The Engendering of Anticommunism and Fear in Chile’s 1964 Presidential Election*

Salvador Allende, a member of the Socialist party and a Marxist, and Eduardo Frei, a member of the Christian Democratic party, ran against each other in the 1964 presidential election in Chile. The race took place during the Cold War, a time when the U.S. government viewed politics through the lens of anticommunism and in a region, Latin America, where the United States had long exercised hegemony. The U.S. government strongly opposed an Allende victory, which would have represented a significant defeat for U.S. policy in Latin America. In order to prevent Allende’s election, the U.S. government massively intervened in Chile’s presidential election. This article explores a pivotal aspect of U.S. involvement in the 1964 presidential campaign in Chile: the Scare Campaign.

The Scare Campaign was a multimedia propaganda blitz that used fear to convince Chileans that they should vote for Eduardo Frei and against Salvador Allende. Working in conjunction with Chileans, the U.S. government developed, designed, financed, and implemented the Scare Campaign. The campaign attempted to convince Chileans, especially women, that Allende’s triumph would lead to the destruction of the family and the undermining of women’s roles as mothers. By incorporating ideas about femininity and masculinity into its efforts to oppose Allende, this U.S.-sponsored propaganda campaign engendered anticommunism in Chile.

This article discusses how the U.S. government successfully employed ideas about gender and the politics of fear to engender and intensify anticommunism, an aspect of U.S. foreign policy toward Chile that has been largely ignored. It

*The author would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.

1. Although this study focuses on how constructions of gender shaped the preparation, execution, and reception of U.S. foreign policy, gender alone neither defined nor motivated it. U.S. foreign policy responded to the desire to preserve U.S. economic interests and political domination in the region and the need to promote domestic harmony and national unity through the construction of a foreign and domestic enemy Other, which at the time was the Communist. Recent studies of U.S. foreign policy have examined how gender (and class and racial) identities and assumptions helped to shape the approaches and decisions of U.S. policymakers. See, for example, Karen Anderson, “Engendering Post-1945 U.S. History,” Perspectives (November 1998) and “Culture, Gender, and Foreign Policy: A Symposium,” Diplomatic History 18, no. 1 (Winter 1994); Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood. Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst, MA, 2001); Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Diplomatic History, Vol. 32, No. 5 (November 2008). © 2008 The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

931
also examines how the Chilean Left responded to the Scare Campaign. My analysis of leftist discourse reveals that although the Left shared many of their opponents’ assumptions about gendered identities, it also entertained some different ideas about the role of women in Chilean society.

The U.S. Government and the 1964 Elections in Chile

Since the late 1940s, anticommunism had defined U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, as it did toward most of the world. The 1959 Cuban Revolution converted the future and potential threat of communism in a more distant area into a real and present danger only ninety miles off the United States’s southern shore, in a region that Washington had long considered its backyard. Additionally, as Thomas C. Wright points out, the Cuban Revolution “violated two canons of Washington’s Latin American policy.” First, it expropriated U.S. holdings on the island “without full and prompt compensation,” thus defying a “cardinal rule [that had been in operation] since the beginning of U.S. economic expansion in the nineteenth century.” Second, Cuba forged an alliance with the USSR, “in defiance of the U.S. position . . . that communism was incompatible with the institutions and way of life of the Western Hemisphere.” As a result, U.S. policymakers had one intransigent goal for Latin America: no more Cubas.

Despite U.S. government efforts, the Cuban Revolution had a tremendous, if disparate, impact on revolutionary forces throughout Latin America. It sparked the rise of guerrilla movements in Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and Nicaragua. However, in Chile, the Left was firmly entrenched in the electoral system and eschewed revolutionary warfare. During the late 1950s and early 1960s the Chilean Left’s popularity grew, and Allende almost won the 1958 presidential elections. Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the Right, received only 33,416 votes.
more votes than Allende, out of a total of 1,235,552 votes cast.\textsuperscript{4} Thirty-four percent of women (148,009 votes), the plurality, voted for Alessandri while only 22 percent (97,084 votes) did so for Allende. By way of contrast, 30 percent of men (241,900) cast their votes for Alessandri and 32 percent (259,409 votes) backed Allende.\textsuperscript{5} For the first time in Chilean history, the women’s vote determined the outcome of the election and gave Alessandri the presidential victory. As U.S. policymakers and Chilean politicians recognized, men and women in Chile voted differently and women’s electoral preferences were decisive to determining which candidate won. This realization explains why the U.S. government viewed capturing women’s votes as critical to winning the 1964 presidential election.

