIPS.
LEAVING PORT ARTHUR, JUNE 23RD 1904.



6 Dredger's Tenders
dragging sweeps.



4 T. B. Ds.
dragging sweeps.



8 T. B. Ds accompanying squadron.

Novik.
(Index)



Diana.

Askold.

Sevastopol.

Poltava.

Peresvyet.

Pobyeda.

Retvizan.

Tzesarevich.

Bayan.

Pallada.



4 T. B. Ds.



Gremyashchi.



Otvazhni.

The naval
sortie on the
23rd June.

vessels should go out separately and, on arrival in the roadstead, should anchor in two lines just outside the eastern defensive minefield, where as yet no Japanese mines had been found or mine layers observed. The *Diana* led the way, followed by the *Novik*. Then came the other cruisers, and lastly the battleships. During the passage through the roadstead several floating mines were seen and sunk by rifle fire, and the *Tzesarevich* had to put her helm over to avoid striking one, but no accident occurred. By about 9 a.m. all the ships had come out and orders were given for boats to be lowered and the spaces between the ships to be dragged for mines, while the regular sweeping party* proceeded to ply their task further out to sea. About ten mines were accounted for in the spaces between the ships, which must be considered very fortunate in having escaped them on their way to the anchorage. Further out none were found. At 1 p.m., the signal came to proceed, and about an hour later the fleet moved slowly out to sea in the order shown in Plate 12.

About 2.35 p.m.† the Japanese destroyers opened fire upon the sweeping party, and the *Novik* was at once sent to drive them off. The *Diana*, which was leading the line, and the Russian destroyers also returned the fire and after about fifteen minutes the Japanese steamed off to the south-east. It was not, however, until 4.30 p.m. that Admiral Vitgeft considered it safe to dispense with the sweeping party. The fleet then stopped, and the steam hoppers hauled in their sweeps and returned to Port Arthur accompanied by the 2nd Flotilla of destroyers. At 5 p.m., the fleet, now headed by the battleships, proceeded on a course S. 20° E. The line was headed by the *Tzesarevich*, bearing the flag of Admiral Vitgeft, and the order of the remaining ships was, *Retvizan*, *Pobyeda*, *Peresvyet*, *Sevastopol*, *Poltava*, *Bayan*, *Pallada*, *Diana*, and *Askold*. The *Novik*, on the starboard beam of the flagship, led a line of seven destroyers.

The appearance of the Russian fleet in the early morning had not escaped the observation of the Japanese destroyers which were watching the harbour from a distance, and information had been promptly dispatched by wireless telegraphy, through the cruisers, to Admiral Togo, who was lying at his base in the Elliot Islands. With him

Admiral Togo's
movements.

* The vessels used for sweeping ahead of the fleet were steam hoppers, originally designed for carrying to sea the mud brought up by the dredgers.

† Port Arthur time is adhered to throughout this account of the events of the 23rd June.

were his four battleships, together with the *Asama*, *Kasagi*, *Chitose*, *Takasago*, *Chiyoda*, *Idzumi*, *Akitsu-shima*, and *Suma*, several small vessels, and six destroyers. The *Itsukushima*, *Matsushima*, *Hashidate*, and *Chinyen* had passed the night in the neighbourhood of Dalny, where were also most of the remaining torpedo vessels. The *Yakumo* was off Port Arthur, and the *Kasuga* and *Nisshin* had left at 4 a.m. to join her. These vessels formed his whole available force, for Admiral Kamimura, with four armoured and four protected cruisers, was still guarding the Korean Strait, and watching the movements of the Vladivostok squadron.* Although a sortie must have been long expected, the reappearance of so many battleships and the great strength of the Russian fleet came as a complete surprise to Admiral Togo, but the movements of the Japanese commander showed no sign of hesitation, and when the great news was received at 7 a.m. orders for steam to be raised were quickly given.

At 9.50 a.m. the Japanese battleships moved out and proceeded at fourteen knots for an appointed rendezvous to the southward of Port Arthur. The cruisers, in two divisions, led respectively by the *Asama* and *Idzumi*, had preceded them and were a few miles ahead. Information that the Russians still remained outside Port Arthur was received soon after departure, but their full strength does not seem to have been generally known until later. By 2.35 p.m., the Japanese fleet was near enough to Port Arthur to hear the sound of firing and about the same time Admiral Togo's scouts informed him that the Russians were heading to the southward.

Admiral Togo had directed his course so as to pass about thirty miles from the land, and at 2.50 p.m. the hills round Port Arthur were visible to the north-west. As it seemed probable that he would pass ahead of the Russians speed was reduced to twelve knots, and the fleet remained on a south-westerly course until Lao-tieh Shan was abeam. Then, as the Russians had not been sighted the Japanese main fleet altered course in succession sixteen points to port and returned in the direction whence it had come. Meanwhile the *Kasuga* and *Nisshin* had joined the battleships, and the *Yakumo* had taken her place at the head of the division of cruisers hitherto led by the *Asama*. The division led by the *Idzumi* had also formed up astern of the battle fleet and the position was then as follows. The *Mikasa* led the line, followed by the *Asahi*, *Fuji*, *Shikishima*, *Nisshin*, *Kasuga*, *Idzumi*, *Akashi*, *Akitsu-shima*

* See Chap. XXIII.

and *Suma*. The division headed by the *Yakumo* was on the starboard quarter of the battle fleet and consisted of the *Yakumo*, *Asama*, *Chitose*, *Kasagi*, *Takasago*, and *Chiyoda*. On the port side of the battle fleet were the destroyers and torpedo boats, which by this time had assembled to the number of over thirty. Nearer the shore was another division consisting of the *Itsukushima*, *Hashidate*, *Matsushima*, and *Chinyen*. The Japanese continued to steer to the north-east until 5.35 p.m., when course was again altered sixteen points to starboard in succession, a movement which again brought them heading to the south-west.

Three hours had passed since firing had been heard, and the long-delayed appearance of the Russians began to produce the impression that they did not mean to come out into the open, but would take advantage of the evening tide to return into harbour. However, at 6.0 p.m., when the Russians were some twenty miles from Port Arthur and the Japanese about ten miles further to the southward, the two fleets came in sight of one another. Then, for the first time, it became known throughout the Japanese fleet that the Russian battleships had been repaired, and that the enemy was in considerably superior strength. But the determination of the commander was reflected in the attitude of his men, and both sides made preparations for a battle upon which the issue of the war might prove to hang.

By this time the Japanese torpedo craft had crossed over to the portside of the battle fleet; the *Yakumo* division was a mile away on the port bow, and the *Itsukushima* division on the starboard quarter some distance off. The *Idzumi* division had dropped some distance astern of the line of battle, which now consisted of the four battleships with the *Kasuga* and *Nisshin*. On sighting the hostile fleet the Russians seem to have turned slightly to starboard, and at 6.20 p.m. the Japanese also turned in succession to the course the Russians were now steering; thus bringing the two fleets on parallel courses at a distance apart variously estimated as from seven to ten miles, with the Japanese line in advance. At 6.45 p.m., the *Mikasa* altered course two points to starboard so as gradually to close the Russian line, and for a few minutes a general action appeared inevitable. There was still half an hour of broad daylight with the prospect of a long twilight and a bright moon; but Admiral Vitgeft would not accept action and, at 7.0 p.m., the *Tzarevich* turned to starboard, followed by all the ships of the Russian fleet in succession, and steered for Port Arthur.

It would appear from Admiral Vitgeft's report that the appearance of the Japanese fleet so near Port Arthur upset all his calculations. In Russian accounts this surprise is invariably attributed to the agency of spies, but there can be no doubt that the true explanation is to be found in the length of time taken in getting the fleet to sea, and in the promptitude with which Admiral Togo availed himself of the opportunity thereby afforded him. The prospect of a fleet action lasting until darkness set in, and the certainty that it would be followed by numerous torpedo attacks, was too much for the Russian commander; but the decision he took was fraught with almost equal danger and could have no advantage such as might have been gained by a resolute attack. He had twenty-three miles to cover on his return journey and nothing could now save the fleet from torpedo attack during the night, for the tide had been lost and the ships could not reach their sanctuary inside Port Arthur before the morning. Moreover, the channel which had been cleared of mines was very narrow, and to take a fleet through it in darkness was a most formidable undertaking. The skill of his mechanics, coupled with the disasters which had deprived the Japanese commander of two battleships, had given Admiral Vitgeft a splendid chance of retrieving all that had been lost in the early months of the war; but unfortunately for his country he was not the man either to conceive or to carry out a resolute policy. Of his personal courage there is no doubt; where he failed was in those moral qualities which enable the great commander to recognize and to seize the fleeting opportunities which fortune throws in his way.

As soon as Admiral Togo realized that his opponent had no intention of accepting battle, he turned his ships eight points to starboard together, as if to follow in pursuit; but a few moments later he resumed his original course, and shortly afterwards turned in succession sixteen points to port, a manœuvre which brought him once more steering to the north-east. The chance of the smaller vessels was now at hand and, at 7.30 p.m., just as the sun was setting, Admiral Togo sent every available destroyer and torpedo boat after the retiring Russians, while he himself remained near Round Island.

The weather was calm and clear, and from the Russian fleet the Japanese torpedo boats could be seen on the horizon on both sides, endeavouring to get ahead and to attack from that direction. The *Novik*, with the destroyers, was sent on ahead, and the cruisers

Admiral
Vitgeft's plan
of operations.

The Japanese
torpedo attacks.

Askold, *Bayan*, *Pallada*, and *Diana* were ordered to come up on the starboard side of the battleships. At 8.45 p.m., when the last touches of daylight had disappeared, the first attack was delivered, apparently on the four rearmost ships, the *Poltava*, *Sevastopol*, *Pallada*, and *Diana*. The destroyers making the attack came down on an opposite course to that of the fleet, but their torpedoes did not take effect, and a quarter of an hour later another equally unproductive attack was delivered. The Russian ships were now nearing the roadstead and, although unable to distinguish the swept channel, had no choice but to risk the perils of the mine fields. With one exception they were fortunate enough to pass safely through the danger space. At 9.35 p.m., when a third attack on the rear of the fleet was in progress, the *Peresvyet* unexpectedly reduced speed and compelled the *Sevastopol* to sheer over to port, with the result that she struck a mine on her port side between the 23rd and 30th frame. The explosion caused a compartment, in which were a coal bunker and a 6-inch magazine, to be flooded, but as the engine room was found to be uninjured the captain steamed slowly towards White Wolf Bay, and anchored close to the shore in six fathoms of water, where he remained until morning. The danger was not yet over, for the bulkhead abaft the flooded compartment showed signs of collapsing, but it was successfully shored up and the ship, which had heeled to port, was righted by flooding a compartment on the starboard side.

Just as the *Sevastopol* was struck the remainder of the Russian fleet anchored in a line along the western shore, apparently in a somewhat irregular formation, and torpedo nets were at once got out. At last Admiral Togo seemed to have the Russian fleet at his mercy, and all night long his flotillas attacked the ships at anchor. To avoid having to approach with the moon behind them, some of the flotillas kept well to the eastward of the harbour entrance; then, turning to port, they made straight for the Russians, and again turning to port discharged their torpedoes as they passed along the line. After making the first turn they were obliged to run through an area lighted by the shore searchlights and swept by the fire of the ships and batteries. In all eight separate attacks were made, the last one taking place just before dawn, but as the Russian ships had swung with their heads to the eastward they offered an unusually small target, and not one was hit. From the Russian accounts of this eventful night it appears that the Japanese did not approach at all closely. In the moonlight the ships would

appear to be nearer than they really were, and this illusion, combined with the glare of the searchlights and the columns of spray thrown up by the hail of projectiles, doubtless explains how the Japanese torpedo craft came to under-estimate their distance. That the range at which the torpedoes were discharged was not always excessive is, however, proved by the fact that more than ten were picked up on the beach unexploded; and in such cases it is obvious that defective aim is the only possible explanation of the Russians' good fortune.

The Russian fire, in spite of its intensity, was hardly less ineffective and the damage done to the Japanese vessels was very slight. Not one was sunk, and only one destroyer, the *Shirakumo*, and four torpedo boats were struck. The total Japanese casualties are reported to have been three men killed and four wounded.

At 5 a.m., on the 24th, the signal was made from the *Tzesarevich* for the fleet to return to harbour. The *Sevastopol* was towed into the eastern basin, and the cofferdam which had been used for the *Retvizan* was placed over her bilge. The other ships got in during the same tide. Thus ended a sortie which was the result of many councils of war and from which much had been expected. But if the disappointment of the garrison of Port Arthur was great, that of the Japanese torpedo flotillas can have been no less. The battle fleet had prevented the enemy from leaving Port Arthur, but during the night a fine opportunity had been lost, and henceforward the army was to play the leading part in the destruction of Russia's sea power in the East.

By this date, Ta-lien Bay was practically cleared of mines and the 1st *Kobi* Brigade had already disembarked at Dalny. A Naval Brigade had also been added to the Japanese Third Army. General Nogi, therefore, felt strong enough to abandon his defensive attitude, and determined to dislodge the Russians from Wai-tou Shan, Shuang-ting Shan, and Hsiao-ping-tao as well as from their observation post on Chien Shan, whence all his movements could be observed.

On the night of the 25th—26th June, three columns were formed from the 11th Division. The right column was to advance in the direction of Lan-ni-chiao, and the centre on Liang-shui-ho and Chu-chuang-tzu-kou, while the left moved along the Dalny—Ho-kou—Huang-ni-chuan road. The bulk of the division, and its head-quarters, were with the centre column.

The return of the Russian fleet to harbour.

The resumption of military operations.

Handwritten notes in the left margin, including the word "return" and other illegible scribbles.

It so happened that the commander of the southern section of the Russian defences had chosen the same moment to make a reconnaissance, and shortly before sunrise the Japanese advanced guards struck the leading Russian patrols. Pushing forward in the darkness the Japanese drove the retreating enemy towards height 899 in the south, while to the north the right column captured the heights a thousand yards east of Lan-ni-chiao without difficulty. The Russians, finding their retreat threatened, evacuated Wai-tou Shan, and between 9 and 10 a.m. the Japanese 11th Division was on the line Shuang-ting Shan—Han-chia-tun, where it came into touch with the left of the 1st Division.

So far the main Russian force had not been encountered, but reconnaissance revealed the real defensive position. In front of the Japanese 1st Division, the hills west and north-west of Pan-tao were seen to be strongly held, but for the present their capture formed no part of the Japanese programme. For the actual attack on Chien Shan the troops of the 11th Division were assembled at Chu-chuang-tzu-kou, where three columns were again formed. A portion of the 22nd Brigade with part of the divisional artillery formed the right column, which was to attack the Russians near Lan-ni-chiao; the 43rd Regiment and one mountain battery were in the centre, and the 12th Regiment with the rest of the artillery was on the left. The centre column was to advance directly against the peak, and the left column on to the ridge south of it. To support the movement a Japanese cruiser and some destroyers moved along the coast.

The Russian warships had already several times interfered with the Japanese left, and at this juncture a force consisting of the *Novik*, *Otvazhni*, *Gremyashchi*, *Bobr*, and *Vsadnik*, with fourteen destroyers, appeared off Hsiao-ping-tao and opened fire. These vessels were joined later by the *Pallada* and *Diana*, but, as on other occasions, there was no systematic co-operation between the Russian army and navy, and the best results were not obtained from the fire of the ships. Nevertheless, the danger of mines near the coast prevented the Japanese vessels from closing, and the number of shell craters on the hill-sides proved that the Russian fire must have been severe while it lasted.

About 12.30 p.m. the 43rd Regiment began its advance, with nearly all its men in the front line. Most of the Russian field artillery were firing from positions west of Chien Shan, and some machine guns were posted on the peak itself. The commander of the Japanese mountain artillery which accompanied the advanced

guard of the centre column, brought his guns into action on a knoll three thousand yards east of Chien Shan, and between 3 and 4 p.m. two batteries with the right column opened fire from a point south of Lan-ni-chiao. These three batteries concentrated their fire upon the small garrison, which then abandoned the two Baranovski guns and retired to the main position without offering any very strenuous resistance. As the men of the 43rd Regiment climbed the slopes, some fougasses exploded, but hurt nobody, and by 5.30 p.m. this important height was in Japanese hands. During the day the Japanese 11th Division suffered a loss of four officers and one hundred and fifty-four men; the 1st Division, on the Japanese right, merely moved forward and engaged in a few insignificant skirmishes near Pan-tao.

After the loss of Chien Shan the Russians withdrew the right of their defensive line to the west of the Lung-wang-tang Inlet, but in other respects the "position of the passes" remained unchanged. Thence it almost coincided with the position occupied before the 26th June, the extreme right on Lao-tso Shan being now practically an advanced position. The Japanese 11th Division occupied Lan-ni-chiao with one regiment of its right brigade; the other regiment held Chien Shan itself. Of the left brigade, one battalion, and later one regiment, held the entrance to the valley at Tashih-tung; the rest of the brigade occupied Shuang-ting Shan, which had been captured by the 12th Regiment on the 26th after a slight skirmish.

Beyond assisting in the military operations the Japanese fleet did but little during the closing days of June. Except for a cruise towards Shan-tung on the 27th, the battleships remained at their base in the Elliot Islands while the cruisers and destroyers were on watch outside Port Arthur. Even the blockade was not very rigidly enforced, for the Russian destroyer *Lieutenant Burakov* was able to run out on the 29th with dispatches for New-chuang, and to return four days later without encountering any hostile force. Meanwhile the torpedo craft made a series of night attacks upon the *Pallada* which, on the return of the Russian fleet, had been left outside the harbour, but inside the line of booms and sunken blockships, where she was mistaken by Japanese scouts for a ship on shore under Golden Hill. On the night of the 26th, while thus employed, the 12th Torpedo Boat Flotilla lost twelve men killed and two wounded.

During the month of June the position of the fortress had changed considerably for the worse. The besieging force was

closing in steadily, the battle of Te-li-ssu had postponed all chances of relief indefinitely, and the failure of the fleet on the 23rd June had shattered the hopes which had been raised by the repair of the battleships. So disappointing was Admiral Vitgeft's conduct of the naval operations on that day that, as soon as the news was received, the Viceroy sent the following orders by the *Lieutenant Burakov* :—

“(1) That the ships should be immediately prepared for sea, completed with coal and stores, and kept in constant readiness.

“(2) That Admiral Vitgeft should, as circum-
 Correspondence stances allowed, render all possible assistance to
 between Admiral the defence of Port Arthur by means of active
 Vitgeft and the operations of the squadron or detached portions
 Viceroy. of it.

“(3) That the squadron was to remain at Port Arthur only so long as it was in safety there.

“(4) In the event of Port Arthur being no longer a safe refuge for the squadron, it was, notwithstanding that the *Sevastopol* was under repair, to put to sea in good time and make for Vladivostok, if possible avoiding an action.”

At the same time the Viceroy suggested that three of the *Pobyeda's* 6-inch guns, which had been mounted ashore, should be returned, the repairs to the *Sevastopol* hurried on, and the exit from Port Arthur into the open sea carefully guarded. The same destroyer also brought Admiral Vitgeft an Imperial command to the effect that he was to fill up with stores and, when the *Sevastopol* was ready, to leave with his squadron for Vladivostok, transferring the command of all vessels remaining at Port Arthur to Admiral Loshchinski.

A conference of flag and commanding officers was called by Admiral Vitgeft to consider these orders. With two exceptions they maintained the impossibility of the fleet proceeding to sea. The majority was firmly convinced of the enormous advantage to the fortress of the presence of the fleet, by aid of which it should be possible to hold out until the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, which was expected in October. The assembled officers, therefore, came to the decision to defend Port Arthur or to perish with the fortress; and in his report to the Viceroy, dispatched on the 5th July, Admiral Vitgeft among other matters said :—

“I did not go out for display, but in accordance with orders. Change of circumstances required my return in order to avoid useless loss. After the departure of the squadron to Vladivostok,

the enemy would clear a channel and capture Port Arthur with his fleet and troops in a very short time; moreover he would not permit our squadron, weakened by nightly attacks and with its ships damaged, to proceed forward or backward without an action. For the squadron there are only two decisions. Either it is necessary for it to defend Port Arthur in conjunction with the troops until reinforced, or to perish; the moment for a sortie to Vladivostok can only arise when death faces us simultaneously in front and rear."

The news of this decision which reached Mukden on the 9th July evoked a new order from the Viceroy, who telegraphed back in the following terms:—

"I have received your dispatch of the 5th July. Your opinion expressed in it, that there are only two methods of procedure for the squadron, to defend Port Arthur or perish with the fortress, so little corresponds with the Imperial commands and the function of the forces entrusted to you, that I must lay the question of the squadron making a sortie and breaking through to Vladivostok before a council of flag officers and captains, in which the commandant of the port, Rear-Admiral Grigorovich, is to take part. A brief summary of the decision of the council is immediately to be forwarded to me by every possible means of communication."

The Viceroy at the same time seems to have considered the advisability of relieving Admiral Vitgeft by an admiral from Vladivostok, but an unfavourable reply from that port caused him to abandon the idea.

Admiral Vitgeft proceeded to carry out the order of the Viceroy by assembling another council of flag and commanding officers on the 28th July. It again affirmed that the best way for the fleet to defend Port Arthur was to lie there, and that the risks of a sortie were too great to be incurred. This resolution was received at Mukden on the 30th July.

The Viceroy now appealed to the Emperor, who telegraphed in reply, saying:—"I fully share your (*i.e.*, the Viceroy's) opinion concerning the importance of the squadron making a speedy sortie from Port Arthur and breaking through to Vladivostok."

On the 2nd August, this message was communicated to Admiral Vitgeft, but on 30th July he had sent a second telegram to Mukden, worded as follows:—

"The squadron cannot go out; the roadstead has been sown nightly, during fogs, by numerous torpedo craft and mine layers, with mines and especially drifting ones. . . . After praying

and considering the situation we have decided finally that the squadron must withstand the siege or perish in defence of Port Arthur. The enemy have drawn near and our forces have retired to the forts. There are continual fogs. I have begun indirect firing on the Japanese troops."

This message was received at Mukden on the 7th August, and to it the Viceroy replied:—"I again reiterate my inflexible determination that you are to take the squadron out of Port Arthur. I must recall to you and all serious officers the exploit of the *Varyag*. The failure of the squadron to proceed to sea regardless of the Imperial will and of my command, and its extinction in the harbour in the event of the fall of the fortress will, in addition to the heavy legal responsibility, leave an indelible spot on the flag of St. Andrew and on the honour of the fleet.* You are to make known this telegram to all admirals and commanding officers and are to report its receipt."

The correspondence was brought to a close by the sortie of the 10th August;† and although it has carried the narrative far beyond the events of June, it has been considered advisable to present it as a whole rather than in isolated fragments, as it helps to explain the line of action adopted by the commander of the fleet during the next few weeks.

* These dispatches were published by the "Russkaya Starina."

† See Chapter XXI.

CHAPTER XIX.

OPERATIONS IN THE KUAN-TUNG PENINSULA DURING JULY—
THE BATTLE AT THE PASSES.

(Charts 3 and 4, and Plan 14.)

At the beginning of July, realizing too late the value of the position that had been lost, General Stessel determined to retake Chien Shan ; but his intention was known through-
 Russian attempt
 to retake
 Chien Shan. out the fortress, and when so many shared the secret, it is more than probable that some intimation of it filtered through to the Japanese outposts.

The movement was begun on the night of the 2nd—3rd July, by the troops of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division under Colonel Semenov. A party of scouts made their way down to the Lung-wang-tang valley and climbed the opposite slopes. The Japanese outposts retired without offering any serious resistance, and on being reinforced by three companies of infantry the Russian scouts reoccupied the position on Ta-po Shan which had been abandoned five days earlier. For some hours Colonel Semenov hesitated to extend his right across the Dalny road, in case a counter-attack should force him to retire, but at 1.30 p.m. he felt that his position was secure and he then sent part of his force to Lao-tso Shan. At 4 p.m., he began to move in a north-easterly direction, but soon came under heavy artillery fire from Chien Shan, and about the same time an attempt to push further eastward was checked by Japanese guns on Shuang-ting Shan. General Stessel had been kept informed of the progress of the fighting, and about midday had advised General Fock to assist Colonel Semenov by demonstrating against Chien Shan from other parts of the line. A few hours later he arrived on the scene in person and at once decided to deliver a general attack.

In accordance with his orders, scout detachments amounting to about three hundred and sixty men, accompanied by eight sappers carrying explosives, were to assemble at dusk on height

990 under the command of Lieutenant Yasevich; thence they were to advance to the attack supported by the 9th and 10th companies of the 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. Two battalions of the 14th Regiment were to take the hills to the north, near Nan-cha-kou, and demonstrations were to be made by the 15th and 16th Regiments along the An-tzu Ling—Dalny road against the Japanese centre. About midnight the scouts reached the foot of Chien Shan, with the 9th and 10th companies of the 14th Regiment in echelon on the right. The lowest tier of Japanese trenches was reached and found unoccupied, and the scouts were hardly more than one hundred and fifty yards from the crest when a cry was heard on their right, where the 9th Company had suddenly come upon a sentry. The assailants dashed forward, but the alarm had been given and they were met by heavy rifle and artillery fire and compelled to lie down within fifty yards of a Japanese breastwork which crowned the height. Numerous attempts were made to rush the defences, and it is said that, on more than one occasion, Russian soldiers seized the Japanese machine guns and strove to tear them from their emplacements.

A Japanese counter-attack was beaten off without much difficulty, but no impression was made on the defence, even when the secondary attack on the left succeeded in occupying the Nan-cha-kou hills, where the 14th Regiment met with very slight opposition. Further to the north the demonstrations by the 15th and 16th Regiments had no effect upon the general situation.

A little before daylight on the 4th, the frontal attack was withdrawn, and General Fock then ordered two battalions of the 13th Regiment to advance from the direction of Ta-shih-tung. As had also been the case on the previous day, the Russians were supported by the *Otvazhni*, *Gremyashchi*, *Bobr*, *Novik*, and *Vsadnik*, with eleven destroyers, all of which shelled the Japanese position at Huang-ni-chuang and Shuang-ting Shan, but the shrapnel fire from Chien Shan checked the advance without difficulty. Russian artillery replied from the neighbourhood of Hou-chia-tun, and a furious artillery duel ensued. The Russians claim to have silenced the hostile guns, but the companies of the 13th Regiment were still unable to advance. About 3 p.m., four guns were brought to Ta-shih-tung, whence they opened upon Chien Shan, but the Japanese reserves were brought up on the left, and five batteries of newly-arrived heavy artillery, with some naval guns, came into action north-east of Huang-ni-chuan. General Stessel now

saw that there was but little chance of success, and when darkness fell, about 8 p.m., he gave orders for the attack to cease. During the night the Russians fell back to their old line, which, with the exception of the loss of Chien Shan, was practically identical with that occupied since the evacuation of Dalny; for Ta-po Shan and Lao-tso Shan were again in their hands.* On the following day there was some exchange of rifle fire, and the Russian gunboats shelled the Japanese left, but there was no serious fighting either on land or at sea. The *Chinyen*, *Matsushima*, and some destroyers opened fire from a distance upon the Russian ships, and it is probable that they were deterred from making a closer approach by the danger from mines. That this danger was a real one was proved on this day when the *Kaimon*, an old Japanese gunboat which had been employed on survey work, struck a mine off Ta-lien-wan. The greater part of the crew was saved, but the captain, two other officers and nineteen men perished with the ship.

The capture of Chien Shan had given the Japanese a point of observation whence their outposts could note the movements of the Russian ships, and information was thus forthcoming which could be communicated to Admiral Togo at his base in the Elliot Islands. Acting probably on incorrect information received from this source, the Japanese fleet left its base on the 6th July and cruised towards Shan-tung, but returned on the 8th without having seen any sign of the hostile fleet. Outside Port Arthur the usual mining and sweeping operations, varied by night attacks on the guardships, still went on. On the night of the 6th, the 6th Torpedo Boat Flotilla made an attempt to torpedo the *Askold*, the cruiser on duty at the entrance to the harbour; but it was not until 5 a.m. that she was discovered by Torpedo Boat No. 58, which attacked her without success. On the 8th, the *Gremyashchi*

* LOSSES ON THE 3RD AND 4TH JULY.

Russian.	Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
4th Division	1	50	3	254
7th Division	1	40	4	248

On the side of the defence the heaviest fighting fell once more to the lot of the Japanese 11th Division, which lost 9 officers and 199 men.

and *Otvazhni* bombarded the left of the Japanese position, and had a distant engagement with eight destroyers. Again on the 9th, the same vessels went out, but as the Japanese destroyers were supported on this occasion by the *Itsukushima* and *Matsushima*, the *Bayan*, *Diana*, *Poltava*, *Pallada*, and *Novik* went to the assistance of the Russian gunboats. An engagement at long range took place in the afternoon, but the only damage done on either side was one boy wounded on board the *Asashiwo*. On the 11th, another night attack was made by the 6th Torpedo Boat Flotilla upon the duty cruiser, this time the *Diana*. Several torpedoes were discharged at her, but both she and her assailants escaped uninjured. A few days later, on the evening of the 15th—16th, the Russian destroyer *Rastoropni* was sent out to reconnoitre to the westward. Earlier in the day the Japanese destroyers had bombarded Pigeon Bay and had seized a Chinese junk which was attempting to run the blockade. Near Iron

The sinking of
the *Hipsang*.

Island the *Rastoropni* fell in with the British merchant vessel *Hipsang* which, according to

Russian accounts, attempted to make her escape towards the Miao-tao Islands even after several shots had been fired as a signal to her to stop. The *Rastoropni* then approached and fired a torpedo which struck the *Hipsang*, causing her to sink in a quarter of an hour. The destroyer saved the crew with the exception of some Chinamen. On the 21st July, two Russian destroyers, the *Stroini* and *Smyeli*, went along the shore to the northward of Pigeon Bay, to bombard the Japanese position. That night there was the usual appearance of Japanese torpedo craft in the roadstead, and again on the 22nd there was a mining expedition, some of the mines being picked up next day by Russian vessels engaged in sweeping. In order to check these nightly expeditions of the Japanese, three Russian destroyers, the *Lieutenant Burakov*, *Boevoi*, and *Grozovoi*, were ordered to lie in wait in Ta Ho Bay during the night of the 23rd, so as to attack

Loss of the
Lieutenant
Burakov.

any mine-layers which might appear. While at anchor, however, these vessels were themselves attacked at 2 a.m. by the 14th Japanese Torpedo

Boat Flotilla and the picket boats* from the *Mikasa* and *Fuji*. Having discovered the position of the Russian destroyers, the picket boats approached cleverly from the shore side, under cover of a fog, and succeeded in hitting both the

* These boats were specially fitted with Whitehead torpedo-dropping gear.

Lieutenant Burakov and *Boevoi* with torpedoes. The former was hit amidships and sank almost immediately, but the latter, which was struck aft, remained afloat and by dint of great efforts was towed into harbour the following morning. The *Grozovoi* is also said to have been slightly injured by the effects of a torpedo which exploded near her. The loss of the *Lieutenant Burakov* was a heavy blow to the Russians. Captured from the Chinese by the allied forces during the Boxer troubles, she is stated by various writers to have been much the fastest destroyer in Port Arthur, and had consequently been used on more than one occasion to carry dispatches to Newchuang.

More serious operations were now about to be resumed, and the preparations to drive the Russians from the "position of the passes" were almost complete. To support General Nogi's movements Admiral Togo sent the 7th Division (*Saiyen*, *Tsukushi*, *Fuso*, *Akagi*, *Chokai*, *Maya*, and *Uji*), with some torpedo boats, to operate on the right flank of the Japanese army. The shallow draught of these ships rendered them especially suitable for inshore work, but as the detachment was comparatively weak the 3rd Division (*Kasagi*, *Chitose*, and *Takasago*), strengthened by the armoured cruisers *Yakumo* and *Asama*, kept a look-out about twelve miles from Lao-tieh Shan promontory. To the eastward, the 5th Division (*Itsukushima*, *Matsushima*, *Hashidate*, and *Chinyen*) went inshore and were to move a little in advance of the left flank of the army; the 6th Division (*Idzumi*, *Suma*, *Akashi*, *Chiyoda*, and *Akitsuishima*) lay in observation off the port, while the battleships with the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga* remained in the vicinity of Round Island. Meanwhile the Third Army had been reinforced by the arrival of part of the 9th Division, the 4th *Kobi* Brigade, and a large quantity of artillery.* Twelve Russian field guns which had been captured at Nan Shan were brought up to Lan-ni-chiao, and six naval guns were placed about a mile west of Chu-chuang-tzu-kou.

General Nogi now felt that he had sufficient force under his command to undertake the operations which were designed to

* The actual reinforcements landed at Dalny during July were the 9th Division (part of which did not reach the front till the 29th), the 4th *Kobi* Brigade, the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade (72 guns), a number of 6-inch and 4.7-inch howitzers, 4.7-inch and 4-inch bronze guns, 4.7-inch and 12-pr. naval guns, and 3.5-inch mortars. Some of this heavy artillery was used during the fighting on the 4th July.

Fighting on the 26th July. push the Russians back into the permanent defences of Port Arthur, and on the 26th July he disposed his troops as follows :—*

Right Wing.—The 1st Division and part of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade.

Centre.—The greater part of the 9th Division, reinforced by the 1st *Kobi* Brigade, one heavy battery, and the captured Russian field guns.

Left Wing.—The 11th Division, four heavy batteries, and some naval 12-pr. guns.

As a general reserve, part of the 9th Division, the greater part of the 4th *Kobi* Brigade, and two heavy batteries were stationed at Wang-chia-tun, in rear of Japanese right, where the ground was open and favourable to counter-attack.

The 1st Division was divided into two columns; the right was to advance along the main Wang-chia-tun—Ying-cheng-tzu road, height 584 being its first objective; while the left was to move against the same line of heights from a more southerly direction. To support the advance of this division, four 4.7-inch howitzers and six 3.5-inch mortars were placed north of the road junction just east of Cha-kou.

In the centre the 9th Division, which was to attack the loftiest heights, was divided into two columns. The 18th Brigade, on the right, was directed against Triple Peak, while the 6th Brigade, on the left, was to attack heights 1100 and 990. The 11th Division, which had gradually been moved southward as the 9th arrived, was also formed in two columns. The right column was to move west from the southern spurs of Chien Shan, across the valley, to the long ridge south of height 990. It consisted of the 10th Brigade, with the 44th Regiment on the right and the 22nd on the left, and was accompanied by five out of the six divisional mountain batteries, six 4.7-inch bronze guns, twelve 3.5-inch mortars and ten naval guns; the mountain batteries came into action from a narrow ridge four thousand yards east of Ta-shih-tung. The left column, consisting of four battalions of the 22nd Brigade with one mountain battery, moved against Ta-po Shan and Lao-tso Shan. Two battalions of the 22nd Brigade remained in reserve with the duty of observing the extreme right of the Russian line.

During the earlier part of the day General Nogi watched the

* An intercepted telephone message is said to have given the Russians warning of the impending attack. *Conférences sur la Guerre Russo-Japonaise*, Part 9, p. 29.

operations on the right and centre from a hill west of Li-chia-tun, but at 3.30 p.m. he moved forward to height 325 north of Pan-tao.

To resist the impending attack, General Fock had distributed the troops under his command in three sections and a reserve.

Left Section.—From Shuang-tai-kou to height 970, under Major-General Nadyein :—

15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 11 companies.

16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 11 companies.

$\frac{3}{4}$ 4th Squadron, 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment.

3 Mounted Scout Detachments from the 5th, 15th, and 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiments.

1 Detachment Infantry Scouts of the 15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

2nd and 3rd Batteries, 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.

Centre Section.—From height 790 viâ Yu-pi-la-tzu, An-tzu Ling, height 990, to a nameless village one mile north of Hou-chia-tun, under Colonel Savitski. This portion of the defence was divided into two sub-sections :—

(a) From height 790 to Yu-pi-la-tzu, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gusakov—

14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2 companies.

15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2 infantry scout detachments.

16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 3 infantry scout detachments.

4 Q.F. guns under Captain Schwindt.

2 guns of the 1st Battery, 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.

4 mountain and 5 machine guns.

(b) From Yu-pi-la-tzu to the nameless village, under a commander nominated by Colonel Savitski—

13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 3 infantry scout detachments and 1 mixed detachment.

14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 9 companies, 1 mounted scout detachment, 3 infantry scout detachments and 1 mixed detachment.

$\frac{1}{2}$ 1st Battery, 7th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.

$\frac{3}{4}$ 1st Battery, 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.
6 machine guns.

Right Section.—From the nameless village to Ta-po Shan and Lao-tso Shan, under Colonel Semenov. This portion of the defence was also divided into two sub-sections—

- (a) Hou-chia-tun section as far as height 640 exclusive, under Colonel Dudin—
 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 4 companies.
 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 3 companies and 2 scout detachments.
 4 Q.F. guns under Captain Puzanov, to fire down the Lung-wang-tang Valley.
- (b) Lung-wang-tang section, under a commander nominated by Colonel Semenov—
 26th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2 companies.
 28th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 8 companies.
 3rd and 7th Reserve Battalions, 4 companies.
 Frontier Guards, 2 companies.
 4 Scout detachments from the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division.
 2nd and 3rd Batteries, 7th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.
 $\frac{1}{4}$ 4th Squadron, 1st Verkne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment.
 19 machine guns.

General Reserve.—At the road junction $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Lieh-shu-fang—

- 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 4 companies.
 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 7 companies.
 4th Reserve Battalion.
 4th Battery, 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.

In all, $17\frac{3}{4}$ battalions and 22 scout detachments, or 19,000 to 20,000 bayonets, 1 squadron, 70 guns of which 52 were quick-firing, and 32 machine guns. In addition there were on Yu-pi-la-tzu some guns which had been removed from a Japanese blockship.

At 7.30 a.m. on the 26th July, the attack began, but all movements were greatly impeded by a thick fog, which, later in the day, turned to heavy rain. In the south, the 11th

The operations on the 26th July. Division was opposed by the troops of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division, which were commanded by Colonel Semenov until General Kondratenko arrived from Port Arthur and assumed the direction of affairs in this quarter. The Japanese came on with such resolution that the pass between Lao-tso Shan and Ta-po Shan was

soon captured, and the height 764 fell into their hands. This loss rendered the position of the Russian right extremely precarious—for the only line of retreat lay round the head of the Lung-wang-tang Inlet—and General Kondratenko decided that the hill must be retaken. All the guns and howitzers which could be spared were therefore concentrated against it, and about 5 p.m. the Russian infantrymen succeeded in establishing themselves on the slopes, but a redoubt which they had built at the top was now held against them. The left of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division on Ta-po Shan was heavily shelled, and from 3.30 to 6.30 p.m. was subjected to a series of attacks, all of which were beaten back by rifle, machine gun, and artillery fire, and failed to get nearer than seven or eight hundred yards from the Russian line.

In the centre, the left column of the Japanese 9th Division advanced against heights 990 and 1120 after a heavy artillery bombardment, and at one time nearly succeeded in reaching the crest of the former hill; but here the fighting consisted for the greater part of the day of an artillery duel, while the main efforts of the Japanese were directed against the Yu-pi-la-tzu salient, which was assailed from the north by the 1st Division and from the south by the right column of the 9th Division. As had been the case elsewhere, the turning movement of the Japanese 1st Division was greatly delayed by the fog, and it was not until 8 a.m. that the outpost on height 594 was driven back to the main position. The Japanese then pushed on towards height 800 which was held by the 1st Scout Detachment of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and one machine gun under Second Lieutenant Burnevich. When attacking this second hill the Japanese were taken in flank by the fire of another scout detachment from height 790; but at midday the Russian machine gun was disabled and about an hour later Lieutenant Burnevich's detachment fell back after losing half its numbers.

While the attack on height 800 was in progress the right column of the 9th Division advanced from the middle road towards Yu-pi-la-tzu, but was beaten back about 11.30 a.m. by rifle and artillery fire both from that hill and from the An-tzu Ling. The attack was pressed with great vigour, and at noon General Fock ordered two companies of the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Regiment to Yu-pi-la-tzu and placed the other two companies on the An-tzu Ling. As soon as Lieutenant Burnevich was driven in the danger increased, for the Japanese 1st Division was then able to advance due south

against the salient, and against the height 790, but in neither case did it succeed in getting within a thousand yards of the position. For a time the pressure was relaxed, but about 3 p.m. Japanese ships joined in the bombardment from Ying-cheng-tzu Bay, and the defences of Yu-pi-la-tzu and height 790 suffered severely, although the actual number of casualties caused is said to have been slight. Towards evening the fire of the Japanese artillery became heavier than ever, and at 7 p.m. the infantry of the 1st and 9th Divisions was again sent forward to the assault of the line of heights from hill 790 to Triple Peak. In some places the Japanese succeeded in reaching the trenches but were at last beaten off, and when night fell the greater part of the 1st Division had been brought to a standstill at the foot of the precipitous spurs north of Yu-pi-la-tzu. At the close of the day the division occupied a line from Ying-cheng-tzu to height 800, while the 9th Division extended from a point between Yu-pi-la-tzu and Kou-kou on the right to the heights south of Pien-shih-peng-tzu on the left. The 11th Division held the ridge north of Ta-po Shan, and its left flank had gained Lao-tso Shan; but Ta-po Shan itself was still in the hands of the Russians. In these positions the Japanese troops remained throughout a cold and rainy night until the coming dawn enabled them to renew the attack.

As the result of the day's fighting, the only success gained by the Japanese was the capture of the height 764, and the pass between Lao-tso Shan and Ta-po Shan. In spite of the heavy cannonade to which they had been subjected the Russian losses did not exceed three hundred and fifty men, and General Stessel decided to continue the resistance on the following day. His only remaining reserves now consisted of three companies of the 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and the 4th Reserve Battalion; for six companies of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, two of which had been called up from Port Arthur, had been absorbed into the fighting line. Of this regiment the 5th and 6th companies* had joined General Kondratenko, who had also summoned from the fortress several companies of his own 7th Division, and a company of marines.

Owing to the fog the Japanese vessels do not seem to have

* The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Companies, and the 1st Scout Detachment of this regiment were brought to An-tzu-ling village, just west of the pass, about 5.30 p.m. The allotment of the other three companies is not known. In his capacity as commandant of the fortress General Smirnov seems to have shown some disinclination to denude the permanent defences of troops which might otherwise have taken part in this battle.

been able to render much assistance to the army, but, probably in order to safeguard the movements of the 5th and 6th Cruiser Divisions, a sweeping party in Naval action on the 26th July. gunboats worked along the shore near Lung-wang-tang. About 11 a.m., one of these gunboats got her propeller foul of the sweeps and, being temporarily disabled, drifted westward towards Swainson Point, where she came under fire from the most eastern of the Russian batteries. Another gunboat came to her assistance, and both were then attacked by some Russian gunboats and destroyers which had come out to support the right flank of their own line on shore. Several unsuccessful efforts were made to torpedo the two Japanese gunboats, but the second vessel was twice struck by shell, and it was only after an hour's hard fighting that the sweeping party got away. Although little could be seen through the mist, the sound of this firing brought the Russian cruisers *Bayan*, *Askold*, and *Pallada* from Port Arthur and the Japanese 5th and 6th Cruiser Divisions from seaward. While the latter force was approaching, the *Chiyoda*, the fourth ship in the line, struck a mine which exploded near her bow. She settled down about two feet by the head, but remained afloat and was able to steam slowly to Ta-lien Bay, where she was sufficiently well repaired by divers to be taken back later to Japan. Meanwhile a long range action took place between the remaining Japanese cruisers and the Russians, who were to some extent protected by their batteries, but towards evening the latter retired into harbour.

To return to the land operations, the night of the 26th passed quietly on the centre and left of the Russian position, but on the right the Japanese drove the Russians down the slopes and regained complete possession of height 764. At daylight, artillery fire opened along the whole front. About 9 a.m., this bombardment was followed by an infantry attack on Ta-po Shan but, owing to the accurate shooting of the Russian batteries posted west of Lung-wang-tang, the Japanese were stopped when about five hundred yards from the trenches. Towards noon the attack was suspended while the troops ate some food, but an hour and a half later the Japanese artillery again burst forth, and fire was concentrated on the batteries which had checked the advance in the morning. The infantry attacks were then resumed, but during the afternoon the defence was greatly assisted by the *Novik*, *Bayan*, and *Retvizan* which joined the gunboats off Lung-wang-tang.

The Japanese attacks on the 27th.

The Japanese 5th Division, with the *Kasuga* and *Nisshin*, engaged these vessels at a range of six miles and compelled them to withdraw, but not before General Tsuchiya, the commander of the Japanese 11th Division, had decided that night would bring him better chances of success. While re-entering the harbour at 7 p.m. the *Bayan* struck a mine which exploded under her bow and flooded the foremost compartment, but her bulkheads held and she was brought into dock on the following day.*

To the north, the Japanese did not attempt any offensive movements against the Russian left, but contented themselves with massing about eighty guns near the village of Ying-cheng-tzu, and pounding the entire front of the position between height 790, which was still held by scout detachments, and Yu-pi-la-tzu. At 10 a.m., the ships in the bay joined in the bombardment, but it was not until midday that the Russian scout detachments were driven back to height 970. Even then the Japanese infantry could not establish themselves on the abandoned peak, for it was thoroughly searched by shrapnel fire from a battery in rear. A general assault was now delivered against the whole front of the Yu-pi-la-tzu salient. About 3 p.m., the defenders of height 970 began to waver, but the line was restored by the timely arrival of two companies of the 15th Regiment. At the apex of the salient the fighting was even more determined and at one time the Japanese infantry forced a way right up to the trenches occupied by the scouts of the 13th Regiment, but were beaten off by some companies of the 16th Regiment which were brought up at the critical moment. The defenders at this point suffered a loss of over two hundred men but refused to give way, and when other means failed they had recourse to stone throwing. The last assault of the day was delivered at 9 p.m., and on this occasion the assailants entered the redoubt only to be driven out at the point of the bayonet. In time even Japanese infantry succumbs to fatigue, and with this last repulse the attacks on Yu-pi-la-tzu and Triple Peak came to an end. When the fighting ceased, the Russian loss already amounted to over a thousand killed and wounded, but General Stessel again decided that the resistance should be continued. Such men as were available were at once set to work to repair the shattered defences of Yu-pi-la-tzu, and after issuing an order praising the conduct of all ranks during the last two days General Stessel returned to the fortress.

* On the 27th a steam hopper, which belonged to the sweeping flotilla used daily by the Russians, was sunk by a mine.

The "position of the passes," although weakened by the loss of height 790, still barred the way to Port Arthur, but General Nogi was not yet at the end of his resources. His attacks in the centre had failed, but during the night the Russian right flank was deprived of the support of the fleet, and within an hour of the last repulse from Yu-pi-la-tzu a desperate attack was launched against Ta-po Shan. At last success crowned the Japanese efforts, and the Russian line was broken. A counter-attack failed, and at 11 p.m. Colonel Semenov decided to retire to the western side of the inlet; but at this moment General Kondratenko arrived upon the scene and resolved to make one more effort to recover the lost trenches. The second attack was no more successful than the first, but it was not until 3.30 a.m. on the 28th that General Kondratenko at last consented to withdraw. In the meantime he visited Lao-tso Shan, where two companies of the Japanese 12th Regiment had worked their way completely round the Russian right. Finding their flank turned and the centre of their line broken, the troops of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division retired from Lao-tso Shan covered by the Frontier Guard, but many of them were compelled to swim across the bay.*

Throughout the night communication between the various Russian commanders was very irregular, particularly while General Kondratenko was on Lao-tso Shan, and contradictory reports were constantly reaching General Stessel. As early as 10.30 p.m. General Fock sent word to say that retreat to Feng-huang Shan† was inevitable, since any further advance of the enemy towards Hou-chia-tun would jeopardize the whole line. For a time, however, the troops of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division were able to remain on the passes, but at 2 a.m. General Fock received permission to retire to Feng-huang Shan as soon as he was convinced that his right flank had been driven in. At 4 a.m., he received General Kondratenko's message announcing his withdrawal, and orders were at once issued for the retreat.

At dawn of day on the 28th, the troops of the 4th Division began to evacuate their positions. The defenders of height 990 fell back by Hou-chia-tun covered by three companies of the 13th Regiment. The artillery and train suffered heavily from Japanese

The retreat
from the passes.

* One account says that they escaped in Chinese junks.

† Also called the Wolf Hills, by which name these heights are perhaps better known. The Chinese names have, however, been adhered to whenever possible.

guns posted on the captured heights, but there was no pursuit. In the centre the retreat was effected in good order from the An-tzu Ling and from Yu-pi-la-tzu ; but on the left flank the Russians were exposed to a galling fire from the Japanese batteries near Ying-cheng-tzu. In this quarter the retreat was greatly assisted by the fire of the 2nd Battery of the 4th Artillery Brigade, which checked the advance of the Japanese 1st Division until it was supported by its own guns. By 9 a.m., the Japanese were in possession of the heights, and three hours later, while General Stessel held a ceremonial march past of his troops, they were established on a line from Chang-ling-tzu in the north to Lung-wang-tang in the south.

The defence of the " position of the passes " cost the garrison of the Kuan-tung Peninsula a loss in killed and wounded of 47 officers and 2,066 men. Five guns remained in the hands of the Japanese, but nearly 4,000 men had fallen in the attack.

The Russians now fell back to their last line of defence outside the permanent fortifications. This line ran along the heights from

Louisa Bay east to Feng-huang Shan, thence south to Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan. It had been very weakly fortified, the trenches being quite devoid of overhead cover, while the *kao-liang*, or tall millet, had been left uncut, with the result that the plain from Hou-sha-pao to Lieh-shu-fang, instead of forming an excellent glacis, allowed the Japanese to approach unseen to within a few yards of the Russian lines. The work of strengthening the defences was at once begun, and it was hoped that the Japanese would halt for some time, as had hitherto been the case after each advance. This hope was disappointed, for the Japanese followed up their success, and at daylight an assault was launched from the north.

The Japanese heavy artillery marched at 11 p.m. on the 29th, and by 2 a.m. on the 30th had reached a point near the railway two thousand yards south-west of Chang-ling-tzu. The 1st Division, again strengthened by the 1st *Kobi* Brigade, advanced on the right, its left moving via Tu-cheng-tzu, and taking advantage of the cover afforded by the *kao-liang*, occupied the heights south of Ni-ho-tzu, and captured Feng-huang Shan, with the hills to the east of it, almost without loss. On the left of the 1st Division was the 9th, which had to cross some open ground and suffered somewhat from the fire of the Russian artillery. The 11th Division, on the extreme left, was not closely engaged, and held a line from the

Fighting on the
30th July.

heights south of Li-lan-tzu to the hill above the village of Kuo-chia-kou.

With the capture of Feng-huang Shan the Russian resistance collapsed, and the whole line was evacuated with the exception of Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan; the retreating troops suffered severely from the Japanese artillery, since no arrangements had been made for using the fortress guns to cover a retirement.* The attack, indeed, came as a surprise, the Japanese finding the arms of some units still piled, and capturing quantities of supplies and cooking utensils. The Russians fell back to the outer line of defences, and by the evening of the 31st July the Japanese were firmly entrenched on the captured heights whence they could overlook the fortifications of Port Arthur.

From this time onwards the garrison of the Kuan-tung Peninsula gave up all idea of active operations, and trusted for ultimate success to General Kuropatkin's army and to the strength of the works into which it had retired. The failure of the field army has already been described at some length, but the capture of the fortress was to cost the Japanese so many lives that its defences merit particular attention.

* The Russians lost 13 officers and 691 men, of whom 2 officers and 150 men were killed.

CHAPTER XX.

THE DEFENCES OF PORT ARTHUR* AND THE CAPTURE OF TA-KU SHAN AND HSIAO-KU SHAN.

(Plan 15.)

SOON after the Russians took over possession of the fortress from the Japanese in 1898 the engineers began to build six permanent fortifications as a protection against land attack. These original works were Forts Pai-yin, Chi-kuan, Erh-lung, Yi-tzu Shan, Ta-yang-kou North, and one which was to have been placed three thousand five hundred yards south of Fort Cha-kua-tzu. Owing to the broken nature of the ground it was soon realized that this plan must inevitably leave much dead ground, and that adjoining forts would not be able to see one another. Other works were therefore designed to fill the intervals and, since the forts were already numbered in series, they were called either "fortifications" or "intermediate works," and were given numbers identical with those in the earlier girdle. The result was a most confusing nomenclature; for example, Fort No. 3 and Fortification No. 3 were side by side, and were equally permanent works. Fort No. 5 was never finished, but its neighbour, Fortification No. 5, was a permanent work complete in all respects. This second series was to begin in the east with a work crowning the height seven hundred yards south-west of Pai-yin Battery. A second work was to occupy the site of Chi-kuan South-East; then were to come Forts Sung-shu, Ta-an-tzu Shan and Cha-kua-tzu. In addition, four permanent concrete batteries, Pai-yin North, Chi-kuan, An-tzu Shan East, and Ta-yang-kou South were designed for certain of the intervals. Lastly, an inner *enceinte* was provided, which consisted of a heavy earthen parapet with a ditch twenty feet wide and twenty feet deep, and was strengthened here and there by

* A fuller description of these defences is given in Part 3 of the "Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (Port Arthur)," which is published separately.

the addition of several small forts. An immense amount of labour was expended upon this *enceinte*, which eventually proved to be quite useless and played no part whatever in the defence. The need of protection against a raid by Chinese bandits has been put forward as an excuse for the time and money wasted upon its construction.

The building progressed but slowly, and when war broke out in February, 1904, five years after the work had been planned, not one of the forts was absolutely finished. Fort Cha-kua-tzu was nearly complete, and Forts Chi-kuan, Erh-lung, Sung-shu, Yi-tzu Shan and Ta-an-tzu Shan were fairly well advanced. Forts Pai-yin and Ta-yang-kou North were still far from ready, and No. 6 had not even been traced. Of the permanent batteries Pai-yin North, Chi-kuan, and An-tzu Shan East were almost complete, but Ta-yang-kou South was only about half finished. Fortunately for the defence there were still in existence a few old Chinese works which could, with very small improvements, be used as provisional fortifications. These were a nameless work about a thousand yards north of Fort Pai-yin, Chi-kuan South-East, East and West Pan-lung. Finally there was the Chinese Wall, a rampart of mud and stones about ten feet high and twelve feet thick at the base, which ran from Pai-yin North Battery to Fort Sung-shu. This wall served as a curtain to which the works on the outer spurs acted as bastions or caponiers. It was strengthened by the Russians, who added loopholes and overhead cover, and built strong bombproofs under the banquette. But for the existence of this old Chinese fortification it is possible that Port Arthur would have fallen to the first attack of the Japanese in August, 1904.

The importance of the heights extending towards Louisa Bay had long been realized, but lack of funds had prevented any attempt to fortify them permanently. Provisional Fortification of outlying heights. works* were at once begun on these heights; Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan, which overlooked the line of defence on the east, were also provisionally fortified. The north-east front being most exposed to attack, the efforts

* The term provisional is not altogether satisfactory, but no better expression has yet been devised. Permanent works must of necessity be constructed in time of peace. Provisional works are thrown up when the need for them arises, so as to supply the deficiencies of permanent fortification. They are frequently described as semi-permanent, but as a rule they consist mainly of field fortifications, supplemented by semi-permanent works at certain important points.

CHINESE WALL.

West Pan-lung.

East Pan-lung.

P



VIEW FROM A POINT 50 YARDS EAST OF M BATTERY, LOOKING NORTH-WEST.

The arrow shows the direction of the Japanese attack, night of 23rd—24th August, 1904.

Gorge of Chi-kuan Battery.

R



VIEW LOOKING SOUTH-EAST FROM A POINT 50 YARDS EAST OF N BATTERY, AND SHOWING THE MILITARY ROAD IN REAR OF THE DEFENCES.

of the garrison were largely directed towards strengthening it, but there were apprehensions of a Japanese landing about Pigeon Bay, and a network of trenches was therefore constructed on the west.

In order to prevent any attempt to carry the heart of the fortress by a rush down the Lun Ho Valley, trenches and obstacles were carried across the low ground between Sung-shu Shan and An-tzu Shan. A line of entrenchments, strengthened by the Waterworks and Temple Redoubts, formed an additional defence to the entrance to the valley, and at the same time protected the waterworks near Hou-pa-li-chuang.

Along the crest of the heights behind the Chinese Wall a line of batteries was placed, all using direct fire with the exception of I Battery, which comprised four heavy howitzers on extemporized garrison mountings and used high-angle fire. These batteries were connected by trenches which acted as a support or second line behind the Chinese Wall.

Still nearer to the town was a third line which ran, with interruptions, from the Sung-shu Supporting Battery to Naval Ridge and Chi-kuan Peak. This line of trenches was not really strong, and was mainly constructed after the development of the attack, in order to act as a retrenchment cutting off the threatened front.

The front of the line was everywhere covered by wire entanglements which, although efficient as obstacles, were not so strong as they might have been. Wooden posts only were available, and it was impossible to set these firmly in the hard ground, while, since barbed wire was to be obtained only in very small quantities, the entanglements were largely made of telegraph wire from the railway. Three to five lines of posts were used. These entanglements caused great loss to the Japanese, especially during the earlier stages of the siege, when it was found necessary for trained men to go forward and destroy them before an assault could hope for success. In the later stages, when the trenches were close up to the obstacle, the destruction sometimes occupied several nights, single men seizing their opportunity and doing what damage they could under cover of darkness. The wires and posts were cut and dragged away wherever possible, or charges of explosive were placed so as to make a breach. The plan was tried of tying ropes to the posts and hauling on them from the siege

trenches, but was not found satisfactory. Although to all intents and purposes invulnerable by artillery fire, certain of the entanglements which were close to the defences, and were under a heavy bombardment for a long period, were cut to pieces by splinters. Latterly, the siege trenches were almost invariably pushed through the line of obstacles before an assault was delivered. Other obstacles used were abattis, tree entanglement, deep military pits, *chevaux de frise* and inundated ditches. In the ditches of the forts a common device was a plank, two inches thick, through which nails four or five inches in length were driven. The planks were then placed in position with the points of the nails uppermost, and were covered with loose earth. The Japanese in their assaults frequently wore their native straw sandals over linen socks, and against such footgear the nails were very effective.

A novel form of obstacle, which however proved a total failure, was a fence designed to carry an electric current capable of killing any man who should touch it. It consisted of a single wire hung on porcelain insulators supported by posts about three feet high. Across the Lun Ho Valley there were three lines of this fence, ten feet apart. Current was supplied from generating stations near Fort Erh-lung, Chi-kuan Battery, and Pai-yin North Battery.

Land mines and fougasses were placed in large numbers in most of the ravines near the line of defence. They were fired electrically, either by observation or by a circuit-closer which acted when trodden upon, but they inflicted little or no loss upon the Japanese.

The defences as a whole were not of the most modern type. No armour was used in any of the permanent works, and the ruling thickness of concrete in the land defences was from three feet to four feet six inches. In the coast batteries it was slightly thicker. Against the shells from the Japanese 6-inch howitzers and mortars, this thickness of concrete was sufficient except when several shells in succession struck the same spot, but it was quite incapable of withstanding an attack by 11-inch howitzers. No counter-mine galleries were prepared during peace time, so that the attack was generally allowed to reach the crest of the glacis without having recourse to mining. The counterscarp galleries were not attacked by artillery, but were easily destroyed by mines.

Although the permanent forts were incomplete and not of the

strongest construction, it will be seen that they justified their existence, since the Japanese in every instance found themselves for several weeks unable to advance beyond the crest of the glacis. The deep ditches, flanked by machine guns, proved to be impassable obstacles, and even after the ditches were dead, the Japanese found it impossible to maintain themselves on the parapets, the defenders being able, by means of retrenchments communicating with bombproof cover in the gorges, to hold them at bay until the forts were reduced to ruins and no longer tenable.

It was found impossible to keep heavy guns in action inside a permanent fort, for their position was too clearly defined, and they served merely to draw fire upon the garrison. On the other hand, it was always possible to bring a few light guns into action at the moment of an assault, both in permanent and provisional works, no matter how heavy the previous bombardment. While the Japanese trenches were still at some distance, these light guns were kept under cover and were run up only when the assault began, but when the saps drew close to their objectives, there was no time to run up the guns, and they then had to be masked and left in position. Even so they frequently escaped destruction and, by firing case at close range, inflicted severe loss upon the assailants.

Very intimately connected with the construction of all defences is the organization of the garrison by which they are to be manned ;

and in this respect the Russian arrangements were complicated by the general plan which had been

formulated by the Viceroy Alexeiev for the operations in the Kuan-tung Peninsula. By that plan General Stessel, whose proper command was the 3rd Siberian Corps, was to have command of the field force, while General Smirnov was to be responsible for the defence of the fortified zone. So soon as a siege became inevitable, it was obvious that this dual command could only lead to friction, and on the 3rd July, General Kuropatkin telegraphed to General Stessel to leave Port Arthur in a destroyer. So far from complying with these directions, General Stessel suppressed the telegram, an action which formed one of the counts against him at his court-martial, and as he was the senior officer in the garrison he practically assumed command of the fortress over the head of General Smirnov. Moreover further intricacies were introduced into the official hierarchy by the presence of the staff of the 3rd Siberian Corps in addition to that of the fortress. For instance, so long as the artillery of the 4th and

7th East Siberian Rifle Divisions remained in the field it was under Major-General Nikitin, chief of artillery of the 3rd Siberian Corps; but as soon as it retired into the defences, it passed under the command of Major-General Byeli, chief of artillery of the fortress. Similarly, Major-General Roznatovski was chief of General Stessel's staff, until owing to sickness he was replaced by Colonel Reis, while at the head of the staff of the fortress was Lieutenant-Colonel Khvostov. Next in importance to Generals Stessel and Smirnov came General Kondratenko, of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division, who was placed in command of the land defences, a capacity in which he won for himself the love and admiration of his men. Under him were three section commandants, Major-General Gorbatovski, Colonel Semenov, and Colonel Irman, who were responsible for the infantry defence of the eastern, northern, and western fronts respectively.* The artillery was, however, entirely independent of these officers, for General Byeli reported directly to General Smirnov and was in no way responsible to General Kondratenko. His command was likewise divided into three sections, corresponding to those of the infantry defence, which was further sub-divided into seven or eight sub-sections.

In spite of this needlessly cumbersome system, the spirit of the troops, under the splendid leadership of General Kondratenko, rose superior to the difficulties. It was inevitable that their discipline should be imperfect, but little fault can be found with the co-operation between the various arms. For the past three months they had fallen back before each attack; but by the beginning of August their backs were against the wall. Their health was good, and their rations, if not luxurious, were still ample.† Surrender instead of retreat was henceforth the only alternative to victory, and under that changed condition the garrison of Port Arthur was

The situation at the beginning of August.

* The eastern section extended from the sea to the Lun Ho; the boundary between the northern and western sections is not known for certain, but was in the neighbourhood of 203 Metre Hill, which was in Colonel Irman's command. Until August the garrison of the eastern section was formed by the 25th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and 134 guns; it was then strengthened by the addition of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and 2 companies of the 15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

† In the middle of July the supplies for a garrison of 42,000 men and 4,500 horses were estimated to be: flour, 180 days; oatmeal, 37 days; meat, 18 days (13 days salt, 5 days on the hoof); pickles, 15 days; sugar, 190 days; tea, 320 days; forage, 150 days. From the beginning of August it became necessary to issue horse-flesh in place of other meat.

to render an account of itself very different from that which the successive retreats from Nan Shan, the Position of the Passes, and Feng-huang Shan had led its opponents to expect.

Turning from the internal to the external situation, the blockade at sea although strict was not perfect, and communication with the outside world could still be effected by means of junks and destroyers. On the landward side, the Japanese troops were suffering severely from sickness, but their previous successes inspired them with complete confidence and made them eager to assault. For many reasons it was highly desirable to bring the operations in the Kuan-tung Peninsula to an early conclusion. In the north the First, Second, and Fourth Armies had closed in on Liao-yang, but without the assistance of the Third Army it was hardly possible to hope for decisive victory.

Apart from this ruling factor, the needs of the field armies, General Nogi in deciding upon his future line of action had many points to take into consideration. A reference Selection of the "front of attack." to Plan 15 will show that a suitable line of close investment clearly defines itself around Port Arthur. From Louisa Bay it runs eastward to the heights near Feng-huang Shan, thence curving to the southward along the hills east of Tuan-shan-tzu, to Ta-ku Shan, Hsiao-ku Shan and Ta Ho Bay. Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan were still in Russian hands, but with their capture the Japanese would be established on a position which was admirably adapted for defence against a sortie from any quarter. General Nogi's next step was, therefore, obvious, but he also had to select the point in the main defences against which to concentrate his subsequent efforts.

The eastern front would be exposed to attack so soon as Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan were taken. But it was flanked by the sea, and the presence of Russian mines would make it impossible for the Japanese fleet to assist the army, whereas the hostile gun-boats were daily proving themselves able to manœuvre in these waters.

The western front presented the same disadvantage; moreover, neither of these sections possessed any dominating point the possession of which would render it hopeless to continue the defence any longer, nor did they contain any point whence the effect of the bombardment upon the ships in the harbour could be observed. The choice therefore lay between the north-eastern and north-western fronts. The peak of Wang-tai situated in the centre of the former section appeared to afford the necessary facilities for

observation and some distance to the westward was 203 Metre Hill which would serve equally well; but the possibility of capturing this point, and of directing the bombardment from it without attacking the principal line, does not seem to have occurred to the Japanese at this stage.

The north-eastern front included three permanent forts and was the most strongly fortified section of the defence; but it formed a pronounced salient, and there the attack would be less exposed to flanking fire than elsewhere. Nevertheless subsidiary attacks would be necessary on the positions at 174 Metre Hill, Namako Yama, and the Waterworks Redoubt. The north-western front was flanked by the works near Fort Sung-shu, upon which a subsidiary attack would have to be made, and as a preliminary measure it would be necessary to carry the successive lines of defence from 174 Metre Hill to 203 Metre and Division Hills. Moreover, owing to the frowning heights which formed its northern face, the north-western front was more formidable in appearance than it was in reality. Once captured, however, it would take in reverse the north-eastern front. The difficulties to be encountered and the advantages to be gained by the attack would seem therefore to be about the same in either case, but the north-eastern front was by far the more conveniently situated with reference to the existing railway; a point of great importance where heavy siege material had to be handled. It is true that no physical obstacle existed which would prevent the extension of the line, without any break of gauge, from Chang-ling-tzu viâ Tso-chia-tun to Louisa Bay; but the Japanese were not well provided with railway troops, and the undertaking doubtless appeared to them more formidable than it would seem to armies more accustomed to work of this nature.

Lastly, the best positions for the siege artillery were to be found in the Feng-huang Shan, or Wolf Hills.

After weighing all these considerations, General Nogi decided that the best chance of success was offered by the north-eastern front, which will henceforth be termed the *front of attack*.*

As soon as this all-important point had been decided the Japanese proceeded to mount their siege guns and to form their advanced depots. At the beginning of August, railhead was at Shuang-tai-kou, some six miles in rear of the line of investment. Progress with the repair of

* For the strength and composition of the Japanese Third Army at the time of the first general assault on Port Arthur, see Appendix M.

the line was very slow, and it was not until the 9th or 10th of the month that railhead reached Chang-ling-tzu, where, although the station was out of range from the fortress, the steam of a locomotive would sometimes draw an ineffectual fire. From railhead a portable tramway of two feet gauge was laid between the existing metals as far as Chou-chia-tun, and carried stores under 1½ tons in weight. Anything above that weight was brought up by road. A second tramway was laid from railhead to Tu-cheng-tzu, and carried stores and ammunition for the Naval Brigade. Advanced depots were formed near Cheng-chia-tun where, although scarcely out of range of the heavier guns of the fortress, they were concealed from view by the heights to the southward, and remained untouched until the end of the siege.

The attack was divided into three sections.* To the 1st Division was allotted the district lying between the western coast and a line running from Huo-shih-liang, east of Shui-shih-ying, to the valley between Forts Sung-shu and Erh-lung. This task involved the capture by the division of all the outlying western works, of the Temple Redoubts, and of Fort Sung-shu.

To the 9th Division was given the country east of the 1st Division as far as a line running from the railway near Tuan-shan-tzu to the ravine between East Pan-lung and P. This would involve the capture of the Waterworks Redoubt, and of the works in the main line from Fort Erh-lung to East Pan-lung inclusive.

The 11th Division had charge of the district between the 9th Division and the sea to the south and east; it would therefore have to capture Ta-ku Shan, Hsiao-ku Shan, and the works on the front of attack from P to Chi-kuan Battery inclusive.

The 4th *Kobi* Brigade was in reserve.

The construction of the siege batteries F to X† was at once started, but the valleys in which the more easterly of them were situated were overlooked by Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan, so that their work could only be carried on at night. The Russians at times fired very heavily at every possible target, both from their batteries and their ships, but they failed to draw any reply from the Japanese until the 3rd August, on which date shrapnel were fired at Ta-ku Shan by the mountain batteries of the 11th Division. Little or

* For the lines of demarcation between the sections see Plan 15.

† See Plan 15.

no infantry fighting took place during the first six days of August, but to protect the work on their siege batteries the Japanese out-posts occupied a line which extended roughly from Ching-chia-tun near Louisa Bay, along the foot-hills to Tuan-shan-tzu, thence along the heights to Kuo-chia-kou near Ta Ho Bay.

The Japanese ships were in sight daily, but they retired to a distance at night, and although the *Novik* and the Russian destroyers had steam constantly ready during daylight, no use was made of them until the 4th August, when the *Ryeshitelni* was sent out to lay mines ten miles to seaward. On the following day, at 4 p.m., fourteen Russian destroyers, divided into three flotillas of seven, four, and three boats, were sent out to lay mines off the port. As they issued from the harbour together they were observed by the Japanese destroyers *Akebono* and *Oboro*. According to Russian accounts the flotillas then separated and the smallest of the three steamed towards Dalny in the hope of drawing off the hostile destroyers, while the other two carried out their mining operations. In this object they were completely successful for the Japanese followed to the eastward and engaged at a range of about five thousand yards. The larger flotillas dropped their mines, and at 5 p.m. the whole returned to harbour. The Japanese destroyers, which had been reinforced by the *Inadzuma*, followed up, and to them it appeared that three of their own boats had attacked and driven back fourteen Russian vessels of approximately equal power.

The *Ryeshitelni* again went out on the 6th and laid ten mines off Pigeon Bay. During this period, also, several mining expeditions were sent in by the Japanese, and although fired upon by the guardships and forts they seem to have escaped without injury.

At 11 a.m. on Sunday, 7th August, 1904, while the inhabitants were at public prayers in the square, one of the two 4·7-inch naval guns at E fired the first shot from landward into Port Arthur. Bombardment from these two guns was carried on intermittently throughout the day, the usual target being the Basin and Old Town, although Forts Erh-lung and Sung-shu were both fired upon. Four men were killed, and among other injuries inflicted the *Tzesarevich* was hit twice and Admiral Vitgeft was slightly wounded by a shell, which wrecked the wireless telegraphy house. Until the 19th August these two 4·7-inch guns were the only pieces used to bombard the town of Port Arthur, as distinct from the defences; but being well concealed from view in heavily

Naval
operations.

The opening
of the land
bombardment.

blinded emplacements they could not be located without the aid of a balloon,* and were never struck by a Russian shell.

From this time onward the possibility of a simultaneous artillery attack from sea and land was a constant menace to the inhabitants. Although they had passed through several bombardments from the sea, and were prepared to bear without complaint the constant stream of shells from the land side, the prospect of attack from both quarters filled them with consternation. At first General Stessel forbade the construction of bombproofs; later in the siege he permitted, and even enjoined, their use and many of the inhabitants had these refuges attached to their houses.

Meanwhile preparations had been made for the capture of Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan. These hills were not strongly fortified, and but for the fact that each was flanked by the other there would have been much dead ground at the foot of their eastern slopes.

As it was, with the sea on their southern flank and the flat ground on either bank of the Ta Ho to their front, they presented a formidable position to assault. Half a mile of ground absolutely devoid of every kind of cover lay between the two hills and the Japanese trenches, and to make matters worse for the attack, the Ta Ho had been dammed by the Russians until it formed a serious obstacle. The garrison of Hsiao-ku Shan consisted of three companies of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment with two field guns. Four companies of the same regiment, with four field guns, held Ta-ku Shan.

On the morning of the 7th August the 11th Division was occupying the line Tuan-shan-tzu—Kuo-chia-kou; the 10th Brigade was on the right, the 22nd Brigade on the left, their point of junction being the height north of Chou-chia-tun. In addition to his six divisional mountain batteries, General Tsuchiya, the commander of the 11th Division, was to be supported by twelve 4.7-inch field howitzers, and twenty-four 3.5-inch mortars, which had been specially detailed by Major-General Teshima, the commander of the siege artillery, and placed under Lieutenant-Colonel Kimihira.

The 10th Brigade (22nd and 44th Regiments) was detailed to attack a line extending from Tung-pa-li-chuang as far as the foot of Ta-ku Shan, while the 22nd Brigade (12th and 43rd Regi-

* A balloon which was on the way to Port Arthur on board the s.s. *Manchuria* fell into the hands of the Japanese on the first day of the war, and was used by them.

ments) was to assault both Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan. The 12th Regiment was assigned to Ta-ku Shan and the 43rd to Hsiao-ku Shan.

To prepare the way for the infantry the divisional artillery and the guns under Colonel Kimihira opened fire at 4.30 a.m. on the 7th August. The Russians replied with the guns of their main defences as well as with those on the hills attacked; their fire was very severe and was concentrated chiefly on the mountain guns, inflicting heavy loss. The artillery fire lasted all day. It was not, strictly speaking, an artillery duel, since the Japanese guns were concentrating their fire upon the two hills, and were not attempting to reply to the heavy guns of the fortress. Indeed, at this period no Japanese gun had been mounted which could have made any effective return to the Russian heavy artillery, except the few 4.7-inch naval guns near Huo-shih-liang.

About 7.30 p.m., the artillery preparation being considered sufficient, the Japanese infantry was ordered to advance. On the right, the 10th Brigade drove back without difficulty the Russians opposed to it, although they only fell back as far as Wu-chia-fang. Opposite Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan, however, matters were different. Owing to the darkness and heavy rain the Japanese guns were unable effectively to support their infantry, and the commander of the division could not control the progress of the attack. Many men were drowned in crossing the Ta Ho inundation, but in spite of a heavy fire the survivors succeeded in establishing themselves at the foot of both hills, where they passed the night.

When daylight dawned on the 8th August rain was still falling heavily and the Japanese gunners were unable to discern their target. Nevertheless, General Tsuchiya resolved to continue the attack, and shortly afterwards the infantry attempted to ascend the slopes, but for some time met with no success. About noon the cruiser *Novik*, with two gunboats, the *Bobr* and *Gremyashchi*, and eight destroyers, the superior power of whose guns enabled them to keep out of range of the Japanese artillery, issued from the harbour and opened a reverse fire from Ta Ho Bay upon the 12th Regiment and the machine gun detachments, which nevertheless managed to make slight progress. Owing to the mines with which the water was sown the Russian vessels were not molested by the Japanese fleet, but at 2 p.m., when the siege artillery was brought into action, they were forced to retire. At 3.30 p.m. the rain ceased and the fire of the heavy guns was then,

for the first time during the day, turned against Hsiao-ku Shan and Ta-ku Shan. By the evening, the effect of the bombardment had been severely felt on the crest of both hills. The defence was most stubborn, the Russian guns firing case at short range into the Japanese as they crept up the slopes. But the entrenchments on the hill-tops did not afford sufficient protection against shrapnel, reinforcement was a matter of difficulty, and by 8 p.m. the defenders of Ta-ku Shan began to make their way down the hill. Seizing their opportunity, the Japanese 12th and 20th Regiments advanced and finally drove the Russians from the trenches on that hill, but it was not until 4.30 a.m. on the 9th that Hsiao-ku Shan was captured by the 43rd Regiment.

The Japanese losses during the two days' fighting amounted to eleven hundred and seventy-one killed and wounded, of whom the great majority belonged to the 22nd Brigade. The 43rd Regiment alone had six hundred and seventy-five casualties, and in its two leading battalions every officer was either killed or wounded. The losses of the Russians were ten officers and four hundred men killed and wounded; and of these one hundred and sixty belonged to the 10th Company of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which brought only eighteen men out of action. The Russians left behind them all their guns, but these had been damaged by the Japanese fire to an extent which rendered them useless to their captors. Until the end of the siege the guns remained on the hill-tops, and around them the dead bodies of the gunners bore witness to the gallantry with which they had been fought.

The capture of Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan was followed by much mutual recrimination on both sides. Undoubtedly the hills were not so strongly fortified as was advisable, but their position was so completely isolated as to preclude all hope of holding them for more than a brief period. As regards the failure of the Japanese fleet to assist the army when the latter was assailed by Russian gunboats, the risks attending the approach of the fleet would have been very great. This fact, however, was not grasped at the moment by the troops who suffered from the reverse fire, and certain officers of the army did not hesitate to express their opinions on the subject. To prevent any repetition of these tactics on the part of the Russians, the Japanese naval brigade mounted four 12-pr. guns at Y overlooking Ta Ho Bay. On the 11th August, this battery opened fire on some Russian vessels in the bay and drove them off, and ten days later its value was again proved during the first general assault.

After the evacuation of Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan a hot fire was opened against both hills by the heavy guns of the fortress and of the fleet, so that for some days the Japanese were unable to establish themselves on the summits. On the 9th, three companies of the 15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment made an attempt to recapture the abandoned guns on Ta-ku Shan. They were supported by two companies of the same regiment which moved against Hsiao-ku Shan, and by the fire of the fortress and of some gunboats and destroyers in Ta Ho Bay. The Japanese, who were holding the northern slopes of the hill, crept round to the west and took the attack in flank, while at the same time the Russians came under fire from their own batteries, and were forced to retire with a loss of about a hundred men. The Russians soon realized that to shell the hills was mere waste of ammunition, and the Japanese were left in possession.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE BATTLE OF THE YELLOW SEA.

(Plans 16 and 17.)

With the loss of Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan the position of the Russian fleet in the harbour became decidedly more perilous.

Situation of
the Russian
fleet in Port
Arthur.

The knowledge that the bombardments would now become more frequent and more severe must have shown Admiral Vitgeft that, unless he put to sea, there was every possibility of his fleet being sunk at anchor without having made a single effort to

dispute the supremacy of the Japanese. Just at this time also he received the direct order from the Tsar to endeavour to break through to Vladivostok,* and this combination of circumstances finally decided him to make the attempt on the 10th August. Most of the guns belonging to such ships as were effective were hurriedly replaced; but even after receiving back all that could be spared from the batteries on shore, as well as those belonging to ships which were to remain in Port Arthur, the squadron was still deficient of one 12-inch, † ten 6-inch, and twelve 12-pr. guns when it met the Japanese fleet.

The work of replacing the armament and preparing for sea was attended with considerable difficulty, as another bombardment took place on the 9th, and from early morning the ships were subjected to a very galling fire. Two shells struck the *Peresvoyet*, but did little damage, while another destroyed the sheers which were being used for moving two 6-inch guns from the *Bayan* to the former ship, and sank the lighter with the guns on board. ‡ The *Retvizan* was particularly unlucky, for she was struck no less than seven times, the most serious damage being done by a shell which hit her below the waterline and made a large hole at a depth of seven feet. Owing to this injury she shipped four hundred tons of water, and in that condition she went to sea on the following day. While taking in coal, replacing guns, and repairing damage as it occurred,

* See p. 302.

† This gun was landed from the *Sevastopol* on account of damaged mountings.

‡ These guns were eventually recovered, but not until much later.

the Russian ships still replied to the Japanese fire, but the effect they produced was negligible.

Before daylight on the 10th August, the Russian fleet began to move out of harbour, and at 8.30 a.m.* the last ship was on her way through the gullet. With the exception of the *Bayan*, which was still in dock under repair for the damage inflicted by the mine on the 27th, the composition of the fleet was the same as on the 23rd June—six battleships, three protected cruisers, and the *Novik*. With them were fourteen torpedo boat destroyers, of which the *Vuinoslivi*, *Vlastni*, *Grozovoi*, *Boiki*, *Bezshumni*, *Bezstrashni*, *Bezposhadni*, and *Burni* were to attempt the passage to Vladivostok, while the remaining six were to return to port after escorting the main fleet through the dangerous waters near Port Arthur.

Rear-Admiral Vitgeft, whose flag was flying on board the *Tzesarevich*, was in chief command, with Rear-Admiral Matusevich as his chief of staff. Rear-Admiral Prince Ukhtomski on board the *Peresvyet* was second in command, and Rear-Admiral Reitzenstein commanded the cruisers with his flag in the *Askold*.

By 9 a.m., the whole fleet, preceded by six steam hoppers in line abreast to sweep the channel for mines, was moving slowly out to sea, the course taken leading it along the shore of the Lao-tieh Shan Peninsula. This channel, which differed from that used on the former occasion, had been swept daily for some weeks. The fleet passed over its own western field of electric contact mines apparently without any trouble, and at 10.30 a.m. had got well clear of the land and of the probable area of Japanese mines. The sweeping flotilla and the second flotilla of destroyers then returned to Port Arthur, while the fleet shaped course S. 50° E. and proceeded at eight knots' speed. Ahead was the *Novik* with the eight destroyers forming the first flotilla, and after them came the *Tzesarevich* leading the fleet, which was cleared for action, in single line ahead in the following order:—*Tzesarevich*, *Retvizan*, *Pobyeda*, *Peresvyet*, *Sevastopol*, *Poltava*, *Askold*, *Pallada*, *Diana*. The hospital ship *Mongolia* followed some distance astern.

The weather was fine and calm with a low-lying mist to the eastward, through which the Japanese cruisers of the 5th Division, and the armoured cruisers *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*, had been seen watching the Russian movements.

The Russian fleet was clear of the port some hours earlier than had been the case on the 23rd June, but on this occasion Admiral

* All times given are those of the meridian of Port Arthur.

RELATIVE POSITIONS OF MAIN FLEETS, 1st ACTION, 10th. AUG 1904.





Plate 16.



Disposition of Japanese fleet. Togo with his main force was nearer to Port Arthur and in a position to bar the advance at once. For weeks the Japanese had expected a sortie, and since the besieging guns had begun to bombard the harbour they had doubtless felt that it could not be much longer delayed. When information of the appearance of the Russian fleet reached them about 9 a.m. the Japanese battleships were in the neighbourhood of Round Island, while the 5th Division (*Matsushima*, *Hashidate*), under Rear-Admiral Yamada, was nearer the shore to the eastward of Port Arthur. The 3rd Division (*Yakumo*, *Chitose*, *Kasagi*, *Takasago*), under Rear-Admiral Dewa, was to the south-westward of Lao-tieh Shan, while the 6th Division (*Akashi*, *Suma*, *Akitsushima*), under Rear-Admiral Togo, was also to the eastward of Port Arthur. Each of these cruiser divisions had one vessel absent, viz., the *Asama*, *Chinyen*, and *Idzumi* belonging to the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Divisions respectively, but they all arrived on the scene of action during the afternoon. Admiral Togo, therefore, had immediately at hand four battleships, three armoured cruisers, and eight protected cruisers with which to meet the Russian force of six battleships and three protected cruisers. In smaller vessels the Japanese had a great advantage, as they were able to oppose seventeen destroyers and twenty-nine torpedo boats to the eight destroyers accompanying the Russian fleet. This preponderance in torpedo craft, useful as it might be when darkness set in, was of little value to Admiral Togo for many hours, and meanwhile he had to oppose the Russian fleet of six battleships with an approximately equal force* of armoured vessels.

* TABLES SHOWING THE GUNS CARRIED BY OPPOSING FLEETS.

I.—*Russian.*

Ship.	12-inch.	10-inch.	6-inch.	4·7-inch.
Armoured—				
<i>Tsesarevich</i> ...	4	—	12	—
<i>Retvizan</i> ...	4	—	12	—
<i>Pobyeda</i> ...	—	4	11	—
<i>Peresvyet</i> ...	—	4	11	—
<i>Sevastopol</i> ...	4	—	12	—
<i>Poltava</i> ...	4	—	12	—
	16	8	70	—
Unarmoured—				
<i>Askold</i> ...	—	—	12	—
<i>Pallada</i> ...	—	—	8	—
<i>Diana</i> ...	—	—	8	—
<i>Novik</i> ...	—	—	—	6
	16	8	98	6
Left at Port Arthur	1	—	10	—
	from the <i>Sevastopol</i>			
Total ...	15	8	88	6

Their long stay in harbour had had the natural effect on the Russian ships. At first the *Tzesarevich* does not seem to have been able to steam more than eight knots. This defect was soon remedied, but at 11.50 something went wrong with her steering gear and the whole fleet had to stop for several minutes. Again about noon, after the signal had been made for thirteen knots, another short delay was caused by the *Pobyeda*. Meanwhile the Japanese battleships, reinforced by the *Kasuga* and *Nisshin*, were drawing nearer and, about 11.30 a.m., the two main

fleets came in sight of each other, dimly visible through the thin haze. The leading ships were now about twelve miles apart, and the relative positions of the two fleets were as shown in Plate 16, Fig. 1. The *Mikasa* (flag of Admiral Togo) was leading the Japanese fleet, followed by the *Asahi*, *Fuji*, *Shikishima* (flag of Rear-Admiral Nashiba), *Kasuga*, *Nisshin* (flag of Vice-Admiral Kataoka) in single line ahead. A few minutes after the Russian fleet came in sight the Japanese turned together four points to port, bringing the formation into port quarter line, probably with a view to checking the rapid approach of the rival fleets until Admiral Togo had time to make out

II.—Japanese.

Ship.	12-inch.	10-inch.	8-inch.	6-inch.	4·7-inch.
Armoured—					
<i>Mikasa</i>	4	—	—	14	—
<i>Asahi</i>	4	—	—	14	—
<i>Fuji</i>	4	—	—	10	—
<i>Shikishima</i>	4	—	—	14	—
<i>Kasuga</i>	—	1	2	14	—
<i>Nisshin</i>	—	—	4	14	—
<i>Yakumo</i>	—	—	4	12	—
<i>Chinyen</i>	4*	—	—	4	—
<i>Asama</i>	—	—	4	14	—
	20	1	14	110	—
Unarmoured—					
<i>Matsushima</i>	1†	—	—	—	12
<i>Hashidate</i>	1†	—	—	—	11
<i>Chitose</i>	—	—	2	—	10
<i>Kasagi</i>	—	—	2	—	10
<i>Takasago</i>	—	—	2	—	10
<i>Akashi</i>	—	—	—	2	6
<i>Suma</i>	—	—	—	2	6
<i>Akitsuishima</i>	—	—	—	4	6
<i>Idzumi</i>	—	—	—	2	6
Total	22	1	20	120	77

* Of old pattern.

† 32-cm. gun of old pattern.

the Russian formation. A quarter of an hour later (11.53 a.m.) the Japanese turned together four points to starboard, thus resuming the original course and formation. They were now steering to cross the bows of the Russian fleet, and so soon as they were directly ahead of the hostile line Admiral Togo turned his ships eight points to port together, bringing them into line abreast, with the Russian fleet astern (Fig. 2).

By these movements the distance between the fleets had been reduced to about 13,000 yards, and at 12.10 p.m. the first ranging

shots were fired on either side by the *Tzesarevich* and *Nisshin*. At 12.13 p.m., the Japanese fleet

turned together eight points to port, bringing the formation once more into line ahead with the ships in reverse order and the *Nisshin* leading. The Russians had also turned somewhat to port in succession, and the fleets were in the position shown in Fig. 3, with the *Novik* abreast of the flagship on the disengaged side. The *Tzesarevich* and *Retvizan* now opened a slow fire from their forward 12-inch guns on the *Mikasa*; the Japanese ships replied, but the firing was not yet by any means general. At 12.30 p.m., Admiral Togo altered course in succession two points to port so as to bring his fleet more directly across the Russian line of advance, but at this moment the *Tzesarevich* turned sharply to starboard. As the others followed, the *Novik* stopped by order of the Admiral, and as each ship passed warned her to look out for mines. The cause of this sudden alteration of course was a report made to Admiral Vitgeft that Japanese torpedo boats were dropping mines in the path of the fleet. Hitherto the Japanese 6th Division and three flotillas of torpedo boats had kept well out of range on the port bow of the Russian fleet, but the latter's gradual turn to port had brought them right ahead and a fear of mines arose. That the report was true appears improbable, for any such action could not fail to hamper the movements of Admiral Togo almost, if not quite, as much as those of his opponent. However, the Russians were now steaming to the southward across the stern of the Japanese who were heading to the north-east, but the range was still over 8,000 yards. As the Russian ships came into line after their turn they took up the firing, which was chiefly directed upon the last two ships, the *Asahi* and *Mikasa*. Only the primary armaments on each side were as yet engaged and, owing to the distance and the rapid changes of formation, the fire was ineffective, although shots were dropping near the ships of both fleets (Fig. 4). At 12.40 p.m., as

his present course would soon have taken him out of action, Admiral Togo turned his fleet together sixteen points to starboard bringing it into line ahead in its proper order. The fleets were now again approaching one another rapidly (Fig. 5); but a few minutes later the Russian admiral, believing that he was clear of the supposed minefield, turned again to port in succession and steered to pass astern of the Japanese fleet. Admiral Togo met this movement with a slight turn to starboard which brought the fleets into the position shown in Fig. 6, steaming rapidly past each other on nearly opposite courses at a distance of 6,000 to 7,000 yards. Fire by this time had become general, and the 6-inch guns forming the secondary batteries had joined in. The unarmoured cruisers in the rear of the Russian line were soon abreast of the powerful battleships of the Japanese van and came in for a heavy fire, to which they gallantly replied with their 6-inch guns. Admiral Reitzenstein, however, rightly considering that it was not the rôle of light cruisers to engage battleships, quickly signalled to his command to withdraw from the line, and increasing their speed these vessels placed themselves to port of their battleships. This was done none too soon as the *Askold* and *Pallada* had both been struck, and fragments of shell which had burst on impact with the water had come on board the *Diana*; but all three had escaped without sustaining any considerable damage.

As soon as he had passed the rear of the Japanese line, Admiral Vitgeft gradually turned to starboard, bringing his fleet back nearly to their original course. Admiral Togo also made a circling movement towards the Russian rear, but finding that his enemy was once more making for the south-east, he turned again to starboard in succession and followed in the same direction. These movements had considerably increased the distance between the fleets, which, at 1.30 p.m., were more than 10,000 yards apart (Fig. 7). Seeing that the Russians would otherwise soon be out of range, Admiral Togo altered course two points towards them, and the two fleets then moved on nearly parallel lines. The Russians were steaming twelve to thirteen knots to the south-eastward, with the Japanese on their starboard quarter going fourteen knots and gradually reducing the range.

Thus far the Russians had good cause to congratulate themselves. Although not especially designed to that effect, their alterations of course had placed them in a position of considerable advantage. Their path lay open before them and they were some distance ahead, while if the Japanese persisted in closing they

must do so with the tactical disadvantage of exposing the head of their line to concentrated fire from the whole Russian fleet. By 2 p.m., this danger became more apparent, and in the next few minutes Admiral Togo had to form a decision which would affect the whole of the Japanese strategy on land and sea. If the Russians should succeed in maintaining until darkness the lead which they had secured, there was a strong probability of their being able to carry out their orders to avoid action and make straight for Vladivostok. It is true that Admiral Kamimura was still in the Korean Strait, but it was more than likely that his attention would be fully occupied by the Vladivostok squadron, and in any case his force of cruisers was not strong enough effectually to bar the passage of the Russian battle fleet. Admiral Togo was therefore compelled to rely entirely upon his own resources. Upwards of an hour's fighting had shown him that he was opposed to a very formidable enemy. If he were to continue the action in the position in which he now found himself he might fairly hope to sink or capture the rear vessels of the Russian line ; but the cost to the Japanese fleet would be considerable, and the Russian van would have a good chance of escaping without serious damage. On the other hand, by drawing out of range and pressing on as fast as possible there was a prospect of inducing the Russians to turn back without exposing his own ships to so grave a danger from gun fire. But in acting thus he had to accept other risks. It was now well on in the afternoon and not many hours of daylight remained in which to get ahead of his enemy and to fight an action ; added to this he must steam at the utmost speed of his older vessels, with the possibility of a breakdown which would leave him in marked inferiority.

In the following year, when Admiral Togo fought the great battle by which his name has perhaps become more widely known, he had a less formidable task ; Russia had then placed her last stake upon the table, and he had but to defeat the enemy before him at whatever cost to his own fleet. The present problem was far more complex. For Japan the success or failure of the land campaign was largely dependent upon command of the sea, and it was of the utmost importance to crush Admiral Vitgeft's fleet before it could be reinforced from Europe. Should it escape to Vladivostok there was but little hope that this aim would be accomplished. Even if only a

Admiral Togo's
tactics.

portion were to make its way there, the Japanese would have to choose between the immediate inception of siege operations against the northern fortress and the risk of a probable junction of the Russian Far Eastern and Baltic fleets at a later date. Lastly, there is no doubt that the underlying idea of Admiral Togo's strategy at this period was to confine the Russian fleet to Port Arthur, where its fate would be sealed with that of the garrison, and to preserve his own ships for the inevitable battle with the Baltic fleet. For all these reasons it was far more to the advantage of Japan to force Admiral Vitgeft back to his original base, than to destroy some of his ships and allow the remainder to escape. Admiral Togo therefore determined to make the attempt, even though by so doing he should lose the chance of a partial success, and subsequent events were to prove the wisdom of his action. It is not, of course, intended to imply that each of these arguments passed in ordered array through Admiral Togo's mind as he gazed from the *Mikasa* at his flying enemy. Far more probable is it that every possible combination of circumstances, favourable or otherwise, had been carefully considered during the weary months of watching, and when this particular situation arose he was already mentally familiar with it.

But no matter what the lines of reasoning may have been, so soon as the momentous decision had been formed the Japanese commander increased speed to fifteen knots and altered his course to starboard, thus gradually increasing the distance between the fleets. All this time steady firing had been in progress and some damage had been received by either side, but not sufficient materially to impair the fighting or steaming capacity of any ship. As the range increased the noise of battle gradually died away, and about 3 p.m. it ceased entirely. Everything now depended upon speed. The Russian fleet was steering S. 62° E., with the cruisers about a mile and a half to two miles on the port side of the battleships, and the destroyers to port of the cruisers. During this pause in the action the fleets remained in sight of one another, though at times only the funnels, masts, and upper works were visible above the horizon. The Russian cruisers closed in nearer so as to communicate by semaphore with the battleships and, on a signal from the *Tzesarevich*, the Russian crews were given supper. About 3.25 p.m., the Japanese fleet altered course slightly to port so as not to lose touch with the enemy, and a few minutes later the Russians made a similar turn to starboard, probably with a view to approaching more nearly their original course for Shan-tung.

RELATIVE POSITIONS OF MAIN FLEETS, 2nd. ACTION, 10th. AUG. 1904.

Scale
Sea Mile 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sea Miles

Plate 17.

Fig. 1.




Fig. 2.




Fig. 3.



Fig. 4.




Fig. 5.





Fig. 6.



At this point it will be as well to follow for a moment the movements of the Japanese cruisers. The 3rd Division, which had remained to the south-westward during the first engagement, placed itself on the port quarter of the Russian fleet at a distance of about eight miles, thus interposing between that force and Port Arthur. The 5th Division, which had been to the northward of the fight and had there been joined by the *Chinyen* about 2.30 p.m., also followed the Russian fleet at the highest speed of that ship, but kept well to the northward. The 6th Division, which it will be remembered had caused the Russians to make their turn at 12.35 p.m., crossed ahead of both fleets and then followed its own battleships at some miles distance. Soon after 3 p.m., Admiral Togo recalled the 3rd Division from its station astern of the Russians, where it was somewhat unnecessarily exposed, and these vessels, led by the *Yakumo*, pressed on to join their commander-in-chief.

Meanwhile the last slight alteration of course was gradually bringing the battle fleets once more into proximity. By 4.15 p.m., when the distance between them had been reduced to about five miles, the Russians appear to have again altered their course, this time slightly to the northward making the approach more gradual.

Another half hour passed without a shot being fired, but by 4.45 p.m. the fleets had closed to about 8,500 yards and the *Poltava*, which had dropped some distance astern of station, reopened the engagement by firing a 12-inch shell at the *Mikasa*. By this time the 3rd Division was coming up and the armoured cruiser *Yakumo* was ordered to reinforce the battle line, the lighter ships taking station on its starboard quarter. Just as the action was renewed the Russians again turned slightly to port, and the Japanese having made a corresponding turn the relative positions were as shown in Plate 17, Fig. 1. The Russian cruisers now turned four points outwards together and resumed their position two miles on the disengaged side of their battle fleet, where they were out of danger from misdirected shell. The shot from the *Poltava* was the signal for a general outburst of firing. For some time the fight raged furiously without any special advantage being gained by either side. The flashes of the guns were clearly seen in the decreasing light, and observers state that the bursting of a 12-inch shell against a hull at first gave the impression of some catastrophe in which the whole ship seemed to be involved; but when the smoke passed away all seemed as before. About 5 p.m., the *Yakumo* came into action

astern of the *Nisshin* but, finding that her lighter guns were not getting their full effect at that range, her captain gallantly took her some five hundred yards nearer to the enemy than her station at the rear of the Japanese line placed her. The Russians fought with their characteristic dogged perseverance, but gradually the better marksmanship of the Japanese began to establish a superiority. At 5.5 p.m., the main topmast of the *Peresvyet* was shot away, and a few minutes later her fore topmast was also struck.

These incidents, insignificant in themselves, were to have a marked effect later as they deprived that ship of her means of making signals. About the same time her fore turret was disabled by two heavy shell. The first struck the turret and jammed its training, while the second entered the gun port and put out of action the whole turret crew. The officer in charge and two men were killed. At this juncture a slight alteration of course to the northward by the Russians deprived the Japanese of the advantage which their greater speed was giving them, and forced them to conform. As was inevitable from her position at the rear of the Russian line, the *Poltava* had hitherto borne the brunt of the Japanese fire, and it was noticed that she had received some damage aloft as her boat derrick was hanging over the side. On the Japanese side also considerable damage had been done. Several large shell had struck the *Mikasa*, and it was noticed that, following a heavy explosion in the after part of the ship, the after turret was silent for the remainder of the action. A few minutes later the *Asahi's* after turret was also silent, and the *Shikishima* had one of her foremost 12-inch guns out of action, reducing the primary armament of the battleships from sixteen to eleven guns. At the end of an hour's hard fighting neither fleet had gained any real advantage, and the Russians had begun to hope that they would be able to hold out until darkness, but at 5.45 p.m. an incident occurred which quickly turned the scale in favour of the Japanese.

For some time the *Tzesarevich* had received a heavy fire from the Japanese van, and at this moment she was struck in quick succession by two 12-inch shell. One burst against the foremast, nearly bringing it down and killed Admiral Vitgeft, who was standing near the conning tower; the navigating officer on his staff and fifteen men were also killed, while Admiral Matusevich and the captain of the ship were severely wounded. The other burst against the roof of the conning tower, and fragments finding their way inside killed

Death of the
Russian Admiral.

or stunned every man at that post. Among the injured were the navigating officer of the ship, a sub-lieutenant, the helmsman, and some men stationed for passing orders. By some means, said in one account to be the bodies of men hurled against it, the helm was left hard a-starboard, although the rods connecting the wheel with the steering engine were not damaged. Taking a list to starboard, due to the action of the helm, the *Tzesarevich* swung round rapidly to port and, making a complete circle, cut through her own line between the *Sevastopol* and the *Peresvyet*. The *Retvizan*, which was the next ship in the line, began to turn in the wake of the leader, but her captain quickly realized that the sudden alteration of course was caused by some mishap and swung back rapidly towards the enemy, possibly in a gallant attempt to draw off the fire and give the *Tzesarevich* time to recover. The Russian line was soon in confusion. The *Pobyeda* at first remained on her original course, while the *Peresvyet* turned to starboard and supported the *Retvizan*. The *Sevastopol*, in order to avoid colliding with the *Tzesarevich*, also turned to starboard, while the *Poltava* at some distance followed in the wake of the *Pobyeda*.

Admiral Togo at once took advantage of the opportunity which a lucky shot had afforded him. Course was altered to port in succession, and rapid fire was concentrated upon the *Retvizan* and *Peresvyet* by every ship of the Japanese fleet as it steamed past them at a range of about 4,000 yards. By this time the *Tzesarevich* had made the signal "Admiral transfers the command" and Prince Ukhtomski, once more, as on the 13th April, left in command of the fleet by the sudden death of the commander-in-chief, displayed the signal "Follow me." Since both topmasts of his flagship had been shot away the flags were hoisted on the bridge rails where they were practically invisible, and most of the captains, seeing no admiral's flag on the *Peresvyet*, were in doubt as to whether the second in command was still alive. The Russian battleships, still in confusion, turned towards the north, and, continuing the circle, gradually came round to the north-westward as though to get away from the terrific fire to which they were subjected. At 6.15 p.m. the Japanese again turned to port in succession, pursuing their enveloping movement and driving the sorely beset enemy towards Port Arthur. The Russian fire had been nearly mastered, and it looked as though some at least of the ships would not reach that port; but the summer's day was drawing to a close, already the sun was low on the horizon, while the heavy pall of smoke from

The return to
Port Arthur.

the funnels of the ships hung over the water and obscured the view.