The Left’s growing political strength at the polls heightened U.S. government concern about the 1964 presidential election. The March 1964 victory of socialist Jaime Naranjo in a congressional by-election in Curicó, a district long considered to be the preserve of the conservative, land-owning elite, reinforced that worry. His surprising success sent shockwaves through both Chilean and U.S. political circles and changed the political playing field. Fearing that Naranjo’s election presaged an Allende victory in the September presidential elections, Chilean politicians and U.S. government officials revised their electoral strategy. Instead of backing Radical party candidate Julio Durán, the rightist Liberal and Conservative parties,\textsuperscript{6} along with U.S. officials, transferred their backing and considerable resources to Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, whom the Chilean Right viewed as the lesser of two evils.

Nervous about what an Allende victory could mean for U.S. economic and political interests in Chile, in addition to the geopolitical repercussions it would have throughout the region, government officials devoted a considerable amount of time, energy, and resources to ensuring Allende’s defeat.\textsuperscript{7} They established an electoral committee in Washington which included Thomas Mann, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs; Desmond Fitzgerald, the western hemisphere division chief of the CIA; Ralph Dungan (who in 1964 became U.S. ambassador to Chile); McGeorge Bundy from the White House; and the chief of the western hemisphere division Branch Four. This team worked closely with “a parallel Election Committee [in Santiago] that coordinated U.S. efforts.” The Santiago team included John Joseph Jova, deputy

\textsuperscript{4} There were five candidates in the election.

\textsuperscript{5} República de Chile, Servicio Electoral Santiago: Servicio Electoral, n.d. In Chile women and men vote separately, and therefore one can tabulate how each gender votes.

\textsuperscript{6} The Radical, Conservative, and Liberal parties formed an electoral alliance called Frente Demócratico, Democratic Front. Timothy R. Scully, Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Chile (Stanford, CA, 1992), 139.

\textsuperscript{7} The United States had significant political and economic investments in Chile; it had invested $700 million in Chile by the early 1960s. In addition, Chile was the showplace of the Alliance for Progress. As Stephen Rabe points out, during the 1960s, Chile received over $1 billion in “Alliance-generated funds, the highest amount in South America on a per capita basis.” Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999), 113.
chief of mission in the U.S. embassy in Santiago; the CIA chief of station; the heads of the Political and Economic sections; and Ambassador Charles Cole.  

In May 1964, Thomas Mann, undersecretary of state for Latin American affairs and formulator of the Mann Doctrine, wrote a memo to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that outlined the dominant thinking and key policy proposals of U.S. government officials regarding the upcoming presidential elections in Chile. Although Mann noted that Frei appeared to be ahead, he warned, “The race will be extremely close and many things could happen in the four months before the election.” One of Mann’s main concerns was the impact that an Allende victory in democratic elections would have on U.S. policy in the region. As Mann wrote, “Clearly, the September election will be determined by factors which are deeply rooted in the political, economic, and social factors of the Chilean scene and by the campaign abilities of the major contenders. Given the consequences, however, if this major Latin American nation should become the first country in the hemisphere to freely choose an avowed Marxist as its elected president, the Department . . .” Although the remainder of the section is blacked out, we can assume that what follows is an argument as to why and how the U.S. government should get involved in the Chilean elections.

Indeed, Mann next proceeded to list the ten steps that the U.S. government should follow in order to ensure Frei’s victory. These steps included continued or increased financial aid to Chile, discussions with members of the Chilean armed forces, beefing up embassy staff, and the publication of anti-Allende propaganda. Some of the specific points suggested Agency for International Development (AID) loans to Chile of approximately $70 million, “thereby keeping the economy as a whole active and unemployment low.” Mann also suggested discreet attempts to contact the “non-political Chilean military and police to encourage their rising awareness of the subversion which would take place under an Allende government.” He counseled “continuing USIA [United


10. John Kennedy had shared this concern as well; as Stephen Rabe writes, Kennedy “informed President Alessandri that it would be ‘a major setback for us if the Communists were to win an election in a democratic country when we have said that communism can remain in power only by building a wall.’” Rabe, The Most Dangerous, 113.