Like the *Retvizan*, the *Askold*, which was leading the Russian cruisers, at first mistook the sudden alteration of course made by the *Tzesarevich* for a preconceived manœuvre, and she also turned sharply to the northward; but when it became apparent that the Russian fleet was in confusion, Admiral Reitzenstein led his squadron back in order to give his support. When the battleships turned to port the cruisers, which by this time were to the northward of them, also turned in the same direction, while the destroyers at first remained to the eastward. This action of the destroyers seems to have had some effect in saving the Russian battleships, as the main Japanese fleet found these small vessels standing across its path and, being unwilling to risk his capital ships to an attack from torpedoes, Admiral Togo was unable to complete his circling movement at close range. The destroyers, however, soon headed back and he was then able to continue his movement to the north-west.

At 6.30 p.m. the position was as shown in Fig. 6. The Russian battleships were slowly moving to the north-west, with the cruisers ahead of them steering to the westward. To the eastward, the Japanese main fleet was still pouring in a heavy fire although the range had somewhat increased. To the south-east, the 3rd Division was following approximately in the track of the battle line, while the 6th Division was approaching from a south-westerly direction. Ahead, more Japanese appeared; the 5th Division led by the old battleship *Chinyen*, in spite of her slow speed, had arrived in time to assist in the last phase, and the *Asama*, guided by the sound of firing, had reached the scene of action so as to fill the only gap to the westward. At this moment the Russian cruisers came under fire from the *Asama* at a range of about 8,000 yards. Finding his way blocked to the westward, Admiral Reitzenstein turned to starboard and circled round, endeavouring to find some gap in the cordon through which he could force a passage. Eventually he decided to make a dash to the southward where only the lighter cruisers of the 6th Division blocked his way. Making the signal "Follow me," he put on full speed, and followed only by the *Novik*, was soon engaged with these vessels, while the Japanese 3rd Division turning to port also endeavoured to cut him off. Although for twenty minutes he sustained a heavy fire from these ships, and ran the gauntlet of a torpedo

The Russian
cruisers and
destroyers.



FUJI,
ASAHII.

MIKASA.

POLTAVA, SEVASTOPOL,
TZESAREVICH, PERESVYET.

RETVIZAN, POBYEDA.

attack from four destroyers attached to them, he managed to get through, and steaming twenty knots was soon lost to view in the gathering darkness. The two remaining cruisers, *Pallada* and *Diana*, which had dropped some distance astern in the confusion caused by the circling movement, seem to have mistaken Admiral Reitzenstein's signal for a command to the whole fleet. Not having seen Prince Ukhtomski's signal they were under the impression that their own admiral was endeavouring to reform the fleet on the *Askold*, and made no attempt to close up the interval. Consequently, when that ship dashed off at full speed they were left behind. She was soon so far away and was travelling so fast that it was hopeless to follow her and, after making an attempt, the captain of the *Diana* for a time proceeded to the westward with the remainder of the fleet, to which the *Pallada* had also attached herself.

To return to the main action. Firing was still kept up, but the range had now increased to about nine thousand yards and the light

The close of the
action.

was getting bad. To add to the discomfiture of the Russians, the 5th Division from the north-westward was also bringing its fire to bear upon the disorganized mass of ships. Twice, at 6.45 p.m. and again at 6.55 p.m., the Japanese battleships turned together four points to port, and on each occasion the original course was resumed after very few minutes. Meanwhile the Russian fleet, covered by a heavy cloud of smoke and favoured by an unusually misty evening, was disappearing in the gloom, but although no hostile ship had been destroyed or captured, Admiral Togo's purpose had been achieved. In its present battered condition there was little or no chance of the Russian fleet attempting to reach Vladivostok, and its return to Port Arthur was a practical certainty. Nothing was to be gained by remaining in its vicinity during the hours of darkness, and if he were to do so Admiral Togo would not only give an opening to the Russian torpedo craft, which had not suffered any considerable damage, but would also hamper his own flotillas whose chance had again come. He therefore decided at once to leave the scene of action, and, steering to the southward, moved rapidly away to a position whence he could renew the battle in the morning, should the Russian fleet again assay the passage to Vladivostok.

The Russian battleships appear not yet to have regained any organized formation but, led by the *Retvizan*, seem to have moved away to the westward, with the *Tzesarevich* and *Poltava* bringing up the rear some distance astern. Following the battle-

ships were the *Pallada* and *Diana*. As long as there was sufficient light the Japanese 5th Division kept up a fire from which the last ship, the *Diana*, received some damage. Nevertheless, her captain decided to break away after dark and to endeavour to reach Vladivostok. Soon after 8 p.m. he turned round and, accompanied by the destroyer *Grozovoi*, made off to the southward. About the same time Commander Shumov, who was left in command of the *Tzesarevich*, having lost touch with the remainder of the fleet through the inability of his ship to keep up, also decided to attempt to reach Vladivostok on his own account and took a southerly course.

The remaining ships followed the *Retvizan* back towards Port Arthur, and during the night were subjected to several torpedo attacks of which little or no detail is available. The Russians, wisely refraining from using their searchlights, were not easily located by the hostile flotillas. There was no moon and the very disorganization of the fleet was an assistance, for it enabled each ship to turn aside when torpedo boats were sighted, and in many cases to avoid an attack; but the Russian accounts state that, as on the night of the 23rd June, the Japanese destroyers and torpedo boats did not press home to close range. Although several torpedoes were seen to pass quite near no single ship was struck, and soon after daylight the battered remnant of the Port Arthur fleet was once more assembled under the guns of that fortress, whence it was destined never to emerge.

The ships which had returned were the *Peresvyyet*, *Poltava*, *Retvizan*, *Pobyeda*, *Sevastopol*, and *Pallada*, the first three being the most severely damaged.* Each had taken in a quantity of water, and only the calmness of the sea enabled the *Peresvyyet* and *Poltava* to reach their port; had the weather been bad they would probably have foundered at sea. Even as it was the *Peresvyyet* had been obliged to flood some of her double bottoms in order to get sufficient stability. Of the eight Russian destroyers only three, the *Vuinoslivi*, *Vlastni*, and *Boiki*, returned with the main part of the fleet.

The fate of those vessels which had not returned must now be described. So soon as Admiral Reitzenstein in the *Askold* had shaken off the Japanese cruisers in the darkness, he gave permission to the *Novik* to act independently,

* A detailed account of the damage is given in Appendix T. The only vessel struck by a torpedo was the Japanese torpedo boat No. 38.

and then reduced speed, partly to allow the *Diana* and *Pallada*, which he believed to be following, to overtake him and partly on account of the damage to his own ship. Shaping course so as to pass well clear of the Shan-tung Promontory, whence he expected a torpedo attack, he steamed slowly till daylight. At dawn he found himself clear of the enemy, but on increasing speed he soon discovered that the damage to the funnels had greatly augmented the expenditure of coal, and as there was evidently little chance of reaching Vladivostok he decided to go to Shanghai. After anchoring for a few hours off the Saddle Islands, Wusung was reached on the 13th, and the *Askold* proceeded up the river to Shanghai, where she was placed in dock. On the news of her arrival reaching Japan, pressure was at once brought to bear upon the Chinese government to fulfil obligations as a neutral; and on the 25th, with the consent of the Russian government, she was finally disarmed, and her crew interned, Japanese cruisers being stationed off the mouth of the Yang-tse River until this was done. During the negotiations the greatest excitement prevailed in Shanghai, as the Chinese more than once permitted the date originally fixed for the departure of the *Askold* to be postponed.

When the *Novik* parted company with the *Askold*, her captain decided to try to obtain coal at Kiao-chao and then to push on for Vladivostok. On the morning after the battle
The *Novik*.
the *Diana* was sighted, but was apparently mistaken for a Japanese vessel, as the *Novik* altered course to avoid her. Kiao-chao was reached in the course of the same day, and after a stay of ten hours, during which coal was rapidly taken in, the *Novik* left intending to make her way round the eastern shores of Japan. On the 13th, she passed through the Osumi Strait, and soon afterwards she had the misfortune to meet a Japanese merchant vessel with which she did not attempt to interfere. Her movements thus became known, and the Japanese cruisers, *Tsushima* and *Chitose*, were at once sent up through the Sea of Japan to cut her off in the north. Her intention to make for Vladivostok was obvious, and it seemed probable that she would be forced to steam at an economical rate during the earlier part of her journey in order to save sufficient coal to enable her to make use of her high speed when nearing her goal. The event proved this forecast to be accurate, but there was considerable doubt as to which of the two channels she would use, Tsugaru or La Pérouse. Arriving at Hakodate on the 17th, the two Japanese cruisers, reinforced by the port guard vessels, *Musashi* and *Takao*, lay in wait in the Tsugaru

Strait until the morning of the 19th. As there was then no sign of the *Novik*, the *Chitose* proceeded up the west coast of Yezo, keeping in touch with the signal stations on shore, by one of which she was soon informed that the Russian cruiser had that morning been sighted from the shore as she passed through the Kunashiri Channel. The *Chitose* at once pushed on for the western entrance of La Pérouse Strait while the *Tsushima*, which had also been informed, kept a more westerly course. As the *Novik* did not make her appearance on the morning of the 20th the Japanese cruisers entered the Strait, and the *Tsushima* proceeded to search Korsakovsk Bay, where, as it happened, the *Novik* then was. During her passage round Japan she had steamed at ten knots, but she had kept well out into the Pacific and even at that moderate speed had begun to run short of both coal and water. On nearing Korsakovsk her captain decided to put in, and at 5 a.m. on the 20th she began to take in the necessary supplies. While thus employed she received, by wireless telegraphy, signs which showed that Japanese war vessels were not far off. About 4.30 p.m., smoke streaks were seen on the horizon to the southward, and soon afterwards the *Tsushima* appeared in sight. The captain of the *Novik* had intended to wait for darkness before making his dash through the Strait, but he at once weighed and steamed out. As soon as she had approached to within about six thousand yards the *Novik* opened the engagement. Keeping her port side to the enemy the *Tsushima* replied, and for about an hour the two vessels were hotly engaged. At the end of that time both ships had received considerable damage. The *Novik*, with six of her twelve boilers disabled, had five hits on the waterline and her steering compartment was flooded. The *Tsushima* had also been struck by a 4.7-inch projectile which, hitting her obliquely just below the waterline, caused two compartments to fill and gave her a heavy list. Neither ship was in a condition to continue the action and, while the *Novik* returned to Korsakovsk to repair, the *Tsushima* was similarly engaged outside.

Just before dark the *Chitose* appeared, and the two Japanese cruisers kept guard during the night at the entrance to the bay, using their searchlights in case the *Novik* should attempt to escape unseen. There was, however, to be no further fighting, for on returning to the anchorage the Russian commander found that his helm was damaged beyond repair and, being made aware by the wireless telegraphy and the searchlights that more than one vessel was waiting outside, he decided to sink his ship in shallow

water. This was accomplished about 10 p.m., the ship's company being sent to the shore, and when the *Chitose* entered the harbour at 6 a.m. on the 21st, intending to complete the work of the previous day, she found the *Novik* partially submerged. For about an hour she shelled the exposed portion of the hull and then, after firing a few rounds at the settlement on shore, withdrew accompanied by the *Tsushima* which had succeeded in temporarily repairing her injuries.

The third of the cruisers to get clear of the Japanese fleet after the battle was the *Diana*, whose captain made off to the south-eastward, trusting to the similarity between his ship and the Japanese cruisers to save him from torpedo attacks. Towards the end of the action some considerable damage had been done to his vessel by the fire of the Japanese 5th Division; one large shell had struck her below the waterline and, although the armoured deck had not been pierced, a quantity of water had found its way inside. In order better to avoid observation it was decided not to use the searchlight nor to fire on torpedo craft, whose attentions might prove unwelcome, but rather to turn aside as soon as they were sighted. On the whole these tactics proved successful, for although it is stated that no less than nineteen destroyers or torpedo boats were seen during the night only six of them attacked her. In all, eight torpedoes were fired at the *Diana*, none of which took effect. Nevertheless she had several narrow escapes, particularly when a hostile vessel, either a destroyer or a torpedo boat, passed on an opposite course at a distance of only about one and a half cables and was seen to fire her torpedo. A few anxious seconds were followed by a feeling of intense relief when it was realized that she had missed her mark. At 10.15 p.m., the *Diana* nearly collided with another destroyer which flashed past in the darkness, and apparently mistook the Russian vessel for a friend as she did not discharge a torpedo. After steaming for three-quarters of an hour longer the light on the Shan-tung Promontory was sighted, and as soon as his position was fixed the captain shaped course S. 23° W., so as to pass through the least frequented part of the Yellow Sea. At daylight it was found that there was not sufficient coal to take the ship to Vladivostok, if steam were to be kept ready for a dash at full speed. After consulting his officers the captain therefore determined to abandon his original intention and to proceed slowly to Saigon, in the hope that the French authorities would permit him to repair his vessel and to return once more to the scene of action. Soon after arriving

at this decision, the *Novik* was sighted and the *Grozovoi*, which had kept company with the *Diana* through the night, was sent to communicate with her and returned with information as to her plans. The *Diana* then started off on her long voyage while the *Grozovoi* made for Kiao-chao. The *Diana's* stock of coal was not sufficient to carry her to Saigon, but on the 16th she managed to obtain a small quantity at the French settlement of Kuan-chao-wan and some more at Along Bay near Hai-phang. In this way she finally succeeded in making Saigon on the 25th August, but the hope of her being able to take further part in the war was not realized and she was disarmed at that port.

Even less fortunate than the cruisers was the *Tzesarevich* which, it will be remembered, had parted company with the remainder of the fleet soon after dark on the 10th. She, like the *Tzesarevich*. other battleships, was attacked by torpedo boats, but no details are known except that she escaped by steaming away at her utmost speed. At daylight she was close to the Shan-tung Promontory; she had suffered heavily in the battle, and as the damage to her funnels had caused an enormous increase in her consumption of coal, it was decided to make straight for Kiao-chao. About 9 p.m. on the 11th August she reached that port, where she was interned a few days later by the German authorities as they found that she would not be able to go to sea in the prescribed time.

Of the eight destroyers which left Port Arthur with the intention of accompanying the fleet to Vladivostok, three returned as already related, while the remaining five scattered to different Chinese ports. After leaving the *Diana* about midday on the 11th, the *Grozovoi* shaped course for Kiao-chao. When about forty miles from that port she was chased by a Japanese cruiser, but made her escape to Shanghai where she shared the fate of the *Askold*. The *Bezshumni*, *Bezstrashni*, and *Bezposhadni* all found their way to Kiao-chao after the battle. As soon as she had coaled, the first-named ship put to sea with the *Novik*, but returned later and was interned, as were also the other two.

The last of the destroyers to be accounted for is the *Burni* which, after being chased by Japanese destroyers, ran ashore at 2 a.m. on the 11th on the northern coast of Shan-tung, ten miles outside the eastern limit of British territory of Wei-hai-wei. Her captain, after landing his crew, destroyed his vessel and then marched with his men to Wei-hai-wei. A few days later they were sent to Hong-kong for internment.

The story of the battle of the Yellow Sea is now complete and, having followed the subsequent movements of the Russian vessels, it is possible to survey the gain which accrued to the Japanese as the result of their victory. Judged by the actual loss to the Russians the engagement might at first appear to have been quite indecisive. No single vessel had been captured by the Japanese, and only one light cruiser, the *Novik*, and one destroyer, the *Burni*, had been destroyed. In addition, the Russian flagship, two cruisers, and four destroyers were lost to their country's service for the rest of the war. But these comparatively insignificant successes do not by any means represent the services rendered to Japan by Admiral Togo's fleet on the 10th August and following days. The Russian fleet had put to sea with the definite intention of forcing its way through to Vladivostok, and with the knowledge that a return to Port Arthur meant that it must accept the fate of the fortress, now closely besieged by an investing army. The alternative was not a pleasant one, but before the day was over the main fleet had been driven back in confusion to the fate which awaited it at the hands of the Japanese Third Army, and there can be no doubt that, in preventing the escape of a single vessel to carry on the war at another point, the Japanese fleet had performed its task with complete success. Only those materials which were already in Port Arthur could be used to place the Russian fleet in a fit state again to meet the enemy, and the means of effecting important repairs were limited; moreover, all work would have to be carried out under a continuous bombardment. But these considerations appeared at the time to be of minor importance, for no one in Japan expected that the fall of the fortress and the capture of the ships would be long delayed.

Of the damage incurred by the Japanese fleet in securing this result little is known beyond the fact that the *Mikasa* suffered more severely than the other ships, and her losses in killed and wounded exceeded the total of those in all the rest of the fleet. Nevertheless, on the morning after the battle Admiral Togo, hearing that five Russian battleships had got back to Port Arthur, at once returned to his base to prepare for another action, and within forty-eight hours he was ready to fight again if called upon to do so.

Thus ended the first great sea fight of the war. But in addition

The seizure of
the *Ryeshitelni*
at Chefoo.

to the disaster, for it can be called by no milder name, to the main fleet, the Russian naval force in the Far East was on the same day still further weakened by the loss of the *Ryeshitelni*. When

Admiral Vitgeft put to sea that vessel was one of the destroyers which returned to harbour with the mine sweeping flotilla. As soon as she got back her commander was ordered by Admiral Grigorovich to take certain officers and dispatches to Chefoo. He was not to return to Port Arthur, but if he had sufficient coal he was to go on to Kiao-chao, and there to disarm. The engines of the *Ryeshitelni* were defective, and she was not able to steam more than twelve knots, but even at that speed she made the passage in safety, and leaving after dark reached Chefoo at 4 a.m. on the 11th. The officers and dispatches had just been landed when the destroyer was boarded by a Chinese officer, who was informed that she could not leave as her engines were disabled, but that her captain would consent to her being disarmed and her machinery dismantled. The *Ryeshitelni* had, however, been seen on her passage across by the destroyers *Asashiwo* and *Kasumi*, which had given chase, but had lost sight of her in the darkness. Judging by the course she was taking that her destination was Chefoo, these vessels followed and took up a position off the harbour in readiness to attack her if she came out. The sequel is thus related by the Japanese.

Finding that his expectation of the reappearance of the *Ryeshitelni* was not fulfilled, the Japanese commander entered the harbour on the night of the 11th with the *Asashiwo* and *Kasumi* and found that not only was there no indication of dismantling the Russian destroyer, but that since her arrival she had taken on board about sixty tons of coal. About 3 a.m. on the 12th, an officer was sent in with a demand that she should either come out and fight or be surrendered to the Japanese. The captain of the *Ryeshitelni* replied that his ship was disarmed and claimed the neutrality of the port. On the Japanese officer persisting in his demand, he was invited to inspect the dismantling of the boat. During the inspection the Russian captain gave orders that the vessel should be blown up and that resistance should be offered to the Japanese on board; he himself set the example by endeavouring to throw the Japanese officer overboard, but the Russian crew was driven into the sea and their vessel was then towed away.

The report of the Russian officer in command, Lieutenant Roshchakovski, differs from the Japanese account in several particulars. He states, and in this he appears to be corroborated by the Chinese authorities, that the *Ryeshitelni* had been visited by a Chinese officer who had acquiesced in her disarmament and had actually removed the breechblocks of her guns, torpedo war heads, small arms, and some portion of her machinery. He also states

that at the request of the Chinese he and his officers had signed a declaration neither to take any further part in the war nor to leave the port without the permission of the Chinese government. Under these conditions he considered his vessel as having been placed under the control of a neutral Power, and only gave orders that she should be blown up when he saw the Japanese preparing to hoist their own flag. He himself jumped overboard and swam, through a hail of bullets, towards some junks where he hoped to find a refuge, but instead of being received as he expected he was beaten back into the sea. At length he lost consciousness, and when he recovered he found himself on board a foreign war vessel.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE FIRST GENERAL ASSAULT UPON PORT ARTHUR.

(Plan 18.)

THE return of the fleet on the morning of the 11th August was a bitter blow to the defenders of Port Arthur. Had the sortie succeeded their task would have been lightened, for the greater part of the blockading fleet would have been drawn away, and the difficulty of getting in supplies would have been greatly reduced.

Now, however, no such hope could be entertained.

The situation in Port Arthur. On land the investing lines were being drawn more tightly; the Baltic fleet had not yet sailed, and the prospect of being able to hold out until it should come to the rescue was far from bright. All idea of the remaining ships making another dash for liberty was dropped, although there was still a suggestion that the *Bayan* should attempt to reach Vladivostok as soon as she could be made ready. For the time being at all events the operations of the fleet were to be confined to bombarding the Japanese positions, and to bringing in blockade runners with provisions and ammunition. With this object the mine sweeping was resumed under the direction of Admiral Loshchinski and, although the want of the boats which had been lost on the 10th was greatly felt, no less than two hundred mines were found and destroyed between this date and the end of the siege. The booms in the gullet and roadstead were replaced, and further mines were laid down for the protection of the entrance. Thus after its outburst of activity the Russian fleet relapsed, in all but minor matters, into its old attitude of passive defence.

The temptation to the Japanese to attempt to rush the permanent defences of Port Arthur was now very great. If only the hostile ships could be quickly captured, they might be refitted in time to be used against any fresh force which might come out from Europe; while there was certainly a possibility that if Port Arthur could be taken the Baltic fleet might not be dispatched.

Added to this was the fact that General Nogi's troops were needed to help in the great struggle round Liao-yang which could not be long delayed. To attempt to carry the defences of a modern fortress by assault and without the aid of siege artillery is a very serious undertaking, but the prize was great and General Nogi decided to accept the responsibility, no doubt with the full approval of Marshal Oyama, who was at Kai-ping. On the day following the battle of the Yellow Sea, hostilities, which had been more or less suspended since the capture of Ta-ku Shan and Hsiao-ku Shan, were actively resumed and, on the 12th, the war-ships were bombarded. Unfortunately, a hospital was struck, but there were no infantry movements until the following day, when the Russians evacuated the village of Wu-chia-ling and fell back to their main line of defence.

On this date also, the 13th, the Japanese initiated a series of operations which were to end in the first attempt against the main defences. In order to protect the right flank of troops advancing against the front of attack, it was desirable as a preliminary measure to carry the positions of Kan-ta Shan, Head-Quarter Hill, and 174 Metre Hill. This operation would, it was hoped, not only simplify the work which was to follow, but would distract the attention of the defenders from the real objective and induce them to concentrate their forces towards the west. To further this object General Nogi decided to keep his guns in the north and east absolutely silent until the time was ripe for an advance against the front of attack. No doubt his plan was wise, but such chance of success as he ever possessed was ruined by Chinese spies, who carried into the fortress news which enabled General Kondratenko to penetrate the designs of the enemy.

Until the beginning of August Head-Quarter Hill and 174 Metre Hill were held only by three scout detachments from the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, supported by a four-gun battery. After the return of the fleet on the 10th August they were reinforced by two companies of seamen, and the defence of these two hills and of an outlying knoll, known to the Russians as Bokovaya or Flank Hill, was entrusted to Commander Ivanov.

The attack on these western hills was entrusted to the 1st Division, and since it was almost independent of the operations in other quarters, it can be dealt with first. On the 13th August, the 1st Division occupied a line from Chou-chia-tun, near Louisa Bay, to Huo-shih-liang. On the right was the 1st *Kobi* Brigade (1st, 15th, and 16th

Japanese advance
in the west.

Kobi Regiments), in the centre the 1st Brigade (1st and 15th Regiments), and on the left the 2nd Brigade (2nd and 3rd Regiments). At 9 p.m. a general advance was made. The *Kobi* brigade occupied a line extending roughly from Sui-chia-tun to the height north-east of Ta-tung-kou. The 1st Brigade sent the 15th Regiment to seize Head-Quarter Hill, while the 1st Regiment was detailed to capture Kan-ta Shan. The 2nd Brigade, on the left, merely held its ground. In pouring rain the 15th Regiment advanced against Head-Quarter Hill, and succeeded by midnight in gaining the knoll at its northern end.* Owing to the darkness and rain the Japanese were under the impression that they were attacking the main defences of the hill, and it was not until the weather cleared that they found themselves to be in possession merely of a weak advanced position, while the real mass of the hill loomed up to the south of them. They then forced a way through the entanglements, and before daylight were established below the Russian trenches, but it was only after repeated assaults during the course of the day that the hill was finally captured. Both Flank Hill and Head-Quarter Hill were heavily shelled, but, with the assistance of two companies which were sent up in support,† the infantry attacks were repulsed. These two advanced posts were held until midday on the 15th, but the defenders, who had suffered severely, were then driven back to 174 Metre Hill and Division Hill.

The intention of the Japanese had been to press forward on the 14th, and with this end in view the six divisional batteries of the 1st Division, and eight batteries from the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, had been ordered to take up a position between Hsiao-pan-chia-tun and Chou-chia-tun, and to open fire at daylight on the 14th. But mist and heavy rain prevented an effectual bombardment, and, except for a forward movement of the 16th Regiment on the peninsula between Louisa and Pigeon Bays, further advance was postponed till the 15th, when height 426, north-east of Hsiao-tung-kou, was captured.‡

On the 16th August, in accordance with the usages of war, a flag of truce was sent into Port Arthur with a summons to

* Called by the Russians *Peredovaya*. *Conférences sur la Guerre Russo-Japonaise*. Part 9, p. 56 *et seq.*

† From the 13th Regiment and the 4th Depot Battalion respectively. Two more companies from the latter and one from the former unit, with part of the Kuan-tung Fleet Equipage, were sent up subsequently.

‡ The three days' fighting cost the Japanese 1,134 killed and wounded, while the Russian losses are given as 300 killed and wounded.

Summons to surrender. surrender, worded substantially as follows:—
“Although the Russians have given signal proof of their gallantry Port Arthur must inevitably fall. Therefore, in order to prevent useless sacrifice of life, and to avoid the danger of unnecessary damage by Japanese troops who may have to fight their way into the town, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan suggests the opening of negotiations for the surrender of the fortress.”

On the following day, a curt reply was sent to the effect that the fortress and ships of H.I.M. the Emperor of Russia would not surrender without a struggle. At the time of the parley the distance between the combatants was nowhere more than a mile, and yet, during the four and a half months which were to elapse before the Japanese should succeed in crossing this narrow space, the combined losses of both sides were to exceed a hundred thousand men. With the summons to surrender the commander of the Third Army sent into the fortress the following message, which had been addressed from Tokio to the commander-in-chief of the Japanese armies in Manchuria.

“His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, out of pure benevolence and goodness, sincerely desires that the non-combatants at Port Arthur may be kept, so far as is possible, free from the disastrous effects of fire and sword. In pursuance of this Imperial wish, you are ordered to escort to Dalny and to hand over to the commander of that port such women, children, priests, diplomats of neutral countries, and foreign military attachés at Port Arthur as may desire to leave the fortress. Those non-combatants who do not belong to the above category, but whose departure from the fortress will not jeopardize our strategical interests, may be similarly dealt with.”

This offer was somewhat abruptly declined, because it was considered that the advantage gained by reducing the number of useless mouths in the fortress would be more than counter-balanced by the amount of information which the Japanese would acquire.

Hostilities were resumed on the 18th, when the 2nd Brigade advanced to Kan-ta Shan, which was occupied without opposition, while the eight batteries from the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade moved to the east of that hill. On the 19th, the 1st *Kobi* Brigade sent the 1st and 15th *Kobi* Regiments to the assault of 174 Metre Hill, round which ran three lines of trenches held by the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment under Colonel Tretyakov, the defender of Nan Shan, and by the 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. The artillery of the 1st Division was ordered to concentrate against this position,

The capture of
174 Metre Hill.

and covered by its fire the *Kobi* brigade moved forward to the attack. General Kondratenko in person directed the defence. All through that day the Japanese kept up the pressure with untiring vigour. Progress was slow, but by 8 p.m. the Russian reserves had been reduced to a company and a half. During the night the Japanese managed to cut the entanglements at the foot of the slopes, and by 5.40 a.m. on the 20th it was evident that the hill could not be held more than a few hours longer unless the batteries on either side could bring a cross fire upon the assailants. A company and a scout detachment of the 27th Regiment came to the help of the garrison, but at 10.30 a.m. the first line of trenches was carried. The second line held out for two hours longer; but the third line lay along the crest of the hill, and could not be carried by direct assault. All the afternoon the opposing forces clung to either side of the hill-top, separated only by some fifty feet of rocky ground, but each concealed from the other by the razor-backed ridge. Their respective artilleries supported them to the best of their ability, but it was almost impossible for the gunners to avoid hitting their own men. The Russians had been reinforced by three companies of the 28th Regiment; and early in the afternoon a Russian quick-firing battery came into action from the western end of Division Hill, and for some minutes swept the Japanese side of 174 Metre Hill with a storm of shrapnel, but the troops refused to move, and before long the battery was withdrawn. At last, shortly before dusk, a small party of Japanese made its way round the western shoulder and took the defenders in flank, thereby enabling the main body to carry the last line of defence, and to drive the Russians back to Namako Yama. As a further result of this reverse, the Russian trenches on ridge 590 were found to be enfiladed and untenable. They were therefore evacuated, and were shortly afterwards occupied by the Japanese.*

The height 331, south-east of Head-Quarter Hill, was also captured on the 19th August, and on the evening of the 20th height 305 was taken. On the night of the 21st, the Russians made a determined attempt to recapture these heights but without success. The Japanese, however, did not advance beyond them until Division Hill was evacuated in the following December. On the 21st, the knoll north-east of Namako Yama was captured, but here the advance of the 1st Division ended for the time.

* The Japanese losses amounted to 55 officers and 1,562 men killed and wounded. The Russian losses are given as 1,100 killed and wounded, and 8 guns were abandoned.

Meanwhile, the 1st Cavalry Regiment had pushed forward among the hills between Louisa and Pigeon Bays, and had succeeded in establishing an outpost line with its flank on the sea at Yang-tou; the Russians, however, held Solovev Hill. With very little alteration this outpost line was retained until after the capture of 203 Metre Hill in December.

The preliminary movements on the west were now completed, but in other quarters much was occurring. The morning of the 18th* was exceptionally quiet, for scarcely a shot was fired. At 11 a.m. a single shrapnel, fired from a concealed Japanese gun, burst over Q Battery, and in the afternoon the naval guns bombarded the dockyard, wounding two men and killing two, of whom one was a surgeon at work in a hospital. In other respects the Japanese gave no indication of the intended attack, but during the night they, for the first time, used searchlights from Tuan-shan-tzu and from the col east of the naval observing station.

Early on the morning of the 19th, a general bombardment was opened from the recently completed siege batteries.† Fire was concentrated mainly on the defences included in the front of attack, that is to

* On this date the French steamship *Georges*, bringing letters from the Viceroy and General Kuropatkin, was escorted in from Pigeon Bay by the *Gremyashchi* and some destroyers. On the return journey the *Gremyashchi* struck a mine about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Lao-tieh Shan lighthouse and sank in a few minutes; eight stokers lost their lives. On this day also the *Skori* laid some mines off Cap Island. These movements show that, on this day, at least, the blockade must have been considerably relaxed, probably because Admiral Togo's cruisers and destroyers were still following the movements of the Russian vessels which had been dispersed on the 10th August.

† The guns at this time available were :—

With the 1st Division	36 field guns.
„ „ 9th „	36 mountain guns.
„ „ 11th „	36 mountain guns.
„ „ 2nd F.A. Brigade	72 field guns.
„ „ Howitzer Regiment	28 4·7-inch field howitzers. 8 4·7-inch naval guns.
„ „ Naval Brigade	16 12-pounder naval guns.
„ „ Seven battalions of siege artillery	24 3·5-inch mortars 72 6-inch mortars. 16 6-inch field howitzers. 30 4·7-inch bronze guns. 4 4-inch Krupp guns of latest pattern.

The above guns were not all in action at the same time, nor was the rate of fire very rapid.

say from Fort Sung-shu to Chi-kuan Battery inclusive, the target being first one and then another of the works. Some of the naval guns, however, fired on the dockyard, and ignited an oil store at the foot of Golden Hill. Later in the day a store of Chinese ammunition caught fire, and several men were killed by Japanese shells while endeavouring to save the contents of the building.

The Japanese shrapnel fire from guns concealed amongst the *kao-liang* was most accurate, but there was no organized system for bringing an oblique or cross fire to bear. Towards evening the bombardment died away, and by nightfall had entirely ceased except for an occasional indirect shot from the naval 4·7-inch guns. The Russian artillery made heroic efforts to reply, but its task was rendered impossible by the conspicuous position in which most of the guns were placed. Wang-tai Battery, with its two 6-inch naval guns, formed the best target and was the first to suffer; the commander was killed, nearly all the men were either killed or wounded, and before evening both guns were damaged beyond repair. The three 4-inch guns in N Battery were all put out of action in spite of the gallantry of the detachments. H Battery, being a little way to the front of, and below, the crest fared better than most and kept up its fire all day.

As the fire of the artillery slackened, the infantry of the 9th and 11th Divisions were placed in readiness to enter upon their formidable task. It was evident that troops advancing against the front of attack would themselves be taken in flank from the Waterworks Redoubt and the adjoining trenches. It was therefore most necessary either to capture or to silence that work before the principal assault was delivered. This attack, in turn, was to be assisted by the 1st Division, which was to make a demonstration against the Temple Redoubt*; but in this quarter of the field no particular vigour was displayed. All day long the Waterworks Redoubt was heavily shelled by naval guns and by the thirty-six mountain guns of the 9th Division until, at about 5 p.m., a battalion of the 19th Regiment advanced against it from the valley two thousand yards north-east of Shin-shih-ying. Taking every advantage of the cover afforded by watercourses and by the standing *kao-liang* the troops moved forward in successive lines, each of one section, with three paces between the men. An advanced trench, about two

* The Waterworks and the Temple Redoubts were held by two companies of the 26th Regiment. Two companies of the 13th Regiment and a scout detachment of the 15th Regiment reinforced the garrison of the former redoubt during the night of the 19th.

hundred and fifty yards from the redoubt, was occupied without difficulty and served as a point of departure for the real attack. Thence a tremendous fire was opened, but the moment the leading company began to cross the open ground it met with such a hot reception that out of a hundred and eighty men who started all but thirty fell.

Still the ardour of the attack was not quenched, and when daylight dawned on the morning of the 20th the Japanese were firmly established in the captured trench; the entanglement on the glacis had been destroyed, and a party of about two hundred men had managed to effect a lodgment at the northern salient, partly on the parapet and partly in the ditch, but between them and the nearest support were three hundred yards of ground absolutely destitute of cover. This small success had cost the battalion a loss of three hundred and fifty men; no fresh troops were forthcoming, and it is not to be wondered at that when, at 2 p.m., a determined counter-attack was made by a company of Frontier Guards from the railway bridge between the Erh-lung and Sung-shu Hills, the party in the salient fell back in confusion, losing heavily from artillery fire before it reached the protection of the advanced trench. No further attempt to capture the Waterworks Redoubt was made during these operations, and it was put into thorough repair by the garrison except that the entanglement on the glacis was left in its damaged condition. The corpses of those who fell during the retirement remained unburied until the redoubt was taken in September.

On the night of the 19th August, simultaneously with the attack upon the Waterworks Redoubt, the 9th and 11th Divisions began their advance against the front of attack.* Both divisions pushed forward and endeavoured to destroy the electric fence, an obstacle which, from its novelty, was invested with an importance far in excess of its merits. Under

The general
assault.

* From Chi-kuan Battery to Fort Sung-shu, both inclusive, there were, on the 19th August, 9 companies of the 25th and 16th Regiments and 55 guns. During the night of the 19th—20th, when the Japanese plan was more fully developed, General Gorbатовski, the commander of the eastern section, took the following measures:—The 3rd, 10th, 11th, and 12th Companies of the 16th Regiment were placed in reserve between Forts Sung-shu and Erh-lung; the 7th Company went to Sung-shu Supporting Battery, and the 9th Company lined the Chinese wall between West Pan-lung and P; the 11th Company of the 15th Regiment went to Fort Erh-lung, the 2nd Company to Q, and the 3rd Company lined the Chinese wall in front of Wang-tai. A battalion of the 14th Regiment was brought up behind Wang-tai on the 20th.

cover of the *kao-liang* crops, scouts crept up and severed the wires, using specially prepared cutters of which the handles had been insulated with bicycle tyres. For the next twelve hours the infantry was content to hold its ground, but throughout the 20th the bombardment of the fortress continued. The two Pan-lung Redoubts, P, Fort Chi-kuan, and Q were especially heavily shelled. During the night the Russians had worked hard to repair the damage inflicted on the previous day, but they had been unable to replace all the crippled armament, and weak though the Japanese siege artillery was it proved itself more than a match for the exposed guns of the fortress, although unable to inflict much damage upon the defences. Magazines in H and R Batteries were blown up, and East Pan-lung took fire, burning fiercely for half an hour; but at dusk, in spite of everything, one of the naval 12-pounders in the latter work was still firing. P work also suffered severely.

Little is known of what actually occurred on the front of attack between the 20th and 23rd August, for the survivors were unable to give any coherent account of the fighting. The Japanese obtained a firm hold of a line from Pa-li-chuang, past Wu-chia-fang, over the col six hundred yards east of Fort Chi-kuan, to the ravines about Wang-chia-tun. From this line the assailants worked their way up the numerous watercourses which served as covered approaches to the works of the defence. Although these ravines afforded some protection there were many points at which they were enfiladed, and as they described most devious courses many units lost their way. Much rain had recently fallen, and in the confined space the ground was trampled by the passage of troops to and fro until it became a morass of blood and filth, in which the living slipped and stumbled over the bodies of the dead. Every vestige of cohesion disappeared from the attack and everything depended upon the energy of the local commanders and upon the devotion of their men, who responded to the call with such good will that before daylight on the 21st the armament for the close defence was firing case shot. A little later some of the troops from the 11th Division actually succeeded in closing with the defenders of Q Battery, but at 9 a.m. the fire of neighbouring works compelled them to retire.

On the right of the 11th Division the men of the 9th Division worked their way up the watercourses to the point W* at the foot of the East Pan-lung hill. During the night they managed to make a small gap at the northern

East Pan-lung.

* See Plan 18.

angle of the entanglement, but their further progress was checked by the fire of a machine gun in the northern salient of the trench which surrounded the battery. In spite of enormous loss the Japanese would not acknowledge themselves beaten, but before long it was found hopeless to attempt to enlarge the gap in the entanglement, and they were forced to remain in the watercourse crowded together under indirect fire from the Russian artillery.

It had been hoped by the Japanese that dawn on the 21st would see a successful charge against the main line of defence, but this expectation proved to be over-sanguine. Seen from the hills in the line of investment the spectacle just before daylight on the 21st was most imposing. In the foreground the Waterworks Redoubt, by this time fully repaired, was sending up a constant stream of magnesium rockets; searchlights near An-tzu Shan, Fort Sung-shu, and Fort Pai-yin lit up the plain, while constant flashes came from the dark mass of hills which formed the line of defence. There was, however, very little rifle fire, and as the light increased it became apparent that an assault could not yet take place.

The day turned out fine and bright, and in the sunlight a number of motionless forms could be seen lying at the foot of the slopes below the East Pan-lung entanglement. Now and again a man would spring to his feet and dash back to the head of the watercourse, where the Japanese national flag was waving. On the extreme left, near Ta-ku Shan, the 11th Division was advancing at the double in single file, following a devious course so as to avail themselves as far as possible of the folds in the ground. Men occasionally tried, singly or by twos and threes, to cross the open ground between the watercourses, but almost invariably fell, and throughout the 21st no progress was made. The East Pan-lung Battery, which was still smoking from the fire of the previous day, bore splendid testimony to the spirit of the defence. The ground between the battery and the watercourse in which the assailants were sheltering could not be seen by the garrison except from the single point where the machine gun was keeping the attack at bay, but the works on either flank swept the hill-side with a deadly cross fire. The whole front of the defence between the Chi-kuan Battery and West Pan-lung was therefore heavily bombarded, but in spite of the hail of shot and shell the garrison of East Pan-lung succeeded in getting one of their larger guns into action during the afternoon, and the little machine gun escaped destruction. Attempts to advance from the watercourse were invariably checked by the fire of similar weapons concealed in

the neighbouring works, and when darkness fell no impression appeared to have been made upon the defence. Nevertheless the loss inflicted, chiefly by the artillery bombardment, had in fact been heavy, and the value of the Chinese wall had been brought home to the defence. By midday on the 21st four more companies had joined the 9th Company of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment there, and a few sections had been sent into the various works attacked. In the afternoon the 2nd Company of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment made its way into West Pan-lung, and at 5 p.m. seven companies of seamen,* under Commander Lebedev, were landed from the fleet, and sent to join General Gorbatovski's reserve.

During the night of the 21st the 4th *Kobi* Brigade was placed under the orders of the commander of the 9th Division, but on the morning of the 22nd, even with this reinforcement, it seemed as though the attack were doomed to failure. A few desperate men from among the survivors of the party in the watercourse determined to make one more effort, and succeeded in creeping up to the redoubt and in destroying both the machine gun, whose fire had proved so fatal, and its emplacement. Profiting by the momentary confusion among the defenders, the Japanese from point W rushed forward to the trench which surrounded the work, and began to enlarge the gap in the entanglement, at the same time sending back word that East Pan-lung was in their hands. But many lives were to be lost before the prize was really won. The Russians were still in full possession of the parapet, and in the triangular space between it and the trench lay the assailants, finding what cover they could in shell craters. Any Japanese who attempted to rise at once drew fire from West Pan-lung and from an unseen machine gun, but so long as they lay flat they could only be fired at by those of the defenders who were sufficiently reckless to stand on the superior slope of the parapet, a proceeding which the Japanese shrapnel soon rendered impossible. The space in which the assailants lay was too small to admit of strong reinforcements, but weak parties, including ammunition carriers, were sent up at brief intervals to replace casualties, which increased rapidly when the Russian artillery found the range and began to search the slope. It was impossible to remove the wounded, and the situation soon became critical. Shortly before noon, an officer and two or three men dashed forward and endeavoured to plant a Japanese flag on the parapet, but a hand to hand struggle ended in

* 1,080 men.

the whole party being either shot or bayoneted. Not long afterwards a Russian officer and a dozen men crawled on hands and knees round the foot of the parapet, and suddenly opened fire on the Japanese at close range. The Russians were nearly all killed, but many of the Japanese gave way before this unexpected onslaught and fled in disorder to the watercourse. There, however, they were rallied without difficulty and quickly reascended the hill. A badly placed Japanese shrapnel caused a second panic by bursting directly over the already highly tried infantry, but on this occasion also the troops were easily rallied. By one o'clock the rifle fire on both sides had died down to a mere sputter, but inside the work a single gun still kept up a desultory fire, and all the efforts of the Japanese artillery failed to silence it.

By this time four naval companies had been absorbed into the garrison. One after another all the officers were either killed or wounded, and Commander Lebedev then took command of the defence. A fifth company was on its way to his assistance, and from the Japanese side the Russian officers could be seen urging their men to deliver a counter-attack. Towards evening the 8th Company of the 14th Regiment, all that remained of the reserve, was brought up; but about the same time Commander Lebedev was killed by a shrapnel bullet, and the survivors began to leave the work by twos and threes. Even when the last man had left it was not possible for the Japanese to cross the parapet, for the moment they attempted to rise they came under fire from the supporting works, of which West Pan-lung occupied the most commanding position.*

Meanwhile two companies of Japanese infantry, which had been sent up to reinforce the attack, were clustered in the watercourse between East and West Pan-lung. At this juncture a company commander who happened to be in the ravine west of Wu-chia-fang, seeing that it was really the defenders of the western redoubt who were rendering so critical the position of the assailants of the eastern work, collected some of the men and joined the two companies in the watercourse. With this small force he attacked West Pan-lung at 5 p.m. The spectacle of a crowd of men climbing the slopes north-east of that redoubt came as a surprise to the Japanese commanders, but quickly grasping the situation the

* The Russian account, *Conférences sur la Guerre Russo-Japonaise*, Part 9, p. 76, speaks of this East Pan-lung having been taken and retaken five times. It is not quite clear what is meant, since even after the capture of West Pan-lung the Japanese could get no further than the outer slope of the parapet.

fire of the artillery was turned against the new target, and thus supported the attackers established themselves on the outside of the parapet with a loss which was surprisingly small compared with that sustained elsewhere. Indeed it would seem that the attention of the Russians was so intently fixed on East Pan-lung that they did not realize the danger until it was too late. The attack was further favoured by the fact that the ground over which it advanced was seen only from West Pan-lung itself, and from the vicinity of East Pan-lung, whence nearly all the defenders had by this time been driven. Nevertheless there was some hard fighting before the Russians were finally ejected, but by 6 p.m. three Japanese flags were planted on the crest. The interior of the work was then burning fiercely, but the rifle fire from the Chinese Wall still prevented the Japanese from entering.

During the night several unsuccessful attempts were made to recapture the two redoubts. As soon as the loss of the two Pan-lungs was reported to General Smirnov he prepared to recover them by a night attack. Three companies of the 13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment started from the west side of the Lun Ho to take the redoubts in rear, and at 3 a.m., when firing could already be heard in the direction of Fort Erh-lung, the 1st Battalion of the 14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, after listening to a short prayer, left the line of the Chinese Wall to deliver a direct assault. The flanking party lost its way, so West Pan-lung was never attacked. East Pan-lung was, however, retaken, but when daylight came it was found that its battered parapet afforded no protection, and that it was no longer tenable against the fire of the Japanese artillery.* It has been suggested that the Japanese would have found these works more difficult to hold had they not been built with closed gorges. This criticism is not quite borne out by the facts, since the Japanese entrenched themselves on the front parapets, leaving the gorges unoccupied for the time. The fact seems to be that the closed gorges contributed very slightly to the defence, beyond providing a little cover for reserves.

The capture of the two redoubts was due mainly to the pertinacity of the Japanese along the whole front, but especially to the two battalions of the 7th Regiment which assaulted East Pan-lung. At the close of the fighting these two battalions could between them muster only two hundred out of eighteen hundred

* In this affair the Russians had 4 officers and 413 men killed or wounded out of 637; all belonging to the 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment.

men who had gone into action. Since the only assault which was launched against West Pan-lung was successful, it would appear that many lives might have been saved by attacking it earlier, but the failure to do so is probably attributable to the unavoidable loss of touch among the various Japanese units. In fact there is reason to believe that the two companies which finally carried the work were ignorant of the situation until it was explained by the officer who joined them from Wu-chia-fang, for the undulations of the ground, while protecting them from the Russian fire, must have prevented them from seeing what was going on around. At the same time, although the watercourses broke up the cohesion of the attack, it is certain that without the cover which they afforded the Pan-lung Redoubts would not have been taken except by regular siege.

Little occurred during daylight on the 23rd August beyond an intermittent artillery fire on both sides. But even after sixty hours of almost incessant fighting the strength of the attack was not

exhausted, and on the following night the 9th and

The repulse
from Wang-tai.

11th Divisions combined in a desperate effort to carry Wang-tai by storm. Starting from the two captured redoubts the Japanese swept irresistibly

over the Chinese Wall, reaching H Battery and forcing their way some distance up the slopes of Wang-tai, but the concentrated fire of rifles and machine guns prevented them from retaining their ground. This wild scene was lit up only by the magnesium rockets of the defence and, in the confusion of the night, parties of Japanese lost their way so completely that some appear to have found themselves at the edge of the ditch of Fort Chi-kuan. The last attack was finally repulsed about 2 a.m. on the 24th, leaving the slopes below Wang-tai and H Battery covered with Japanese dead. Following up their retreating foe, the Russians for a time regained possession of the Pan-lung Redoubts, only again to lose them.

All through the 24th August about a hundred Japanese clung desperately to the almost vertical outer face of the Chinese Wall north-east of H Battery. There, although separated from the Russians only by the thickness of the earth and rubble, they could not be seen from any point held by the defenders, and suffered only from an occasional hand-grenade tossed over from the other side. However, it was impossible to reinforce them, and during the night they, too, fell back to the Pan-lung Redoubts.

With this final episode the first general assault on Port Arthur was brought to a close. While the defence cost the Russians some 3,000 killed and wounded, the Japanese, in return for losses

amounting to over 15,000 officers and men, were able to show merely the capture of the two Pan-lung Redoubts, the retention of which was a doubtful advantage, since it could be effected only by almost superhuman endurance on the part of the troops. H Battery completely overlooked both the captured works from a distance of less than five hundred yards, and with its 6-inch guns inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese lodgments on the parapets, while indirect fire from guns and howitzers searched the unseen ground. One company formed the garrison of each redoubt, and between the two the casualties from shell fire amounted at one time to one hundred a day, but as the Japanese deepened and improved their trenches these losses decreased. From the slopes of Wang-tai to the Pan-lungs the ground was covered with dead, and since it was impossible, even at night, for either side to leave the trenches without being fired at, the stench soon became almost unbearable. Trying though it must have been for the Japanese in the redoubts it was infinitely worse for the Russians holding the Chinese Wall, for between them and H Battery more than a thousand Japanese corpses were decaying. Strips of cloth soaked in carbolic acid were hung everywhere in the trenches, and the military police, aided by Chinese, succeeded, under cover of darkness, in removing several hundred bodies, but not without some loss to the burial parties. No attempt was made to use a flag of truce.

Owing to the distance from the coast at which the fighting took place, the parts played by the fleets was of minor importance; nevertheless the Russian ships suffered one disaster. On the 21st the gunboats and destroyers left the harbour and endeavoured to render some assistance to the right flank of the defence, but the four naval guns which had recently been placed at Y* were too strong for them. On the 23rd the *Sevastopol* went out with the intention of silencing this battery, but was prevented from doing so by the appearance of the *Kasuga* and the *Nisshin*. As she steamed back to port, the *Sevastopol* left the swept channel, and struck a Japanese mine which exploded and damaged her hull almost in the same spot as on the occasion of her previous accident on the 23rd June. As there was no coal in the bunker the damage was greater than on the former occasion, and the bunker, a 6-inch magazine, and a 12-inch shell room were flooded. She was, however, got into harbour, and was repaired in about six weeks.

The events of the past few weeks had at last convinced the Japanese that their scheme for carrying the north-east front by

* See page 331.

assault was beyond their power, and that Port Arthur could only be reduced by regular siege operations which must last for several months. Of the gallantry of the attack Observations. there is no need to speak for it was equalled only by the stubbornness of the defence, but the actual plan of battle gives rise to two important considerations: first, why the western attack by the 1st Division, even if intended merely as a demonstration, was relaxed at the moment when the assault was launched at the north-east front; secondly, why the assault on the night of the 23rd—24th August was delivered on so narrow a front. In both cases the absence of secondary attacks permitted the defenders to concentrate their attention on the points of greatest danger, and even so the margin of safety was at times very small. Indeed, it may fairly be said that the failure of the Japanese to capture the fortress at the first attempt was principally due not to any mistake but to the stubborn fighting of the Russian soldier.

The Japanese have sometimes been accused of headstrong folly in that they attempted, in the first place, to capture a formidable fortress with an artillery which was hopelessly inadequate for the task; but it must be remembered that a siege formed no part of the original plan, and that they hoped to rush the defences, ignoring such permanent works as they could not carry. For this purpose their artillery might well have been expected to prove sufficient. Moreover, had this plan been successful, the Third Army would have been free to join the forces in the north, and Marshal Oyama would have been able to bring considerably greater numbers into line for the battle of Liao-yang than was actually the case. For some days before the assault was finally repulsed it had been evident to Marshal Oyama that the great battle with the Russian field army could not be longer delayed. The Japanese First, Second, and Fourth Armies were already opposed by equal if not superior numbers, and General Kuropatkin was daily receiving reinforcements from Europe. The probability was that unless the Japanese assumed the offensive, they would themselves be attacked and would thereby lose the initiative. The position was, therefore, full of difficulties, but Marshal Oyama decided that even without the assistance of the Third Army he must go forward at once, for to hesitate now might mean that he would be forced to abandon his whole plan of campaign. That his decision was right there can be no doubt, but the story of the great land battles must be left for another volume.

CHAPTER XXIII.

RUSSIAN CRUISER RAIDS.

(Charts 2 and 5.)

WHILE following the movements of the main fleets and the great field armies, the events which took place simultaneously in the Sea of Japan have been neglected. Although these operations of the Vladivostok squadron were of secondary importance, they caused considerable anxiety in Japan at one time, and to follow them it is necessary to go back to the beginning of the month of May.

It will be remembered that after sinking the *Kinshu Maru* off Chestakov Point, the Russian cruiser squadron returned to Vladivostok on the 27th April, and that two days later Admiral Kamimura left for Takeshiki.* For more than a fortnight both squadrons remained inactive, but on the morning of the 15th May Rear-Admiral Iessen hoisted his flag on board the *Bogatuir*, intending to proceed to Possiet Bay. The weather was very foggy, and the navigation was consequently dangerous, but the admiral insisted on attempting to carry out his programme. Through a miscalculation, the ship ran ashore on the rocks at the extremity of Bruce Point, and all the efforts of the ice-breaker *Nadezhni* to tow her off were unavailing. At first she was not much damaged, but a gale which sprang up on the night of the 16th caused four compartments to be flooded, and it was not until the 16th June, after a month's hard work, that she was got into dock at Vladivostok. This accident to the *Bogatuir* was reported in the foreign press a few days after it occurred, but since she was described as a total wreck the Japanese did not attempt to interfere with the salvage operations. Her injuries were so serious, however, that she took no further part in the war.

On the 22nd May, a week after this unfortunate incident, Vice-Admiral Skrudlov arrived at Vladivostok, where he hoisted his flag on board the *Rossiya* and assumed command of the Pacific Ocean

* See Chapter X.

fleet, but for some time longer the activities of the squadron were confined to sweeping operations in Ussuri Bay. No mines were found, but on the 10th of June, while waiting for permission to enter the port, the *Tiberius*, a German vessel laden with coal for Vladivostok, struck one off Skryplev Island, where it had probably been laid by the Japanese on the 28th or 29th April. She was, however, safely taken into harbour and there beached.

Two days later the Vladivostok squadron, now consisting of the *Rossiya*, *Rurik*, and *Gromoboi*, left on another cruise, this time under the command of Vice-Admiral Bezobrazov whose flag was in the *Rossiya*. The intention was to strike a blow at the Japanese communications with Korea, and with this end in view the squadron was to pass through the eastern channel of the Korean Strait, to cruise for two days between Quelpart and Ross Islands, and to come back by the western channel. Should it be found impossible to break through the straits on the return journey, the squadron was to go on to Port Arthur. After leaving Vladivostok at 6 a.m. on the 12th June, there was found to be a thick fog at sea, and Admiral Bezobrazov decided to put into Slavianski Bay. The next morning the fog had lifted, and at 8.30 a.m. the squadron got under weigh and proceeded towards Tsushima. About 4 p.m. on the 14th, the Liancourt rocks were passed, and daylight on the morning of the 15th found the Russian ships in the eastern channel, just to the north of Iki Island and not far from the Shimonoseki Strait. The weather was misty with occasional fog, but at 6 a.m. a number of vessels were in sight, including two large merchantmen, a Japanese cruiser (*Tsushima*), and a torpedo boat. The *Gromoboi* was ordered to chase one large merchant vessel, while the *Rossiya* and *Rurik* endeavoured to overhaul the other which was already making for Iki Island. Although the *Rossiya* increased speed to eighteen knots, the Japanese vessel proved too fast for her, and succeeded in making her escape under the land, when the Russian cruiser gave up the chase after firing a few rounds at long range. The *Gromoboi*, however, quickly overhauled the second of the merchant vessels and signalled to her to stop, but as the warning was disregarded two shots were fired across her bows. Still no notice was taken, and the Russians then opened fire upon her with 6-inch guns. Only when she had been struck several times did she stop and lower her boats. On closer inspection she proved to be the *Izumi Maru*, 3,229 tons, returning from Dalny to Japan with a number of sick. Two boats, containing seventeen officers and eighty-eight men, were received

alongside the *Gromoboi*, but three others escaped to the shore. The *Izumi Maru* was then sunk by firing shell at her waterline, and a few men who refused to leave the ship perished with her.

Shortly afterwards two more steamers were sighted coming from the Straits of Shimonoseki. The *Gromoboi* was immediately dispatched after one, while the *Rossiia*, which had by this time returned, went in pursuit of the other. About 10 a.m., the *Gromoboi* overtook her chase, which proved to be the *Hitachi Maru*, 6,172 tons, a large Japanese transport outward bound with troops, estimated by the Russians at two thousand, siege guns, and military stores destined for the Third Army before Port Arthur. According to Russian accounts she paid no attention to signals warning her to stop nor to shots fired across her bows, and the *Gromoboi* then poured in a heavy shell fire at close range. A terrible scene of slaughter ensued, for the decks were crowded with defenceless men. Eventually the *Hitachi Maru* stopped and some of those on board escaped in boats, but those who stayed refused to surrender. Finding that she was sinking but slowly, the *Gromoboi* fired a torpedo which, taking effect in the engine room, soon caused her to list over and finally to sink. Of the survivors only one boatload reached the Russian cruiser.

Meanwhile the *Rossiia* had come up with her vessel, the *Sado Maru*, 6,222 tons, which was also outward bound from Japan with a railway battalion, pontoons, and stores. She, likewise, would not stop until several shots had been fired at her; and when she eventually did so, a number of men made off to the shore. A demand that the Japanese officers should surrender was met with a stern refusal, and the *Rurik* which had rejoined the flag was then ordered to torpedo her. The first torpedo struck the *Sado Maru* abreast of a coal bunker, causing her to take a list. Then, seeing that she managed to right herself to some extent, the *Rurik* went round to the other side and fired a second torpedo which also exploded, and the Japanese vessel then settled down as far as her dead lights. The mist had now changed to heavy rain, a strong wind had sprung up, and the horizon was momentarily becoming more obscured. All the morning "wireless" signs had been received on board the *Rossiia*, and a Japanese cruiser had several times been observed in the distance, although she had moved off when the *Gromoboi* had attempted to approach her. As the Japanese port of Takeshiki was only some fifty miles distant, and Admiral Kamimura with his squadron might suddenly appear upon the scene, the Russian

cruisers made off to the northward feeling confident that the *Sado Maru* could not last more than a few minutes. Yet in spite of her injuries and the rising sea, she was kept afloat, and at 1 p.m. on the following day she was sighted by a sailing boat, which took off the survivors, and eventually landed them safely at Moji. Even the ship was salvaged, and was towed into Moji by the *Ise Maru* on the 17th.

Although the Russians had been able to complete their work without interference, the Japanese cruiser on look-out duty, the *Tsushima*, had not been idle. At 8 a.m. on the 15th, just two hours after the hostile ships were sighted, Admiral Kamimura who was then at Takeshiki heard of their appearance in the Korean Strait. At that time the force under his command consisted of the armoured cruisers *Idzumo*, *Adzuma*, *Tokiwa*, *Iwate*; the protected cruisers *Naniwa*, *Takachiho*, *Nitaka*, *Chihaya*, and *Tsushima*; and two flotillas of torpedo boats. As his first information was to the effect that the Russians were steering to the southward, he at once dispatched a torpedo boat flotilla to watch the channel between Iki and Tsushima and to warn vessels approaching from the westward to take shelter at Takeshiki. He also cabled to Moji to stop all vessels sailing to the westward, and at the same time recalled to his flag all detached ships which happened to be on look-out duty. At 9.25 a.m., he left Takeshiki with his squadron, and, passing round the southern end of Tsushima, met the torpedo boats which had sailed earlier in the day. Thence, in order to interpose between the Russians and their base, he shaped course to the north of Okinoshima. Meanwhile the *Tsushima* kept in touch with the hostile squadron, and at noon informed the Japanese admiral that it was fifteen miles south of that island steering to the northward. On receipt of this report Admiral Kamimura altered course for the southward of Okinoshima, but the sudden change in the weather was all in favour of the Russians and, soon after sending in the last message, the *Tsushima* lost sight of them in a heavy squall of rain. At 1.30 p.m., she picked them up again some ten miles further to the northward, but soon lost sight of them in the mist and rain. Shortly afterwards she fell in with her own squadron and, concluding from her report that the Russians had taken advantage of the weather to make their escape northward, Admiral Kamimura started in pursuit. Being unable to find them, he left the torpedo boat flotilla to continue the search during the night, and proceeded with the cruisers at full speed to a prearranged position to the northward.

Admiral
Kamimura
in pursuit.

Admiral Kamimura's movements had, however, been more or less anticipated by the Russians and, calculating that the Japanese would pursue in the direction of Vladivostok, Admiral Bezobrazov had steered to the eastward along the western shore of Japan. The morning of the 16th was fine and the sea had gone down, but the two squadrons were then a long way apart. At 9 a.m., when off Oki Island, the Russians fell in with the British steamer *Allanton* from the port of Mororan in Yezo, bound for Singapore with a cargo of coal. On the pretext that her papers were not in order and that she was carrying a suspicious Japanese passenger, a prize crew was put on board and she was sent to Vladivostok, where she was condemned by the local prize court but was afterwards released on appeal. All that day the Russians steamed to the north-east, only stopping to transfer to a passing Japanese schooner the non-combatants who had been taken from the sunken transports. One account, written by an officer serving on board the *Rossiya*, states that, during the following night, a torpedo boat was seen to pass close to that ship on an opposite course and to vanish quickly in the darkness. Possibly this was a Japanese boat, but eyes strained on the look-out at night are often led astray, and the officer who made the report may well have been mistaken.

Still keeping a circuitous course, it was not until daylight on the 18th that the Russian squadron was off the Tsugaru Straits, near which it remained for some hours, boarding a few small vessels but making no captures. Course was then shaped towards Povorotni Point, which was sighted about 3 p.m. on the 19th; but before reaching Askold Island the squadron was warned by wireless telegraphy to return to Amur Bay, as Ussuri Bay was dangerous on account of mines. At 8 p.m., having successfully eluded all pursuit, the Russians anchored in Amur Bay, and the following morning, the 20th, they re-entered Vladivostok.

Meanwhile, after spending two days in a fruitless search for the vanished cruisers, Admiral Kamimura had returned to his base.

Throughout the 16th he was without any news, but on the 17th, hearing that the Russians were still near the Japanese coast, he spread his ships on a line of search and swept down to the southward. Arriving in the afternoon of that day at a point 100 miles to the north-east of Tsushima, he received by wireless telegraphy a message that the Russians were off the Island of Yezo, and as further pursuit was

The Russian
cruisers regain
Vladivostok.

Pursuit
abandoned.

then obviously hopeless he took his squadron back to Takeshiki where he arrived on the 19th.

During the absence of the cruisers, the Russian torpedo boats had made an independent raid to the northern shores of Japan. The "C" Flotilla, consisting of torpedo boats Nos. 203, 205, and 206, left Vladivostok on the 15th June. The special object of this cruise is somewhat obscure, but whatever it may have been it is said to have failed owing to fog. However, on the three following days they captured and burned two Japanese junks, and made prizes of the *Hatsuku Maru* and a small schooner which were safely brought into Vladivostok on the 20th. Another torpedo boat flotilla accompanied the transport *Lena* as far as Plastun Bay, on an expedition which she had been ordered to make to the mouth of the Amur River. They searched the coast line in the neighbourhood of Plastun for Japanese schooners which were said to be fishing there, but, finding nothing, they returned with the "C" Flotilla on the 20th.

This mid-June cruise of the Vladivostok squadron was the boldest expedition yet made by the Russians, and, so far as it went, must be considered satisfactory from their point of view; for although it could have no important effect on the course of the war, it was, like all raids of a similar nature, galling to the pride of those attacked. The loss of men and material without any corresponding gain, and the evasion of Admiral Kamimura's force, stirred public opinion in Japan to such an extent that deputations were sent to wait on the Minister of Marine, Admiral Baron Yamamoto. He, however, was well able to appreciate Admiral Kamimura's difficulties, and explained that, although special convoys were arranged when large bodies of troops were being shipped, it was not possible to escort single transports and a certain amount of risk was unavoidable. Nevertheless, he assured his hearers that special arrangements were being made to prevent the recurrence of such a disaster.

Encouraged by their success, the Russians made preparations for a similar raid to take place on the 27th of the same month; but, owing to fog, the departure was delayed until 1 p.m. on the 28th, when the *Rossiya*, *Gromoboi*, *Rurik*, *Lena*, and eight torpedo boats sailed. The intention was for the whole squadron to proceed as far as Gensan in company. There the torpedo flotilla was to be detached to make a night attack on any Japanese ships which might be lying in that port, while the cruisers

Fourth cruise of
the Vladivostok
squadron.

remained outside. The *Lena* was then to escort the torpedo boats back to Vladivostok, but the larger vessels were to pass through the Korean Strait during the following night, and to fall upon the Japanese communications near Quelpart Island. After carrying out this programme the squadron was to return to Vladivostok by the same route.

Owing to a fresh breeze some difficulty was at first experienced with the torpedo boats, two of which were towed by the *Rurik* and *Gromoboi*, but towards evening the wind went down, and at 2 a.m. on the 30th the squadron reached the entrance to Gensan Bay. The Russians were under the impression that Admiral Kamimura was using this port as a base for his squadron, but when the torpedo boats were sent in they found only two small vessels, the steamer *Koun Maru* and a sailing vessel of 122 tons named the *Seisho Maru*. These they sank, and, seeing some Japanese troops on shore, they shelled the settlement for some time, setting fire to a few houses and damaging some piers and lighters. While thus engaged, torpedo boat No. 204 ran ashore, and when she was floated off after some trouble, it was found that her helm was damaged and jammed hard over. Two of the other boats managed to get her out to the *Lena*, but as she could not proceed under her own steam and was very awkward to tow, the crew, guns, and torpedo tubes were taken out and she was then blown up.

About noon the cruisers and torpedo boats parted company. The former started for the Korean Strait, while the latter, with the *Lena*, went back to Vladivostok. When waiting outside the harbour the cruisers had approached within sight of the shore, probably without meaning to do so, and their presence had become known. Moreover, the delay caused by the accident to torpedo boat No. 204 prevented them from reaching the Korean Strait during the night, and it was midday on the 1st July when they reached Okinoshima. Wireless telegraphy messages were now received, and from some of those which were deciphered, such, for instance, as "The Russians are attacking," it was evident that they had been discovered, but no Japanese ships were sighted during the passage through the eastern channel. At 6 p.m., the Russian cruisers reached the southern end of the strait and course was then altered to the westward, but half an hour later the Japanese squadron, which had been lying in wait between Iki and Tsushima, came in sight to the southward.

The appearance
of the Japanese
squadron.

When it was seen that the hostile squadron consisted of nine

ships, four of which were armoured cruisers, the Russian admiral turned back and, increasing speed to eighteen knots, made off to the northward. Admiral Kamimura at once gave chase, and ordered his torpedo boats to endeavour to cut the enemy off. The distance between the squadrons was about twelve miles, but the Japanese fired a few shots which fell more than a mile short and to which the Russians did not reply. The *Rurik* soon proved unable to maintain a speed of eighteen knots, and as her consorts would not leave her the Japanese began to overhaul them rapidly; but when darkness came on the two squadrons lost sight of one another. Just as the Russians thought they had got clear, a new danger appeared ahead of them, in the shape of some Japanese torpedo boats which had apparently been lying under the land. Eight approached on the port bow and three on the starboard but, although well placed to make an attack, none came within sixteen hundred yards. A heavy fire was opened upon them, and the Russians were able to dash through without being torpedoed, probably owing to a miscalculation as to the speed at which they were travelling. They then extinguished all lights, altered course, and escaped in the darkness.* Till 2 a.m. on the following morning they saw occasional signals, but at daybreak nothing was in sight. At 9 a.m., the Russian squadron met the British steamer *Cheltenham* of 3,741 tons, bound from Otaru to Fusan with railway material. She was stopped and boarded, a prize crew was sent to her, and on arrival at Vladivostok she was condemned by the prize court. The owners lodged an appeal, but the authorities at St. Petersburg upheld the decision of the local court and ship and cargo were confiscated. Except for this incident the return journey was uneventful, and the squadron reached Vladivostok at 5 p.m. on the 3rd July.

After this cruise the squadron remained in harbour for a fortnight, coaling, taking in provisions, and making good defects in the engines. Sweeping operations were also undertaken At Vladivostok. in Ussuri Bay, and some Japanese mines were discovered on the 11th. Four days later a German merchant vessel struck a Russian mine in the same bay and sank at once, but her crew was saved. On the 16th, a flotilla of torpedo

* The Russians state that after they had passed the torpedo boats, a heavy fire was opened by the Japanese cruisers for a few minutes and searchlights were turned on. A number of rockets were seen to go up, and the firing ceased. From these indications the Russians conclude that the Japanese cruisers opened fire upon their own torpedo boats.

boats started on a cruise. The boats were passing through the eastern channel in double quarter line and were rather more than a mile from Skryplev Island when No. 208, which was the starboard rear boat, struck a mine with her propeller. The after part of the vessel was shattered by the explosion, with the result that she went down by the stern and, on the engine room bulkhead giving way, sank in about ten minutes. One man was killed and five were wounded, but the crew was saved by the other boats which then returned into harbour and did not again go to sea for some days.

At midday on the 17th a signal was unexpectedly made for the Russian cruisers to prepare to go to sea by 4 p.m., and at 4.30 p.m. they left the harbour, under the command of Admiral Iessen whose flag was hoisted on board the *Rossiya*. On this occasion the squadron was to pass through the Tsugaru Strait to the eastern shores of Japan, in the hope of being able to intercept Japanese transports on their way from Yokohama to the inland sea. The voyage was likely to be a long one and, in order to keep down the consumption of coal, speed was set at ten knots. For the first twenty-four hours fine weather was experienced, but on the night of the 18th there was a fog, and when it lifted in the morning the *Rurik* found that she had nearly lost touch with her consorts. Towards evening on the 19th, the squadron approached the Japanese coast intending to pass through the straits during the night, but the fog still hung about the shore and Admiral Iessen decided to wait for dawn. At 3.30 a.m. on the 20th, the Russians entered the straits steaming fifteen knots with a favourable tide, and about 5.30 a.m. they were off Hakodate. There seven torpedo boats were seen, but they did not approach, and a larger vessel was just visible from aloft. By 7 a.m., the squadron was through the narrow waters, and shortly afterwards met a small Japanese steamship laden with a hundred and sixty boxes of powder and miscellaneous goods. After being examined by the *Rossiya* and *Rurik* she was sunk, while the crew, which had been ordered to take to the boats, made for the shore. Meanwhile the *Gromoboi* overhauled another vessel, which proved to be the British steamer *Samara* bound for Mororan in ballast. A prize crew was sent to her, but was afterwards withdrawn and she was allowed to proceed after a detention of three hours. During the remainder of the day two Japanese schooners were sunk, and one small steamship was released as she had a large number of passengers, including women and children. In the afternoon the *Rossiya* picked up a wireless telegraphy message which

read "The Russians moving in a northerly direction are already confiscating ships." Profiting by this warning Admiral Iessen moved further from the shore, and in the evening proceeded to the southward. Beyond a number of fishing boats nothing was met with on the 21st, but on the following day, when about a hundred miles from Yokohama, the German steamer *Arabia*, bound to Japanese ports with railway material and flour, was stopped and boarded. A prize crew from the *Gromoboi* was put on board of her, and she was sent to Vladivostok via La Pérouse Strait. On

the next day but one, the British steamer *Knight Commander* was stopped off Yokohama at 9 a.m. and, on finding that her cargo consisted partly of railway material consigned to Japan, the Russians removed her crew and sunk her by shell fire.

The sinking of the *Knight Commander*.
In reply to strong protests from the British Government, the Russians excused themselves for their high-handed action, in sinking a neutral vessel without trial before a prize court, on the ground that the *Knight Commander* had not enough coal to enable her to proceed to Vladivostok. The Russian commander now began to feel some anxiety about his own coal supply, as the *Gromoboi* was proving to be a very expensive steamer. Speed during the day was therefore reduced to five knots, and at night to as low as three knots. On the 24th, two more schooners laden with fish and rice were sunk, and the *Tsinan*, a British passenger steamer, was detained but was subsequently allowed to proceed. During the night another vessel was stopped, and was found in the morning to be the German steamship *Thea* with a cargo of fish. The *Rurik* was ordered to sink her; but, according to one Russian account, it was not until four hours later, and after the expenditure of two hundred rounds of ammunition, that this apparently simple task was accomplished. The same morning the British steamer *Calchas* was examined and was made a prize. Her capacity exceeded 6,000 tons, but she was carrying only 2,400 tons of general cargo, some of which consisted of flour and railway material. She accompanied the squadron to the north, but was sent to Korsakovsk in the Island of Sakhalin, and some days later reached Vladivostok where her cargo was condemned by the local prize court. She was herself released in the following October on bail being deposited.

On the 26th July, after a cruise of nine days, the Russian squadron headed north, intending to return by La Pérouse Strait, coaling at Korsakovsk. Course was shaped to pass through the Kuna-shiri Channel, between the islands of Yetorup and Kunashiri. This

passage was only partially surveyed, and on the morning of the 28th, when about thirty miles from the entrance by dead reckoning, there was so thick a fog that Admiral Iessen considered it advisable to wait for clearer weather. Throughout the 29th there was no improvement, and the Russians appear to have felt some apprehensions as to their exact position, since they had been working by dead reckoning for some days. However, on the morning of the 30th, the fog lifted sufficiently to enable them to distinguish the land, and they then found that they were close to the Tsugaru Straits. Admiral Iessen at once decided to adopt this route, and at 11 a.m. the passage began. Near Hakodate, which was still enveloped in fog, several Japanese vessels were sighted. These were, however, nothing more formidable than old coast defence ships of slow speed, and were unable to get within three miles of the hostile cruisers. Seven torpedo boats were also seen, but no firing took place, and the Vladivostok squadron passed through unmolested. The Japanese coast defence ships followed until 5 p.m., and at sunset the torpedo boats were still in sight; but as soon as it was dark the Russian squadron, being then well clear of the straits, altered course and escaped, although for some hours an attack was fully expected. No further dangers were encountered, and at 3 p.m. on the 1st August the Vladivostok squadron returned safely from its fifth cruise, after an absence of fifteen days.

The steps taken by the Japanese to counter Admiral Iessen's raid have not been made public, but it can easily be seen that the difficulty in dealing with it was real. The appearance of the hostile cruisers off the Gulf of Tokio might well have been intended to tempt Admiral Kamimura away from his strategic position, and so enable Admiral Iessen to effect a junction with the Port Arthur fleet in the Yellow Sea. So long as any such possibility existed Admiral Kamimura dared not go far to the eastward. If, however, as indeed was actually the case, Admiral Iessen's cruise was merely a raid directed against the Japanese trade and communications, he could not be permitted indefinitely to prevent the outward sailing of transport and merchant vessels while supplying himself with coal from captured ships. No doubt the solution of the problem was greatly influenced by the vastly more important events which were taking place at Port Arthur. There General Nogi's army was rapidly closing in upon the defences, and it was more than probable that, as the dangers from the land attack

The return to
Vladivostok.

Admiral
Kamimura's
apparent
inaction.

increased, the main Russian fleet would attempt to burst through the blockading line and to reach Vladivostok. For this reason it may well have been felt that it was wiser for Admiral Kamimura to remain in telegraphic communication with Admiral Togo, and in a position to prevent either a junction of the Russian squadrons or an attack upon the transports proceeding from the western ports, than to chase Admiral Iessen's squadron about the Pacific in order to prevent the capture of a few merchant vessels.

In one particular Admiral Kamimura's attitude makes this cruise especially interesting, for it is possible to realize how little material damage the Russian squadron was able to inflict, although it was left unmolested. Within a few hours of its appearance in the Tsugaru Straits outward sailings from the eastern ports were stopped, and the only vessels which were captured were a few which happened to be on their way to Japan. Nevertheless, the mere presence of hostile ships off the Gulf of Tokio where they were able to board and destroy Japanese vessels within sight of Japanese shores was intensely galling to the national pride, and they certainly could not have been permitted to remain in the position which they had taken up.

While the matters just described were in progress in the Sea of Japan, there occurred as far away to the west as the Red Sea a series of events which, although it had little bearing on the course of the war, created great interest in Europe, and which deserves a passing notice here. Early in June the *Smolensk* and the *Peterburg* of the Russian Volunteer fleet passed out of the Dardanelles under the usual permit granted by the Porte to volunteer ships flying the merchant flag, and under that flag proceeded through the Suez Canal. On arrival at Suez guns, which had been stowed below, were brought on deck and were mounted when clear of the port, while the ships' colours were changed to those of the Russian Navy. The two ships then cruised in the Red Sea, boarding vessels bound to the Far East and capturing those which carried or were suspected of carrying contraband of war. One of the first vessels captured was the British ship *Malacca*, of the Peninsula and Oriental Company, with mails, passengers, and cargo for eastern ports. Part of the cargo consisted of ammunition belonging to the British government destined for Hongkong. This capture was immediately made the subject of an energetic protest by Great Britain on the ground that these vessels could not be reckoned as war vessels in the service of Russia in view of their having passed the Dardanelles as merchant vessels. This contention was ultimately

agreed to by the Russian government; the *Malacca* was released at Algiers where she had been taken en route to the Baltic, and other vessels which had been subsequently captured were also released. At the same time orders were issued to the *Smolensk* and the *Peterburg* instructing them to desist from their operations against neutral vessels; but for some time, owing to their departure into unfrequented waters in the Indian Ocean, it was not found possible to deliver these instructions. This was effected eventually, at the request of the Russian government, by H.M.S. *Forte*, at Zanzibar, on the 6th September, and the two vessels then proceeded to the Baltic.

CHAPTER XXIV.

BATTLE OF ULSAN.*

(Chart 2.)

AFTER their return to Vladivostok on the 1st August, the Russian cruisers coaled and made ready for another expedition. It is not known whether any concerted plan of action had ever been arranged between the Port Arthur fleet and the Vladivostok squadron, but if so it can only have been of a general character, as the news of the sortie of the 10th August found the Vladivostok cruisers with fires out. Moreover, the information that the fleet had left Port Arthur was not received until 4 p.m. on the 11th, many hours after the great battle had been fought, when it was telegraphed by the officers who had landed at Chefoo from the *Ryeshitelni*. Even they could only say that Admiral Vitgeft had been in action on the 10th, for when the *Ryeshitelni* left all that was known at Port Arthur was that heavy firing had been heard about midday, and that no ships had returned before dark. On receipt of the news, orders were at once given for the *Rossiya*, *Gromoboi*, and *Rurik* to raise steam, but it was not until 5 a.m. on the 12th that they sailed, † under the command of Rear-Admiral Iessen, to meet and reinforce Admiral Vitgeft. Assuming that the Port Arthur fleet had beaten off Admiral Togo, at a speed of ten knots it would be due to reach the Korean Strait not later than the early morning of the 13th ; con-

* This battle takes its name from the Korean port, also called Commemoration Bay, near which it was fought.

† In passing it should be noted that the armed transport *Lena* left Vladivostok for the north on the 13th August, *i.e.*, the day after the departure of the cruiser squadron. No details are forthcoming as to this mission except that she was accompanied by transports. The *Lena* was next heard of a month later at San Francisco, where she made her appearance on the 11th September. On arrival her captain stated that the boilers of his ship were in such bad condition that it was not possible again to put to sea. The truth of his statement was verified by the United States authorities, and as the boilers would require thorough renovation the Russian government agreed to disarmament.

sequently Admiral Iessen could hardly expect to arrive at that strategically important point in time to be of any assistance unless he pushed his ships to their utmost capacity. The speed at which he started has been variously estimated. In some accounts it is given as from fourteen to fifteen knots; in another it is put as low as ten knots. Circumstantial evidence would, however, appear to show that the former estimate is the more correct, for shortly after Admiral Iessen's departure news of the return of the main fleet to Port Arthur was received in Vladivostok, but a torpedo boat which was promptly dispatched to recall the squadron failed to overtake it.

During the hours of daylight Admiral Iessen kept his ships five miles apart so as to increase his range of vision, but they made the Korean coast on the evening of the 13th without having sighted anything. It was already twelve hours after Admiral Vitgeft should have entered the Korean Straits, but the speed of the Vladivostok squadron must have been greatly reduced, for it was not until just before dawn on the 14th that it reached the parallel of Fusan where Admiral Iessen proposed to wait. At 4.30 a.m., the *Rossiya*, followed by the *Gromoboi* and *Rurik*, turned to the westward intending to steam along the parallel, but a few minutes later daylight revealed four Japanese cruisers about eight miles away a little to the westward of north.

These cruisers formed part of the force under Admiral Kamimura, who had received news of the sortie of the Russian main fleet some twenty-four hours before any information had reached Vladivostok. He was then lying at his base in Tsushima Sound and, in addition to his flagship, the *Idzumo*, had with him the armoured cruisers *Adzuma*, *Tokiwa*, and *Iwate* (flag of Rear-Admiral Misu) as well as the dispatch vessel *Chihaya*. He also had under his command the 4th Division,* which was patrolling the Korean Strait.

The first intimation that the Russian fleet had put to sea reached Admiral Kamimura at 5 p.m. on the 10th in a telegram

from the chief of the naval general staff in Tokio.

Encounter with Japanese cruisers. He immediately made preparations for leaving port, and on the following morning received definite instructions from Admiral Togo to go at once to

Ross Island, off the south-west coast of Korea. Leaving Admiral Uriu with the 4th Division and the torpedo boats to watch the straits, he sailed at 10.40 a.m. with the 2nd Division and proceeded at high speed to the westward. While on his way he was informed

* *i.e.*, the *Naniwa* (flag of Rear-Admiral Uriu), *Takachiho*, *Niitaka*, *Tsushima*, and eighteen torpedo boats.


BATTLE OF ULSAN, 14TH. AUGUST 1904.

Relative positions of Squadrons.

Scale 1000 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 Yards

Iwate
Tokuma
Adzuma
Takachiho


Fig. 1.
5 a.m.



Rurik


5:40 a.m.

Fig. 2.
5:35 a.m.



5:47 a.m.

Fig. 3.
6:15 a.m.



Rurik

Fig. 4.
6:40 a.m.





Fig. 5.
7:10 a.m.




Rurik

Fig. 6.
7:30 a.m.




Rurik

Fig. 7.
7:50 a.m.



Rurik

Fig. 8.
8:20 a.m.



Rossiia
Gromoboi

Idzumo
Adzuma
Tokuma
Iwate

Naniwa
Takachiho

by wireless telegraphy that the *Askold* and *Novik* had escaped to the southward on the previous night. This information led him to detach a part of his force. On approaching the Island of Quelpart about 7 p.m., he detached the *Tokiwa* and *Iwate* to make a detour round the southern shore, and kept to the northward with the remainder of his division. At 6 a.m. on the 12th, off Ross Island, he was met by the 6th Division, which was in search of the *Askold*, and heard a full account of the events of the 10th, from which he was able to calculate that the missing cruisers would probably attempt the passage through the Korean Straits on the night of the 12th, and that it was still possible to forestall them. This view of the situation had already occurred to Admiral Togo, with the result that immediately after Admiral Kamimura had decided to return he received from the commander-in-chief another message in which his own opinion was almost exactly reflected. There was no time to lose and, after recalling the *Tokiwa* and *Iwate*, he set off at full speed for the northern end of Tsushima. The morning of the 13th found him back on his station, where yet another telegram from Admiral Togo warned him to look out for the Vladivostok cruisers, as well as for those which had escaped from Port Arthur, and told him of the *Novik's* visit to Kiao-chao. Again leaving the 4th Division stretched on patrol duty across the straits, he took the 2nd Division further north. As we have seen, neither the *Askold* nor the *Novik* adopted the course which had been anticipated, but on the morning of the 14th, Admiral Kamimura's judgment was rewarded when the three Russian cruisers, which had so often eluded him, appeared in sight. Hoping to avoid an action with a superior force, the Russians at once turned to port and steered to the north-eastward, but as soon as this manœuvre was observed, Admiral Kamimura also turned to port and, steering to the eastward, endeavoured to prevent his old enemy from escaping him again.

The two squadrons were thus on converging courses, and at 5 a.m.* fire was opened by the Japanese from their 8-inch guns at a range of about nine thousand yards. To this the Russians quickly replied (Fig. 1). In expectation of a meeting with the enemy, steam had been raised in all boilers during the previous evening, and the Russian ships began to work up to seventeen knots; but the Japanese squadron was already showing better speed and, keeping on a nearly parallel course, was gradually reducing the range. The

* Local time is used throughout this account.

fire soon became general throughout both lines, and the Japanese superiority both in number of guns* and in marksmanship began to make itself felt. The light also was in favour of the Japanese, for the rising sun was behind their gun-layers, while the glare on the horizon to the north-eastward made it very difficult for the Russians to mark the fall of their projectiles. At the end of half an hour's fighting the distance between the squadrons had decreased to about five thousand yards. The Japanese fire was very accurate, and conflagrations had broken out in each of the Russian ships. In the *Rossiya* and *Gromoboi* the flames were extinguished without difficulty; but the *Rurik*, which had already dropped astern of her station, was in a more serious condition, for the fire was near the ammunition supply to her forward 8-inch guns and was less easily got under. About 5.30 a.m., the *Rossiya* turned slightly to starboard in order to draw away from the enemy, leaving the *Rurik* in a very exposed position, of which the Japanese were not slow to take advantage (Fig. 2). A few minutes later, Admiral Iessen turned sixteen points to starboard in succession and steered to the north-westward, hoping to be able to steam round the Japanese squadron to the westward and then to make for the north. The *Rurik*, by turning short of the track of her next ahead, was also enabled to make up some of her lost ground. The Russian ships were now steaming at seventeen knots, and at one moment it looked as though Admiral Iessen's manœuvre might prove successful. This hope was quickly dispelled when Admiral Kamimura, who had merely watched his opponent until the new course became clearly defined, turned in succession to port and again steered a nearly parallel course. These movements increased the range to nearly nine thousand yards, and for a few minutes all firing ceased; but the Japanese gradually drew nearer and just before 6 a.m. the guns reopened. By this time three of the *Rossiya's* 6-inch guns were disabled, but the unfortunate *Rurik* was the greatest sufferer. About 6 a.m., when still some distance astern of her station, she signalled "Steering gear disabled" and began to turn to starboard towards the hostile line. Admiral Iessen replied "Steer with engines" and held on his course, but the *Rurik* continued to turn at reduced speed, and received the concentrated fire of the Japanese ships as they passed at a range of about six thousand yards (Fig. 3). From the accounts of the survivors it

The *Rurik*
disabled.

* The total broadsides of the opposing squadrons were :—

Russians six 8-inch, twenty-one 6-inch guns.

Japanese twelve 8-inch, twenty-seven 6-inch guns.

appears that her helm communications from the conning tower were destroyed, and that orders were given to connect the hand-gear and to use the wheel which was in the steering engine compartment. It was not, however, possible to carry out these instructions since both the tiller and steering engine compartments were being rapidly flooded from shot holes below the waterline. Efforts to place a collision mat and to pump out the water were of no avail, and, since the helm was fixed hard over to port, all attempts to steer by the engines failed. All the *Rurik* could do was, therefore, to steer round to starboard in circles of greater or less magnitude. Realizing from her movements that she was unable to follow him, Admiral Iessen, at 6.20 a.m., turned sixteen points to port; in order, as stated in his report, to cover her and afford her an opportunity to repair the damaged steering gear by drawing upon himself the whole of the Japanese fire. However gallant his intention, this movement was very far from assisting the ill-fated *Rurik* since, according to her survivors, the other two cruisers passed to the southward and not between her and the enemy. This error was possibly due to the eccentric behaviour of the disabled ship and to the danger of collision, but whatever the cause the result was equally unfortunate for her.

Very soon after the Russians were seen to alter course, Admiral Kamimura turned in succession sixteen points to starboard, but before doing so his ships were able to pour a heavy fire into their enemy while in the act of turning. Leaving the *Rurik* on the port hand, the *Rossiia* and the *Gromoboi* passed her, and then circling round to starboard again steered to the north-westward (Fig. 4). When making this second turn the Russian squadron, more especially the *Rurik*, was exposed to a concentrated fire from the whole Japanese line without being able to make any effective reply. For some minutes the Japanese did not conform to the last manœuvre, but held on their south-easterly course until past the Russian ships and then, at 6.45 a.m., turned to port in succession once more, steering a course nearly parallel to that of the Russian flagship. Five minutes later Admiral Iessen again came back to support the *Rurik*, but most

The *Rossiia*
on fire.

of the guns of the *Rossiia* had by this time been silenced, and a serious fire had broken out under her fore-castle, igniting a number of cartridges.

About this time also a fire was seen to break out in the *Iwate*, caused apparently by a shell which had burst in one of the casemates, putting out of action both the gun there and one in the casemate immediately below. For about a quarter of an hour the *Rossiia*

manœuvred in a somewhat undecided manner, but at 7.10 a.m. she steered a southerly course (Fig. 5). The Japanese squadron, which had again turned to the south-east at 7 a.m., conformed and the two squadrons were once more on parallel courses, with the shattered *Rurik* between the lines. This last manœuvre on the part of the Russians seems to have been due to a desire to put a greater distance between themselves and the enemy in the hope of being able to extinguish the fire on board the *Rossiya*. For the time being every available man in that ship was withdrawn from the guns, and in about twenty minutes the flames were got under. The *Rossiya* then again approached the *Rurik*, and, passing close to her, ordered her by megaphone to make for Vladivostok at full speed. At the same time the flagship turned to a northerly course. Meanwhile the Japanese admiral was devoting all his attention to the crippled vessel, round which he first circled to the westward at a range of about five thousand yards (Fig. 6), then turning in succession to starboard and steering an easterly course he passed about a thousand yards nearer to her. Enveloped in smoke, with a heavy list to port, and her stern deep in the water, her condition was almost hopeless; but still she kept up a heavy fire from the only two guns which had not been temporarily or permanently silenced.

A little before 8 a.m. (Fig. 7) Admiral Iessen turned for the last time to assist the *Rurik*. The *Rossiya* had availed herself of her short respite to attempt some temporary repairs to her guns, but a fire had now broken out on the battery deck, and, signalling to the *Rurik* to make her own way to Vladivostok, the Russian commander steamed away to the northward at the highest speed of which his ships were capable.

Meanwhile, in response to wireless telegraphy messages, two more Japanese cruisers, the *Naniwa* and the *Takachiho*, had made their appearance, although they had as yet taken no part in the action. Leaving these two vessels to complete the destruction of the *Rurik*, which had turned to the northward and from the appearance of her bow wave seemed to be moving at a good speed, Admiral Kamimura with his two armoured cruisers continued to engage the *Rossiya* and the *Gromoboi* (Fig. 8). For upwards of an hour the running fight continued. The Japanese, maintaining a range of about six thousand yards, soon came up abreast of their opponents, who gallantly kept up the fire with such guns as remained unsilenced.

The *Rurik* was out of sight astern and there appeared to be no

Admiral Iessen's
retreat to
Vladivostok.

Escape of
the *Rossiya*
and *Gromoboi*.

hope of escape for the *Rossiya* and the *Gromoboi* when, at 9.40 a.m., after a tremendous outburst of rapid fire, Admiral Kamimura suddenly put his helm over and abandoned the chase.

No satisfactory explanation of this unexpected action is as yet forthcoming. It has been suggested that Admiral Kamimura was not sufficiently confident of the ability of the *Naniwa* and the *Takachiho* to deal with the *Rurik*, or that his supply of coal or ammunition was running short. It is possible that, as the speed of his opponents had not been greatly reduced, he failed to realize their almost helpless condition; and his ignorance of the fate of the ships which had escaped from Port Arthur may have influenced his decision to turn back. But in any case it can hardly be denied that Admiral Kamimura's judgment was at fault, for had the engagement been continued even for a short time longer it is most improbable that either vessel would have reached port.

If Admiral Kamimura had any doubts as to the ability of the *Naniwa* and *Takachiho* to complete the destruction of the *Rurik* they must have been quickly dispelled, for by the time he reached the scene of action she had disappeared and the 4th Division was engaged in picking up survivors. After the departure of the other vessels in pursuit of the *Rossiya* and *Gromoboi*, the *Naniwa* and *Takachiho* immediately closed and opened fire upon the *Rurik*. The Russian cruiser must have patched up some of her injuries, since she kept up a brisk fire and for a short time followed the course taken by the rest of her squadron. Before long, however, the helm again became hopelessly jammed, and for the second time during the morning she could only turn in circles. Fighting gallantly to the end, her resistance was gradually overcome, and at 9.45 a.m. her last gun ceased to fire. All her senior officers were

The end of
the *Rurik*.

killed or severely wounded, and the command devolved upon the junior gunnery officer, Lieutenant Ivanov. One torpedo tube was still undamaged, and in a last effort the torpedo was fired at the Japanese cruisers, but failed to hit. Determined that the *Rurik* should not fall into the hands of the enemies of his country, Lieutenant Ivanov* gave instructions for

* Official recognition was accorded to the action of Lieutenant Ivanov in August, 1907, when a notification was published to the effect that "Lieutenant Ivanov, to whom the command of the *Rurik* reverted after the captain and commander had been killed in the action of Ulsan on the 14th August, 1904, and who behaved gallantly on the occasion, is for the rest of his service to be known as "Ivanov trinadtzati" or Ivanov the thirteenth, in commemoration of this notable event. . . ." (The number thirteen refers to the fact that Lieutenant Ivanov was the thirteenth officer of that name on the Navy list.)


the wounded to be brought on deck and ordered Sub-Lieutenant Baron Shilling, the only unwounded combatant officer, to prepare to blow up the torpedo magazine. This was found to be impossible, but an order to the engine room to open the Kingston valves and flood the ship was promptly obeyed. Life-belts and pieces of wood from the shattered boats were lashed to the wounded, and the others were told to do the best they could for themselves. Many jumped overboard to get clear of the whirlpool caused by the sinking ship. Quickly grasping the situation, Admiral Uriu ordered his cruisers to cease firing and send their boats to the rescue. As the *Rurik* sank by the stern, her ram rose high out of the water, and, slowly settling down, she finally disappeared at 10.20 a.m. with one hundred and seventy of her crew. The *Niitaka*, *Tsushima*, *Chihaya*, and torpedo boats, as well as the armoured cruisers, arrived in time to assist in the work of picking up survivors, and were so successful that six hundred and twenty-five officers and men were saved, of whom two hundred and thirty were wounded.* Admiral Kamimura then returned with his squadron to Takeshiki, and as soon as he heard of the return of the Russian battleships to Port Arthur he sent the armoured cruisers to Sasebo for repairs.

In his report of this action Admiral Iessen stated that when he left the *Rurik* he had hopes that she might yet be able to beat off her two comparatively weak opponents, and eventually reach Vladivostok. In this expectation he was disappointed; but it is difficult to see that he could have acted otherwise, for even as it was the *Rossiia* and the *Gromoboi* suffered very heavily and had they stayed with the *Rurik* they could only have shared her fate. As soon as the pursuit was abandoned Admiral Iessen took steps to ascertain the amount of damage sustained by his two remaining ships, and it was then found to be so serious that all thought of renewing the action, or returning to the *Rurik*, was given up. The *Rossiia* had forty-seven killed and one hundred and fifty-three wounded, while the *Gromoboi* had ninety-three killed and one hundred and sixty-six wounded. In addition to other injuries, the former ship had eleven and the latter had six holes near the water-line, and it was necessary to stop and to repair them temporarily.

Fortunately for the battered ships the sea was calm, and when the work had been successfully accomplished they returned to Vladivostok, where they arrived on the 16th.

The return to
Vladivostok.

* Of the twenty-two officers on board nine were either killed or drowned, and nine were wounded. For details as to damage, see Appendix T.



NANIWA.

TAKASHIHO.

RURIK.

TORPEDO BOAT.

N. WILKINSON

The Russians had undoubtedly fought splendidly. For five hours they had withstood the attack of a superior force, and, although defeated in the end, Admiral Iessen was justified in testifying as he did to the gallantry and devotion displayed by the officers and men of his squadron. It is noticeable that throughout the action the Japanese deliberately fought at long range. In doing so they trusted to their superior marksmanship rather than to the greater number of guns they could bring to bear. Had a closer action been forced, it would doubtless have been decided far more quickly, but probably at greater expense to the victors. Except for the sudden termination of the engagement when decisive success was within his grasp, Admiral Kamimura's tactics were thus in full accord with those of Admiral Togo, and, taking the whole strategical position, as well as the absence of reserves, into account they were justified. Although two of the Russian cruisers escaped destruction, the defeat they sustained seems to have had a demoralizing effect upon them. Nearly two months elapsed before the *Rossiya* and the *Gromoboi* were again ready for sea. The good fortune which had so far favoured these two vessels had then forsaken them, and, on the very next occasion upon which the latter put to sea, she ran upon a rock and was so severely damaged that for several months she was *hors de combat*. The *Bogatuir* was in a similar or even worse condition, and only the *Rossiya* remained. She, however, made no further attempt to interfere with the Japanese communications, and her subsequent movements are quite without importance.

CHAPTER XXV.

NAVAL COMMENTS.

As a preliminary step towards even a short study of the strategy of the war, it may tend to clearness if the main object with which the campaign was fought is briefly stated. The problem before the War Council in Japan was the substitution of Japanese for Russian control in Southern Manchuria, and the prevention of any further advance by Russia in the direction of Korea. For Russia, it was all important to hold by force of arms the province over which her diplomacy had given her the control. It is clear that Japan could only attain her purpose by means of her army, which must meet, and defeat, the Russian forces in Manchuria, and must, as a preliminary step, be transported across the sea which separates her from the continent of Asia. The duty of the Japanese fleet was, therefore, in the first place, to safeguard the passage of the army to those points of disembarkation which military strategy deemed the most suitable as bases for the operations in the field; and, secondly, to keep open the sea communication until the land operations should be concluded. Hence it follows that, if the Japanese fleet could have been defeated, Russia would practically have attained the main object of the war, and both Manchuria and Korea would have passed under her control. On the other hand, the maintenance of Russian supremacy in Manchuria was only indirectly dependent upon the fleet, since there was a complete line of land communication from St. Petersburg to Port Arthur. Thus at the beginning of the war Japan was so placed that defeat at sea would have been disastrous, while victory, however complete, was no more than a supremely important step towards the defeat of the Russian army. Nevertheless, an attempt to win a naval victory at the outset does not appear to have formed part of the Russian plan of campaign, which aimed solely at crushing the Japanese in southern Manchuria, while the Port Arthur fleet acted as an auxiliary to General Kuropatkin's field army. Russia deliberately preferred to decide the issue in Manchuria, and throughout the war the outstanding feature to be borne in mind, when reviewing

the naval operations as actually conducted, is the power of the Russian fleet to interfere with the oversea communications of the Japanese armies.

This being so, the first point to be considered is the distribution of that fleet at the beginning of the war. The fact that for a long time previously all the newest and the best Russian ships had been sent to the Far Eastern station, and that further reinforcements were already on their way when hostilities broke out, prove that the naval authorities were alive to the importance of maintaining a powerful fleet in those waters. Had Russia's responsible statesmen adhered to the 1898 building programme she would have been still stronger, but even as it was they failed to develop their naval bases at Port Arthur and Vladivostok at a rate commensurate with the growth of the fleet which was to act from them. If a strong naval force was necessary, a first-class base was certainly no less so; but instead of completing the dockyard at Port Arthur and carrying out the scheme for improving the harbour, large sums of money were spent in the attempt to convert Dalny into a great commercial port. In this, as in some other respects, Russia's diplomacy outpaced her preparations, with the result that by February, 1904, so little progress had been made at Port Arthur that there was no dock capable of taking a battleship, nor was the dredging of the western basin sufficiently advanced to permit of the whole fleet being concentrated at that port. In spite of these limitations it cannot be said that the Russians acted wrongly in making Port Arthur the principal base of their fleet. The harbour at Vladivostok was larger, but it was ill-suited for a base of offensive operations either against the Japanese fleet or against the line of communications of the army. In the first place, the exits were frozen for several months in the year, and although a passage might have been kept open by the ice-breaker, the freedom of action of the fleet would have been seriously hampered, and in case of defeat return would have been almost impossible. Secondly, the dense fogs which are so frequent in the neighbourhood of Vladivostok must have occasioned similar difficulties.