11. LBJ Library, Austin, Texas, National Security File, Chile: Memo, Mr. Mann to the Secretary, 1 May 1964, Box 12 (author’s emphasis).
States Information Agency] placement in Chile of unattributed materials.” Mann concluded by adding that he planned to “strengthen our Embassy in Chile in the four months prior to the election by adding . . . a top-ranking political officer with an excellent record on the Cuban desk, Robert Hurwitch.”

Taking a hands-on approach that clearly set the tone for U.S. government dealings with Chile in this period, Mann wrote to Jova at the U.S. embassy in Santiago, counseling him “we must use all appropriate resources to limit chances of a FRAP victory.” (FRAP was the Popular Action Front [Frente de Acción Popular], the coalition formed by the Communist and Socialist parties to support the candidacy of Salvador Allende.) The State Department marshaled some of its most experienced officials (such as Hurwitch) to Chile to coordinate efforts to defeat Allende. The team clearly understood that their involvement in the domestic presidential elections of a sovereign nation demanded discretion. For example, Mann requested that “as part of an all-out effort to avoid Allende’s election,” General Andrew Pick O’Meara (commander in chief, U.S. Southern Command, 1961–1965) should have Bill Belton “detailed for a one month ‘vacation’ in Chile during the first week in May. Suggest Mrs. Belton might accompany him as part of cover. His role would be to re-establish contacts, pin-point areas where we should do more in overall effort and advise generally on actions to be taken.”

Deputy Chief of Mission in the U.S. embassy in Santiago Jova played a central role in the Scare Campaign. Jova had close personal and political ties with Latin America. Part of his family emigrated from Cuba in the late 1800s and settled in the Hudson Valley. Other members stayed in Cuba and Jova frequently visited them there, which helps to explain his fluency in Spanish and, after Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, heightened his deeply held anti-Castro sentiments. He used his position in the State Department as chief of personnel operations to secure entry visas to the United States for anti-Castro

---

12. Ibid. Hurwitch had experience dealing with U.S. clandestine operations in Cuba. In 1962 he had handled the release of three CIA agents arrested in Cuba and he later worked on a shipment of medical supplies to Cuba in exchange for prisoners captured after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York, 1964), 256–58, 281. Although there were certainly social, economic, political, and cultural differences between Cuba and Chile, many in the U.S. government believed that the lessons they learned in fighting communism in Cuba could be successfully transferred to Chile, or, for that matter, to other countries in Latin America.

13. LBJ Library, National Security File, Chile: Memos, Telegram, Thomas C. Mann to Amembassy Santiago, 1 May 1964, Box 12.

14. LBJ Library, National Security File, Chile: Memos, Telegram, Thomas C. Mann to Amembassy La Paz, Bolivia, 29 April 1964, Box 12. After his trip to Chile in early May, Belton wrote a letter to his friend Cecil B. Lyons, the former U.S. ambassador to Chile from 1956 to 1958. In it he noted, “The election still looks to be a toss up, though Frei is felt to have the edge.” Georgetown University, Special Collections, Cecil B. Lyons Papers, Letter from William Belton to Cecil Lyons, 30 July 1964, Box 14, Folder 21.

15. After leaving Chile, Jova became ambassador in Honduras in 1965; next he served as U.S. representative to the OAS; in 1973, President Nixon appointed him U.S. ambassador to Mexico, a position he held until 1977.
members of his family. Jova, a devout Roman Catholic, was strongly anti-Communist and anti-Castro, sentiments he drew on to further his work against Allende. Like Mann, he was convinced that “if the socialists and communists came to power through a free election [it] would be a terrible blow to our system, [because] if they did it through the ballot box it would be legitimate.”

During the Alessandri presidency, at a time when most U.S. officials cultivated relations with the Right, Jova “developed close relations with Frei and a rather large number of his associates.” His relationship facilitated the U.S. embassy’s “switch from [Julio] Durán [candidate of the Right] to Frei after Curicó.”

As part of their anti-Allende work, the U.S. embassy staff in Santiago wrote lengthy studies analyzing the political situation in Chile and conducted detailed polls to determine the political leanings of the Chilean electorate. One “short” study consisted of 2002 interviews conducted between April 20 and May 15, 1964, the goal of which was to offer officials “quick and accurate information about selected aspects of the current electoral situation.” It predicted that Frei would win a majority of the vote, although it underestimated the extent of his victory by 4 percent.