But more important than either of these drawbacks was the choice of Liao-yang as the place of concentration of the field army. This rendered it almost inevitable that the Japanese should attempt to transport their troops through the Yellow Sea. In doing so they must pass within easy striking distance of the Kuan-tung Peninsula, and a force whose object was to interfere with the Japanese sea communications was very much better placed at Port Arthur than at Vladivostok. For operations of this nature Port Arthur was of far greater importance as a

strategical point than Vladivostok, and its selection as the principal naval base was, moreover, quite in harmony with the Russian military dispositions. Later on, when the Japanese had established their superiority at sea, and after the officer in command of the Russian fleet had voluntarily abandoned all idea of attempting to regain the offensive, the weakness of the geographical position of Port Arthur, at the end of a long peninsula which could easily be isolated, was at once brought into prominence. As a harbour of refuge Vladivostok would certainly have been preferable, but as a base of operations all the advantage lay with Port Arthur. The subsequent efforts of the fleet to change its base must not be taken as a confession that its original position was ill-chosen, for to have placed it at Vladivostok would only have been compatible with a generally defensive plan of campaign on land and sea. It is true that the choice of Port Arthur as the principal base entailed some dispersal of force, but this was less injurious than might have appeared probable at first sight, since the Japanese could not afford to ignore the existence of the four cruisers at Vladivostok.

A detachment may fairly be said to justify its existence if it keeps employed a larger detachment of the enemy, and thereby increases the chance of success at the decisive points. This requirement the Vladivostok squadron fulfilled, and had the officers in command displayed rather more enterprise they might have exercised an important influence upon the course of the naval operations. As it was, many weeks elapsed before any attempt was made from the north against the Japanese communications, but even the somewhat half-hearted raids which were made during the summer of 1904, and the difficulty which Admiral Kamimura then experienced in bringing the hostile cruisers to action, show the results which might have been achieved under more skilful leadership. The detachment of the *Varyag* and *Koreetz* at Chemulpo must be explained upon different grounds. Strategically it was indefensible; but at a time when relations between Russia and Japan were highly strained, political influence at the Court of Seoul was a matter of great importance, and it was natural that the Russian Minister should wish to keep a warship in Korean waters. But the captain of the *Varyag* should have been warned to watch the situation carefully, and to be prepared to return to Port Arthur on the slightest sign of a rupture. This warning we know that he did not receive. Assuming, therefore, that Russia's intention was to use her fleet in the way that has been indicated, no serious fault can be found with its distribution at the beginning of February, 1904, but the opening events of the war brought

about a complete change in the naval conditions. For some months political relations had been strained, and the appearance of the Russian fleet outside Port Arthur on the 3rd February brought matters to a head. Two days later the Japanese Minister was recalled from St. Petersburg, and on the morning of the 6th Admiral Togo left Sasebo with orders to defeat the Russian fleet. Both diplomatically and strategically Russia was taken by surprise, and even before war had been formally declared the Japanese had temporarily established their superiority at sea. The Russian fleet was forced on to the defensive, and the lack of foresight in failing to provide ample docking accommodation and to increase the resources of Port Arthur was severely felt. For the Russian admiral's action in anchoring in the open roadstead, when war might be declared at any moment, there can be no justification, and he must be considered fortunate to have escaped greater loss. His damaged ships were quickly repaired considering the limited resources at his disposal, and although the conditions were greatly changed, the main problem remained the same.

By the beginning of June the two fleets were again on more or less equal terms, and, as before, the real question to be decided by Admiral Vitgeft was whether he would best serve his country by bringing on or by avoiding a decisive naval action. So long as he remained in harbour he did little or nothing to hamper the oversea communications of the hostile army. On the other hand the mere existence of the Russian fleet constituted a threat, which was sufficiently formidable to attract four divisions of the Japanese army to the Kuan-tung Peninsula, at a time when they were sorely needed elsewhere. It cannot, therefore, be said that the fleet rendered no service, but sooner or later the policy which was adopted was bound to fail. It involved, in fact, the abnegation of true leadership, and the accounts of the deliberations in Port Arthur show nothing more clearly than the failure of the Russian naval officers to realize that the supreme object of their existence was to assist in the defeat of the Japanese field army. Many splendid opportunities were thus allowed to pass. Even the efforts of the Japanese to block the exit from the harbour did not open the eyes of the Russians to the difficulties in which their enemy might have been evolved by a sudden sortie when the transports were bringing the Second Army to Pi-tzu-wo.

Again on the 15th May, the destruction of two Japanese battleships, a success which was due to the initiative of a subordinate officer and was achieved almost under the eyes of his superiors, was not sufficient to induce the Russian naval commanders to run the risk of bringing on a general engagement.

That they would have been successful is improbable, but even had they failed they might have done much to render the task of the Baltic fleet less formidable, for the one loss which Japan could not afford was that of ships. The only real attempt on the Russian side to assume the offensive was the sortie of the 23rd June, when Admiral Vitgeft certainly seems to have intended to fight an action on the following day; but the prompt appearance of the Japanese and the approach of darkness were sufficient to cause him to abandon his resolution. The sortie of the 10th August had a different object since the intention was to reach Vladivostok, without fighting if possible, or should an action prove to be unavoidable it was to be purely defensive. Even so it was only pressure from superior authority, supported by the approach of the besieging force, which induced Admiral Vitgeft to make the attempt. The only argument which can be advanced in favour of inactivity was that the fortress might possibly hold out until reinforcements could arrive from Europe. But by that time the efficiency of the fleet must have deteriorated greatly through its prolonged stay in harbour; and the spirit which would render possible such a line of action, when opposed by a fleet of practically equal strength, is not likely to be successful on the day of battle.

Before passing to the consideration of the Japanese naval strategy the foregoing remarks may be summarized as follows:—
 ✓ First, that the Russian fleet might have been utilized (*a*) to
 ✓ establish superiority at sea and to render the transport of troops
 ✓ so hazardous that it would not be attempted; (*b*) to attack the
 ✓ military transports before the troops were able to disembark;

* The two methods indicated in (*a*) and (*b*) of dealing with a threatened invasion have always afforded matter for discussion. In this connexion it is interesting to recall, for comparison, the military situation in Europe in the year 1801, when the southern and eastern shores of England were threatened by the army of Napoleon, for whose transport hundreds of small vessels and flat boats had been collected in the ports of France and Flanders.

One British fleet was blockading Brest and another was watching the Texel. On his return from the Baltic, Nelson was placed in command of the cruisers and small craft which had been collected for the purpose of dealing with the threatened invasion, and on the 25th July he wrote to the Admiralty as follows:—

“ . . . for supposing London the object of surprise, I am of the opinion that the enemy's object *ought* to be the getting on shore as quickly as possible It is therefore most probable that from Boulogne, Calais, and even Havre that the enemy will try and land in Sussex or the lower part of Kent, and from Dunkirk, Ostend, and the other ports of Flanders to land on the coast of Essex or Suffolk; for I am myself of the opinion that the object being to get ashore somewhere within 100 miles of London as speedily as possible, the Flats at the mouth of the Thames will not be the only place necessary to attend to; added to this the enemy will create a

(c) to operate against the communications of those troops when landed. Secondly, that for any of these objects the distribution of the fleet was substantially correct. Thirdly, that the dispersal of force necessitated by keeping the main portion of the fleet at Port Arthur was not in fact a source of weakness, and that a naval concentration at Vladivostok would not have been compatible with a military concentration at Liao-yang. Fourthly, that after the opening events the Russian naval problem remained

powerful diversion by the sailing of the combined fleet, and the either sailing or creating such an appearance of sailing, of the Dutch Fleet, as will prevent Admiral Dickson from sending anything from off the great Dutch ports while each of the smaller ports will spew forth its flotilla—viz., Flushing, &c., &c. . . I will suppose that 40,000 men are destined for this attack, or rather surprise of London.”

Then follows his disposition of his force.

“These are offered as merely the rude ideas of the moment, and are only meant as a sea plan of defence for the City of London; but I believe other parts may likewise be menaced if the Brest fleet and those from Rochefort and Holland put to sea; although I feel confident that the fleets of the enemy will meet the same fate which has always attended them, yet their sailing will facilitate the coming over of their flotilla, as they will naturally suppose our attention will be called only to the fleets.”

A few days after the dispatch of this letter Nelson attempted to destroy the boats which had been prepared at Boulogne, but was beaten off with some loss by the defences of the port. It then became apparent to him that he must wait for them to put to sea, as he could not hope to destroy them in harbour. In a letter dated 21st August, 1801, he seems to be in doubt as to the best disposition of his vessels, for he then wrote—“ . . . I own I do want good counsel. Lord St. Vincent is for keeping the enemy closely blockaded; but I see that they get along shore inside their sandbanks, and under their guns which line the coast of France. Lord Hood is for keeping our squadrons of defence stationary on our own shore (except light cutters, to give information of every movement of the enemy); for the time is approaching when a gale of westerly wind will disperse our light squadron. When men of such good sense, such great sea officers, differ so widely, is it not natural that I should wish the mode of defence to be well arranged by the mature consideration of men of judgment? I mean not to detract from my judgment; even as it is, it is well known, but I boast of nothing but my zeal; in that I will give way to no man upon earth.”

The difference of opinion between these officers appears to be in the method of disposing the force detailed to guard our shores. All were agreed that the invading force must be attacked at sea by every available vessel if it attempted to cross, but whereas St. Vincent, to whose views Nelson was inclined to agree, favoured a close blockade and the strangling of the expedition at its birth, Hood advised that it should be permitted to put to sea and the attack allowed to develop so that its destruction might be the more complete when the counter-stroke was delivered. The analogy between 1801 and 1904 is not complete, but the difference is one of degree rather than of kind. In the former case a flotilla of small craft was attempting to deal with a threatened invasion protected by small craft; in the latter case a fleet had to meet an invasion covered by a fleet.

practically unchanged, the crucial question being whether the wiser course was to bring on or to avoid a fleet action. Fifthly, that by avoiding action whenever possible the Russian commanders showed a failure to realize two things: namely, that the main object with which the war was fought could be attained by a naval victory either at the outset or at any time before the strategic deployment of the Japanese armies in Manchuria had been completed; and that so soon as the hostile armies were landed the true rôle of the fleet was to assist General Kuropatkin by active operations against the Japanese communications.

From this general view of the Russian naval strategy it follows that Admiral Togo's primary objective was the hostile fleet, considered with relation to its power to prevent or to hamper the movements of the Japanese army. His true rôle was in its essence defensive, but the only sure way in which he could carry out his duty of protecting the oversea lines of communication was to destroy the Russian fleet as a fighting force. This task he first attempted, acting under orders from Tokio, by means of a surprise attack with his whole force. The surprise was completely successful; not so the attack. The *Varyag* and *Koreetz* fell an easy prey, and sufficient advantage was gained to permit of the passage of the first body of troops to Korea without serious danger of interference; but the battlefleet, though crippled, was still capable of offensive action, and Admiral Togo then decided to confine it to the harbour in which it had sought refuge. If he could succeed in doing this there would be no interference from Port Arthur with the all-important sea transport of the army,* and at the same time he would avoid all the risk which a fleet action would entail of damage to, and possibly loss of, his armoured ships. He was prepared to accept action at any moment in defence of the sea

* In this connexion considerable interest attaches to the text of the Imperial message which was sent to Admiral Togo in acknowledgment of his report, dated the 11th February, 1904, in which he described his operations from the 6th to the 10th inclusive. It ran as follows:—

“We have heard that the combined fleet has completely carried out the duty of landing the troops in Korea; has swept the west coast clear; has attacked the enemy's ships at Port Arthur and destroyed several of them, thereby vindicating our prestige. We are greatly pleased. Officers and men—Fight with increasing vigour.”

It is noteworthy that the Emperor's thanks (probably drafted by the Grand Council of War) describes the services of the fleet under three headings, and it is not improbable that the order in which these services are put actually represents the degree of importance attached to them by the Council.

The Empress and Crown Prince in their messages speak only of the damage to the enemy and the glorious victories at Chemulpo and Port Arthur.

communications or to prevent the Russians from changing their base to Vladivostok, but at no time does he appear to have wished to tempt them out for a fight in the open sea. The complications which might have arisen from a successful dash for Vladivostok have been considered in the account of the battle of the 10th August, but it may be as well again to emphasize the fact that at that date the Japanese had no doubt of their ability to bring about the fall of the fortress, with the consequent destruction or capture of the ships, before the arrival of a reinforcing fleet from Europe.

If we accept the view that Admiral Togo's aim was to confine his enemy to Port Arthur, we find an explanation for all his later actions, especially of the first two blocking expeditions. It was thought at one time that these expeditions, upon which he expended so much blood and material, were specially designed to occupy the attention of the Russian fleet during the critical periods when the main bodies of the Japanese armies were on the sea or disembarking from the transports. This explanation can, however, hold good only in the case of the third attempt to close the exit from the harbour, for the dates of the two earlier expeditions do not coincide with any great movements by sea of the Japanese troops. They seem rather to have been part of a general plan to keep the Russian fleet in port until a regular blockade could be established. It is true that Admiral Togo must have known that even if he should succeed in sinking his blockships in the channel the obstruction, unprotected by guns to prevent the enemy removing it, could only be of a temporary nature, but valuable time would have been gained in which to develop the military plans, and this was what was required.

The third expedition was more particular in its aim, and although the harbour was not blocked its object was achieved when the landing of General Oku's army was carried out unmolested.

It must be acknowledged that whatever Admiral Togo's plan may have been he was unusually fortunate in his opponents. Their attitude of passive defence was exactly suited to his policy, which was undoubtedly the wisest in the circumstances in which he found himself placed. Although the strength in material of the Russian and Japanese fleets in far eastern waters was approximately equal, the total naval strength of Japan was greatly inferior to that of her rival. Moreover, so long as the war lasted she had no means of replacing any armoured vessels which might be lost. An overwhelming victory, such as he gained later in the Sea of Japan, would have solved Admiral Togo's problem; but the

risk of losing one or more of his precious ships would be considerable in a hard fought action and, even if successful, he could hardly hope to prevent some portion of the enemy from reaching the protection of the fortress, where it would still be a force to be reckoned with when the Baltic fleet arrived from Europe. So long as the Russians could be induced to remain in Port Arthur they could do no hurt to Japanese interests, and the only point of real importance was that the fleet should cease to exist as a fighting force before the arrival of reinforcements. But Japan could better afford the loss of men than of ships upon which so much might depend later. Hence the land attack by the Japanese Third Army; and it was not until hostile shells were actually falling in the harbour that the possibility of the loss of the fortress was seriously entertained by the higher officers of the Russian fleet, who seem to have considered that when assisting in the defence they were fulfilling their whole duty. Admiral Togo's tactics on the 23rd June and again on the 10th August tend to confirm the view that the Japanese strategy contemplated dealing with the Russian fleet by a land attack rather than in a naval battle. On the former occasion he did not follow when Admiral Vitgeft declined action, but it is probable that the course which he took was adopted deliberately as being in accordance with a general plan for avoiding unnecessary risks to the battleships. Similarly on the 10th August all Admiral Togo's efforts were directed to heading off the hostile fleet and forcing it to return. Moreover, when it became evident that on this occasion the Russians did not intend to decline action, the Japanese commander elected to fight at long range, again with the probable intention of lessening the danger to his own ships. He achieved his object, but before long the weak point in his policy began to manifest itself. At the time when the Japanese believed that they could carry Port Arthur by assault within a few weeks, the escape of a number of damaged ships may have seemed of small importance, but it is a cardinal rule of warfare that once battle is accepted no effort should be spared to make the result decisive. The price that Japan had to pay for neglecting this rule was very heavy; fifty thousand men fell in the various attempts to carry the defences, and there was no relaxation of the strain upon the ships which kept up the blockade. Had the fortress been able to hold out longer, or had Admiral Rozhestvenski reached the scene of action a few months earlier, the Japanese would have had but little time to complete the repairs and the refits which their ships required before meeting the Baltic fleet. It is, of course, impossible to say with certainty what the result of

more vigorous action might have been, but when darkness put an end to the battle of the Yellow Sea the Russians were not in a condition to offer much more resistance, and it is conceivable that had Admiral Togo closed to effective range from the outset the victory would have been as complete as that of the Sea of Japan in the following year. In that case Admiral Rozhstvenski might never have left Libau, and at least a part of the army investing Port Arthur could have been released for the main operations in Manchuria.

While pursuing the policy which has been indicated with regard to the Port Arthur fleet, Admiral Togo could not afford to neglect the existence of the Russian cruisers at Vladivostok, which, if boldly handled, might at any time seriously interfere with the passage of Japanese troops. During the early days of the war Admiral Kataoka's squadron was stationed in the Straits of Korea to guard against an attack from this quarter, but his ships were slow and it is doubtful whether he could have brought the Russian cruisers to action had they shown any enterprise. Moreover, his vessels were required as escorts whenever any considerable body of transports had entered the Yellow Sea. Recourse was therefore had to occasional demonstrations by a superior force off Vladivostok, combined with the utmost secrecy as to the movements of Japanese ships. By these means the Russians were led to believe that a strong squadron was acting in the Sea of Japan, with the result that during the first few months, the most critical period so far as the movements of troops were concerned, they did not venture to leave harbour. Later, when the Russians became bolder, it was found necessary permanently to detach Admiral Kamimura's squadron and to station it in the Straits of Korea. There it served the double purpose of guarding the route of the transports from attack by the Vladivostok cruisers, and of preventing a junction between those vessels and any portion of the Port Arthur fleet which might succeed in evading Admiral Togo. A blockade of Vladivostok would doubtless have been a more effective way of dealing with the problem, but a much larger detachment would have been required and this the Japanese were unable to spare from their main operations at Port Arthur. Again their action was dictated by the imperative rule of economy of strength. The story of the Russian raids illustrates the great difficulty which a commander may experience in bringing a quickly moving force to action, particularly when the aggressor is favoured by the weather; and it furnishes an interesting example of the importance of keeping the main issue always in view. Admiral Kamimura's first duty was protective, and not once did he allow

himself to be tempted away from his position except when he was in touch with his enemy either directly or through the signal stations. So long as the hostile cruisers confined their operations to the northern part of the Sea of Japan or to the east coast of the islands, they could have little or no effect upon the course of the war, but the moment they came south they became a source of danger to the stream of transports proceeding from Japan, and it was then necessary to drive them off. The Japanese commander had to guard against the danger of being drawn away to a distance, and thereby affording his enemy an opportunity for achieving the very objects which it was his duty to frustrate. His task was by no means easy, but he was far too clear-sighted to be led away while the enemy's objective was in doubt; but, as has often been the case in war, his wise self-restraint exposed him to no small amount of obloquy from uneducated public opinion.

It is clear, therefore, that from first to last the Japanese naval commanders never forgot that their first duty was to guard the oversea communications of the army. Tactically the problem was simplified by the lack of enterprise of the enemy; but strategically it was complicated by the unknown value of the Baltic fleet. Had Admiral Togo been able to take risks his tactics on the 23rd June and the 10th August might have been more aggressive, but caution was imposed upon him by conditions over which he had no control. The greatest credit is due to him for his self-restraint, and for the perseverance with which he pursued to the end the line of conduct that he had adopted in the early days of the war. He reaped his reward in the battle of the Sea of Japan.

Turning from the general principles of strategy to the influence of recent inventions, it is unfortunate for the student of warfare that there was no opportunity for testing the powers of the submarine. Skilfully commanded, a few submarines might have been invaluable for the Russian operations off the Kuan-tung Peninsula. But, after all, these vessels are of the nature of torpedo boats, available, through their practical invisibility, for use during the hours of daylight, and they could have achieved but little unless they had been handled with greater audacity than were the Russian destroyers. On the other hand, one of the most striking features of the war is the great development of the mechanical mine. During the first two months this weapon was not used at all by the Japanese, who, as has been shown, appear to have put greater faith in blockships as a means of keeping the Russian fleet in harbour. The extraordinary success which attended their first mine-laying operations, when one Russian battleship became a total loss and a second was seriously damaged, naturally led to a

marked development of this form of warfare as a means of blockade. Although the Japanese were never able absolutely to close the exit from the harbour, the grave danger incurred and the delay caused by the necessity for sweeping a long channel whenever the fleet put to sea, and the still greater danger when returning to port, exercised a powerful influence upon Admiral Vitgeft when called upon to decide whether he could leave Port Arthur or not.

Unlike their opponents, the Russians made use of the mechanical mine from the outset, and during the first week of the war laid a large number round the coast of the Kuan-tung Peninsula with a view to preventing a Japanese landing near Port Arthur. At this time the danger most feared was a sudden blow from the land side against the fortress, which for many weeks was in no condition to resist a determined enemy. Later on the mines proved most useful in delaying the movements of the enemy, and in preventing co-operation between his army and navy. Both at the battle of Nan Shan, and during the subsequent operations which led up to the siege, the Japanese navy was prevented by the Russian mines from rendering more than slight help to the army, while the Russian vessels, with their knowledge of the positions of the mine fields, were able to move freely along the coast and to be of considerable assistance to their comrades on shore. In this way the mines proved their value; but when laid outside the range of covering guns, unless in a position where they can be constantly renewed, they can only serve to delay a cautious foe who is content to sweep for them systematically. For instance, the mines in Ta-lien Bay did not prevent the eventual use of Dalny as a base for the besieging force at Port Arthur.

The mines near Port Arthur were in a somewhat different category, as there they could constantly be replaced and were a source of great anxiety to the Japanese, more particularly on account of the insecurity of their moorings and the distances to which they drifted. This is not the place to discuss the international question of the danger to neutral and peaceful vessels from drifting mines, but it is conceivable that in crowded waters, frequented by the ships of many nations, a state of affairs such as existed outside Port Arthur for many months might prove intolerable. By far the most important result of the Russian mine-laying operations was the destruction of the *Hatsuse* and *Yashima* in May, but, as already mentioned, it was not turned to advantage. Even before the greater number of mines had been laid, the fire of the forts was sufficiently formidable to keep the Japanese fleet at a distance of over seven miles—almost entirely

✓ by means of the five 10-in. guns in the Electric Cliff Battery. The value of a few modern guns of high power mounted on shore was thus very clearly proved, though it is possible that, had no other considerations been involved, the fleet would have been capable of silencing the fort. But such conditions are extremely rare, and the risks are so great that a fleet will seldom be justified in engaging permanent works.

As compared with the gun and mine, the Whitehead torpedo proved a somewhat ineffective weapon. With the exception of the first attack upon Port Arthur it had little or no influence upon the operations, although it undoubtedly had considerable indirect effect upon tactics. The number of torpedoes fired was large, yet both the percentage of hits obtained and the results which ensued when a large ship was struck fell considerably short of the expectations which had been formed from peace experience. It is possible that the Japanese, who had the most frequent opportunities for its use, placed too great reliance upon the accuracy of their weapon, and were thus tempted during night attacks to fire their torpedoes at a range which is often spoken of by their opponents as a long one. Or, again, the spray thrown up by projectiles may have had the effect of rendering vision, and consequently judgment of range, exceedingly difficult. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that on the nights on the 23rd June and the 10th August, although a large number of attacks were made under conditions which might be considered favourable to the assailants, and many torpedoes were fired, not a single Russian ship was struck. That the failure was not due to any lack of dash on the part of the Japanese officers is unquestioned, for there is abundant evidence that no men have shown greater endurance and gallantry than those employed in the Japanese torpedo craft.

CHAPTER XXVI.

MILITARY COMMENTS.

In the preceding chapter it has been shown that the proper distribution of the Russian fleet was to some extent dependent upon purely military considerations. During the year 1903, Major-General Flug, temporarily on the staff of the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeiev, presented a special report upon "The Strategical Distribution of the Manchurian Army," in which the country round Liao-yang was marked as the *rayon* for the concentration of all the forces in Southern Manchuria in case of war with Japan, and for such reinforcements as might be sent out. This report, which may have influenced the naval authorities in the choice of their principal base, was submitted to General Kuropatkin, who was then War Minister, and was finally approved in the highest quarters. Whether the existence of General Flug's paper was known to the Japanese or not is uncertain, nor is it of great importance, for there is no doubt that an exhaustive study of the conditions led them to believe that Liao-yang was the point at which the first great battle against the Russian main army would be fought. This, therefore, was the idea which underlay their land strategy from the outset of the war, and, true to their German teaching, they resolved that from the first their troops must be deployed upon the mainland of Manchuria in such a way as to enable them to envelop their enemy at Liao-yang. The whole campaign forms an interesting example of a strategic deployment made with the avowed object of culminating in a decisive battle at a definite point. It was clear, however, that at the outset the sphere of possible military operations would be strictly limited by the naval conditions, and in these circumstances the first problem which presented itself to the general staff in Japan must have been to decide how the army should be employed until the navy had established such superiority at sea as to enable transports to move in safety. Obviously this might be a long business, yet it was of vital importance to Japan to derive the greatest possible advantage

from her readiness to act. The resources of Russia in wealth* and population were far greater than were those of her rival, and against these advantages Japan could only pit proximity to the theatre of war, superior organization, and consequent power to act first. At the same time, although much might be gained by prompt action, it was remembered that each step which was taken must form part of the general plan of campaign and lead nearer to the ultimate goal, the complete defeat of the Russian field army. With this settled object the Japanese decided that their first measure must be to land troops in Korea, whence they could advance, as the right wing of the converging forces, along the Imperial road from Seoul to Mukden.

Moreover, Korea possessed other advantages which must not be overlooked. In the first place, if the navy should ultimately fail to secure more than a partial supremacy at sea, there would always be a comparatively safe line by which supplies could be sent from Japan to Manchuria. Secondly, in case of a serious reverse on land Korea would form a convenient base upon which the army could fall back until reinforced from the home country. Thirdly, the control of Korea, as one of the main points in dispute, was of considerable political importance. But there was more than this. The roads in Manchuria are few and bad, and the Japanese plan of campaign would necessitate a considerable dispersion of force. For some time therefore the various armies might be liable to attack in detail by superior numbers, and when once it had been decided to accept that risk no better scheme could have been devised than that which eventually placed the First Army at Feng-huang-cheng, where it was in a position to threaten the communications of any force which might be sent from Liao-yang towards Port Arthur. At the same time the First Army was itself secure from attack, for while General Kuroki was able to draw his supplies from Japan by sea, it was impossible for General Kuropatkin to concentrate or to feed any large body of troops so far from the railway. But for the presence of General Kuroki at Feng-huang-cheng, the army under General Oku might have drawn upon itself the whole weight of the Russian forces in Manchuria, and for this reason the crossing of the Ya-lu played almost as important a part in securing the safety of the Second Army as did the sealing up of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur.

In strong contrast to the clear plan of campaign which the Japanese followed out from the opening of hostilities is the Russian

* The wealth of the two countries at the outbreak of the war must not be confused with their borrowing powers in later stages. In the case of Japan the latter were largely affected by military success, see p. 415.

strategy during the early months of 1904. The possibility of war had scarcely been acknowledged in St. Petersburg, and when diplomatic relations were abruptly broken off the advisers of the Tsar were completely unprepared. The inevitable result followed. The initiative in the conduct of operations was resigned to the enemy from the outset, and while the Japanese First Army was marching steadily through Korea the Russian opposition was very weak. The moment that command of the sea was lost the difficulties of supply became very great; and even had it been possible to push the 3rd Siberian Corps south of the Ya-lu it would probably have been unwise to do so, for the threat of a landing near the mouth of the river would have been sufficient to bring it back. In these circumstances the only body of troops which could oppose the Japanese advance to the Ya-lu was the cavalry under General Mishchenko, and it must be acknowledged that that officer did not display any great enterprise. Even unopposed the Japanese advance was difficult, and a really efficient cavalry leader would surely have found means to render it more so. As it was the Cossack Brigade was used simply as a corps of observation, and when it finally retired across the Ya-lu its losses had been very slight.

The actual battle of the Ya-lu provides one more example of the difficulty of guarding a river crossing against an enterprising enemy. This is a problem which constantly recurs in war, but this particular instance differs from most others in that the scope of the defending general was more than ordinarily limited. As a rule it may be said that the defenders are free to take up a position on either bank; but a position east of the Ya-lu might readily have been turned from the sea. The question to be decided was not, therefore, where General Zasulich should make his first stand, but rather whether he should fight or manœuvre, and if the former alternative were chosen should he attempt to win a victory or merely fight a delaying action? General Zasulich's force being inferior in numbers, the correct answer to these questions depended mainly on the time conditions in relation to the general plan of campaign. The decision, therefore, lay with General Kuropatkin whose orders do not appear to have been very definite, and rightly or wrongly the former alternative was chosen.

For this decision the commander-in-chief must bear the responsibility, but the manner in which the battle was fought was the affair of General Zasulich. The numbers against him were greatly superior to his own, and his best chance of success was to watch the line of the river with a comparatively weak force and

to strike a vigorous blow, with superior numbers if possible, at some one point. The possibility of offensive action does not, however, appear to have entered into General Zasluch's calculations, for although he concentrated a strong reserve at Tien-tzu, he placed it there solely with the object of meeting a turning movement against his right flank. His plan of battle, was, in fact, purely defensive, and as such it was bound to fail. The negligence of the cavalry on his left was, perhaps, the immediate cause of his defeat, but it is evident that, so far as the Russians were concerned, the battle was fought without any clear idea of how a victory was to be won.

When compared with General Zasluch's difficulties, those which confronted General Kuroki appear simple. In numbers the Japanese commander was greatly superior, and the command of the sea enabled him to deceive his adversary as to where the blow was to fall. Just as in the grand strategy of the campaign, so now in the first important battle, the co-operation of the Japanese navy and army was thorough and effective. The knowledge that his right flank was liable to be turned from the sea, exercised a disturbing, almost a paralysing, influence on the mind of the Russian commander; and the repeated appearances of hostile vessels in the lower waters of the Ya-lu increased his anxiety. By skilful use of this advantage General Kuroki was able to create a false impression as to his intentions, to induce his opponent to keep troops at a point where they were of no use, and greatly to simplify the turning movement. A battle fought under such conditions could have but one end.

Some forty hours after the crossing of the Ya-lu, Admiral Togo cabled to Japan that "the harbour entrance appears to have been completely blocked to the passage of cruisers and larger vessels," and the land campaign then entered upon its second phase. We now know that the third attempt to block the exit from Port Arthur had not been perfectly successful, but on the receipt of this report the Japanese believed it to have been so, and at last felt that transport vessels might venture to approach the Kuan-tung Peninsula. Hitherto military operations had necessarily been dependent upon naval success, and the war contains nothing more instructive than the prompt manner in which the rupture of diplomatic negotiations was followed by the first attack upon Port Arthur, and by the landing of Japanese troops in Korea. Diplomacy and strategy kept pace, the one with the other, until the time came for decisive action; and when that moment arrived both navy and army were prepared. Now, however, there were two objectives; a fleet at Port Arthur

and an army concentrating round Liao-yang. By his action in attempting to close the exit from Port Arthur, Admiral Togo had made it clear that he had no intention of bringing on a decisive engagement at sea, and the double task of crushing both fleet and army devolved upon the soldiers. Which should be selected for attack, or should Japan attempt to deal with both simultaneously? The destruction of the fleet would entail the siege of Port Arthur; while the first step towards the destruction of General Kuropatkin's army would be an arduous and possibly a long march, during which the supply of food and ammunition would present serious difficulties. At the same time the two objectives could not be regarded separately, for they formed parts of a single problem. The ultimate aim of the Japanese must be to destroy the Russian field army, and towards that end the capture of Port Arthur, and of the fleet which had taken shelter there, was the most important step.

Much has been written about Port Arthur. On the one hand, many arguments have been advanced to show that it was a serious error for the Russians to attempt to hold it, since the garrison of the fortress would have formed a valuable addition to the field army; on the other hand it has been asserted with equal emphasis that the Japanese should not have attempted its capture, for they thereby weakened their field army, and consequently failed to secure any really decisive victory. Had Port Arthur been a simple fortress, such, for instance, as Metz or Verdun, these arguments would carry great weight; but the fact that the fortress afforded protection to a fleet, which, until it was destroyed, was a constant menace to Japanese communications, entirely altered the conditions. In the course of the narrative it has been shown that the mere appearance of the Russian fleet on the 23rd June completely dislocated the Japanese transport arrangements. The fact that the Russian admiral returned to port without fighting does not affect the question. The point is, that the possession of Port Arthur had enabled the Russians to repair their damaged ships, and to assume the offensive with a reasonable chance of securing a victory which might have changed the whole course of the campaign.

At that date Japan had in Manchuria the First, Second, and part of the Fourth Armies, in addition to the 1st and 11th Divisions at Port Arthur. All these troops were dependent for their supplies and munitions of war upon their over-sea communications which were now seriously threatened. Even on the 10th August the Japanese naval victory was not sufficiently decisive to justify a change in the plan of campaign, and until the

5th December, when 203 Metre Hill was captured, and fire could be brought to bear upon the ships in the harbour, the Japanese general staff was never free from anxiety. There could hardly be more convincing justification of the Russian strategy than this, and, although it is not always wise to judge measures by their results, it is only fair to assume that the resources and possibilities of the dockyard were realized by Admiral Alexeiev, and that the chance of the fleet being again in a condition to put to sea made it impossible for him to give up the fortress. But this was not all, for there was the Baltic fleet to be considered, and it must be admitted that if Port Arthur had been able to hold out until the arrival of Admiral Rozhdestvenski in Chinese waters, the difficulty of Admiral Togo's task would have been seriously increased. We know now that the fighting value of that fleet was not great, but although the Tsar's advisers may be justly accused of having hoped for more than it was able to accomplish, they can hardly be blamed for trying to hold Port Arthur until its arrival. These are reasons which have sometimes been overlooked when it has been asserted that Port Arthur should not have been held, and it has been somewhat unfairly assumed that undue importance was attached to the loss of prestige which the abandonment of Port Arthur, and of the commercial harbour of Dalny, would involve.

Granting then that the Russian strategy was correct, were the Japanese well advised in attacking Port Arthur, or should they have concentrated every available man against General Kuropatkin, merely masking the fortress? Again, the real question was not the bricks and mortar, but rather the mobile naval force which had taken shelter under the guns. So long as that force was in a position to assume the offensive with any reasonable chance of success, even granting that the resources of the dockyard were not fully appreciated, the Japanese could not look upon their communications as secure; and until they could do so their land operations must be attended with considerable risk. Moreover, they could not regard the arrival of the Baltic fleet with equanimity, for it was quite possible that the combined fleets might be too strong to be met with any reasonable hope of success. On the sea Japan was acting upon interior lines against the divided forces of her enemy, and it was of the utmost importance that she should make use of her army just as much as of her fleet to turn her position to the best advantage. Even had the difficulties and delays which would be encountered been fully recognized, it is difficult to see that any other course would have been wiser.

Another point now arises. Having decided to attack Port

Arthur, should Japan have allotted every available man to this task, or was she right to attack General Kuropatkin's army at the same time? In considering this fresh question we must remember that the strength of the Russian army was increasing daily, and that time was precious. Undoubtedly, therefore, the correct course was to utilize in active operations elsewhere every man not required to take part in, and to cover, the siege. If the four divisions, which were ultimately required to capture the fortress, had been employed from the first on that duty, instead of two only, there would still have been eight Line divisions and one Guard division (or, deducting the 7th and 8th Divisions which were retained in Japan until after the battle of Liao-yang, seven divisions) available for field operations. Nothing was to be gained by keeping these troops idle, and since, even if there had been no other hostile forces in the field, lack of space would prevent them from being used in the Kuan-tung Peninsula, they must be employed either against General Kuropatkin or possibly against Vladivostok.

At first sight it might appear that the same arguments which justify the siege of Port Arthur apply also to Vladivostok. Up to a point this is no doubt the case, for that harbour also afforded shelter to ships which threatened the Japanese sea communications. At the same time the difference in the degree of importance of the two fortresses was great. In Port Arthur there was a first-class fleet; in Vladivostok there was only a squadron, whose action could not greatly affect the course of the war one way or the other; and the difficulties and loss which would have been entailed by a siege of the latter place would have been out of all proportion to the advantage to be gained. Moreover, the two forces in front of Vladivostok and Port Arthur would have been unable to render one another any assistance, whereas an army advancing against Liao-yang from the south would be in close touch with, and would cover, the troops engaged in the Liao-tung Peninsula. An isolated detachment directed against Vladivostok could only have been justified on the ground that its presence would necessitate the weakening of the Russian field armies, and so long as this result could be attained in any other way, as was the case, the actual landing of troops must have been a mistake. Vladivostok was, therefore, but a side issue, and the Japanese were right in disregarding it, and in concentrating such forces as could be spared from Port Arthur against the second of the two great objectives, the Russian field army. But since the Japanese did not achieve all that they hoped and, although they gained repeated victories, were never in

a position to dictate terms of peace, it might be argued that even this policy was too ambitious. In answer to this objection it has been alleged that the Japanese failed to gain complete success because their movements in the field were over-cautious or at least slow, not because their strategy in council was over-daring. But the primary causes of disappointment were that Port Arthur held out longer than had been expected, and that the Trans-Siberian Railway enabled Russia to place more men in the field than had been thought possible ; with the result that the Japanese were compelled to carry out their enveloping strategy with insufficient numbers. Moreover, the campaign was fought out in a defile, between the mountains to the east and the Liao Ho on the west, which allowed no room for manœuvre and the defences of which had to be carried with heavy loss. It was these factors, accentuated, no doubt, by the lack of cavalry to follow up their victories, which mainly contributed to deprive the Japanese of a complete triumph.

Allowing that the Japanese decision to pursue the double objective was correct when it was formed, it might still be said that after the naval victory of the 10th August the greater part of the besieging forces would have been better employed against General Kuropatkin than against General Stessel. Indeed, the great attack which was made on Port Arthur during the next fortnight was probably undertaken in the threefold hope that the fortress would fall, that the fleet would be finally destroyed, and that the besieging troops would be released to take part in the battle of Liao-yang. Hence this great and costly effort ; and when fifteen thousand Japanese lives had been lost it would have been unwise to relax the siege simply because the fleet had been defeated at sea. With Mafeking fresh in our memories it is not difficult for us to appreciate the sentimental importance which besieged localities assume in war ; an importance which is frequently out of all proportion to their strategical value. The very fact that a great effort had just been repulsed rendered it probable that any withdrawal would have been interpreted in Japan and by the world at large as a confession of failure. Moreover, a peculiar interest was attached to Port Arthur, for every Japanese soldier believed that it had been unjustly wrested from his country by the coalition of certain European Powers in 1895. Be the result of the war what it might in other ways, on one point the mind of the Japanese people was made up, namely, that Port Arthur should become Japanese territory ; and it was realized that when the time should come to make peace, it would greatly strengthen the hands of statesmen if the coveted fortress was already in the

hands of the soldiers and sailors.* But the prime factor was that the Russian fleet was still far from being destroyed and might again become formidable, exactly as had happened on the 23rd June.

Granting then that the Japanese plan of campaign was correct in its broader aspects, we must now examine the problem which arose as soon as the decision to pursue the double objective had been formed, and the duty of capturing Port Arthur had been finally allotted to the Third Army at the beginning of June.

Two courses were open to the Japanese. Either they might advance towards Liao-yang with the definite intention of attacking the Russian army wherever it should be encountered; or, by pressing the siege of Port Arthur, they might endeavour to compel General Kuropatkin to come to its relief, and meet him in battle on ground of their own choosing. To derive the greatest possible advantage from the latter form of warfare, the force which covered the siege would be pushed northward until the enemy was encountered, and would then be able to manœuvre to the rear until the selected battlefield was reached. This course, if successful, would have simplified many difficulties, and at the same time the Japanese would have been able to adopt what has been pronounced by von Moltke to be the strongest form of war, namely, the combination of the strategical offensive with the tactical defensive. In this way the importance of Port Arthur would have been utilized by the Japanese to bring on a decisive battle under circumstances advantageous to themselves, and up to a point therefore they would have been acting in accordance with correct principles. All this would have been to the good, but the first requirement of this form of warfare is that the value attached to the particular locality which is utilized to force on a battle should be so great that there is little room for doubt that the opponent will act as desired. Such conditions are extremely rare, and it is open to question whether in this particular case they were present.† Ample justification existed for defending Port Arthur, but so far as the purely military conditions were involved there was no certainty that General Kuropatkin would have risked a decisive battle for its relief. The strength

* The fortress of Belfort furnishes a parallel case at the conclusion of the Franco-German War of 1870. It was specially excluded from the armistice which preceded the peace, and the negotiations prove clearly that but for the defence under Colonel Denfert-Rochereau it would now be German territory.

† Compare the previous arguments as to Port Arthur. The decision to hold that fortress compelled the Japanese to attack the garrison under unfavourable conditions, and forms a distinct illustration of this principle.

of other influences is more difficult to estimate, but it is possible that the sentimental and commercial interest attached to Port Arthur and Dalny, as well as the more real importance of the fleet, might have outweighed other considerations in the minds of the Russian statesmen. Under such conditions General Kuropatkin's hand might have been forced, and the Japanese might have attained their object by means perhaps less risky than those which they actually adopted. At the same time a defensive attitude must always entail the surrender of some advantage to the enemy. Assuming for the moment that General Kuropatkin could have been induced to conform to the Japanese plan of campaign, he could, to some extent, have selected his own time for doing so; and time was one of the factors in his favour. Moreover, a Japanese advance towards Liao-yang, which offered a good chance of securing a decisive victory before the Russians had concentrated in great numbers, would not preclude the possibility of standing on the defensive tactically if, at any time, a change of policy should seem desirable. For these reasons the more active policy was preferred and an advance from the south was adopted in spite of the fact that the Japanese forces, which only when united would be sufficiently large to encounter the Russian main army with any chance of success, must move in isolated and comparatively small detachments along roads which were separated by intricate and, in places, lofty country.

A considerable amount of dispersion was thus imposed from the start upon the Japanese strategists; a disadvantage which was to some extent obviated by the landing of the 10th Division at Ta-kushan, but still more by the skill with which numbers and intentions were concealed from the enemy. At the same time it was this dispersion which enabled Marshal Oyama to deliver his converging attack upon General Kuropatkin at Liao-yang, a movement which would have met with even greater success had it been possible for the Japanese to make use of the port of Newchuang.* A force disembarked at that point in the beginning of July would have been able to unite with the Second Army at Kai-ping without difficulty, and would have been within easy reach of Liao-yang, but from the naval point of view the risks to be run were great. The Bay of Liao-tung was thickly strewn with mines, the line of communication must pass within fifty miles of Port Arthur, and the landing would undoubtedly be opposed. In these circumstances the

* That General Kuropatkin for some time anticipated a landing on the west coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula is clear from his messages to General Stessel, see p. 156.

Japanese were probably right when they decided that the possible benefit was not sufficient to justify them in incurring the certain dangers to which the troops and transports would be exposed. Speaking generally it may be said that when two courses lay open, the Japanese usually selected that which presented the fewest dangers; a tendency which may perhaps be explained by the facts that the result of the war was far more vital to Japan than to Russia, and that her financial position was less stable.

Unlike Russia, the borrowing power of Japan depended largely upon her military success, not upon her own internal resources, and there was reason to fear that any serious disaster might close the money markets of Europe. In this connexion a comparison of the prices at which the 4^o/_o bonds of the two countries stood at various dates is interesting, as it furnishes an indication of the estimation in which their financial stability was held in Europe, and upon which their borrowing powers were based.

—	Russia.	Japan.	—
5th February, 1904 ...	97	75	Before the outbreak of war.
10th February, 1904 ...	89	66	After the outbreak of war.
4th May, 1904 ...	90	68	After the Ya-lu.
12th August, 1904 ...	91	74	After the defeat of the Russian fleet.
5th September, 1904 ...	91	75	After Liao-yang.
20th October, 1904 ...	92	73	After the Sha Ho.
1st February, 1905 ...	89	79	After the fall of Port Arthur.
15th March, 1905 ...	87	86	After Mukden.
1st June, 1905 ...	88	87	After the battle of the Sea of Japan.
1st September, 1905 ...	94	90	After peace was declared.
23rd April, 1908 ...	83	81	

One point for which, in the absence of any official explanation, it is very difficult to see any justification, is that of the retention of the 7th and 8th Divisions in Japan. Two reasons have been advanced; first, that in the councils of Japan there was a party which did not wish to see the country denuded of troops; secondly, that at this stage of the war it was impossible to supply a greater force than that which was actually employed. If the former explanation be the correct one, then it was a display of human weakness which, however excusable, can hardly be approved; if the latter be correct might not the difficulty have been met by a landing at Newchuang as soon as that port had been occupied by the Second Army? The risk entailed by this course would still have been considerable, but the advantage which must have been gained by bringing these two divisions into

the fighting line at Liao-yang might have justified it; and in either case it is interesting to note that the danger most feared was the disabled and blockaded, but still existing, Russian fleet. The point is of great interest, for in almost every war in which an island power is engaged, a time must come when a choice between danger at sea and danger on land is inevitable. Every such case must, of course, be judged on its own merits, and the decision must depend on the advantage to be gained as well as on the risk to be incurred. So variable are the factors affecting the problem that a correct solution in one case is but little guide for the future.

With these two possible exceptions, the failure to make use of Newchuang and the retention in Japan of the 7th and 8th Divisions, the Japanese strategy would appear to have been well suited to the circumstances; but it possessed the obvious flaw that for some weeks the various forces were liable to defeat in detail. In the narrative an attempt has been made to show how this danger was lessened, partly by concealment and partly by deceiving General Kuropatkin as to the direction from which each successive blow was to fall, and in this connexion the dates of the movements of the various Japanese forces as well as the manner in which each of the three armies was utilized to assist the other two are extremely instructive. But although these movements were correct in conception, it cannot be denied that in execution they were slow. Every day added to the strength of the forces under General Kuropatkin's command; every day the danger of the isolated Japanese groups should have grown greater.

In the foregoing chapters an endeavour has been made to do justice to the difficulties occasioned by want of transport, bad roads, and heavy rains; but the telegrams quoted on pages 231 and 257 seem to place it beyond doubt that the principal cause of the delay was the unexpected reappearance of the Russian fleet on the 23rd June. At the moment when the repaired battleships appeared outside the harbour the First, Fourth, and Second Armies were on the eve of starting their northward march. On the following day the converging movement was suspended, and the three commanders were warned that "the battle at Liao-yang must be postponed until after the rainy season." Of the wisdom of this decision it is impossible for outsiders to judge. The conditions were so complex that it is impossible to reconstruct in imagination the situation as it must have appeared in Tokio; and it is hardly less difficult to avoid being influenced by later events. Put shortly, the problem to be solved was whether the danger of being defeated in detail if the armies moved slowly was, or was

not, greater than the dangers which might arise from more rapid movement. The event may be taken to have justified the deliberation of the Japanese actions, but it may fairly be doubted whether a more enterprising enemy on land would not have been able to derive considerable advantage from the diversion caused by the fleet. It is, however, possible that against such an enemy a different course would have been adopted; for Russian characteristics must have been as carefully studied in Tokio as every other detail of the coming campaign.*

To sum up the preceding remarks, although the Japanese strategy was not crowned with complete success, it was well conceived, and the simultaneous pursuit of the two objectives was correct. At the same time, whether partly from a desire to minimize risks or owing altogether to natural difficulties, the method of executing the plan adopted, as will be seen later, resulted in the Japanese armies being exposed to considerable danger. Having adopted a bold course in going to war at all, the safest plan was to follow it out boldly. Had it been possible to do so it is conceivable that General Kuropatkin's army, not yet fully concentrated, would have been crushed at Liao-yang, and that Japan might have found herself in a position to secure peace on terms considerably more favourable than those to which she finally agreed. Nevertheless, the relentless persistence with which the Japanese carried out their original plan of campaign in the face of difficulties which would have shaken the confidence of less determined men was altogether admirable, and any criticism of Marshal Oyama's campaign must be made in a due spirit of diffidence.

Turning now to the Russians, it is clear that the loss of sea command, which gave the power of the initiative to the Japanese, placed the councillors of the Tsar at a grave disadvantage. The propriety of attempting to hold Port Arthur has already been discussed, and the opinion has been expressed that it was impossible to do otherwise. It is not proposed, therefore, to return to that question here, but merely to discuss the movements of the field armies; and it must be remembered that when the land campaign entered upon its second phase there were two such forces. The Army of the Ussuri under General

* It has been suggested that the cautious nature of the Japanese advance was carefully calculated upon the ground that more rapid movement might induce General Kuropatkin to retire from Liao-yang without fighting a general action. This would mean that the Japanese deliberately allowed their enemy to mass superior numbers against them; a most improbable decision.

Linevich was at Vladivostok, and the Army of Manchuria was distributed along the railway south of Mukden, with the "Eastern Force," which had just been defeated on the Ya-lu, at Feng-huang-cheng. These two armies were independent of one another, but the supreme command in the Far East was still in the hands of the Viceroy Alexeiev.

Before going any further, it will be well to consider what adequate reasons there could have been for maintaining a force of two infantry divisions, and more than twenty squadrons of cavalry in Vladivostok. As soon as the main Russian fleet had been driven into Port Arthur, the whole coast line of Manchuria and Korea was open to attack, and a landing near Vladivostok was at least possible. But by the end of June, at the latest, the Japanese plan of campaign must have become apparent; and from that time onwards it is inconceivable that there was any serious danger of a landing on the east coast. Nothing, indeed, could have been more favourable to the Russians than an isolated operation of this nature, for they would have been in a position to move troops by rail, and to operate against widely separated bodies which would have been unable to render one another any assistance. Part at least of the Vladivostok garrison could well have been spared for active operations under General Kuropatkin, and until some official explanation is forthcoming we must ascribe this dispersal of power to an error of judgment, due probably to the division of responsibility among three commanders. It will not be necessary to make any further reference to the waste of this force at a time when its services would seem to have been urgently required, except to point out that it furnishes another example of the paralysing effect which a fortress sometimes produces upon a field army, and with that we may turn to the study of the principal operations.

At the beginning of May, 1904, the main body of General Kuropatkin's army was in and around Liao-yang, where a large depôt of supplies had been formed. For the moment, at all events, the control of the operations had passed into the hands of the enemy, and General Kuropatkin could but await the next move. In a more highly civilized country, supplied with roads and railways, it would have been open to him to strengthen his "Eastern Force," and perhaps to drive General Kuroki back across the Ya-lu; but in Manchuria this was impossible. The difficulties of supply, which proved so formidable to the Japanese, affected the Russians even more seriously, for their wants were greater, and their organization less complete. Thus General Kuropatkin was not only deprived of

information as to the movements of the Japanese transports at sea, but he was also unable to move large bodies of troops except along the railway. Had the coast-line open to attack been shorter, and the roads better, he would have been able to concentrate in a central position, whence troops could have been dispatched to oppose any threatened landing; but since this was impossible, the only course open to him at first was to adopt a waiting attitude, in the hope that his adversary might give him some more favourable opportunity to assume the offensive. When it is remembered that, in addition to all these disadvantages, he was not supreme even in his own province, it must be acknowledged that the commander of an army has seldom been placed in a more unenviable position. Two advantages, however, he did hold. First, that he was being reinforced daily from Europe; secondly, that unless the Japanese were content to concentrate their efforts against Port Arthur, they must disperse their forces, for it was improbable that they would be able to advance in superior strength by any one line.*

By the beginning of June, the strategical position had become clearer, for the landing of the Second and Fourth Armies, and the operations in the Kuan-tung Peninsula, had disclosed to some extent the Japanese plan of campaign. The Japanese First and Fourth Armies were still too far off for attack, but three other courses were now open to General Kuropatkin. He might advance southward along the railway against the Japanese Second Army; he might retire to Mukden, or even to Harbin; or he might continue to bring his reinforcements to Liao-yang.† The first of these courses had the advantage that if made in sufficient force, the advance might result in the relief of Port Arthur. Against this was the danger of attack from Newchuang

* It should be noted that these arguments apply only to the Russian field army. It is very difficult to see why the mobile troops which formed part of the garrison of Port Arthur should not have been used to oppose the landing of the Japanese Second Army. This operation occupied eight days, during the whole of which time the Japanese 4th Division was in the neighbourhood of Chin-chou, only 25 miles away, and the 7th Division could easily have been brought up from Port Arthur by rail. Apparently the only explanation of this inaction is to be found in the message to General Stessel, quoted on p. 142, by which the responsibility of that officer seems to be confined to opposing the Japanese if they should land south of Nan Shan.

† The course which was actually adopted, when General Stakelberg was dispatched to relieve Port Arthur, was an unfortunate compromise which had nothing to recommend it, and which does not require further consideration than has been given to it in the narrative.

or Kai-ping, to which the right flank would be exposed, as well as the possibility of the advance of the First and Fourth Armies, and to protect so vulnerable a line of communications it would have been necessary to leave strong detachments.

The force at General Kuropatkin's disposal was, therefore, scarcely sufficient to justify him in adopting the first course, but there was much to be said for the second. Every mile that General Kuropatkin moved northward would bring him nearer to his reinforcements, and would tend, however slightly, to relieve the railway. At the same time the distance which the Japanese had to march from Korea, or from the south of Manchuria, would be increased, and the difficulty of bringing up their supplies would be proportionately greater. Moreover, each mile that he retired would release men from the communications to take their places in the fighting line, and would have exactly the reverse effect upon the enemy. Thus there was considerable inducement to retire, but if he were to do so the Japanese field armies would be able to unite in the plains round Liao-yang, and the force besieging Port Arthur would be freed from all danger of interruption.

Throughout June and the greater part of July, therefore, there was no urgent reason either to adopt an offensive policy or to fall back from Liao-yang, but towards the end of the latter month the position had again changed, and the balance of strategical advantage had passed to General Kuropatkin. On the 20th July, the XVIIth Army Corps had begun to arrive from Europe,* and General Kuropatkin at last felt himself strong enough to assume the offensive. By this date, also, the Japanese advance had brought all three armies to within striking distance of Liao-yang, and since it was no longer necessary for the Russians to move far from the railway the difficulty of supply had solved itself.

At this date the Japanese First Army was between the Hsi Ho and the Lan Ho, with the 12th Division scarcely twenty-five miles from Liao-yang. The Fourth Army was south of the Fen-shui Ling only twenty-five miles from the railway at Hai-cheng. The Second Army was on the railway south of Ta-shih-chiao. Between the Second and the Fourth Armies there was a gap of twenty-five miles, and between the Fourth and the First Armies there lay nearly fifty miles of mountainous country. In numbers General Kuropatkin was superior to his enemy and all

* One brigade of this corps, the 2nd Brigade of the 35th Division, had been in Manchuria since the beginning of the war.

three Japanese armies were open to attack.* This, presumably, was the opportunity for which General Kuropatkin had waited so long, but when it came to him he failed to take advantage of it. The main question to be decided was at which point a tactical

* A comparison of the Russian and Japanese infantry available for field operations, *i.e.*, exclusive of the troops in Liao-yang and Pen-hsi-hu, on the 20th July gives the following results:—

	Russians.			Japanese.		
	Corps.	Divisions.	No. of Battalions.	Divisions.	No. of Battalions.	
Eastern Group	Xth ... } 3rd Siberian }	9th Infantry	16	Guard 2nd 12th <i>Kobi</i> troops. (These 5 battalions were at the battle of Yu-shu Ling, see Appendix K.)	12	} First Army.
		31st Infantry	8		12	
		3rd E.S.R.	12		5	
		6th E.S.R.	12		12	
10th <i>Kobi</i>	5					
Southern Group	1st Siberian } 2nd Siberian } 4th Siberian } Xth ... } XVIIth ... }	1st E.S.R.	12	10th	12	} Fourth Army.
		9th E.S.R.	12	10th <i>Kobi</i>	6	
		5th E.S.R.	12	Brigade.		} Second Army.
		2nd Siberian Infantry	16	3rd	12	
		3rd Siberian Infantry	16	4th	12	
		31st Infantry	8	5th	12	
35th Infantry.	16	6th	12			
Total ...	—	—	140	—	107	

Taking Russian battalions at 700 rifles and Japanese at 800, this gives total strengths of infantry as 98,000 and 85,600 respectively. The 1st Siberian Infantry Division and the 3rd Infantry Division have not been taken into account as they were on the lines of communication south of Mukden, but 5 battalions from these divisions were in Pen-hsi-hu, and could have taken part in the battle of Yu-shu Ling. Similarly any *Kobi* troops which may have been on the Japanese lines of communication are not taken into account, nor are their numbers known, though they were certainly inferior to those of the Russians. The 5th Siberian Corps and the 1st Corps had both been ordered to the front, but General Kuropatkin could not reckon on receiving any further reinforcements before the very end of August. In lectures delivered at the Staff College in St. Petersburg the distribution of Russian troops "in the second half of July" is given as:—

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.
Eastern Group	59	77	158
Southern Group	84	65	254
Reserve in Liao-yang	20	—	96

success would produce the greatest strategical result, and which consequently would have the greatest effect upon the campaign. Nothing decisive could be hoped from a defeat of the Fourth Army which was still very weak, and the real choice lay between the First and the Second Armies. General Kuropatkin selected the First Army. Was he right in doing so?

The arguments in favour of the course which was adopted were that General Kuroki's army directly threatened the Russian line of communication with Mukden as to the safety of which General Kuropatkin was extremely sensitive; that that army was the nearest hostile force to Liao-yang; that General Liubavin's cavalry and the garrison of Pen-hsi-hu were very well placed for operations against General Kuroki's right. The principal argument against this line was that, even in the event of victory, the difficulties of supply and transport would prevent the Russians from following up the retreating enemy to any great distance from the railway. In these circumstances no success against General Kuroki could be so decisive as to leave the Russian commander free to deal with General Oku.

The conditions in favour of operating against the Second Army were that the railway would facilitate the massing and feeding of superior numbers; that a victory in this quarter could be followed up with comparative ease; that if the Second Army were driven back to any distance, the First and Fourth Armies would be forced to retire. On the other hand any attack against the Second Army must from the nature of the country have been almost purely frontal, and in spite of the facilities for bringing up men afforded by the railway, tactical success might have been more difficult of attainment than against the First Army. In this connexion it should also be remembered that the mountainous country east of Liao-yang was much more favourable to the holding operations, which must be the complement of any offensive action of the kind now being considered, than was the comparatively open ground near the railway. For these reasons the balance of argument appears to be in favour of an attack against General Oku rather than against General Kuroki. *at it whichever* course was decided upon the essential condition of success was that it should be followed out with the utmost thoroughness.

Passing now to the execution of General Kuropatkin's plan, it has been shown in Chapter XVII that the delay of five days, from the 24th to the 29th July, permitted General Kuroki to complete his preparations for a counter-attack, but the breakdown of the Russian strategy was largely due to the failure of the holding operations in front of General Oku, which were

entrusted to General Zarubaiev. The orders to that officer are therefore of great interest.*

In order No. 6258, issued on the 11th July, General Zarubaiev was instructed that "considering the disadvantages of the Ta-shih-chiao positions, and of fighting on them, the troops of the 1st East Siberian Corps and the 4th Siberian Corps are to concentrate at Hai-cheng." This order went on to say, "I propose that the corps begin this retreat not otherwise than under strong pressure of the leading divisions of the enemy upon our rear guards." Again on the 22nd July, General Kuropatkin's orders to General Zarubaiev were, "If the enemy deploys superior force for attack, then the corps are to retreat fighting to Hai-cheng."

Evidently it was to these orders that General Stakelberg referred in the message to General Zarubaiev which is given in Chapter XV (p. 207), and from them it is clear that General Kuropatkin did not contemplate a serious engagement at Ta-shih-chiao, but rather a series of delaying actions and a gradual retirement to Hai-cheng. Instead of carrying out these orders General Zarubaiev stayed longer than was necessary in his positions and then retired forty miles to An-shan-chan. The reasons for this unnecessarily rapid withdrawal were, first that the troops belonging to the XVIIth Corps which had been concentrated south of Hai-cheng were withdrawn to Liao-yang when the Xth Corps was sent against General Kuroki; secondly, the Japanese success at Hsi-mu-cheng on the 31st July. In these circumstances it is only fair to General Kuropatkin to point out that, although the wisdom of his strategy in moving the Xth Corps against the Japanese First Army may be open to doubt he was entitled to expect more effective co-operation from General Zarubaiev than he received, unless indeed that officer was acting under fresh orders which have not yet become known.

These then are the principal points which it will be well to consider, and if the foregoing remarks upon the Russian strategy are justified it would appear that:—

- (1) To retain the whole of the Army of the Ussuri round Vladivostok later than the end of June was a mistake.
- (2) The loss of command of the sea left the commander on land no choice but to remain strategically on the defensive, until the situation should develop.

* It is not certain that General Kuropatkin even meant to do more than look out for a favourable opportunity to attack the First Army. The only thing that seems clear is that any plan for offensive action which he may have formed was abandoned when he heard of the retirement from Ta-shih-chiao.

- (3) In the meanwhile the best place to concentrate was at Liao-yang;* but should events prove that the Japanese could not be prevented from concentrating superior numbers at that point, a retirement, without fighting a decisive battle, would probably have been desirable.
- (4) The failure of the Russian offensive was due, in the first place, to the waste of five days from the 24th July, during which the cavalry was trying to obtain definite information about the Japanese First Army; and in the second place to the conduct of the holding operations in front of the Second Army.

Doubtless much more might be written, for the vast output of literature which follows every modern campaign shows clearly that in military criticism there is no finality; but in the course of a brief chapter the most that can be attempted is to indicate some of the possibilities, and to leave the details to be followed up with map and compass by those who wish to do so.

Compared with the great battles which occurred later in the war, the actions which are described in this volume sink to insignificance. The present is, therefore, hardly a suitable period at which to discuss the tactics of either combatant at any length; yet it may not be out of place to draw attention to a few of the more salient features.

In Chapter XVII an attempt has been made to show how all General Rennenkampf's endeavours to penetrate the Japanese outpost line were checked, how exaggerated rumours were constantly received at Liao-yang, and how when the cavalry failed to discover the truth, Count Keller, with his infantry, strove to do so. But it is not difficult to account for the failure of the Russian cavalry in the eastern portion of the theatre of operations. The country was most unsuitable for mounted action; large bodies could be always checked by well posted infantry, and, at the same time, the Cossacks were practically untrained to act on foot, or in small bodies. The absence of mountain artillery was another heavy handicap; and the attack on the Mo-tien Ling, on the 17th July, by infantry unsupported by guns, is but an instance of the difficulty from which the Russian "Eastern Force" suffered. Great as they were, these disadvantages were still further accentuated by the faulty system under which Count Keller and General Rennenkampf each held an independent

* From what has been said above regarding Major-General Flug's report upon "The Strategical Distribution of the Manchurian Army," it is evident that neither praise nor blame for the choice of Liao-yang as the place of concentration of the Russian forces can be accorded to any individual.

command. Acting separately, neither was sufficiently strong to achieve anything against the forces opposed to him; acting together their chances would have been more than doubled. Even as things were it would not have been unreasonable to expect some degree of co-operation between two forces separated by only a few miles of country, but the effect of the independence of the two commanders was clearly exemplified on the 23rd June, when General Rennenkampf started to reconnoitre towards Sai-ma-chi just two days after Count Keller had returned from his fruitless expedition towards Feng-huang-cheng.

The failure of the Russian cavalry, in spite of superior numbers, may with advantage be compared with the action of General Akiyama's brigade, covering the Second Army under General Oku, who was always well informed of the enemy's movements. That the action of the Japanese cavalry elsewhere was not equally effective was due, not to the inferiority of the horses, nor to the small numbers available, as has so often been stated, but rather, as has been pointed out by an Austrian writer,* to faulty organization. At the outbreak of war the Japanese had one Guard cavalry regiment, and sixteen cavalry regiments of the line. Of these, thirteen regiments were attached to the infantry divisions, and the remaining four were formed into two weak cavalry brigades. Thus rather more than three-quarters of the available mounted troops were tied to the infantry, a wasteful practice to which may be ascribed the tendency to over-estimate the numbers of the Russians in front of the First and Fourth Armies. One or two squadrons should have been sufficient to retain with each division, and had this economy been effected a considerable number of men would have been released for the work of exploration.

While on the subject of cavalry, a point in connexion with the battle of Te-li-ssu is certainly worthy of note. In that battle General Stakelberg was surprised by the attack of the Japanese 4th Division against his right; that is to say that he was surprised from the flank upon which the bulk of his cavalry was posted. It has been stated that a report of the Japanese turning movement was sent in from the cavalry and was duly received by an officer on the staff of the 1st Siberian Army Corps at 9.30 p.m. on the 14th June, but that General Stakelberg was not informed. The actual facts, however, seem to be as follows:—

The 5th Sotnia of the 5th Siberian Cossack Regiment was in Fu-chou, where a heliograph station had been established. About

* Count Wrangel, *The Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War*.

8 a.m. on the 14th June, a detachment of Japanese cavalry appeared before the town, followed a little later by about two and a half squadrons. After exchanging shots, the sotnia, fearing that it might be surrounded, retired and was followed by the Japanese. Owing to fog the heliograph could not be worked and a report of the event was sent to General Stakelberg by an orderly. The sotnia spent the night in a pass twenty miles north-west of Fu-chou (whereas the distance from that city to the right of the Russian position was only fifteen miles) and rejoined the main body of the cavalry on the following morning. Whether General Stakelberg received the report from the commander of the sotnia or not, and if received, the hour of its arrival, are questions which have not yet been settled. At the same time, the report is said to have contained information as to the approach of the three squadrons of cavalry only.

It was not until 6.20 a.m. on the 15th June that General Samsonov reported from Lung-kou that a force of "about one regiment of infantry with mountain artillery was on the heights west of Ta-fang-shen." In a later report, sent in at 9.30 a.m., General Samsonov estimated the strength of the force advancing against the Russian right flank at about one brigade of infantry with thirty-two guns, and added, "It seems that these are fresh troops as their direction is from Wa-fang-tien."

With regard to the other arms there is little to be said at present, but before dismissing the subject there are two points which may be noted. First, there is the gradual change which came over the tactics of the Russian artillery, exemplified by the action of the 2nd and 3rd Batteries of the 1st Siberian Corps at Ta-shih-chiao. Taught by the experience of Te-li-ssu, these two batteries used indirect fire for the first time, and remained in action all day against the greatly superior artillery of the enemy. Their longer ranging weapon gave them a great advantage over the Japanese batteries, which were compelled to take up their positions in the open; and once they had done so their mobility was gone, for the teams could never again be brought up to the guns. Elsewhere on the battlefield the same tactics could not be pursued, for to the east the broken nature of the ground enabled the attacking columns to approach under cover comparatively close to the Russian position. Here the defenders found it necessary to use direct laying, but on their right where the ground was unfavourable for an infantry attack, the indirect method, against artillery alone, met with great success.

The second and last point of note is the bold handling of the Japanese reserves. It is remarkable that in every action which

has been described, except that at Hsi-mu-cheng, almost all the reserves were thrust into the fighting line at a very early stage. This is the more noteworthy since it shows a great power of detecting and turning to advantage a weak spot in the enemy's armour, namely, his inability to organize a scientific counter-attack on a large scale.

At a time like the present, when tactical opinion on the continent of Europe is divided into two distinct schools, nothing could have been more instructive from the point of view of the student than to see an enveloping attack on the new system (*i.e.*, practically without reserves with which to meet emergencies) met by a well organized counter-stroke, and the result fought out under equal conditions of training and leadership. Instances are not wanting in the history of past wars of decisive victory being gained by a vigorous, timely, and well directed counter-offensive; and it may safely be said that there is nothing in the Russo-Japanese war to prove that similar methods will be less effective in the future. On the other hand, nothing is more certain than that a counter-attack insufficiently prepared has little chance of success. The battle of Te-li-ssu furnished the only attempt, in the earlier part of the war, at a movement of the nature indicated, and the lessons to be learnt from it, though valuable, are inconclusive. Had General Stakelberg's orders been clearer, and had the co-operation between Generals Gerngross and Glasko been closer, the effect produced would have been different; at the same time there is no convincing evidence to show that the result of the battle would have been altered.

In many other respects these earlier actions are interesting, and the comparatively small numbers with which they were fought render them, perhaps, more important to us as a nation, than battles like Liao-yang, the Sha Ho, and Mukden. But as the account of the war proceeds more suitable opportunities for tactical discussions will arise, and for the present nothing further need be said.

APPENDIX A.

STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN TROOPS IN THE FAR EAST, *i.e.*, EAST OF LAKE BAIKAL, IN FEBRUARY, 1904.

(See Strategic Map I.)

The troops in these tables have been classified as follows :—

Field Troops.—Troops which form the first line available for field operations.

Fortress Troops.—Troops specially organized for service in the fortress to which they are allotted.

Railway Troops.—Troops employed in the construction of the railway line.

Frontier Guards.—The special force of all arms whose primary duty was to guard the railway, but which was also available for service in the field.

A.—*Field Troops.*

Although the established war strength of a battalion of infantry and a squadron is about 1,000 rifles and 155 sabres, at no period of the war were these units up to their full numbers. If the average combatant strength of an infantry battalion be taken at 700, and that of a squadron at 120, the field troops may be summarized as follows :—

Infantry.	Battalions.	Estimated Strength.
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th East Siberian Rifle Brigades	48	33,600
7th* East Siberian Rifle Brigade	12	8,400
8th* East Siberian Rifle Brigade	8	5,600
9th† East Siberian Rifle Brigade	12	8,400
2nd Brigade,‡ 31st Infantry Division (Xth Army Corps)	8	5,600
2nd Brigade,‡ 35th Infantry Division (XVIIth Army Corps)	8	5,600
1st§ Siberian (Reserve) Infantry Brigade ...	4	2,800
Total Infantry	100	70,000

* These brigades had been recently formed from the fortress infantry regiments of Port Arthur and Vladivostok respectively. They were intended for the mobile defence of the fortresses of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, but were not to form part of the field armies.

† The formation of this brigade was carried out, during the period of mobilization, by means of drafts from European Russia. The four regiments composing this brigade were not completed before the 18th February.

‡ These brigades, with part of their artillery, were moved to the Far East during the latter half of 1903.

§ This brigade (consisting of the 1st Strietensk, 2nd Chita, 3rd Nerchinsk

Cavalry.	Squadrons.	Estimated Strength.
Primorsk Dragoon Regiment	6	720
1st Nerchinsk Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment ...	6	720
1st Chita Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment ...	6	720
1st Argun Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment ...	6	720
1st Verkhne - Udinsk Trans - Baikal Cossack Regiment	6	720
Amur Cossack Division	3	360
Ussuri Cossack Division*	2	240
Total Cavalry	35	4,200

* These squadrons expanded into six squadrons on mobilization. It is not known to what extent this expansion was completed in the early days of February.

Artillery.	Batteries.	Estimated Strength.	Guns.
1st East Siberian Artillery Brigade	8*	2,120	64
2nd East Siberian Artillery Brigade	4	984	32
Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery	2	476	12
East Siberian Rifle Artillery Division	3	783	24
Trans-Baikal Artillery Division ...	2	521	16
31st Artillery Brigade	3	783	24
35th Artillery Brigade	3	783	24
Total Artillery	25	6,450	196

* Two of these were mountain batteries.

Engineers.	Companies.	Estimated Strength.
1st and 2nd East Siberian Sapper Battalions ...	8	1,612
3rd East Siberian Sapper Battalion*	4	808
Kuan-tung Sapper Company	1	280
Total Engineers	13	2,700

* Formed on 14th February.

and 4th Verkhne-Udinsk battalions) would, on mobilization, expand into a division of 16 battalions, having an estimated strength of 14,000 men. In view of the large number of reservists required to complete the war establishment, it is probable that this brigade did not complete its mobilization and expansion until considerably later. This view is confirmed by the fact that the division formed by this brigade was at Harbin at the end of April, and only reached Mukden in May, notwithstanding the urgent need for troops at the front.

Summary of Field Troops.	Estimated Strength.
Infantry.—100 Battalions	70,000 rifles, with 8 machine guns.
Cavalry.—35 Squadrons	4,200 sabres.
Artillery.—25 Batteries	6,450 men, with 196 guns.
Engineers.—13 Companies	2,700
Total Field Troops	83,350 men, with 196 guns.

B.—*Fortress Troops.*

Infantry.	Battalion.	Estimated Strength.
Nikolaievsk Fortress Infantry Battalion... ..	1	1,150

Artillery.	Companies.	Estimated Strength.
Port Arthur Fortress Artillery Regt. (2 Battalions)	8	2,620
Vladivostok Fortress Artillery Regt. (2 Battalions)	8	2,620
Nikolaievsk Fortress Artillery Company	1	392
Possiet Bay Fortress Artillery Detachment	1	327
Total Fortress Artillery	18	5,959

Engineers.	Companies.	Estimated Strength.
Vladivostok Fortress Sapper and Mining Company	1	236
Vladivostok Submarine Mining Company	1	165
Nikolaievsk Submarine Mining Company	1	88
Novokievskoe (Possiet Bay) Submarine Mining Company	1	88
Total Fortress Engineers	4	577

C.—*Railway Troops.*

	Companies.	Estimated Strength.
Ussuri Railway Brigade—1st and 2nd Ussuri Railway Battalions	8	3,655
Trans-Amur Railway Brigade—4 Battalions ...	16	7,776
Total Railway Troops	24	11,431

D.—*Frontier Guards.*

On the lines of communication and guarding the railway.	Estimated Strength.
Infantry.—55 Companies	13,750 men.
Cavalry.—55 Squadrons	8,250 „
Artillery.—6 Batteries	1,440 „ with 48 guns.
Total Frontier Guards... ..	23,440 „ with 48 guns.

The troops enumerated above in detail may be summarized as follows :—

	Estimated Strength.	Guns.
A.—Field troops	83,350	196
B.—Fortress troops	7,686	—
C.—Railway troops	11,431	—
D.—Frontier Guards	23,440	48
Estimated combatant strength of the Russian troops present, or in process of formation, east of Lake Baikal at the beginning of February, 1904.	125,907*	244 horse, field and mountain guns. 8 machine guns.

* This number includes 13,849 artillery men and 3,277 sappers.

The above force would be accompanied by some 16,000 to 17,000 non-combatants, forming an integral part of the troops, who, though not increasing the fighting strength, must be included in the ration strength of the army.

APPENDIX B.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES IN MANCHURIA (EXCLUSIVE OF THE KUAN-TUNG PENINSULA)
AT THE END OF APRIL, 1904.

Locality and Commander.	Troops.	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Remarks.
MANCHURIAN ARMY.					
Commander-in-Chief : General Kuropatkin.					
I.— <i>Southern Group.</i>					
Lieut.-General Stakelberg.					
1. Newchuang (Major-General Kondratovitch)	33rd and 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiments	6	—	—	¹ 2nd squadron. ² 2nd and 4th batteries. ³ For the defence of the fort at Newchuang. They were mostly old guns of various types. ⁴ 1st squadron. ⁵ 1st and 3rd batteries.
	Primorsk Dragoon Regiment	—	1 ¹	—	
	9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade	—	—	16 ²	
	Guns ³	—	—	14	
	34th and 35th East Siberian Rifle Regiments	6	—	—	
	Primorsk Dragoon Regiment	—	—	—	
	9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade	—	1 ⁴	—	
			—	—	
			—	16 ⁵	
			—	—	
2. Kai-ping—Pu-lan-tien (Major-General Zulkov)					

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES IN MANCHURIA AT THE END OF APRIL, 1904—*continued*.

Locality and Commander.	Troops.	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns	Remarks.
<i>II.—Eastern Group—continued.</i>					
Po-te-tien-tzu ...	11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ... 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ... 6th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade ...	$\frac{1}{4}$ ²² 2 ²⁵	—	—	²⁷ 1st and 3rd battalions. ²⁸ 1st and 3rd battalions. ²⁹ 3rd battery.
Ching-kou ...	22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ... 6th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade ...	1 ²⁵	—	6 ²⁴	³⁰ This detachment left An-ping Ho on 29th April, and retired up the valley of the An-ping River towards Hung-shih-la.
Tien-tzu ...	9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ... 11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ... 3rd East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade ...	$\frac{1}{4}$ ²⁷ 2 ²⁸	—	2 ²⁶	³¹ 10th company. ³² 1st battalion.
4. An - ping Ho Detachment ³⁰ (Colonel Lechitski)	10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ... 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ... Ussuri Cossack Regiment ... 1st East Siberian Mountain Battery	$\frac{1}{4}$ ³¹ 1 ³²	—	8 ²⁹	³³ 1st and 2nd squadrons. ³⁴ 3rd, 4th and 5th squadrons. ³⁵ 5th squadron.
Pu-hsi Ho Detachment (Colonel Kartsev)	Ussuri Cossack Regiment ... Ussuri Cossack Regiment ... 1st Argun Cossack Regiment ... 1st Argun Cossack Regiment ...	—	2 ³³	—	The other half - squadron was detained on the line of communication, An - tung—Feng-huang-cheng, as postal orderlies. Colonel Trukhin was under the orders of Colonel Kartsev.
Kuan - tien - cheng (Colonel Trukhin)	24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ... 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ... 2nd Chita Cossack Regiment ...	$\frac{1}{3}$ ³⁷ 3	—	2 (mountain)	³⁷ 5th and 6th companies. They were retained as a garrison for that city.
4. Feng-huang-cheng ...	3rd East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade ...	—	4 ³⁸	—	³⁸ These 4 squadrons had reached Feng-huang-cheng on 29th April.
5. <i>En route from Liao-yang to join the Eastern Group</i>	6th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade ...	—	—	8 ³⁹	³⁹ 4th battery.
				8 ⁴⁰	⁴⁰ 4th battery.

III.—Army Reserve.

1. Hai-chen	18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	2 ⁴¹	—	—	41 1st and 3rd battalions.
(4182)	...	17th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	42 2nd and 3rd battalions.
2. An-shan-chan	19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	43 The other two guns were with Major-General Kossakovski, on the Liao Ho.
	...	20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	2 ⁴²	—	—	44 2nd battalion, employed on road-mending.
	...	5th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade	—	—	32	45 1st battalion, on lines of communication.
	...	2nd Chita Cossack Regiment	—	1	—	46 On line of communication.
	...	2nd Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	47 3rd battalion, on road-mending.
	...	2nd Nerchinsk Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	48 7th company, on road-mending.
	...	2nd Argun Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	49 4th battalion, on road-mending.
	...	3rd and 4th Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Batteries	—	—	12	50 3rd battalion.
	...	123rd Koslov Regiment	3	—	—	51 1st 2nd, 6th and 7th companies.
	...	124th Voronej Regiment	3	—	—	52 Belonging to the 4th battery.
	...	139th Morshansk Regiment	3	—	—	53 This detachment was for the personal protection of the Viceroy Alexeiev, and was not under General Kuropatkin's orders.
	...	140th Zarsk Regiment	3	—	—	
4. Liao-yang	Amur Cossack Regiment	—	1 ^{1/2}	—	
	...	2nd Chita Cossack Regiment	—	1	—	
	...	31st Artillery Brigade	—	—	22 ⁴³	
	...	35th Artillery Brigade	—	—	24	

IV.—Troops Employed on Special Duties.

1. Between Hsin-yen and Hai - cheng	...	18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	1 ⁴⁴	—	—	54 Consisting of:—1st Strietensk Regiment (2 battalions), 2nd Chita Infantry Regiment (4 battalions), 3rd Nerchinsk Regiment (4 battalions, <i>en route</i> from Trans-Barkalia), 4th Verkhne-Udinsk Infantry Regiment (4
2. Between Liao-yang and Feng-huang-cheng	...	20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	1 ⁴⁵	—	—	
3. East Fen-shui Ling	...	3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment	4 ⁴⁶	—	—	
4. Mo-tien Ling	...	140th Zarsk Regiment	1 ⁴⁷	—	—	
	...	24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	4 ⁴⁸	—	—	
	...	124th Voronej Regiment	1 ⁴⁹	—	—	
	...	139th Morshansk Regiment	1 ⁵⁰	—	—	

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES IN MANCHURIA AT THE END OF APRIL, 1904—*continued*.

Locality and Commander.	Troops.	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Remarks.
V.— <i>Other Troops.</i>					
1. On the Liao Ho, between Tien-chuang-tai and Hsin-min-tun, with head-quarters at Ta-wan (Major-General Kossakowski)	123rd Koslov Regiment ... Amur Cossack Regiment ... 31st Artillery Brigade	3½	—	battalions). This force was retained as a special reserve in Harbin, at the specific request of the Viceroy, without the consent of General Kuropatkin. It was intended as a reinforcement to South Manchuria, or to Vladivostok, as occasion might arise.
2. Mukden ⁵³ ...	1st Strietensk Infantry Regiment Amur Cossack Regiment	—	2 ⁵²	
3. Harbin ...	1st Siberian Infantry Division ⁵⁴ Amur Cossack Regiment	—	—	
4. Hsing-ching ...	1st Siberian Artillery Brigade ... Amur Cossack Regiment	—	32	
5. Upper Ya-lu ...	Ussuri Cossack Regiment	...	1½	—	

NOTE.—*The Engineer Troops* (1st, 2nd and 3rd East Siberian Sapper Battalions), consisting of 9 sapper companies, 2½ telegraph companies, and 2 pontoon companies, and the *Frontier Guards* have not been included in this table; they were scattered about the country in small detachments. For the troops in the Kuan-tung Peninsula and Ussuri District, see Appendix C.

APPENDIX D.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE JAPANESE FIRST ARMY AT THE YA-LU.

General Officer Commanding : General Baron Kuroki.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Fuji.

Commander of Artillery : Colonel Matsumoto.

Commander of Engineers : Major-General T. Kodama.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
GUARD DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant - General Baron Hasegawa.				
1st Guard Brigade, Major-General N. Asada.				
1st Guard Regiment 	3	—	—	—
2nd Guard Regiment 	3	—	—	—
2nd Guard Brigade, Major-General A. Watanabe.				
3rd Guard Regiment 	3	—	—	—
4th Guard Regiment 	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
Guard Cavalry Regiment 	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
Guard Artillery Regiment (field guns)... ...	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
Guard Engineer Battalion 	—	—	—	3

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

---	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
2nd DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Nishi.				
3rd Brigade, Major-General M. Matsunaga.				
4th Regiment 	3	—	—	—
29th Regiment 	3	—	—	—
15th Brigade, Major-General S. Okasaki.				
16th Regiment 	3	—	—	—
30th Regiment 	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
2nd Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
2nd Artillery Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
2nd Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3
12th DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Inouye.				
12th Brigade, Major-General N. Sasaki.				
14th Regiment 	3	—	—	—
47th Regiment 	3	—	—	—
23rd Brigade, Major-General Kigoshi.				
24th Regiment 	3	—	—	—
46th Regiment 	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
12th Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
12th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns) ...	—	—	36	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ENGINEERS.				
12th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3
CORPS ARTILLERY.				
5 Howitzer batteries (4.72-in. Krupp)	—	—	20	—
Total	36	9	128	9

Note.—The strength of a battalion of infantry may be taken at about 800, and of a squadron of cavalry at about 140.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN EASTERN FORCE AT THE YA-LU.

General Officer Commanding : Lieutenant-General Zasulich (commanding
2nd Siberian Army Corps).

Chief of the Staff : Colonel Oranovski.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
3RD EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Kashtalinski.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Mardanov.				
9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Stolitsa.				
11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
12th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
Machine Gun Company, attached to 9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	—	—	8	—
ARTILLERY.				
3rd East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Colonel Shwerin.				
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Batteries	—	—	24	—
6TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Trusov.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Yatsuinin.				
21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Krichinski.				
23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
6th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Colonel Meister.				
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Batteries... ..	—	—	24	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ENGINEERS.				
2nd Company, 2nd East Siberian Sapper Battalion	—	—	—	1
CAVALRY.				
Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade, Major-General Mishchenko.				
1st Verkhne-Udinsk Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
1st Chita Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
<i>Attached.</i>				
1st Argun Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
Ussuri Cossack Regiment	—	5	—	—
1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Battery ...	—	—	6	—
1st East Siberian Mountain Battery ...	—	—	8	—
Total	24	24	62	1

The total combatant strength of this force amounted to about 21,000 men, of which the infantry was nearly 17,000.

Note.—All of the above force was not present on the Ya-lu on the 1st May, 1904.

2 $\frac{1}{2}$ battalions of the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment were in the neighbourhood of Ta-ku Shan.

The 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment left Liao-yang for the Ya-lu on the 30th April.

Five companies of the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and one company of the 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment were on the line of communication.

The 1st Verkhne-Udinsk and 1st Chita Cossack Regiments were engaged in watching the coast from the mouth of the Ya-lu westward, and with them were a horse battery and a battery of field guns.

The mountain battery with the Russian troops at Chang-tien-cheng (see p. 79) was the 1st East Siberian Mountain Battery, transferred from Major-General Mishchenko's force and replaced by the 1st/6th Battery.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF THE YA-LU.

Japanese.

The following statement is from Japanese sources, and includes losses from the 26th April to 1st May.

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total Losses.		
Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Grand Total.
5	198	33	775	—	10	38	983	1,021

An Austrian authority gives the losses by divisions as shown in the table below. It will be noticed that there is a discrepancy of 49 between the two statements.

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.		Total Losses.		
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Grand Total.
Guard Division ...	1	25	7	146	8	171	179
2nd „ ...	1	90	14	352	15	442	457
12th „ ...	3	48	8	375	11	423	434
	5	163	29	873	34	1,036	1,070

Russian.

The statement given below is a compilation from two Russian tables of losses, and is greatly at variance with the computation of the Japanese, who assert that up to the 7th May they buried 1,363 Russian dead. The Japanese estimate agrees more nearly with a less detailed Russian report, which gives the losses as 1,400 killed, and 1,100 wounded, and 600 missing.

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total Losses.		Grand Total.
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	
Staff	1	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	2
9th Regiment ...	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
10th " ...	—	3	—	9	—	—	—	12	12
11th " ...	14	209	15	392	—	281	29	882	911
12th " ...	11	277	10	434	2	212	23	923	946
22nd " ...	—	23	4	152	—	144	4	319	323
Artillery Staff ...	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	—	2
2nd/6th Battery ...	2	32	1	39	—	27	3	98	101
3rd/6th " ...	—	8	1	17	—	15	1	40	41
3rd/3rd " ...	3	24	2	58	—	—	5	82	87
Machine Gun Co. ...	1	16	1	38	—	—	2	54	56
2nd/2nd Sapper Co.	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	1	2
	33	592	38	1,140	2	679	73	2,411	2,484

The 3rd/3rd Battery had 84 per cent. of its horses disabled and an almost similar loss befell the 2nd/6th Battery.

The Machine Gun Company had twenty-two out of twenty-four horses disabled.

APPENDIX E.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE JAPANESE SECOND ARMY AT NAN SHAN, 26TH MAY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : General Baron Oku.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Ochiai.

Commander of Artillery : Major-General Saisho.

Commander of Engineers : Colonel Abe.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
1ST DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General H.I.H. Prince Fushimi.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Matsumura.				
1st Regiment	3	—	—	—
15th Regiment	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Nakamura.				
2nd Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
3rd Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
1st Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
1st Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
1st Battalion	—	—	—	3
3RD DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Y. Oshima.				
5th Brigade, Major-General K. Yamaguchi.				
6th Regiment	3	—	—	—
33rd Regiment	3	—	—	—
17th Brigade, Major-General J. Kodama.				
18th Regiment	3	—	—	—
34th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
3rd Regiment... ..	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
3rd Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
3rd Battalion	—	—	—	3

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
4TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ogawa.				
7th Brigade, Major-General Nishijima.				
8th Regiment	3	—	—	—
37th Regiment	3	—	—	—
19th Brigade, Major-General Ando.				
9th Regiment	3	—	—	—
38th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
4th Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
4th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
4th Battalion	—	—	—	3
CORPS ARTILLERY.				
1st Artillery Brigade, Major-General Uchiyama.				
13th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
14th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
15th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
Total ...	36	9	216	9
To the above total must be added—				
5th Engineer Battalion (of the 5th Division)	—	—	—	3
Total ...	36	9	216	12
From the above total must be deducted—*				
3RD DIVISION.				
34th Regiment	3	—	—	—
3rd Cavalry Regiment	—	2	—	—
3rd Artillery Regiment	—	—	18	—
4TH DIVISION.				
37th Regiment (3rd Battalion)	1	—	—	—
38th Regiment (2nd Battalion)	1	—	—	—
4th Cavalry Regiment	—	2	—	—
Total ...	31	5	198	12

Total combatant strength all ranks about 38,500, of which about 29,500 would be infantry. The Japanese state that the number of bayonets present on their side at this battle was between 30,000 and 31,000.

* The units of the Second Army not present at the battle were attached to the 5th Division, which, with the 1st Cavalry Brigade, was covering the Second Army from the north. The 3rd Battalion, 37th Regiment, was, however, in Korea, having two companies at Seoul—one at Fusan, and one at Gensan.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN FORCE AT NAN SHAN, 26TH MAY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : Major-General Fock (commanding 4th East Siberian Rifle Division).

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Machine Gun Companies.
4TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.					1
Commander : Major-General Fock.					(8 guns.)
1st Brigade, Major-General André de Biui Gingliatt.					
13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—	—
14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Nadyein.					
15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—	—
16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment	3	—	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.					
4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries (Q.F. field guns) ...					—
OTHER TROOPS.					
5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment*	3	—	—	—	1
7th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, two batteries (Q.F. field guns) ...	—	—	16	—	(8 guns.)
ARTILLERY.					
Fortress and old field guns ...					—
Total ...	15	—	114	—	16

The total strength of the Russian force at the battle of Nan Shan, including the whole of the 4th Division, was probably somewhat less than 16,000 to 18,000 all ranks, which was the Japanese estimate. Of these only some 3,500 were actually engaged.

* The 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which belonged to the 2nd East Siberian Rifle Division in the Ussuri District, was at Chin-chou at the outbreak of war, and was attached to the Russian force in the Kuan-tung Peninsula ; the 1st Company was on Legation Guard in Peking.

† During the war each Russian division included in its organization one machine gun company of 8 guns ; it is not known whether two complete companies were present at this engagement, *i.e.*, those of the 2nd and 4th East Siberian Divisions, but 10 guns were captured by the Japanese.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF NAN SHAN.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Killed.			Wounded.			Total.		
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.
1st Division	14	202	—	41	1,102	14	55	1,304	14
3rd „	6	161	6	32	1,222	0	38	1,383	6
4th „	8	298	1	38	1,303	0	46	1,601	1
1st Artillery Brigade ...	0	15	11	5	43	5	5	58	16
5th Engineer Battalion...	1	5	0	0	8	0	1	13	0
Total	29	681	18	116	3,678	19	145	4,359	37

Grand total, all ranks, 4,504 killed and wounded.

A later and more correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses, including those at Chin-chou on the night of the 25th—26th May, as follows:—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other ranks.						
31	652	124	3,803	—	3	155	4,458

A final statement, which contains no detail, gives the total Japanese losses at 4,885 of all ranks.

The naval losses amounted to 10 of all ranks, and included the commander of the gunboat *Chokai*, who was killed.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF NAN SHAN—*continued.**Russian.*

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
	Officers.	Other ranks.						
*5th E.S.R. Regiment ...	7	97	5	364	11	558	23	1,019
13th " " ...	—	30	—	82	—	13	—	125
14th " " ...	—	20	2	105	—	22	2	147
15th " " ...	—	5	—	1	—	—	—	6
16th " " ...	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
1st Battery 4th E.S.R. Artillery Brigade ...	—	3	—	10	—	—	—	13
3rd Battery 4th E.S.R. Artillery Brigade ...	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
Fortress Artillery ...	—	22	1	55	—	—	1	77
Engineers ...	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	—
Total ...	7	177	8	619	12	593	27	1,389

* The strength of the regiment at the beginning of the action was 45 officers and 2,781 men.

The Russians lost the following war material:—rifles, 365; guns (heavy, 30, light, 52, machine guns, 10); 4 ammunition wagons for guns; and 4 small arm ammunition wagons; rifle ammunition, 416,650 rounds; shells, 8,906; 1 dynamo, and 52 mines and 4 searchlight machines. About 300 railway wagons were found at Ta-lien-wan and Dalny.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED AT THE BATTLE OF NAN SHAN.

Japanese.

—	Common Shell (High-explosive).	Shrapnel Shell.	Small Arm Ammunition.
1st Division	450	6,015	667,010
3rd Division	462	3,249	425,148
4th Division	806	5,000	1,110,886
1st Artillery Brigade ...	2,029	16,036	—
5th Engineer Battalion ...	—	—	62
Total ...	3,747	30,300	2,203,106

Average number of rounds expended :—

Per Rifle.

76

Per Gun.

174.50

In this battle the difficulty of ammunition supply was great, since, on the date on which it took place, only one infantry and one artillery ammunition column had been disembarked. The infantry, therefore, engaged with what the men carried in their pouches and the ammunition in the battalion reserve, or 180 rounds in all, while the artillery had limber ammunition and first and second line wagons or 198 rounds per gun.

Russians.

The ammunition expended by the Russians is not known in full detail. The 5th East Siberian Regiment, however, expended 736,000 rounds, while the Artillery expended 7,780 rounds.

APPENDIX F.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE JAPANESE SECOND ARMY AT TE-LI-SSU, 15TH JUNE 1904

General Officer Commanding : General Baron Oku.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Ochiai.

Commander of Artillery : Major-General Saisho.

Commander of Engineers : Colonel Abe.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
3RD DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant - General Baron Y. Oshima.				
5th Brigade, Major-General K. Yamaguchi.				
6th Regiment	3	—	—	—
33rd Regiment	3	—	—	—
17th Brigade, Major-General J. Kodama.				
18th Regiment	3	—	—	—
34th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
3rd Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
3rd Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
3rd Battalion	—	—	—	3
4TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ogawa.				
7th Brigade, Major-General Nishijima.				
8th Regiment	3	—	—	—
37th Regiment	2	—	—	—
19th Brigade, Major-General Ando.				
9th Regiment	3	—	—	—
38th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
4th Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
4th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
4th Battalion	—	—	—	3

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
5TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ueda.				
9th Brigade, Major-General Yamada.				
11th Regiment	3	—	—	—
41st Regiment	3	—	—	—
21st Brigade, Major-General K. Tsukamoto.				
21st Regiment	3	—	—	—
42nd Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
5th Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
5th Regiment (mountain guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
5th Battalion	—	—	—	3
6TH DIVISION.				
1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment	1	—	—	—
CORPS CAVALRY.				
1st Cavalry Brigade, Major-General Akiyama.				
14th Regiment	—	4	—	—
15th Regiment	—	4	—	—
One battery of machine guns	—	—	6	—
CORPS ARTILLERY.				
1st Artillery Brigade, Major-General Uchiyama.				
13th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
14th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
15th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
Total	36	17	216	9

Total combatant strength, all ranks, about 37,500 men; the strength of battalions at this time was appreciably less than before the battle of Nan Shan, and the infantry would amount to about 30,000 men. Only about half of the 4th Division took part in the battle.

The 14th Artillery Regiment and one battalion from the 4th Artillery Regiment, 56 guns in all, were with the remainder of the 4th Division. The 3rd Battalion, 37th Infantry Regiment was not present at the battle of Te-li-ssu, being still in Korea. The strength given above is that of war establishments, and no deduction has been made for sick or casualties prior to the battle. The 6th Mountain Battery of the 5th Artillery Regiment was attached to the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

In all Russian accounts of the battle of Te-li-ssu, the Japanese are mentioned as having used machine guns. So far as is known the Japanese infantry had no machine guns until after the battle of the Sha Ho, but each cavalry brigade had six.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN FORCE AT TE-LI-SSU, 15TH JUNE, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : Lieutenant-General Baron Stakelberg
 (commanding 1st Siberian Army Corps).
 Chief of the Staff : Major-General Ivanov.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
1ST SIBERIAN ARMY CORPS.				
1ST EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Gerngross.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Rutkovski.				
1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Maximovich.				
3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
1st East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Major-General Luchkovski				
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries (Q.F. field guns).	—	—	32	—
9TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Kondratovich.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Krauze.				
33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment... ..	2	—	—	—
34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Zuikov.				
35th East Siberian Rifle Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Major-General Mrozovski.				
1st, 3rd and 4th Batteries (Q.F. field guns) ...	—	—	24	—
CORPS CAVALRY.				
SIBERIAN COSSACK DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Simonov.				
1st Brigade, Colonel Erkovski.				
4th Siberian Cossack Regiment	—	3	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Chirikov.				
5th Siberian Cossack Regiment	—	2	—	—
8th Siberian Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
USSURI CAVALRY BRIGADE : Major - General Samsonov.				
Primorsk Dragoons Regiment	—	6	—	—
Frontier Guard (42nd and 48th Squadrons and two companies).	2 coys.	2	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.	—	—	6	—
3rd Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery.	—	—	6	—
CORPS ENGINEERS.				
1st East Siberian Sapper Battalion	—	—	—	3
<i>Other Troops.</i>				
3RD SIBERIAN INFANTRY DIVISION.				
9th Tobolsk Regiment	4	—	—	—
35TH INFANTRY DIVISION (OF THE XVIIITH ARMY CORPS).				
2nd Brigade, Major-General Glasko.				
139th Infantry Regiment	4	—	—	—
140th Infantry Regiment	4	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
2nd Division, 35th Artillery Brigade, Colonel Olshevski.				
Two batteries (Q.F. field guns)	—	—	16	—
Frontier Guard Artillery (old pattern mountain guns).	—	—	6	—
Total	35½	19	90	3

The total strength of the above force is not known. It is believed that the infantry battalion did not exceed, on an average, 700 bayonets, which would represent a force of about 25,000 bayonets.

Note.—The 2nd Battery of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade was not present at this battle ; only two battalions of the 33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment were present ; only a part of one regiment of the 1st Brigade Siberian Cossack Regiment was present ; the other regiment of this brigade is the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment. The other regiments of the Ussuri Cossack Brigade are the 1st Nerchinsk Trans-Baikal Cossack Regiment and the Ussuri Cossack Regiment. The former was near Vladivostok, and the latter was with Colonel Madritov.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF TE-LI-SSU.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Arms.	Killed.			Wounded.			Total.		
		Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.
3rd Division	Infantry	2	77	—	11	307	3	13	384	3
	Cavalry ...	—	2	1	—	8	—	—	10	1
	Artillery	—	4	20	2	30	35	2	34	55
4th Division	Engineers	—	2	—	—	8	—	—	10	—
	Infantry	1	73	—	14	266	—	15	339	—
	Cavalry ...	—	—	4	—	—	2	—	—	6
5th Division	Artillery	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
	Engineers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Infantry	4	36	—	10	219	—	14	255	—
1st Cavalry Brigade	Cavalry ...	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
	Artillery	—	15	—	—	1	—	—	16	—
	Engineers	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	—
1st Artillery Brigade	Cavalry ...	—	—	—	—	2	4	—	2	4
	Artillery	—	—	1	6	59	24	6	59	25
	Total ...	7	210	26	43	903	68	50	1,113	94

A later and more correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses as follows:—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other ranks.						
8	198	45	938	—	1	53	1,137

A still later account, which is the one quoted in the text, gives the number of casualties at 1,064 only.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF TE-LI-SSU—*continued.**Russians.*

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
	Officers.	Other ranks.						
Staff	—	—	2	—	—	—	2	—
1st East Siberian Rifle Div.								
1st Regiment	5	27	13	206	—	16	18	249
2nd " 	6	116	11	298	7	310	24	724
3rd " 	3	123	19	282	3	335	25	740
4th " 	1	22	6	162	2	39	9	223
Artillery	1	15	9	85	—	—	10	100
9th East Siberian Rifle Div.								
33rd Regiment	—	23	6	435	—	15	6	473
34th " 	1	15	2	115	—	4	3	134
35th " 	—	64	7	226	—	31	7	321
36th " 	—	34	6	254	—	14	6	302
Artillery	1	—	2	35	—	—	3	35
2nd Brig. 35th Infy. Div.								
139th Regiment	—	12	7	137	—	7	7	156
140th " 	—	2	2	49	—	3	2	54
Artillery	—	3	4	37	—	—	4	40
3rd Siberian Infantry Div.								
9th Tobolsk Regiment	1	9	1	56	1	1	3	66
CAVALRY.								
4th Sib. Cossack Reg.	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
5th Sib. Cossack Reg.	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	1
Primorsk Dragn. Reg.	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	2
Frontier Guard	—	5	—	15	1	—	1	20
Total	19	470	98	2,396	14	775	131	3,641

The above table, from Russian sources, accounts for a loss of 131 officers and 3,641 non-commissioned officers and men, and includes 23 officers and 311 non-commissioned officers and men who were killed and wounded on the 14th June. As the Japanese state in their official reports upon the action that the number of Russians buried by them on the field amounted to 2,000, of whom 1,620 fell in front of the 3rd Division, it would appear that the losses given above are far from complete. Moreover, the detachments of the 4th Japanese Division, which surprised a portion of the Russian cavalry near Chiao-chia-tun, inflicted upon it heavy losses, and these are not shown above.

The Japanese took 16 Q.F.* guns in this battle, and in addition captured 46 ammunition wagons and a large quantity of war material.

* This number is taken from the Japanese official reports, but only 13 Q.F. guns and 4 mountain guns are accounted for in the narrative.

EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION.

Japanese.

The average number of rounds expended per gun amounted to 75, and per rifle to 46. The 5th Brigade, 3rd Division, expended an average of 112·4 rounds per rifle, and the 17th Brigade of the same division expended an average of 521·8 rounds. The latter brigade, however, was engaged in the fighting which took place on the 14th June, the day prior to the battle.

Russians.

No official information regarding the expenditure of ammunition on the Russian side is available. From other sources it appears that three batteries of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade expended the following amounts :—

	Total.
2nd Battery, on 14th June, 321 rounds ; on 15th June, 70 rounds	= 391
3rd Battery, on 14th and 15th June	= 883
4th Battery, on 14th June, 440 rounds ; on 15th June, 390 rounds	= 830

APPENDIX G.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE JAPANESE SECOND ARMY AT TA-SHIH-CHIAO, 24TH JULY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : General Baron Oku.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Ochiai.

Commander of Artillery : Major-General Saisho.

Commander of Engineers : Colonel Abe.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
3RD DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant - General Baron Y. Oshima.				
5th Brigade, Major-General K. Yamaguchi.				
6th Regiment	3	—	—	—
33rd Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
17th Brigade, Major-General J. Kodama.				
18th Regiment	3	—	—	—
34th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
3rd Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
3rd Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
3rd Battalion	—	—	—	3
4TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ogawa.				
7th Brigade, Major-General Nishijima.				
8th Regiment	3	—	—	—
37th Regiment... ..	2	—	—	—
19th Brigade, Major-General Ando.				
9th Regiment	3	—	—	—
38th Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
4th Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
4th Regiment (field guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
4th Battalion	—	—	—	3

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
5TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ueda.				
9th Brigade, Major-General Yamada.				
11th Regiment...	3	—	—	—
41st Regiment...	3	—	—	—
21st Brigade, Major-General T. Tsukamoto.				
21st Regiment...	3	—	—	—
42nd Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
5th Regiment ...	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
5th Regiment (mountain guns) ...	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
5th Battalion ...	—	—	—	3
6TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Okubo.				
11th Brigade, Major-General S. Iida.				
13th Regiment...	3	—	—	—
45th Regiment...	3	—	—	—
24th Brigade, Major-General Koizumi.				
23rd Regiment	3	—	—	—
48th Regiment...	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
6th Regiment ...	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
6th Regiment (field guns) ...	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
6th Battalion ...	—	—	—	3
CORPS CAVALRY.				
1st Cavalry Brigade, Major-General Akiyama.				
14th Regiment...	—	4	—	—
15th Regiment...	—	4	—	—
One battery of machine guns	—	—	6	—
CORPS ARTILLERY.				
1st Artillery Brigade, Major-General Uchiyama.				
13th Regiment (field guns) ...	—	—	36	—
14th Regiment (field guns) ...	—	—	36	—
15th Regiment (field guns) ...	—	—	36	—
Total ...	47	20	252	12

No *Kobi* brigades were present at the battle of Ta-shih-chiao. The 3rd Battalion, 37th Infantry Regiment, was still in Korea when the battle took place.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN FORCE AT TA-SHIH-CHIAO, 24TH JULY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Babel.

Commander of Artillery : Major-General Osipov.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
—				
1ST SIBERIAN ARMY CORPS.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Stakelberg.				
Chief of the Staff : Major-General Ivanov.				
1ST EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Gerngross.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Rutkovski.				
1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Maximovich.				
3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
1st East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Major-General Luchkovski.				
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries (Q.F. field guns).	—	—	32	—
9TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Kondratovich.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Krauze.				
33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Zuikov.				
35th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
9th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, Major-General Mrozovski.				
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries (Q.F. field guns)	—	—	32	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
CAVALRY.				
SIBERIAN COSSACK DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Kossakovski.				
1st Brigade.				
4th Siberian Cossack Regiment	...	6	—	—
2nd Brigade.				
5th Siberian Cossack Regiment	...	6	—	—
8th Siberian Cossack Regiment	...	6	—	—
Ussuri Cavalry Brigade.				
Primorsk Dragoons	6	—	—
Frontier Guards	2	—	—
4 Detachments Mounted Scouts	...	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
2nd Trans-Baikal Horse Artillery Battery	—	—	6	—
3rd Trans-Baikal Horse Artillery Battery	—	—	6	—
ENGINEERS.				
1st East Siberian Engineer Battalion	...	—	—	3
4TH SIBERIAN ARMY CORPS.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev.*				
Chief of the Staff : Major-General Babel.				
2ND SIBERIAN INFANTRY DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Levestam.				
2nd Brigade, Major-General Oganovski.				
7th Siberian (Krasnoyarsk) Infantry	...	4	—	—
8th Siberian (Tomsk) Infantry	...	4	—	—
3RD SIBERIAN INFANTRY DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Kossovich.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Shileiko.				
9th Siberian (Tobolsk) Infantry	...	4	—	—
10th Siberian (Omsk) Infantry	...	4	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Baron Rebinder.				
11th Siberian (Semipalatinsk) Infantry	...	4	—	—
12th Siberian (Barnaul) Infantry	...	4	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
1st Siberian Artillery Brigade	...	—	—	—
2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries	—	24	—

* Also commanding the army in this battle.

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
CAVALRY.				
Commander: Major-General Mishchenko.				
Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade.				
1st Chita Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
1st Verkhne-Udinsk Regiment	—	4	—	—
2nd Brigade, Orenburg Cossack Division:				
Major-General Tolmachev.				
11th Orenburg Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
12th Orenburg Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
From 1st Brigade Siberian Cossack Division.				
7th Siberian Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
11th Horse Artillery Battery	—	—	6	—
20th Horse Artillery Battery	—	—	6	—
ENGINEERS.				
4th Battalion East Siberian Engineers (including 5th Telegraph Company) ...	—	—	—	3
Total	48	54*	112	6

* To these should be added 4 detachments of mounted scouts = 4 officers and 152 men, if at full strength.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF TA-SHIH-CHIAO.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Arms.	Killed.			Wounded.			Total.		
		Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Horses.
3rd Division	Infantry	4	67	3	14	275	5	18	342	8
	Cavalry ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Artillery	—	1	1	2	11	8	2	12	9
	Engineers	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	—
	Others ...	—	—	—	—	3	1	—	3	1
	Total ...	4	69	4	16	290	14	20	359	18
4th Division	Infantry	—	5	—	1	57	6	1	62	6
	Cavalry ...	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
	Artillery	—	10	11	13	79	72	13	89	83
	Engineers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Others ...	—	1	—	1	7	—	1	8	—
	Total ...	—	17	11	15	143	78	15	160	89
5th Division	Infantry	4	57	—	9	322	2	13	379	2
	Cavalry ...	—	1	3	—	2	3	—	3	6
	Artillery	—	3	12	2	59	49	2	62	61
	Engineers	—	1	—	1	4	—	1	5	—
	Others ...	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	2	1
	Total ...	4	62	15	12	389	55	16	451	70
6th Division	Infantry	—	4	—	1	42	2	1	46	2
	Cavalry ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Artillery	2	5	6	1	14	3	3	19	9
	Engineers	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—
	Others ...	—	—	2	—	3	—	—	3	2
	Total ...	2	9	8	2	60	5	4	69	13
1st Artillery Brigade	Artillery	—	12	14	11	72	69	11	84	83
Total ...	—	10	169	52	56	954	221	66	1,123	273

A later and correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses as follows:—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other ranks.						
12	136	47	848	—	1	59	985

The total of the Japanese losses, from the 23rd to the 25th July, amounted to 1,054 killed and wounded of all ranks.

Russians.

The losses of the Russians are not known, but have been estimated from independent sources at 2,000 killed, wounded and missing. One authority puts the losses at 20 officers and 600 men killed and wounded. In the two batteries most heavily engaged, the losses are said to have been:—

	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
	Officers.	Other ranks.						
2nd Battery ...	—	2	2	25	—	—	2	27
3rd Battery ...	—	—	—	11	—	—	—	11

EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION AT THE BATTLE OF
TA-SHIH-CHIAO.

Japanese.

The average number of rounds expended was as follows:—

Per Rifle.
8·8

Per Gun.
80·5

The highest average expenditure of ammunition occurred in the 3rd Division, and the average number of rounds per rifle expended in its two brigades was as follows:—

5th Brigade.
107·12

17th Brigade.
16·76

Russian.

The Russian batteries are stated to have expended on an average 200 rounds per gun, the 2nd Battery of the 9th Brigade (8 guns) firing over 4,000 rounds, and the 3rd Battery 3,141 rounds. A Cossack horse artillery battery fired an average of 104 rounds per gun.

APPENDIX H.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE JAPANESE FORCE AT THE FEN-SHUI LING ON THE 27TH JUNE, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : Lieutenant-General Baron Kawamura.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Uchiyama.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
10TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant - General Baron Kawamura.				
8th Brigade : Major-General H. Tojo.				
10th Regiment	3	—	—	—
40th Regiment	3	—	—	—
20th Brigade : Major-General M. Marui.				
20th Regiment	3	—	—	—
39th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
10th Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
10th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns)	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
10th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3
ATTACHED.				
GUARD MIXED BRIGADE.				
Commander : Major-General N. Asada.				
1st Guard Regiment	3	—	—	—
2nd Guard Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
Guard Cavalry Regiment	—	2	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
Guard Artillery Regiment (field guns) ...	—	—	12	—
ENGINEERS.				
Guard Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	1
Total	18	5	48	4

The Russian force present at the Fen-shui Ling on the 27th June is not known in sufficient detail to admit of the preparation of an Order of Battle. *See p. 230.*

LOSSES AT THE CAPTURE OF THE FEN-SHUI LING, 26TH AND
27TH JUNE, 1904.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.
GUARD DIVISION.				
1st Guard Regiment	1	6	2	49
2nd Guard Regiment	1	2	—	31
Guard Cavalry Regiment	—	—	—	—
Guard Artillery	1	4	2	15
3rd Company Guard Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	8
Guard Bearer Company	—	—	—	3
13TH DIVISION.				
10th Regiment	—	6	—	30
40th Regiment	—	1	—	17
20th Regiment	—	—	1	4
39th Regiment	—	1	—	8
10th Cavalry Regiment... ..	—	—	—	1
10th Artillery Regiment	—	—	—	8
10th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	2
Total	3	20	5	176

A later and more correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses as follows:—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other ranks.						
3	19	3	168	—	—	6	187

Russians.

The official Russian report gives their losses as only one man killed and 20 wounded. Unofficial information raises them to from 300 to 500 killed and wounded. The numbers quoted in the text (footnote to p. 235) appear to be the most nearly correct. These, giving no detail, place the total Russian loss at 9 officers and 375 men. The Japanese, in their official report of this action, state that many Russians were killed, those on the main road alone numbering over 90, while six officers and 82 men were taken prisoners.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED AT THE CAPTURE OF THE
FEN-SHUI LING.

Japanese.

The expenditure of the 10th Division is not known, but that of the Guard Mixed Brigade on the 27th June, was as follows:—

Body of Troops.	Gun Ammunition.		Small Arm Ammunition.
	High-Explosive.	Shrapnel.	
1st Guard Regiment	—	—	49,251
2nd Guard Regiment	—	—	9,677
Guard Artillery Regiment (12 guns)	317	971	—
10th Artillery Regiment	182	376	—
Total	499	1,347	58,928

Russians.

No information is available regarding the expenditure of ammunition by the Russians in this action beyond the fact that one quick-firing battery expended the whole of its ammunition between daylight and 7.40 a.m., or in less than four hours.

APPENDIX I.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE JAPANESE FORCE AT HSI-MU-CHENG, 31ST JULY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : General Count Nodzu.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Uehara.

Commanding Artillery : Major-General Kasunose.

Commander of Engineers : Major-General Furokawa.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
10TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant - General Baron Kawamura.				
8th Brigade : Major-General H. Tojo.				
10th Regiment	3	—	—	—
40th Regiment	3	—	—	—
20th Brigade : Major-General M. Marui.				
20th Regiment	3	—	—	—
39th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
10th Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
10th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns)...	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
10th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3
10th <i>Kobi</i> Brigade :—				
10th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	—
20th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	—
40th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	—
ATTACHED.				
5TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Ueda.				
9th Brigade : Major-General Yamada.				
11th Regiment	3	—	—	—
41st Regiment	3	—	—	—
21st Brigade : Major-General Tsukamoto.				
21st Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
42nd Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
5th Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

—	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ARTILLERY.				
5th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns) ...	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
5th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3
3RD DIVISION.				
Major-General Kodama's detachment	3	1 troop	12	1
Total	33	6 & 1 troop	84	7

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN FORCE AT HSI-MU-CHENG, 31ST JULY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : Lieutenant-General Zasulich.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
5TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Alexeiev.				
1st Brigade : Major-General Okulich.				
17th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade : Major-General Putilov.				
19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
5th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade				
Four Batteries... ..	—	—	32	—
2ND SIBERIAN INFANTRY DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Levestam.				
1st Brigade : Major-General Plyeshkov.				
5th Siberian Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
6th Siberian Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
1 Battery of the 1st Siberian Artillery Brigade				
	—	—	8	—
31ST INFANTRY DIVISION.				
2nd Brigade, Major-General Vasilev.				
122nd Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
123rd Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ARTILLERY.				
31st Artillery Brigade :				
4th, 5th, and 6th Batteries	—	—	24	—
CAVALRY.				
7th Siberian Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
4th Ural Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
MAJOR-GENERAL MISHCHENKO'S FORCE.*				
Commander : Major-General Mishchenko.				
3RD SIBERIAN INFANTRY DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Kossovich.				
1st Brigade : Major-General Shileiko.				
9th Siberian (Tobolsk) Infantry Regiment	3½	—	—	—
10th Siberian (Omsk) Infantry Regiment...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade :				
11th Siberian (Semipalatinsk) Infantry Regiment	2	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade :				
1st Chita Cossack Regiment... ..	—	6	—	—
1st Verkhne-Udinsk Regiment	—	6	—	—
2nd Brigade, Orenburg Cossack Division, Colonel Pavlov.				
11th Orenburg Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—
12th Orenburg Cossack Regiment	—	6	—	—

* It does not appear that General Mishchenko was placed directly under the command of General Zasulich. As far as can be ascertained, the former received orders direct from army head-quarters. General Zasulich was the senior officer on the battlefield.

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

—	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ARTILLERY.				
1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Horse Artillery Battery	—	—	6	—
10th Horse Artillery Brigade :				
11th Horse Artillery Battery	—	—	6	—
20th Horse Artillery Battery	—	—	6	—
Frontier Guard (Mountain) Battery	—	—	4	—
Total	$36\frac{1}{2}$	36	86	—

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF HSI-MU-CHENG, 31ST JULY, 1904.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.
5TH DIVISION.				
11th Regiment	—	3	1	14
41st Regiment	—	9	2	73
21st Regiment	1	2	—	8
42nd Regiment	—	2	1	—
5th Cavalry Regiment	—	—	—	—
5th Artillery Regiment... ..	—	2	—	23
5th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	2
Total, 5th Division... ..	1	18	4	120
10TH DIVISION.				
10th Regiment	2	45	6	144
40th Regiment	2	89	8	194
20th Regiment	—	—	—	—
39th Regiment	2	14	1	63
10th Cavalry Regiment... ..	—	—	—	—
10th Artillery Regiment	—	5	4	25
10th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	—
Ammunition Column	—	—	—	5
Total, 10th Division	6	153	19	431
10TH <i>Kobi</i> BRIGADE.				
10th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	11	—	72
20th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	—	5	3	12
40th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	—	—	—	—
Total, 10th <i>Kobi</i> Brigade	2	16	3	84
Total	9	187	26	635

In the 5th Division 2 horses were killed and 9 wounded and in the 10th Division 10 horses were killed and 13 wounded.

A later and more correct, but less detailed, return gives the losses as follows :—

Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.	
Officers.	Other ranks.						
9	186	24	617	—	—	33	803

Russians.

Body of Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.	
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.
5TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.						
17th E.S.R. Regiment ...	—	12	4	109	—	22
18th E.S.R. Regiment ...	1	20	3	49	—	2
19th E.S.R. Regiment ...	—	37	2	67	—	8
20th E.S.R. Regiment ...	2	19	—	31	—	7
5th E.S.R. Art. Brigade ...	—	—	—	5	—	1
Total, 5th E.S.R. Division	3	88	9	261	—	40

Besides the above, the losses of the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Infantry Division are officially stated to have been 27 officers and 730 men, of whom 5 officers and 120 men were overcome by the great heat. General Zasluch's official report puts the losses of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps at 25 officers and about 1,500 men. General Mishchenko's cavalry is reported to have lost 5 officers and 40 men only, and the infantry attached to his force lost 270 men.

The Japanese official report states that about 700 Russian dead were found.

The Russians lost six field guns, some ammunition, and supplies.

AMMUNITION EXPENDED AT THE BATTLE OF HSI-MU-CHENG.

Japanese.

Body of Troops.	Gun Ammunition.		Small Arm Ammunition.
	High-Explosive.	Shrapnel.	
5TH DIVISION.			
11th Regiment	—	—	14,905
41st Regiment	—	—	64,385
21st Regiment	—	—	13,750
42nd Regiment	—	—	9,338
5th Artillery Regiment	402	2,727	—
10TH DIVISION.			
10th Regiment	—	—	111,482
40th Regiment	—	—	77,166
39th Regiment	—	—	41,056
10th Cavalry Regiment	—	—	240
10th Artillery Regiment	439	3,131	—
10TH <i>Kobi</i> BRIGADE.			
10th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	—	—	41,642
20th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	—	—	23,903
Total	841	5,858	397,867

One gun was damaged in each of the artillery regiments.

Russians.

No information is available regarding the expenditure of ammunition by the Russians in this action.

APPENDIX K.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE JAPANESE FIRST ARMY AT YANG-TZU LING—YU-SHU LING,
31st JULY, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : General Baron Kuroki.
Chief of the Staff : Major-General Fuji.
Commander of Artillery : Colonel Matsumoto.
Commander of Engineers : Major-General T. Kodama.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
—				
GUARD DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant - General Baron Hasegawa.				
1st Guard Brigade, Major-General N. Asada.				
1st Guard Regiment	3	—	—	—
2nd Guard Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
2nd Guard Brigade.				
3rd Guard Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
4th Guard Regiment... ..	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
Guard Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
Guard Artillery Regiment (field guns) ...	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
Guard Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3
2ND DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Nishi.				
3rd Brigade, Major-General M. Matsunaga.				
4th Regiment	3	—	—	—
29th Regiment	3	—	—	—
15th Brigade, Major-General S. Okasaki.				
16th Regiment	3	—	—	—
30th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
2nd Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
2nd Artillery Regiment (field guns) ...	—	—	36	—

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
ENGINEERS.				
2nd Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3
12TH DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Baron Inouye.				
12th Brigade, Major-General N. Sasaki.				
14th Regiment	3	—	—	—
47th Regiment	3	—	—	—
23rd Brigade, Major-General Kigoshi.				
24th Regiment	3	—	—	—
46th Regiment	3	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
12th Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
12th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns)...	—	—	36	—
ENGINEERS.				
12th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	3
<i>Kobi</i> TROOPS.				
Guard <i>Kobi</i> Brigade	4	—	—	—
39th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	1	—	—	—
CAVALRY.				
Guard <i>Kobi</i> Cavalry	—	1	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
<i>Kobi</i> Artillery of the Line	—	—	6	—
ENGINEERS.				
Guard <i>Kobi</i> Engineers	—	—	—	1 Sec.
Total	41	10	114	9 Com. 1 Sec.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN FORCE AT YANG-TZU LING—YU-SHU LING,
31ST JULY, 1904.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
EASTERN FORCE.				
General Officer Commanding: Lieutenant-General Count Keller.				
Chief of the Staff: Colonel Oranovski.				
3RD EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander: Major-General Kashtalinski.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Mardanov.				
9th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Stolitsa.				
11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
12th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
3rd East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.				
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries ...	—	—	32*	—
6TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.				
Commander: Major-General Romanov.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Yatsuinin.				
21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Krichinski.				
23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
6th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.				
1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Batteries ...	—	—	32*	—
CAVALRY.				
2nd Chita Cossack Regiment ...	—	3	—	—
Frontier Guard ...	—	—	4*	—
Artillery ...	—	—	mountain.	—
XTH ARMY CORPS.				
Commander: Lieutenant-General Sluchevski.				

* It has been ascertained that although 68 guns were present at Yang-tzu Ling, only 28 field and 4 mountain guns actually took part in the action.

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Engineer Companies.
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION.				
Commander : Major-General Gershelmann.				
1st Brigade, Major-General Ryabinkin.				
33rd (Elets) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
34th (Syev) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
2nd Brigade, Major-General Martson.				
35th (Bryansk) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
36th (Orel) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
9th Artillery Brigade (6 batteries)...	—	—	48	—
31ST INFANTRY DIVISION.				
Commander : Lieutenant-General Mau.				
1st Brigade.				
121st (Penza) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
122nd (Tambov) Infantry Regiment ...	4	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
31st Artillery Brigade (less 1 Battery) ...	—	—	40	—
CAVALRY.				
1st Argun Cossack Regiment ...	—	5	—	—
1st Orenburg Cossack Regiment ...	—	5	—	—
Terek-Kuban Cavalry Regiment ...	—	6	—	—
ENGINEERS.				
6th Engineer Battalion... ..	—	—	—	3
Major-General Liubavin's detachment.				
ARTILLERY.				
4th Trans-Baikal Cossack Artillery Battery.	—	—	6	—
4th Battery 6th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade.	—	—	8	—
CAVALRY.				
2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade.				
2nd Nerchinsk Cossack Regiment ...	—	6	—	—
2nd Argun Cossack Regiment... ..	—	6	—	—
Ussuri Cossack Regiment	—	3	—	—
Garrison of Pen-hsi-hu.				
11th (Pskov) Regiment	4	—	—	—
1st Siberian Infantry Regiment ...	1	—	—	—
ARTILLERY.				
Frontier Guard Battery	—	—	2	—
CAVALRY.				
2nd Daghestan Cavalry Regiment ...	—	6	—	—
Total	53	40	172	3

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF YANG-TZU LING—YU-SHU LING
(31ST JULY—1ST AUGUST).

Japanese.

—	Killed.		Wounded.		Total.
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	
Guard Division	5	74	17	317	413
2nd Division	1	15	8	99	123
12th Division	2	61	10	351	424
<i>Kobi</i> troops	—	1	2	26	29
Total	8	151	37	793	989

Russians.

—	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Total.
	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	Officers.	Other ranks.	
Yang-tzu Ling	3	48	11	306	1	22	391
Yu-shu Ling	6	269	33	1,345	8	407	2,068

EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION AT THE BATTLE OF
YANG-TZU LING—YU-SHU LING.

Japanese.

—	Yu-shu Ling.	Yang-tzu Ling.
Gun ammunition	4,053 rounds	2,263 rounds.
Rifle ammunition... ..	351,885 „	587,997 „

Russians.

The only information available is that one battery fired 1,292 rounds during the battle at the Yang-tzu Ling.

APPENDIX L.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE RUSSIAN FORCES IN THE KUAN-TUNG PENINSULA AT
THE TIME OF THE ISOLATION OF PORT ARTHUR, MAY, 1904.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Horse and Field Guns.	Fortress Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Remarks.
Commander of the Fortified Zone : Lieutenant-General Stessel.	—	—	—	—	—	Chin-chou to Port Arthur.
Chief Staff Officer, Fortified Zone : Colonel Reis.	—	—	—	—	—	In succession to Major - General Roznatovski, who died about the beginning of June.
Commander of the Artillery : Major-General Nikitin.						
4TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.						
Commander : Major-General Fock.						
1st Brigade, Colonel Savitski.						
13th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—	—	
14th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—	—	
2nd Brigade, Major-General Nadyein.						
15th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—	—	
16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—	—	
ARTILLERY.						
4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, four batteries	—	—	32	—	—	

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Horse and Field Guns.	Fortress Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Remarks.
7TH EAST SIBERIAN RIFLE DIVISION.						
Commander : Major-General Kondratenko.						
1st Brigade, Major-General Gorbatovski.						
25th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—	—	
26th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—	—	
2nd Brigade, Major-General Tserpitski.						
27th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—	—	
28th East Siberian Rifle Regiment ...	3	—	—	—	—	
ARTILLERY.						
7th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, three batteries	—	—	24	—	—	
One horse-battery of 2·24-inch guns ...	—	—	6	—	—	
ATTACHED.						
5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment (less the 1st Company, which formed part of the Legation Guard at Peking)	3	—	—	—	—	Detached from the 2nd East Siberian Rifle Division at Vladivostok.
Detachments from the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division	—	½	—	—	—	Formed into two companies.
CAVALRY.						
Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment, one squadron	—	—	1	—	—	Including about 50 mounted men from various other units.
ARTILLERY.						
One field-howitzer battery ...	—	—	—	4	—	
ENGINEERS.						
2nd East Siberian Rifle Division Telegraph Company	—	—	—	—	1	
Total ...	27½	1	66	—	1	

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

—	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Horse and Field Guns.	Fortress Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Remarks.
Commandant of the Fortress of Port Arthur: Lieutenant-General Smirnov. Chief of the Fortress Staff: Colonel Khvostov. Commander of the Fortress Artillery: Major-General Byeli. Commander of the Fortress Engineers: Colonel Grigorenko.						These depot troops are formed on cadres detached from the units of the standing army, and are filled up by men of the reserve (who are not required for the mobilization of the active units), by recruits, or by men of the four youngest classes of the militia. They serve to keep the units of the standing army up to full strength in time of war.
East Siberian Depot Battalions. (3rd, 4th and 7th Battalions)	3					
Frontier Guards. (21st and 36th Companies)	$\frac{1}{2}$					
ARTILLERY.						
Three Battalions of Fortress Artillery			*			
ENGINEERS.						
Kuan-tung Sapper Company					1	
Port Arthur Mining Company					1	
Total	$3\frac{1}{2}$			*	2	

The total of the above forces amounted to about 41,000 officers and men, of which about 30,000 were infantry.

In addition to the above, there were the shore detachments of

* The number of guns and howitzers in and around Port Arthur was approximately as follows, though the various accounts differ considerably as regards details :—

—	Coast Defences.	Land Defences.	Reserve.	Total.
Heavy guns and howitzers ... (8·3-inch and upwards)	50	9	—	59
Medium guns and howitzers... (4·2-inch and upwards)	32	112	4	148
Light quick-firing guns and field guns	36	267	8	311
Total	118	388	12	518

the Port Arthur Naval Squadron, formed into ten companies, amounting to about 4,000; and the Town Guard, composed of Volunteers from among the civil population. These were formed into 12 infantry and 1 mounted companies, with a total strength of about 2,500.

The grand total of the combatants in the Kuan-tung Peninsula amounted therefore approximately to 47,000 officers and men.

The above figures include 143 naval guns, of which 121 were 6-inch and 4·7-inch, and the remainder light quick-firing guns. In the later stages of the siege it appears that the number of guns landed by the fleet was increased to some 200 or more. In addition to the above armament 29 machine guns were available for the defence.

The figures quoted do not include guns in position at Nan Shan and Kerr Bay. At the beginning of May there were 50 guns in position at the former place and 2 at the latter. This number may have been subsequently increased, since the Russian losses on the 26th May included 30 heavy guns, 52 light guns, and 10 machine guns.

APPENDIX M.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE JAPANESE THIRD ARMY AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST GENERAL ASSAULT ON PORT ARTHUR, AUGUST 19TH—25TH, 1904.

General Officer Commanding : General Baron Nogi.

Chief of the Staff : Major-General Idichi.

Commander of the Naval Brigade : Captain Kuroi.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Field and Mountain Guns.	Siege Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Remarks.
1ST DIVISION.						
Commander : Lieutenant-General Matsumura.						
1st Brigade, Major-General Yamamoto.						
1st Regiment	3	—	—	—	—	
15th Regiment	3	—	—	—	—	
2nd Brigade, Major-General Nakamura.						
2nd Regiment	3	—	—	—	—	
3rd Regiment	3	—	—	—	—	
1st <i>Kobi</i> Brigade, Major-General Oki.						Attached to the 1st Division.
1st <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	—	—	
15th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	—	—	
16th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	—	—	
CAVALRY.						
1st Cavalry Regiment	—	3	—	—	—	
ARTILLERY.						
1st Artillery Regiment (field guns) ...	—	—	36	—	—	
ENGINEERS.						
1st Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	—	3	

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Field and Mountain Guns.	Siege Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Remarks.	
9TH DIVISION.							
Commander : Lieutenant - General Oshima.							
6th Brigade, Major-General Ichinohe.							
7th Regiment	3						
35th Regiment	3						
18th Brigade, Major-General Hirasa.							
19th Regiment	3						
36th Regiment	3						
CAVALRY.							
9th Cavalry Regiment						This regiment left the Third Army early in the siege, only a detachment remaining at Port Arthur.	
ARTILLERY.							
9th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns)			36				
ENGINEERS.							
9th Engineer Battalion					3		
11TH DIVISION.							
Commander : Lieutenant-General Tsuchiya.							
10th Brigade, Major-General Yamanaka.							
22nd Regiment	3						
44th Regiment	3						
22nd Brigade, Major-General Kamio.							
12th Regiment	3						
43rd Regiment	3						
CAVALRY.							
11th Cavalry Regiment						This regiment left the Third Army early in the siege, only a detachment remaining at Port Arthur.	
ARTILLERY.							
11th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns)			36				

ORDER OF BATTLE—*continued.*

					Battalions.	Squadrons.	Field and Mountain Guns.	Siege Guns.	Engineer Companies.	Remarks.
ENGINEERS.										
11th Engineer Battalion	—	—	—	—	—	3	
ARMY TROOPS.										
4th <i>Kobi</i> Brigade, Major-General Take-nouchi.										
8th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	—	—	—	
9th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	—	—	—	
38th <i>Kobi</i> Regiment	2	—	—	—	—	—	
FIELD ARTILLERY.										
2nd Field Artillery Brigade, Major-General Nagata.										
16th Artillery Regiment	—	—	24	—	—	—	
17th Artillery Regiment	—	—	24	—	—	—	
18th Artillery Regiment	—	—	24	—	—	—	
SIEGE ARTILLERY.										
1st Regiment.										
1st Battalion	—	—	—	24	—	—	4·7-in. bronze guns.
2nd Battalion...	—	—	—	16	—	—	6-in. howitzers.
2nd Regiment.										
3rd Battalion...	—	—	—	24	—	—	6-in. mortars.
4th Battalion...	—	—	—	24	—	—	6-in. mortars.
3rd Regiment.										
5th Battalion	—	—	—	10	—	—	Four 4-in. Krupp guns. Six 4·7-in. bronze guns.
6th Battalion...	—	—	—	24	—	—	6-in. mortars.
7th Battalion...	—	—	—	24	—	—	3·5-in. mortars.
Heavy Field Artillery Regiment	—	—	—	28	—	—	4·7-in. howitzers.
Naval Brigade	—	—	—	26	—	—	Eight 4·7-in guns. Eighteen 12-pr. guns.
Total	48	3	180	200	9		

* In addition to the above, twelve Russian guns which had been captured at Nan Shan were brought up during July.

APPENDIX N.
JAPANESE WAR VESSELS.
(a) BATTLESHIPS, CRUISERS, GUNBOATS, AND DISPATCH VESSELS.

Name.	Class.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Dis- place- ment.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.		Maximum Thickness of Armour.				Armament.			Complement.
							Normal.	Tons. Maximum.	W.L.	Deck.	Gun Protection.	Conning Tower.	Ordnance.	Sub-merged.	Above Water.	
<i>Adzuma</i> ✓	Armoured cruiser	June, 1899	St. Nazaire, France	9,307	16,000	20	Tons. 600	Tons. 1,200	Ins. 7	Ins. 2	Ins. 6	Ins. 14		4 8-in.; 12 6-in.; 12 12-pr.; 8 2½-pr.	4	1
<i>Akagi</i> ✓	Gunboat	Aug., 1888	Onohama	612	950	10	—	74	—	—	—	—	1 12-cm.; 5 12-pr.; 4 3-pr.; 2 2½-pr.	—	—	130
<i>Akashi</i> ✓	Cruiser, 3rd class	Nov., 1897	Yokosuka	2,756	8,000	20	—	600	—	2	—	—	2 6-in.; 6 4.7-in.; 10 3-pr.; 2 2½-pr.	—	2	305
<i>Akitsu-shima</i> ✓	Cruiser, 3rd class	July, 1882	Yokosuka	3,126	8,500	19	—	550	—	3	—	—	4 6-in.; 6 4.7-in.; 8 3-pr.; 2 2½-pr.	—	4	309
<i>Amagi</i> ✓	Gunboat	Mar., 1877	Yokosuka	911	710	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	6 17-cm.; 3 75-mm.; 2 3-pr.; 1 machine gun	—	—	148
<i>Asahi</i> ✓	Battleship, 1st class	„ 1899	Clydebank	15,200	15,000	18	700	1,690	9	4	14	14	4 12-in.; 14 6-in.; 20 12-pr.; 8 3-pr.; 4 2½-pr.	4	—	835

<i>Asama</i> ...	Armoured cruiser	Mar., 1898	Elswick	9,750	18,000	22	600	1,200	7	2	6	14	4	1	637
<i>Atago</i> ...	Gunboat ...	June, 1887	Yokosuka	612	950	10	—	74	—	—	—	—	—	—	102
<i>Banjo</i> ...	Wooden gun- boat (sur- veying ship)	July, 1878	Yokosuka	656	650	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	70
<i>Chihaya</i> ...	Dispatch vessel	May, 1900	Yokosuka	1,238	6,000	21	—	400	—	—	—	2	—	5	135
<i>Chinyen</i> ...	Battleship, 2nd class	„ 1882	Stettin	7,220	6,000	15	—	800	14	3	14	8	—	3	447
<i>Chitose</i> ...	Cruiser, 2nd class	Jan., 1898	San Francisco	4,760	15,500	23	800	1,000	—	4½	3	—	—	4	438
<i>Chiyoda</i> ...	Cruiser, 3rd class	June, 1890	Clydebank	2,450	5,600	19	—	427	4½	1	—	—	—	3	316
<i>Chokai</i> ...	Gunboat ...	Aug., 1887	Ishikawajima	612	950	10	—	74	—	—	—	—	—	—	100
<i>Fuji</i> ✓ ...	Battleship, 1st class	Mar., 1896	Thames Iron- works	12,450	13,500	18	700	1,200	18	2½	14	14	4	1	736
<i>Fuso</i> ...	Battleship, 3rd class	Apr., 1877	Messrs. Sa- muda, Lon- don	3,718	3,500	13	—	350	9	¾	8	—	—	—	358
<i>Hashidate</i>	Cruiser, 2nd class	Mar., 1891	Yokosuka	4,210	5,400	16	—	683	—	1½	12	6	—	4	409
<i>Hatsuse</i> ...	Battleship, 1st class	June, 1899	Elswick	15,000	14,500	18	700	1,690	9	4	14	14	4	—	849
<i>Heijei</i> ...	3rd class, coast de- fence	Aug., 1877	England	2,247	2,500	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	226
<i>Heijen</i> ...	Armoured gunboat	„ 1887	Fuchau	2,150	1,200	11	—	300	8	2	8	10	—	—	205

(a) BATTLESHIPS, CRUISERS, GUNBOATS AND DISPATCH VESSELS—continued.

Name.	Class.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.		Maximum Thickness of Armour.				Armament.		Complement.	
							Normal.	Maximum.	W.L.	Deck.	Gun Protection.	Conning Tower.	Ordnance.	Submerged.		Torpedo Tubes.
<i>Idzumi</i> ✓	Cruiser, 3rd class	Aug., 1883	Elswick	2,950	6,000	17	Tons. 400	Tons. 600	Ins.	Ins.	Ins.	2	2	—	—	296
<i>Idzumo</i> ✓	Armoured cruiser	Sept., 1899	Elswick	9,750	14,500	21	600	1,550	7	2½	6	14	6	4	—	722
<i>Itsukushima</i> ✓	Cruiser, 2nd class	July, 1889	Toulon	4,210	5,400	16	—	683	—	1½	12	6	6	—	4	435
<i>Iwate</i> ✓	Armoured cruiser	Mar., 1900	Elswick	9,750	14,500	21	600	1,550	7	2½	6	14	6	4	—	688
<i>Kaimon</i> ✓	3rd class, coast defence	Aug., 1882	Yokosuka	1,350	1,250	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	226
<i>Kasagi</i> ✓	Cruiser, 2nd class	Jan., 1898	Philadelphia	4,862	17,000	23	800	1,000	—	4½	3	—	—	—	4	438
<i>Kasuga</i> ✓	Armoured cruiser	Oct., 1902	Genoa	7,628	13,500	20	584	1,178	5.9	3	5.9	4.7	4.7	—	4	609

Ordnance.

2 6-in.; 6 4.7-in.;
7 3-pr.; 1 2½-pr.
4 8-in.; 14 6-in.;
12 12 pr.; 8 2½-pr.
1 12.5-in.; 11 4.7-in.;
6 12-pr.; 6 2½-pr.
4 8-in.; 14 6-in.;
12 12-pr.; 8 2½-pr.
1 17-cm.; 6 12-cm.;
1 12-pr.; 5 machine
guns

2 8-in.; 10 4.7-in.;
12 12-pr.; 6 2½-pr.
1 10-in.; 2 8-in.;
14 6-in.; 10 12-pr.;
5 3-pr.

<i>Katsuragi</i>	3rd class, coast defence	Mar., 1885	Yokosuka	1,480	1,600	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 17-cm.; 5 12-cm.; 1 75-mm.; 2 machine guns	—	182
<i>Kongo</i>	3rd class, coast defence	Apr., 1877	England	2,247	2,500	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	3 17-cm.; 6 15-cm.; 2 12-pr.; 6 machine guns	2	165
<i>Matsu</i>	Cruiser, 2nd class	Jan., 1890	Toulon	4,210	5,400	16	—	1½	12	6	—	—	1 12.5-in.; 12 4.7-in.; 6 12-pr.; 4 2½-pr.	—	435
<i>Maya</i>	Gunboat	Aug., 1886	Onohama	612	950	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 15-cm.; 2 3-pr.; 2 machine guns	—	107
<i>Mikasa</i>	Battleship, 1st class	Nov., 1900	Barrow	15,140	15,000	18	700	4½	14	14	—	—	4 12-in.; 14 6-in.; 20 12-pr.; 8 3-pr.; 4 2½-pr.	4	875
<i>Miyako</i>	Dispatch vessel	Oct., 1897	Kure	1,772	6,000	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 4.7-in.; 6 3-pr.; 4 2½-pr.	2	227
<i>Musashi</i>	3rd class, coast defence	Mar., 1886	Yokosuka	1,480	1,600	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 17-cm.; 5 12-cm.; 1 75-mm.; 2 machine guns	—	182
<i>Naniwa</i>	Cruiser, 2nd class	„ 1885	Elswick	3,650	7,500	18	350	3	2	2	—	—	8 6-in.; 10 3-pr.; 2 2½-pr.	4	338
<i>Niitaka</i>	Cruiser, 3rd class	Nov., 1902	Yokosuka	3,366	9,400	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	6 6-in.; 10 12-pr.; 4 2½-pr.	—	320?
<i>Nisshin</i>	Armoured cruiser	„ 1902	Genoa	7,628	13,500	20	584	5.9	3	5.9	3	—	4 8-in.; 14 6-in.; 10 12-pr.; 6 3-pr.	4	609
<i>Oshima</i>	Gunboat	Oct., 1891	Onohama	630	1,200	13	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 4.7-in.; 5 12-pr.; 2 3-pr.; 3 2½-pr.	—	130
<i>Otowa</i>	Cruiser, 3rd class	Nov., 1903	Yokosuka	3,000	10,000	21	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 6-in.; 6 4.7-in.; 4 12-pr.	—	312?
<i>Saiten</i>	3rd class, coast defence	„ 1883	Stettin	2,440	2,800	15	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 21-cm.; 1 15-cm.; 1 75-mm.; 6 3-pr.	1	237
<i>Shiki</i>	Battleship, 1st class	„ 1898	Thames Iron-works	14,850	14,500	18	800	3½	14	14	—	—	4 12-in.; 14 6-in.; 20 12-pr.; 8 3-pr.; 4 2½-pr.	4	842
<i>Suma</i>	Cruiser, 3rd class	Mar., 1895	Yokosuka	2,657	8,500	20	—	2	—	—	—	—	2 6-in.; 6 4.7-in.; 10 3-pr.; 2 2½-pr.	2	304

<i>Tsukushi</i>	Gunboat	Dec., 1882	Elswick	1,350	2,400	16	—	300	—	1	—	2 10-in.; 4 40-pr.; 2 9-pr.; 4 machine guns	—	104
<i>Tsushima</i>	Cruiser, 3rd class	, 1902	Kure...	3,366	9,400	20	—	600	—	3	—	6 6-in.; 10 12-pr.; 4 2½-pr.	—	320?
<i>Uji</i>	Gunboat	Mar., 1903	Kure...	620	1,000	13	75	150	—	—	—	3 12-pr. 12-cwt.; 1 12 pr. 8 cwt.; 3 ma- chine guns	—	93
<i>Yakumo</i>	Armoured cruiser	July, 1899	Stettin	9,646	15,250	20	600	1,200	7	2	7	4 8-in.; 12 6-in.; 12 12-pr.; 8 2½-pr.	4	639
<i>Yamato</i>	3rd class, coast de- fence	May, 1885	Onohama	1,480	1,600	13	—	150	—	—	—	2 17-cm.; 5 12-cm.; 1 75-mm.; 2 9-pr.; 4 machine guns	—	182
<i>Yashima</i>	Battleship, 1st class	Feb., 1896	Elswick	12,320	13,500	18	700	1,200	18	2½	14	4 12-in.; 10 6-in.; 4 2½-pr.	4	736
<i>Yaeyama</i>	Dispatch vessel	Mar., 1889	Yokosuka	1,584	5,400	20	—	350	—	—	—	3 4.7-in.; 8 2½-pr.	—	228
<i>Yoshino</i>	Cruiser, 2nd class	Dec., 1892	Elswick	4,160	15,500	23	350	1,000	—	4½	4	4 6-in.; 8 4.7-in.; 22 3-pr.; 2 2½-pr.	—	419

(b) DESTROYERS.*

Name.	Date of Launch.	Builders' Name or Where Built.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.		Ordnance.	Armament.		Comple-ment.	
						Normal.	Maximum.		No. of Tubes.	Torpedoes.		No. of Torpedoes.
<i>Akatsuki</i>	1901	Yarrow	Tons. 363	6,000	Knots. 31.3	—	—	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	58	
<i>Akebono</i>	1899	Yarrow	341	6,000	31.2	—	81	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	53	
<i>Asagiri</i>	1902	Yokosuka	375	6,000	29	—	—	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	55	
<i>Asahiwo</i>	1902	Thornycroft	375	7,000	31	40	96	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	56	
<i>Harusame</i>	1902	Yokosuka	375	6,000	29	—	—	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	55	
<i>Hayatori</i>	1903	Yokosuka	375	6,000	29	—	—	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	63	
<i>Ikadzuchi</i>	1898	Yarrow	341	6,000	31	—	—	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	59	
<i>Inadzuma</i>	1899	Yarrow	341	6,000	31	—	81	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	55	
<i>Kagero</i>	1899	Thornycroft	279	5,400	30.5	30	80	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	56	
<i>Kasumi</i>	1902	Yarrow	363	6,000	31	—	—	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	55	
<i>Murakumo</i>	1898	Thornycroft	322	5,400	30.1	30	80	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	52	
<i>Murasame</i>	1902	Yokosuka	375	6,000	29	—	—	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	55	
<i>Oboro</i>	1899	Yarrow	341	6,000	31	—	81	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	56	
<i>Sazanami</i>	1899	Yarrow	341	6,000	31.2	—	—	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	56	
<i>Shimonome</i>	1898	Thornycroft	322	5,400	30.5	30	80	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	55	
<i>Shirakumo</i>	1901	Thornycroft	375	7,000	31.8	40	96	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	59	
<i>Shirawanu</i>	1899	Thornycroft	322	5,400	30.5	30	80	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	52	
<i>Usugumo</i>	1900	Thornycroft	279	5,400	30.5	30	80	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	54	
<i>Yugiri</i>	1899	Thornycroft	322	5,400	30.1	30	80	2 12-pr.; 4 6-pr....	2	4	51	

* At the beginning of the war the armament of these vessels consisted of one 12-pr. and five 6-pr. guns and was changed during 1904.

(c) TORPEDO BOATS—FIRST CLASS.

<i>Aokata</i>	1903	Kure	Tons.	4,200	Knots.	29	Tons.	—	Tons.	25	3 3-pr.	...	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Chidori</i>	1900	Normand	...	137	4,200	29	29	13	25	3 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Hashitaka</i>	1904	Kobe	137	4,200	29	29	—	25·5	1 12-pr.; 2 6-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Hato</i>	1902	Kure	137	4,200	29	29	—	25	3 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Hayabusa</i>	1900	Normand	...	137	4,200	29	29	13	25·5	3 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Hibari</i>	1903	Kure	137	4,200	29	29	—	25	3 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Kami</i>	1904	Kure	137	4,200	29	29	—	25	1 12-pr.; 2 6-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Kari</i>	1902	Kure	137	4,200	29	29	—	25	3 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Kasasagi</i>	1900	Normand	...	137	4,200	29	29	13	25·5	3 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Kotaka</i>	1886	Yarrow	...	182	1,217	19·5	19·5	30	60	2 machine guns	4	—	—	—	28
<i>Manadzuru</i>	1900	Normand	...	137	4,200	28·9	28·9	13	25·5	3 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Otori</i>	1904	Kobe	137	4,200	29	29	—	—	1 12-pr.; 2 6-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Tsubame</i>	1903	Kure	137	4,200	29	29	—	—	3 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Sagi</i>	1904	Kure	137	4,200	29	29	—	—	1 12-pr.; 2 6-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Shirataka</i>	1900	Schichau	...	123	2,600	28	28	—	20	3 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	—
<i>Uzura</i>	1904	Kure	137	4,200	29	29	—	—	1 12-pr.; 2 6-pr.	3	—	—	—	—

(d) TORPEDO BOATS—SECOND CLASS.

(70 Tons and less than 120.)

<i>Fukurya</i>	1886	Schichau	...	111	1,400	20	20	18	—	2 3-pr.	4	—	—	—	20
No. 21	1892	Normand	...	78	1,018	21	21	7	—	1 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	16
No. 24	1894	Onohama	...	78	1,018	21	21	7	—	1 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	16
No. 25	1895	Schichau	...	94	904	17	17	10	—	2 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	20
No. 26	1886	—	...	81	577	14	14	8	—	1 3-pr.	3	—	—	—	—

(d) TORPEDO BOATS—SECOND CLASS—*continued.*

(70 Tons and less than 120.)

Number.	Date of Launch.	Builders' Name or Where Built.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.		Armament.			Comple-ment.
						Normal.	Maximum.	Ordnance.	Torpedoes.		
									No. of Tubes.	No. of Torpedoes.	
No. 29	1898	Normand	Tons. 89	2,000	Knots. 26	Tons. —	Tons. 15	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 30	1898	Normand	89	2,000	26	—	15	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 31	1899	Schichau	81	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 32	1899	Schichau	81	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 33	1899	Schichau	81	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 34	1899	Schichau	81	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 35	1899	Schichau	81	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 36	1899	Schichau	81	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 37	1899	Schichau	81	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 38	1899	Schichau	81	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 39	1900	Yarrow	110	2,000	27	—	32	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 40	1900	Yarrow	110	2,000	27	—	32	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 41	1900	Yarrow	110	2,000	27	—	32	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 42	1900	Yarrow	110	2,000	27	—	32	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 43	1900	Yarrow	110	2,000	27	—	32	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 44	1900	Schichau	82	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—
No. 45	1900	Schichau	82	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—

No. 46	1900	Schichau	82	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 47	1900	Schichau	82	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 48	1900	Schichau	82	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 49	1900	Schichau	82	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 60	1901	Schichau	82	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 61	1901	Schichau	82	1,200	24	—	14	1	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 62	1901	Yarrow	110	2,000	27	—	32	1	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 63	1901	Yarrow	110	2,000	27	—	32	1	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 64	1901	Yarrow	110	2,000	27	—	32	1	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 65	1901	Yarrow	110	2,000	27	—	32	1	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 66	1901	Yarrow	110	2,000	27	—	32	1	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 67	1902	Yokosuka	88	1,200	24	—	—	2	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 68	1902	Yokosuka	88	1,200	24	—	—	2	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 69	1902	Sasebo	88	1,200	24	—	—	2	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 70	1902	Sasebo	88	1,200	24	—	—	2	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 71	1902	Sasebo	88	1,200	24	—	—	2	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 72	1902	Yokosuka	88	1,200	24	—	—	2	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 73	1902	Yokosuka	88	1,200	24	—	—	2	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 74	1902	Kobe ...	88	1,200	24	—	—	2	3-pr.	3	—	—
No. 75	1902	Kobe ...	88	1,200	24	—	—	2	3-pr.	3	—	—

(4182)

(c) TORPEDO BOATS—THIRD CLASS.
(20 Tons and less than 70.)

No. 5	1892	Creusot	53	525	20	8	—	1	3-pr.	2	—	16
No. 6	1892	Creusot	53	525	20	8	—	1	3-pr.	2	—	16
No. 7	1892	Creusot	53	525	20	8	—	1	3-pr.	2	—	16
No. 8	1892	Creusot	53	525	20	8	—	1	3-pr.	2	—	16
No. 9	1892	Creusot	53	525	20	8	—	1	3-pr.	2	—	16

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(e) TORPEDO BOATS, THIRD CLASS—*continued*.
(20 Tons and less than 70.)

Number.	Date of Launch.	Builders' Name or Where Built.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.		Armament.			Comple-ment.	
						Normal.	Maximum.	Ordnance.	No. of Tubes.	Torpedoes.		No. of Torpedoes.
No. 10	1892	Onohama	53	525	20	—	8	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 11	1894	Onohama	53	525	20	—	8	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 12	1893	Onohama	53	525	20	—	8	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 13	1893	Onohama	53	525	20	—	8	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 14	1893	Onohama	53	525	20	—	8	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 15	1893	Creusot	52	540	20	—	4	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 17	1893	Onohama	52	525	20	—	8	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 18	1893	Onohama	52	525	20	—	8	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 19	1894	Onohama	52	525	20	—	8	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 20	1893	Onohama	52	540	20	—	4	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 27	1886	Stettin...	69	577	16	—	8	1	3-pr.	...	3	16
No. 50	1900	Yokosuka	53	700	20	—	—	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 51	1900	Yokosuka	53	700	20	—	—	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 52	1900	Yokosuka	53	700	20	—	—	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 53	1900	Kure ...	53	700	20	—	—	1	3-pr.	...	2	16
No. 54	1900	Kure ...	53	700	20	—	—	1	3-pr.	...	2	16

APPENDIX O.
JAPANESE AUXILIARY VESSELS.

Name.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Gross Tonnage.	Arma-ment.	Comple-ment.
<i>Aki Maru</i> ...	1902	Nagasaki	6,443	—	
<i>America Maru</i> ...	1898	Newcastle	6,307	2 4·7" ; 6 6-pr.	
<i>Ariake Maru</i> ...	1889	South Shields	2,987	—	
<i>Atagosan Maru</i> ...	1897	Dumbar-ton	2,043	—	
<i>Bushu Maru</i> ...	1883	Dundee ...	1,249	—	
<i>Buyo Maru</i> ...	1889	Leith ...	1,163	—	
<i>Dairen Maru</i> ...	1875	Dumbar-ton	2,926	—	
<i>Fukuoka Maru</i> ...	1885	Newcastle	2,744	—	
<i>Fuso Maru</i> ...	1895	Osaka ...	318	—	
<i>Genkai Maru</i> ...	1891	Glasgow ...	1,446	—	
<i>Hakuai Maru</i> ...	1898	Renfrew ...	2,636	—	
<i>Heijo Maru</i> ...	1903	Kobe ...	1,201	—	
<i>Hijikawa Maru</i> ...	1897	Kobe ...	564	—	
<i>Hikosan Maru</i> ...	1892	Sunderland	3,712	—	
<i>Himekawa Maru</i>	1894	Osaka ...	420	—	
<i>Hinode Maru</i> ...	1872	London ...	1,115	—	
<i>Hitachi Maru</i> ...	1898	Nagasaki...	6,172	—	
<i>Hokoku Maru</i> ...	1870	Glasgow ...	2,766	—	
<i>Hongkong Maru</i> ...	1898	Sunderland	6,169	2 4·7" ; 6 6-pr.	
<i>Ise Maru</i> ...	1883	Paisley ...	1,250	—	
<i>Izumi Maru</i> ...	1893	Newcastle	3,229	—	
<i>Jinsen Maru</i> ...	1877	Glasgow ...	2,331	—	
<i>Kagawa Maru</i> ...	1903	Kobe ...	613	—	
<i>Kaijo Maru</i> ...	1902	Osaka ...	284	—	
<i>Kasuga Maru</i> ...	1897	Glasgow ...	3,819	Light guns	
<i>Kinshu Maru</i> ...	1890	Middles- brough	3,853	—	
<i>Kobe Maru</i> ...	1888	Glasgow ...	2,877	—	
<i>Kochi Maru</i> ...	1890	Osaka ...	329	—	
<i>Koryo Maru</i> ...	1903	Osaka ...	745	—	
<i>Kosai Maru</i> ...	1898	Renfrew ...	2,635	—	
<i>Koto Maru</i> ...	1883	Glasgow ...	3,182	—	

JAPANESE AUXILIARY VESSELS—*continued.*

Name.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Gross Tonnage.	Armament.	Complement.
<i>Kumano Maru</i> ...	1901	Glasgow ...	5,076	Light guns	
<i>Manda Maru</i> ...	1900	Osaka ...	248	—	
<i>Mandasan Maru</i>	1901	Sunderland	4,513	—	
<i>Manshu Maru</i> ...	1894	Greenock	5,248	—	
<i>Miike Maru</i> ...	1888	Sunderland	3,364	—	
<i>Miyo-Jima Maru</i>	1902	Osaka ...	273	—	
<i>Mukogawa Maru</i>	1893	Osaka ...	417	—	
<i>Nikko Maru</i> ...	1903	Nagasaki...	5,538	Light guns	
<i>Nippon Maru</i> ...	1898	Sunderland	6,168	2 4.7" ; 6 6-pr.	
<i>Okinawa Maru</i> ...	1896	Renfrew ...	2,232	—	
<i>Onogawa Maru</i> ...	1893	Kobe ...	318	—	
<i>Otagawa Maru</i> ...	1893	Osaka ...	408	—	
<i>Otaru Maru</i> ...	1886	Newcastle	2,547	—	
<i>Sado Maru</i> ...	1897	Belfast ...	6,222	—	
<i>Saikyo Maru</i> ...	1888	Glasgow ...	2,904	—	
<i>Sakura Maru</i> ...	1887	Glasgow ...	2,978	—	
<i>Shibata Maru</i> ...	1886	Sunderland	2,783	—	
<i>Shinano Maru</i> ...	1900	Glasgow ...	6,387	—	
<i>Taichu Maru</i> ...	1897	Sunderland	3,319	2 4.7" ; 6 6-pr.	
<i>Taihoku Maru</i> ...	1891	Newcastle	2,796	—	
<i>Tainan Maru</i> ...	1897	Sunderland	3,311	2 4.7" ; 6 6-pr.	
<i>Taro Maru</i> ...	1890	Greenock	3,165	—	
<i>Tenshin Maru</i> ...	1889	W. Hartlepool	2,942	—	
<i>Uwajima Maru</i> No. 5	1895	Kobe ...	377	—	
<i>Uwajima Maru</i> No. 6	1901	Osaka ...	444	—	
<i>Yamaguchi Maru</i>	1890	Sunderland	3,320	—	
<i>Yawata Maru</i> ...	1898	Glasgow ...	3,816	2 4.7" ; 6 6-pr.	
<i>Yehime Maru</i> ...	1903	Kobe ...	613	—	
<i>Yeiko Maru</i> ...	1903	Nagasaki...	1,966	—	
<i>Yoshidagawa Maru</i>	1890	Osaka ...	309	—	

APPENDIX P.
RUSSIAN WAR VESSELS.
(a) BATTLESHIPS, CRUISERS, GUNBOATS AND MINING TRANSPORTS.

Name.	Class.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.		Maximum Thickness of Armour.				Armament.		Complement.	
							Normal.	Maximum.	W.L.	Deck.	Gun Protection.	Conning Tower.	Ordnance.	Submerged.		Torpedo Tubes.
<i>Aleut</i> ...	Mining transport	1886	Christiania ...	Tons. 892	730	Knots. 12.2	Tons. —	70	Ins. —	Ins. —	Ins. —	Ins. —	—	—	—	104
<i>Amur</i> ...	Mining transport	Nov., 1898	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	3,017	4,890	17.4	—	400	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	317
<i>Askold</i> ...	Cruiser, 1st class protected	Mar., 1900	Kiel (Germania Yard)	5,905	19,000	23	—	1,100	—	3	—	6	2	4	—	573
<i>Bayan</i> ...	Armoured cruiser	June, 1900	Toulon (Forges et Chantiers)	7,726	16,500	21	8	1,100	2	6	6 $\frac{5}{16}$	6	2	2	—	573

<i>Bobr</i>	Gunboat ...	1885	Abo (Crichton's Works)	1,230	1,140	11.2	170	250	—	—	—	—	—	1 9-in.; 1 6-in.; 6 9-pr.; 2 3-pr.; 1 2½-in.; 4 machine guns	—	170	
<i>Bogatuir</i> ✓	Cruiser, 1st class protected	Jan., 1901	Stettin (Vulcan Works)	6,645	19,500	23	900	1,430	—	2¾	5	5½	2	12 6-in.; 12 12-pr.; 6 3-pr.; 2 2½-pr.; 4 machine guns	2	4	575
<i>Boyarin</i> ...	Cruiser, 3rd class protected	June, 1901	Copenhagen (Burmeister and Wain)	3,200	11,500	22	—	600	—	—	2	3	—	6 4.7-in.; 8 3-pr.; 1 2½-in.; 3 machine guns	—	5	266
<i>Diana</i> ✓	Cruiser, 1st class protected	Oct., 1899	St. Petersburg (Gallermi Island)	6,657	12,129	19	900	1,430	—	3	—	6	2	8 6-in.; 24 12-pr.; 2 2½-in.; 8 machine guns	2	1	570
<i>Dzhigit</i> ...	Gunboat ...	1876	St. Petersburg	1,516	1,383	12	—	250	—	—	—	—	—	2 6-in.; 4 9-pr.; 4 3-pr.; 1 2½-in.; 6 machine guns	—	1	188
<i>Gaidamak</i>	Torpedo gunboat	1893	Abo (Crichton's Works)	405	3,330	20	—	90	—	—	—	—	—	6 3-pr.; 3 machine guns	2	65	
<i>Gilyak</i> ...	Gunboat ...	1896	St. Petersburg (New Dockyard)	1,251	1,000	12	170	250	—	½	—	—	—	1 4.7-in.; 5 12-pr.; 4 3-pr.; 2 2½-in.; 3 machine guns	—	1	170
<i>Gremyashchi</i> ✓	Armoured gunboat	May, 1892	St. Petersburg (New Dockyard)	1,700	2,000	14.5	100	200	5	1½	—	1	—	1 9-in.; 1 6-in.; 4 12-pr.; 6 3-pr.; 4 machine guns	—	2	188
<i>Gromoboi</i>	Armoured cruiser	May, 1899	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	13,220	15,500	20	800	2,500	6	2½	4¾	12	4	24 12-pr.; 12 3-pr.; 2 2½-in.; 22 machine guns	4	—	874
<i>Koreetz</i> ...	Gunboat ...	Aug., 1886	Stockholm (Bergsund's Works)	1,270	1,564	13.5	—	250	—	¾	—	—	—	2 8-in.; 1 6-in.; 4 9-pr.; 1 2½-in.; 6 machine guns	—	1	179
<i>Mandzbur</i>	Gunboat ...	Dec., 1886	Copenhagen (Burmeister and Wain)	1,437	1,964	13.3	—	240	—	¾	—	—	—	2 8-in.; 4 9-pr.; 1 6-in.; 1 2½-in.; 6 machine guns	—	1	179

(4) BATTLESHIPS, CRUISERS, GUNBOATS AND MINING TRANSPORTS—continued.

Name.	Class.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.		Maximum Thickness of Armour.			Armament.		Complement.	
							Normal.	Maximum.	W.L.	Deck.	Gun Protection.	Conning Tower.	Ordnance.		Submerged.
<i>Novik</i> ✓	Cruiser, 3rd class protected	Aug., 1900	Elbing (Schi-chau)	Tons. 3,080	17,000	Knots. 25	Tons. 400	500	Ins. —	Ins. —	Ins. 1 $\frac{3}{4}$	6 4.7-in.; 6 3-pr.; 1 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ -in.; 4 machine guns		—	5
<i>Otrazhni</i>	Armoured gunboat	May, 1892	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	1,854	2,500	14.2	100	200	5	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	1 9-in.; 1 6-in.; 4 12-pr.; 6 3-pr.; 5 machine guns	—	2	188
<i>Pallada</i> ✓	Cruiser, 1st class protected	Aug., 1899	St. Petersburg (Gallerni Island)	6,823	13,108	19.3	900	1,430	—	3	6	8 6-in.; 24 12-pr.; 2 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ -in.; 8 machine guns	2	1	570
<i>Peresvyet</i>	Battleship, 1st class	May, 1898	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	12,674	13,775	18.6	1,060	2,060	9	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	6	4 10-in.; 11 6-in.; 20 12-pr.; 20 3-pr.; 2 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ -in.; 8 machine guns	2	3	776
<i>Petrovavlovsk</i> ✓	Battleship, 1st class	Nov., 1894	St. Petersburg (Gallerni Island)	11,354	11,213	16.9	700	1,500	15	3	9	4 12-in.; 12 6-in.; 10 3-pr.; 2 2 $\frac{3}{8}$ -in.; 28 machine guns	2	4	642

<i>Pobiyada</i> ...	Battleship, 1st class	May, 1900	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	12,692	15,492	18.5	1,060	2,060	9	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	9	6	4 10-in.; 11 6-in.; 20 12-pr.; 21 3-pr.; 2 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -in.; 9 machine guns	2	3	778
<i>Poltava</i>	Battleship, 1st class	Nov., 1894	St. Petersburg (New Dockyard)	10,960	11,255	16.3	700	1,500	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	3	10	9	4 12-in.; 12 6-in.; 12 3-pr.; 2 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -in.; 28 machine guns	2	4	651
<i>Razboinik</i>	Gunboat	1878	St. Petersburg (Newski Works)	1,477	1,477	13.1	—	250	—	—	—	—	2 6-in.; 4 9-pr.; 4 3-pr.; 1 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -in.; 6 machine guns	—	1	186
<i>Retvizan</i>	Battleship, 1st class	Oct., 1900	Philadelphia (Cramp and Sons)	12,902	16,121	18.8	1,000	2,000	9	3	10	10	4 12-in.; 12 6-in.; 20 12-pr.; 24 3-pr.; 2 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -in.; 12 machine guns	2	4	778
<i>Rossiya</i> ...	Armoured cruiser	May, 1896	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	13,675	18,426	19.7	1,000	2,500	8	2	5	12	4 8-in.; 16 6-in.; 12 12-pr.; 20 3-pr.; 2 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -in.; 16 machine guns	—	5	839
<i>Rurik</i> ...	Armoured cruiser	Nov., 1892	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	11,690	13,588	18.8	1,000	2,000	10	3	—	6	4 8-in.; 16 6-in.; 6 4.7-in.; 10 3-pr.; 2 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -in.; 12 machine guns	—	6	719*
<i>Sevastopol</i>	Battleship, 1st class	June, 1895	St. Petersburg (Galeri Island)	11,842	10,600	17	700	1,500	14 $\frac{1}{2}$	3	10	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	4 12-in.; 12 6-in.; 12 3-pr.; 2 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -in.; 28 machine guns	2	4	651
<i>Sivuch</i> ...	Gunboat	1884	Stockholm (Bergsund's Works)	1,134	1,125	11.7	170	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$	—	—	1 9-in.; 1 6-in.; 6 9-pr.; 1 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -in.; 4 machine guns	—	—	170
<i>Tzesarevich</i>	Battleship, 1st class	Feb., 1901	Toulon (Forges et Chantiers)	12,900	16,300	18	1,350	—	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	10	10	4 12-in.; 12 6-in.; 20 12-pr.; 20 3-pr.; 2 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -in.; 12 machine guns	2	2	782

* Number of men on board on 14th August was 805.

(a) BATTLESHIPS, CRUISERS, GUNBOATS AND MINING TRANSPORTS—continued.

Name.	Class.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Dis- place- ment.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.		Maximum Thickness of Armour.				Armament.			Complement.
							Normal.	Maximum.	W.L.	Deck.	Gun Protection.	Conning Tower.	Ordnance.	Sub-merged.	Torpedo Tubes.	
<i>Varyag</i> ✓	Cruiser, 1st class protected	Oct., 1899	Philadelphia (Cramp and Sons)	6,500	19,158	23.2	Tons. 600	Tons. 1,250	Ins. —	Ins. 3	Ins. —	Ins. 9				—
<i>Vsadnik</i>	Torpedo gun-boat	1893	Abo (Origh-ton's Works)	432	3,300	20	—	90	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	65
<i>Yevisei</i> ...	Mining transport	Feb., 1899	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	3,000	4,958	18	—	400	—	‡	—	—	—	—	1	317
<i>Zabiyaka</i>	Gunboat ...	1878	Philadelphia (Cramp and Sons)	1,236	1,426	14.2	—	270	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	155

* Number of men on board on 9th February was 553.

(b) DESTROYERS.

Name.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.	Armament.			Complement.
							Ordnance.	Torpedoes.		
								No. of Tubes.	No. of Torpedoes.	
<i>Bätelni</i> ...	1900	Elbing (Schichau)	Tons. 350	6,000	Knots. 27	Tons. 80	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr....	3	—	62
<i>Bezposhadni</i>	1900	Elbing (Schichau)	346	6,000	27	80	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr....	3	—	62
<i>Bezshumni</i> ...	1899	Elbing (Schichau)	346	6,000	27	80	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr....	3	—	62
<i>Bezstrashni</i> ...	1899	Elbing (Schichau)	346	6,000	27	80	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr....	3	—	32
<i>Boevoi</i> ...	1899	Birkenhead (Laird)	350	6,000	27	80	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr....	2	—	62
<i>Boiti</i> ...	1901	St. Petersburg (Nevski Works)	350	5,700	26	80	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr....	3	6	62
<i>Burni</i> ...	1901	St. Petersburg (Nevski Works)	350	5,700	26	80	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr....	3	6	62
<i>Grozovoi</i> ...	1902	Havre (Forges et Chantiers)	312	4,750	26	60	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr....	2	—	57
<i>Lieutenant Burakov*</i>	1898	Elbing (Schichau)	280	6,000	33.6	67	6 3-pr. ...	2	—	56
<i>Rastoropnii†</i>	1902	St. Petersburg (Izhora Works)	240	3,800	27.5	60	1 12-pr.; 3 3-pr....	2	—	51

* Captured from the Chinese.

† Sent out in sections and put together at Port Arthur.

(b) DESTROYERS—continued.

Name.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.	Armament.			Complement.
							Ordnance.	Torpedoes.		
								No. of Tubes.	No. of Torpedoes.	
<i>Razvashchi</i> *	1902	St. Petersburg (Izhora Works) ...	240	3,800	27·5	60	1 12-pr. ; 3 3-pr. ...	2	—	51
<i>Ryeshitel'ni</i> *	1902	St. Petersburg (Izhora Works) ...	240	3,800	27·5	60	1 12-pr. ; 3 3-pr. ...	2	—	51
<i>Serdit'</i> *	1902	St. Petersburg (Nevski Works) ...	240	3,800	26·5	60	1 12-pr. ; 3 3-pr. ...	2	—	51
<i>Silni</i> *	1901	St. Petersburg (Nevski Works) ...	240	3,800	26·5	60	1 12-pr. ; 3 3-pr. ...	2	—	51
<i>Skorni</i> *	1903	St. Petersburg (Nevski Works) ...	240	3,800	26·5	60	1 12-pr. ; 3 3-pr. ...	2	—	51
<i>Smygli</i> *	1902	St. Petersburg (Nevski Works) ...	240	3,800	26·5	60	1 12-pr. ; 3 3-pr. ...	2	—	51
<i>Statni</i> *	1903	St. Petersburg (Nevski Works) ...	240	3,800	26·5	60	1 12-pr. ; 3 3-pr. ...	2	—	51
<i>Steregushchi</i> *	1903	St. Petersburg (Nevski Works) ...	240	3,800	26·5	60	1 12-pr. ; 3 3-pr. ...	2	—	51
<i>Storozhoi</i> *	1902	St. Petersburg (Nevski Works) ...	240	3,800	26·5	60	1 12-pr. ; 3 3-pr. ...	2	—	51

<i>Strashni</i> * ...	1903	St. Petersburg (Nevski Works) ...	240	3,800	26·5	60	1 12-pr.; 3 3-pr. ...	2	—	51
<i>Stroini</i> * ...	1903	St. Petersburg (Nevski Works) ...	240	3,800	26·5	60	1 12-pr.; 3 3-pr. ...	2	—	51
<i>Vlastni</i> ...	1901	Havre (Forges et Chantiers) ...	312	4,750	26	60	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr. ...	2	—	57
<i>Vnimatelni</i> ...	1899	Havre (Normand) ...	312	4,750	27	60	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr. ...	2	—	57
<i>Vnushitelni</i>	1900	Havre (Forges et Chantiers) ...	312	4,750	26	60	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr. ...	2	—	57
<i>Vunosilivi</i> ...	1901	Havre (Normand) ...	312	4,750	27	60	1 12-pr.; 5 3-pr. ...	2	—	57

* Sent out in sections and put together at Port Arthur.

(c) TORPEDO BOATS—FIRST CLASS.

Number.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.	Armament.			Complement.
							Ordnance.	Torpedoes.		
								No. of Tubes.	No. of Torpedoes.	
No. 201	1887	St. Petersburg (Mechanical Works) ...	Tons. 76	969	17.2	Tons. 29	2 machine guns	2	—	21
No. 202	1887	St. Petersburg (Mechanical Works) ...	76	969	16.8	29	2 machine guns	2	—	21
No. 203	1889	Abo (Crichton's Works)	175	1,956	20.4	30	3 machine guns	3	—	21
No. 204	1889	Abo (Crichton's Works)	175	2,039	19.5	30	3 machine guns	3	—	21
No. 205	1886	Havre (Normand) ...	96	737	19.2	29	2 machine guns	2	—	21
No. 206	1886	Havre (Normand) ...	108	837	19.7	29	2 machine guns	2	—	21
No. 208	1897	St. Petersburg (New Dockyard) ...	120	1,460	18.5	40	2 machine guns	3	—	21
No. 209	1897	St. Petersburg (New Dockyard) ...	120	1,460	18.5	40	2 machine guns	3	—	21
No. 210	1898	St. Petersburg (Izhora Works) ...	120	1,460	18.5	40	2 machine guns	3	—	21
No. 211	1898	St. Petersburg (Izhora Works) ...	120	1,460	18.5	40	2 machine guns	3	—	21

(d) TORPEDO BOATS—SECOND CLASS.

Number.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.	Armament.		Complement.
							Ordnance.	Torpedoes.	
No. 91	1878	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	Tons. 24	220	—	Tons. —	—	1 Whitehead	8
No. 92	1878	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	24	220	—	—	—	1 Whitehead	8
No. 93	1877	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	24	220	—	—	—	1 Whitehead	8
No. 94	1878	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	23	220	—	—	—	1 Whitehead	8
No. 95	1878	St. Petersburg (Baltic Works)	23	220	—	—	—	1 Whitehead	8
No. 97	1878	Abo (Crichton's Works)	23	220	—	—	—	1 Whitehead	8
No. 98	1878	Baird	23	220	—	—	—	2 spar	8
								2 spar	8

APPENDIX Q.
RUSSIAN AUXILIARY VESSELS.

Name.	Class.	Date of Launch.	Where Built.	Displacement.	I.H.P.	Speed.	Coal Supply.	Armament.	Complement.	Remarks.
<i>Angara</i> ...	Hospital ship ... (Port Arthur)	1898	Clydebank ...	Tons. 12,050	16,800	Knots. 20 Under	Tons. 1,583	Under Red Cross ...	—	Ex-Volunteer steamship <i>Moskva</i> .
<i>Argun</i> ...	Armed transport (Vladivostok)	1902	Middlesbrough	7,000	—	12	—	Not known	—	Ex-Renck (Hamburg) steamship <i>Hafsa</i> .
<i>Bogatuir</i> ...	Mining vessel ... (temporarily)	—	—	About 500*	—	10	—	Under merchant ensign	—	
<i>Kamchadal</i> ...	Transport ... (Vladivostok)	1892	Glasgow	900	—	11.5	—	2 machine guns ...	—	
<i>Kazan</i> ...	Hospital ship ... (Port Arthur)	1900	Newcastle ...	9,755	4,000	12.5	1,481	Under Red Cross ...	—	Volunteer steamship.
<i>Lena</i> ...	Armed transport (Vladivostok)	1896	Newcastle ...	10,675	13,100	19.5	1,440	3 4.7"; 12 12-pr.; 8 machine guns	—	Ex-Volunteer steamship <i>Kherson</i> .
<i>Mongolia</i> ...	Hospital ship ... (Port Arthur)	1901	Trieste ...	2,937*	4,750	16	—	Under Red Cross...	—	Owned by Chinese Eastern Railway Co.
<i>Mongugai</i> ...	Patrol duty ... (Vladivostok)	1891	Flensburg ...	1,012*	—	Under 12	—	Not known	—	Ex-Struve (Germany) steamship <i>Pronto</i> .
<i>Nadezhni</i> ...	Ice-breaker ... (Vladivostok)	1896	Copenhagen ...	1,525	2,920	13.8	—	2 machine guns ...	—	
<i>Peterburg</i> ...	Volunteer steamship	1894	Newcastle ...	9,460	11,200	19	1,100	7 6-in.; 4 12-pr.; 12 machine guns	—	

<i>Selenga</i> ...	Armed transport (Vladivostok)	1899	W. Hartlepool	6,219	—	9	—	Not known	...	—	Ex-Anderson (Ham- burg) steamship <i>Claudius</i> .
<i>Silach</i> ...	Harbour vessel (Port Arthur)	1890	Gothenburg ...	738	1,000	11.5	—	2 machine guns	...	48	
<i>Smolensk</i> ...	Volunteer steam- ship	1902	Newcastle ...	12,050	16,500	20	1,580	8 4-7-in.; 8 12- pr.; 6 3-pr.; 2 machine guns.	...	—	
<i>Sungari</i> ...	Armed transport (Vladivostok)	—	Newcastle ...	6,970	—	9	—	Not known	...	—	Ex-Anderson (Ham- burg) steamship <i>Tiberius</i> .
<i>Ussuri</i> ...	Armed transport (Vladivostok)	1893	Belfast ...	3,400	—	—	—	Not known	...	—	Ex-Jebsen (Ham burg) steamship <i>Elisa</i> .
<i>Yakut</i> ...	Transport ... (Vladivostok)	1880	Purchased in England in 1892	700	867	12	—	2 3-pr.; 2 machine guns	...	95	

* Gross tonnage.

APPENDIX R.
 MERCHANT VESSELS SEIZED OR SUNK UP TO THE 19TH AUGUST, 1904.
 (a) VESSELS SEIZED BY JAPANESE.

Name.	Nationality.	Gross Tonnage.	Voyage.	Cargo.	Place of Capture.	Date of Capture.	Remarks.
<i>Ekaterinoslav</i>	Russian	5,627	Vladivostok to Odessa	General	Near Fusan	6.2.04	Appeal dismissed by Higher Court. Now under Japanese flag; name changed to <i>Karasaki Maru</i> . Cleared at Nagasaki on 5th February before hostilities commenced. Condemned by Sasebo Prize Court. Appeal rejected.
<i>Mukden</i>	Russian	1,567	Nagasaki to Vladivostok	General	Fusan	6.2.04	Afterwards owned by Japanese Navy Department and named <i>Hoten Maru</i> . Condemned on final appeal.
<i>Argun</i>	Russian	2,458	Dalny to Nagasaki	General	South - west Coast of Korea	7.2.04	Condemned on final appeal.
<i>Rossiya</i>	Russian	2,312	Dalny to Karatsu	General	South - west Coast of Korea	7.2.04	Appeal rejected. Now owned by Japanese Government. Present name <i>Saishin Maru</i> .
<i>Hermes</i>	Norwegian	1,358	Moji to Port Arthur	Coal	Near Port Arthur	9.2.04	Released 9th March by Sasebo Prize Court because vessel started before hostilities were known. Condemned on final appeal.
<i>Manchuria</i> (E.A. Co.)	Russian	6,193	Baltic to Port Arthur	Military stores, &c.	Near Port Arthur	9.2.04	Condemned on final appeal.

<i>Nikolai</i> (whaler) ...	Russian	124	Engaged fishing ...	None	...	East Coast of Korea	10.2.04	Condemned on final appeal.
<i>Alexandr</i> (whaling transport)	Russian	261	Engaged at fisheries	Provisions	...	Idzuhara	10.2.04	Condemned on final appeal. Afterwards owned by Japanese Navy Department and renamed <i>Re-kisan Maru</i> .
<i>Michail</i> ...	Russian	3,603	Engaged at fisheries	Iron bars, &c.	...	East Coast of Korea	10.2.04	This vessel is a whale oil factory. Condemned on final appeal.
<i>Kotik</i> ...	Russian	400	In port ...	Iron bars, &c.	...	Yokohama	12.2.04	No appeal against confiscation.
<i>Lyesnik</i> (schooner)	Russian	100	In port ...	Salt	...	Nagasaki	17.2.04	No appeal against confiscation.
<i>Manchuria</i> (E.C. Ry.)	Russian	2,937	Repairing	Provisions	...	Nagasaki	17.2.04	Unable to leave as engines dismantled. Condemned on final appeal.
<i>Nadeshda</i> (schooner)	Russian	68	In port ...	None	...	Hakodate	17.2.04	Sealing schooner. No appeal made
<i>Bobrik</i> (schooner) ...	Russian	125	In port ...	None	...	Hakodate	17.2.04	No appeal against confiscation.
<i>Brisgravia</i> ...	German	6,477	Hamburg to Kiaochao	General	...	Moji	28.3.04	Seized in consequence of guns on board, but released when shown they were for German Government at Kiaochao.
<i>Tarria</i> (schooner)	Russian	120	In port ...	None	...	Hakodate	13.4.04	Sealing schooner. No appeal against confiscation.
<i>Hsiping</i> ...	British	1,981	Shanghai to New-chuang	General	...	Near Chefoo	14.7.04	Contraband cargo for Newchung confiscated. Balance released.
<i>Peiping</i> ...	Chinese	400	Shanghai to New-chuang	General	...	Near Chefoo	17.7.04	Contraband cargo for Newchung confiscated. Balance released.
<i>Georges</i> ...	French	179	Shanghai to Port Arthur	Provisions	...	Near Port Arthur	19.8.04	Ship confiscated, cargo having been transferred to a Russian steamship. Appeal rejected.

(b) VESSELS SEIZED OR SUNK BY RUSSIANS.

Name.	Nationality.	Gross Tonnage.	Voyage.	Cargo.	Place of Capture.	Date of Capture.	Remarks.
<i>Argo</i>	Norwegian	1,394	—	—	Port Arthur ...	5.2.04	Released March 14th.
<i>Brand</i>	Norwegian	2,003	—	—	Port Arthur ...	5.2.04	Released March 14th.
<i>Seirstad</i>	Norwegian	995	—	—	Port Arthur ...	5.2.04	Released March 14th.
<i>Ras Bera</i>	British	3,837	—	—	Port Arthur ...	5.2.04	Escaped about February 13th.
<i>Foxton Hall</i>	British	4,247	—	Coal	Port Arthur ...	8.2.04	Released about March 12th. Vessel not damaged, but all loose articles taken, such as food, stores, ropes, &c., and certain parts of machinery. Surveyed at Chefoo in view of claim against Russian Government.
<i>Fu-Ping</i>	British	1,393	—	—	Port Arthur ...	Previous 10.2.04	Released February 10th. Fired on when leaving port. Afterwards put into Wei-hai-wei to repair the damage.
<i>Hsi-Ping</i>	British	1,981	Ching-wang-tao to Shanghai	—	Off Port Arthur	10.2.04	Ordered to Dalny. Released after four days.
<i>Wenchow</i>	British	898	—	—	Port Arthur ...	Previous 11.2.04	Released about February 18th.
<i>Naganoura Maru</i>	Japanese	1,084	—	—	Off Tsugaru ...	11.2.04	Seized and sunk.
<i>Ethrickdale</i>	British	3,775	Barry to Sabang ...	Coal	In Red Sea ...	19.2.04	Released February 28th. Russian Government recognized claims advanced and agreed to pay an indemnity.

<i>Frankley</i>	British	4,182	Barry to Hong-kong	Coal	In Red Sea ...	19.2.04	Released February 28th. Russian Government recognized claims advanced and agreed to pay an indemnity.
<i>Mahaida</i>	Norwegian	3,480	Penarth to Sasebo	Coal	In Red Sea ...	19.2.04	Released 28th February.
<i>Rosahie</i>	British	4,303	—	—	—	—	At or near Vladivostok	Previous 22.2.04	Released February 22nd.
<i>Hanyei Maru</i>	Japanese	75	Chemulpo to Newchuang	—	—	—	Newchuang ...	26.3.04	Seized and sunk.
<i>Fa-Wan</i>	British	—	—	—	—	—	—	About 2.4.04	Released April 3rd.
<i>Goyo Maru</i>	Japanese	600	—	—	—	—	Gensan Harbour	25.4.04	Seized and sunk. (Had not discharged her cargo.)
<i>Haginozura Maru</i>	Japanese	219	—	—	—	—	Japan Sea ...	25.4.04	Seized and sunk.
Junks (46 in No.)	—	—	Bound to Tientsin	Fish and vegetables	Liao River ...	About 10.5.04	Seized.
<i>Allanton</i>	British	4,253	Mororan to Singapore	Coal	Japan Sea ...	16.6.04	Released November 9th. Ship and cargo declared lawful prize by Vladivostok Court. Decision reversed by Admiralty Council at St. Petersburg.
<i>Ansei Maru</i> (sailing vessel)	...	Japanese	105	—	—	—	—	Between Oku and Kojima Islands	16.6.04	Seized and sunk.
<i>Yawata Maru</i> (sailing vessel)	...	Japanese	198	—	—	—	—	Between Oku and Kojima Islands	16.6.04	Seized and sunk.
<i>Seiyei Maru</i> (sailing vessel)	...	Japanese	114	—	—	—	—	—	16.6.04	Seized and sunk.
<i>Hatsiman Maru</i> (schooner)	...	Japanese	—	—	—	—	—	—	16.6.04	Seized and sunk.
<i>Hatsuku Maru</i> (schooner)	...	Japanese	200	—	—	—	—	—	18.6.04	Seized and taken to Vladivostok.
<i>Seisho Maru</i> (schooner)	...	Japanese	122	—	—	—	—	Gensan ...	30.6.04	Seized and sunk.

(b) VESSELS SEIZED OR SUNK BY RUSSIANS—continued.

Name.	Nationality.	Gross Tonnage.	Voyage.	Cargo.	Place of Capture.	Date of Capture.	Remarks.
<i>Koun Maru</i> <i>Cheltenham</i>	Japanese ... British ...	57 3,741	— Otaru to Fusan ...	— Chiefly 67,500 sleepers and logs and 375 cases of beer	Gensan ... Off Coast of Japan. (In Japan Sea)	30.6.04 4.7.04	Seized and sunk. Seized and taken to Vladivostok. Court of Appeal at St. Petersburg confirmed confiscation of both vessel and cargo.
<i>Malacca</i> ...	British ...	4,045	Antwerp and London to China and Japan	3,000 tons general and 40 tons of explosives for Hong-Kong	In Red Sea ...	13.7.04	Released at Algiers July 27th, after the British Consul had certified that the military stores on board were the property of the British Government and that the remainder of the cargo was not contraband of war. Claim made and believed settled. Released.
<i>Dragoman</i> ...	British ...	3,496	Batoum to China	—	In Red Sea ...	Previous 15.7.04	Released.
<i>Fa-Wan</i> ...	British ...	—	—	—	In Japan Sea	Previous 15.7.04	Released after having given up 31 sacks of letters and 24 sacks and boxes of parcels intended for Japan. The German Government obtained satisfactory replies to its representations with regard to this vessel.
<i>Prinz Heinrich</i>	German ...	6,263	Hamburg to Yokohama	—	In Red Sea ...	16.7.04	

<i>Hipsang</i>	British	... 1,659	Newchuang Chefoo	to	Provisions, &c. ...	Off	Pigeon Bay	16.7.04	Torpedoed for refusing to stop when ordered. Shanghai Naval Court found was torpedoed with- out just cause. A commission was appointed about April 2nd, 1905, to examine claim.
<i>Arzona</i>	British	... 3,553	New York Manila	to	—	In Red Sea ...	17.7.04	Released at Suez July 25th. Claim for detention to be made.	
<i>Skandia</i>	German	...	Hamburg to China		General and Gov- ernment stores	In Red Sea ...	About 19.7.04	Released July 24th. German Government obtained satisfac- tory replies to representations made with regard to this vessel.	
<i>Okassima Maru</i>	Japanese	...	—	—	—	Japan Sea ...	20.7.04	Seized and sunk.	
<i>Kyodounya Maru</i>	Japanese	... 147	—	—	—	Japan Sea ...	About 20.7.04	Released as most of her passengers were women.	
<i>Takashima Maru</i>	Japanese	... 319	—	—	160 boxes of pow- der for mining purposes and 589 bales of mis- cellaneous goods	Tsugaru Strait	20.7.04	Seized and sunk. (Note: Cargo valued at £50.)	
<i>Kiho Maru</i> ... (sailing vessel)	...	Japanese	... 140	—	—	—	Pacific Ocean near Tsugaru Strait	20.7.04	Seized and sunk.	
<i>Hokusei Maru</i> ... (schooner)	...	Japanese	... 91	—	—	—	Pacific Ocean near Tsugaru Strait	20.7.04	Seized and sunk.	

(b) VESSELS SEIZED OR SUNK BY RUSSIANS—continued.

Name.	Nationality.	Gross Tonnage.	Voyage.	Cargo.	Place of Capture.	Date of Capture.	Remarks.
<i>Arabia</i> ...	German ...	4,438	Portland (O.) to Hongkong	Flour, railway material, &c.	100 miles north of Yokohama	22.7.04	Decision of Prize Court at Vladivostok: 59,000 poods of flour for Japanese ports and the railway material confiscated. Steamer liberated with 142,500 poods of flour destined for Hongkong. The judgment of the Vladivostok Court quashed by Supreme Court at St. Petersburg December 3rd, 1904, as far as the portion of the cargo (flour) was concerned.
<i>Knight Commander</i>	British ...	4,306	New York to Chemulpo via Japan	General and railway material	75 miles south-west from Yokohama	24.7.04	Prize Court at Vladivostok declared vessel and cargo lawful prize. Appeal dismissed at St. Petersburg. Amount of claim £102,000.
<i>Jizai Maru</i> ...	Japanese ...	199	—	—	Near Gulf of Tokio	24.7.04	Seized and sunk.
(schooner) <i>Fukujin Maru</i> ...	Japanese ...	121	—	—	Near Gulf of Tokio	24.7.04	Seized and sunk.
(schooner) <i>Hakutsu Maru</i> ...	Japanese ...	91	—	—	Japan Sea ...	24.7.04	Seized and sunk.
<i>Tsinan</i> ...	British ...	2,269	Australia to Japan	—	Off Gulf of Tokio	24.7.04	Released for the purpose of carrying 21 lascars of the crew of the <i>Knight Commander</i> steamer to Yokohama.

<i>Thea</i>	German ...	1,613	For Yokohama ...	Fish manure and fish oil	Off Coast of Japan	25.7.04	Seized and sunk. The Supreme Court at St. Petersburg decided that the sinking of the steamer was unjustified and reversed the finding of the Vladivostok tribunal. Inasmuch as no appeal was lodged regarding the cargo the Vladivostok judgment on that point will stand.
<i>Calchas</i>	British	6,748	Tacoma to Japan, China and Liverpool	General and flour, 2,411 tons on board at time of seizure	30 miles from entrance to Gulf of Tokio	25.7.04	NOTE.—This vessel was chartered by the Oguri Co. at Kobe. The owners will present a claim for £39,000 as damages. (£22,000 was eventually paid, but no claim for belongings of seamen.) Released about October 29th, after the British Government had paid a security of 600,000 roubles. Was seized for carrying conditional contraband. Supreme Court at St. Petersburg confirmed cargo confiscated except wheat.
<i>Formosa</i>	British	4,045	London to Japan	—	In Red Sea ...	Previous 26.7.04	Released July 27th.
<i>Holsatia</i>	German	3,349	—	—	In Red Sea ...	Previous 27.7.04	Taken to Suez with prize crew on board. Released July 27th.

APPENDIX S.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF THE YELLOW SEA,
10TH AUGUST, 1904.

RUSSIAN.

Ship.	Killed.		Wounded.		Prisoners or Interned.		Total Losses.	
	Officers.	Other ratings.	Officers.	Other ratings.	Officers.	Other ratings.	Officers.	Other ratings.
<i>Tzesarevich</i>	4	9	9	41	28	741	32	750
<i>Retvizan</i>	—	6	5	38	—	—	5	44
<i>Pobyeda</i>	—	3	1	37	—	—	1	40
<i>Peresvyet</i>	1	12	9	68	—	—	10	80
<i>Sevastopol</i>	—	1	3	60	—	—	3	61
<i>Poltava</i>	1	11	3	40	—	—	4	51
<i>Pallada</i>	—	4	—	5	—	—	—	9
<i>Askold</i>	1	10	4	44	22	540	23	550
<i>Diana</i>	1	8	—	20	9	542	10	550
<i>Novik</i> (10.8.04)	—	2	1	6	—	—	1	8
<i>Novik</i> (20.8.04)	—	4	1	12	—	—	1	16
<i>Ryeshitelni</i> (11.8.04)	—	2	2	4	4	45	4	47
<i>Bezshumni</i>	—	—	—	—	4	58	4	58
<i>Bezposhchadni</i>	—	—	—	—	4	58	4	58
<i>Bezstrashni</i>	—	—	—	—	4	58	4	58
<i>Grozovoi</i>	—	—	—	—	4	53	4	53
<i>Burni</i>	—	—	—	—	4	61	4	61
Grand total	8	72	38	375	83	2,156	114	2,494

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF THE YELLOW SEA—*continued.*

JAPANESE.

Ship.	Killed.		Wounded.		Total Losses.	
	Officers.	Other ratings.	Officers.	Other ratings.	Officers.	Other ratings.
<i>Mikasa</i>	4	28	10	78	14	106
<i>Asahi</i>	—	—	1	1	1	1
<i>Yakumo</i>	—	12	—	10	—	22
<i>Nisshin</i>	6	10	2	28	8	38
<i>Kasuga</i>	—	—	—	11	—	11
<i>Chinyen</i>	—	—	—	6	—	6
<i>Idzumi</i>	—	—	—	1	—	1
<i>Asagiri</i>	1	8	—	—	1	8
T.B. No. 38 ...	—	1	1	7	1	8
Grand total ...	11	59	14	142	25	201

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF ULSAN, 14TH AUGUST, 1904.

RUSSIAN.

Ship.	Killed.		Wounded.		Prisoners or Interned.		Total Losses.	
	Officers.	Other ratings.	Officers.	Other ratings.	Officers.	Other ratings.	Officers.	Other ratings.
<i>Rurik</i>	9	171	9	230	13	612	22	783
<i>Rossiya</i>	1	46	6	147	—	—	7	193
<i>Gromoboi</i>	4	89	6	160	—	—	10	249
Grand total ...	14	306	21	537	13	612	39	1,225

In comparing casualties sustained in modern naval actions with those of former days it must be remembered that a far greater proportion of the crew are now employed below the waterline and are not exposed to gun-fire.

LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF ULSAN—*continued.*

JAPANESE.

Ship.	Killed.		Wounded.		Total Losses.	
	Officers.	Other ratings.	Officers.	Other ratings.	Officers.	Other ratings.
<i>Idzumo</i>	—	3	—	6	—	9
<i>Iwate</i>	2	37	5	32	7	69
<i>Adzuma</i>	—	—	—	8	—	8
<i>Tokiwa</i>	—	—	—	3	—	3
<i>Takachiho</i>	—	—	3	10	3	10
<i>Naniwa</i>	—	2	—	4	2	4
Grand total ...	2	42	8	63	12	103

In comparing casualties sustained in modern naval actions with those of former days it must be remembered that a far greater proportion of the crew are now employed below the waterline and are not exposed to gun-fire.

APPENDIX T.

DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY RUSSIAN SHIPS AT THE BATTLES OF THE
YELLOW SEA AND ULSAN.

Tzesarevich.—According to the account of the Russian officers, the ship was struck by fifteen 12-inch and by a far larger number of smaller projectiles, but the damage was not so great as might have been expected.

No guns were permanently disabled, nor were the engines injured, but some fragments of shell which had struck the funnels damaged the economiser tubes of her Belleville boilers. The thick armour was nowhere penetrated, and though each turret was struck once by a 12-inch shell the only damage done was by the flying of some of the smaller bolts which killed two men. Three 12-inch projectiles struck the funnels, and a hole $3\frac{1}{4}$ feet square was made in the ship's side below the fore turret by another. Both cables were shot through, causing the loss of the anchors. The foremost charthouse was blown to pieces. All the boats were riddled. Another 12-inch projectile passed through the upper deck, tearing away half a bollard. One projectile struck the side about 7 feet under water which, although it did not penetrate, caused a leak through which 150 tons of water entered the ship.

A 12-inch shell struck the conning tower and passed under the roof, killing or stunning all inside.* Another burst against the foremast, almost bringing it down; it killed Admiral Vitgeft and some of his staff and wounded many others.

An 8-inch shell struck the superstructure and damaged the boat-deck. Another passed through the lower edge of the after 6-inch turret, making a hole 3 feet by $1\frac{1}{2}$ in the side wall. The effect of the high-explosive gases on the men was serious. Some who had received no wound suffered from stupor, giddiness, loss of memory and headache, even 24 hours after the action.

Askold.—During the first action on August 10th this ship was hit twice. A 12-inch shell burst close above the upper deck near the foremost funnel, killing the officer who was working the range-finder and shattering the starboard side of the bridge. The lower plates of the foremost funnel were so much torn and bulged that the

* This shell is the one that caused the confusion to the Russian line.

uptake was blocked and the foremost boilers had to be disconnected. Another hit (ricochet) passed through the outer skin about $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet above the waterline and set fire to some 3-inch ready ammunition under the bridge, which burnt out without further damage.

In her action with the Japanese cruisers late in the afternoon, the *Askold* was struck by 13 large and a great number of small projectiles and fragments. Two of her funnels were shot away, and the aftermost boiler had seven tubes damaged by splinters. There were three hits on or just below the waterline, but the protective deck was not penetrated. About 100 tons of water entered the ship. No guns were permanently disabled. The boats were riddled by fragments and splinters. An ammunition hoist was disabled. Most of the other shell burst in the officers' quarters, but did not damage the ship much structurally, nor were there any large fires caused by their explosion.

Sevastopol.—A report on the damage to the *Sevastopol* on August 10th states that during one period of the action lasting 15 to 20 minutes no less than seven fires broke out in different parts of the vessel from shell fire, but in most cases there does not seem to have been any great difficulty in extinguishing them. One which occurred in the living space set fire to a considerable quantity of clothing, and the smoke which spread in the closed compartments rendered the work of extinguishing the fire difficult. No hole was made on or below the waterline. There were three hits on the 14-inch armour 3 to 4 feet below the waterline, which, although they did not penetrate, caused distortion of the frames and leakage through the armour bolts. This is put down to the insufficient strength of the backing. On the 6-inch armour above the waterline there were four hits; two of these from 12-inch high-explosive shell left only slight traces; the other two by armour piercing projectiles had more effect. One broke off a piece of the armour 3 feet by 4 feet, the other penetrated 4 inches and much distorted the frames behind, destroying an electric shell hoist which was fixed to the ship's side. The unarmoured portion was considerably damaged, but no details are given except that one high-explosive 12-inch shell struck the wardroom 3 feet above the waterline. Temporary repairs were carried out with the battleship's own resources in a week.

Peresvyet.—As stated in the narrative of the action, this ship received considerable damage to her hull. She is said to have been struck by 39 projectiles of various calibre in the action. Except for her fore turret being put out of action by two shells when the fight was at its fiercest, there is no record of loss to her armament, but several holes on or near the waterline caused the shipment of a considerable amount of water. As the result of two holes on the living deck forward, that deck was flooded to a depth of 2 to $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet both before and abaft the bulkhead; and a good deal of water found its way below before all the hatches were closed down.

A 12-inch projectile which struck the corner of an armoured plate under the starboard foremost casemates, although it did not actually penetrate the plate, bent it in and made a triangular hole 2 feet at the base and 7 feet high by which 160 tons of water entered the ship. In order to bring the ship upright an equivalent quantity had to be taken into a wing compartment on the opposite side. The water seems to have found its way through the armoured deck by an improperly secured manhole. Some of the splinters from a 12-inch shell, which burst against the after fighting position, found their way into the central engine room* and did some damage to steam pipes, which took half an hour to repair, during which time that engine had to be stopped. There were other holes in the side of which no details are forthcoming. When using her helm on the night of the action to avoid torpedo attacks, it was found that the ship took a heavy list, which was accentuated by the free water on the fore decks, and gave indications that her stability was much impaired. This was rectified by taking in water in the double bottoms, which had the effect of bringing her down very deep in the water.

Poltava.†—Little is known of the damage sustained by this ship except that she had a large hole under the fore turret on the starboard side and another under the upper deck between the after turret and the superstructure. One shell had burst on the fore 6-inch turret without doing damage. There was also a large hole in her starboard quarter near the waterline and some damage to ventilators and funnels.

Pobyeda.†—Less still is available concerning the damage to this ship, of which it is only stated that she had several hits in her side of no great importance and a large splash on her armour.

Retvizan.†—This ship had a large hole in the starboard quarter near the 12-pounder gun-port, another right in the gun-port on the opposite side, and two hits are reported on the waterline, one of which is said to have penetrated. Her after funnel and boats on the superstructure were much knocked about.

Pallada.†—This ship is reported as showing no external signs of damage.

Diana.—Only two projectiles are reported to have struck the *Diana*, the first of these, which burst against the funnel casing or a temperley transporter, killed 5 and wounded 12 men, while the second, from a 10-inch gun, was received just below the waterline towards the close of the action. This latter hit was an oblique one, doing considerable damage to the plating, but causing only a slight leak in the armoured deck. A considerable amount of water entered the

* The *Peresvyet* had three sets of engines working three propellers.

† The reports on these ships are from an external view only.

space above the armoured deck, but little went below. The space on the opposite side was flooded to bring the ship upright and the armoured deck shored up.

Rossiya.—This ship showed 19 clear hits on the starboard side and nine on the port side, exclusive of hits in the boats and funnels and on the upper deck. There were also others which could not be exactly recorded. The after funnel was ripped right down, while the first and third also suffered; three boilers were put out of action as the result of shell bursting in the funnels. The boats were practically all wrecked and a fire occurred in one of the steam boats. The forecastle, containing two 8-inch and two 6-inch guns, suffered severely; the whole side was smashed in, both guns on the starboard side put out of action, and the whole space showed evidence of the fierce fire which had raged there for a short time. The second gun on the starboard side was also permanently disabled, and many other guns showed signs of having received injuries rendering them temporarily disabled. Comparatively few shells were received on the upper deck itself and the light guns suffered little. Several shells reached the coal bunkers, the coal proving an excellent protection. The marks of splinters on the battery deck from shell striking the ship's side showed where a large number of the guns crews had been killed or wounded. The armoured belt at the waterline does not appear to have been penetrated, but there were several holes just above the armour which did not extend more than a few feet in height.

Gromoboi.—A report on the damage to the *Gromoboi* states that there were 15 hits on her starboard side from heavy guns, seven on the port side, at least four plunging shots on the upper deck, one in a fighting top and one struck a funnel. There were other hits in the boats and about the upper deck which could not be distinguished, and numerous small marks showed that shell had burst on touching the water. The plunging hits are said to have done great execution and the hit in the foretop from a 6-inch shell to have killed an officer and 12 men. At least five of the 12-pounder guns on the upper deck were put out of action and the boats were wrecked. Two 8-inch and one 6-inch guns were probably put permanently out of action and the armoured belt was partially penetrated in one place. A serious fire occurred on the main deck outside a casemate, where a shell setting fire to a number of spare charges, made a perfect furnace for a short time in which an officer and several men were burnt to death; the fire burnt itself out very quickly. Splinters from a plunging shell which fell on the forecastle flew under the roof of the conning tower and were deflected downwards, killing the helmsman and wounding the captain and navigating officer. The great loss in killed and wounded in this ship has been ascribed to keeping the crews of light guns at their stations and not under cover.

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