Public officials shared the State Department’s concern with the outcome of the presidential elections in Chile. In May 1964, Senator Hubert Humphrey, who was a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, sent his foreign policy assistant, John Riley, for a one-week visit to Chile because the senator was “very much interested in the present political situation in Chile, particularly the outcome of the Presidential election scheduled for September


17. See, for example, Georgetown University, Special Collections, John Joseph Jova Papers, Memo from Jova, “Assessment Socialist-Communist Candidate Salvador Allende,” 22 April 1964. In the memo, Jova claims that Allende “could be led by events into being harsh and ruthless with his opponents but [he will] more likely use exile rather than prison or the paredón [firing squad].” Jova compares Chileans to Cubans, and concludes that the former lack the “emotional excesses” of the latter, because they are not from a “tropical country” such as Cuba.

18. Georgetown University, Special Collections, John Joseph Jova, The Association for Diplomatic Studies, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, 68.


20. LBJ Library, National Security File, Chile: “Chilean Election Survey: Analysis and Tabulation,” May 1964, Box 12. U.S. embassy staff wrote political/personal profiles about Allende and Frei, weighing each candidate’s strengths and weaknesses. One memo characterized Allende as “a chameleon [sic] person who over the years has appeared on occasion as [an] idealistic socialist reformer who believes [in] democracy and [at] other times as [a] militant revolutionist striving [to] bring revolution a la Cuba to Chile. . . . He does not possess unusual intelligence and his ideas and program have changed little, if at all, over the years. Personally he is vain, quick tempered, easily offended, socially as well as politically ambitious, able [to] turn on or off at will a considerable social charm.” LBJ Library, National Security File, Chile: Memos, U.S. Embassy to State Department, “Assessment Socialist-Communist Candidate Salvador Allende,” 10 April 1964, Box 12.
In Chile, Riley “conferred at length with Senator Frei and other political leaders.” In the memorandum he wrote and submitted to Humphrey upon his return, which Humphrey in turn sent to McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to President Lyndon Johnson and member of the DC-based Electoral Committee, Riley noted that “the dominant motive of most, but not all American officials, is to defeat Allende.”

U.S. government officials were very conscious of the significant role that Chilean women would play in determining the outcome of the elections for two reasons: first, because the female vote had given Alessandri his 1958 victory and second, because women’s electoral participation had steadily increased during the 1960s and therefore would carry even more weight in the upcoming elections. As a result, the May 1964 election survey mentioned above paid considerable attention to analyzing how men and women would vote. A central part of the study extrapolated electoral outcomes depending on the ratio of male to female voters. For example, one table assessed what the voting percentage would be if the “Male-Female voting ratio were 67% to 33%,” which, the study makes clear, is one “which least favors FREI and most favors ALLENDE.” The study concluded that Frei would receive somewhere between 52 and 55 percent of the total vote and Allende would obtain somewhere between 36 and 38 percent. However, the study cautions that it is critical that women actually turn out to vote because “everywhere in the world female turnout (as a percentage of female registration) is lower than male turnout.” Therefore, the U.S. embassy worked very hard not only to ensure that women voted for Frei but that they voted in the first place because “the margin of the FREI victory—and perhaps victory itself—will depend upon the female turnout [and] the harder job—getting women to vote—has still to be performed.” To encourage women to show up at the polls on election day, the study recommended the formation of “baby-sitting pools.”

U.S. government awareness of the significance of the female vote continued through August, and their efforts appear to have borne fruit. As one cable from the U.S. embassy to the Department of State noted, “The number of women registrants has increased greatly in absolute numbers and in percentage of the total registrants and their weight is likely to be the most significant factor in the election result.”

Given the high stakes involved, the U.S. government needed to simultaneously make sure that women voted in large numbers, that they voted for Frei,

21. LBJ Library, Chile file, Letter, McGeorge Bundy to Hubert Humphrey with attachment, 23 June 1964, General Co 49, Box 21, White House Central Files (hereafter WHCF).
22. LBJ Library, Chile file, Letter, Hubert H. Humphrey to McGeorge Bundy, 17 June 1964, General Co 49 Box 21, WHCF.
24. LBJ Library, National Security File, Chile: Memos, Airgram, Amembassy Santiago to Department of State, 21 August 1964, Box 21. Jova approved this memo, as he did most messages that dealt with the 1964 presidential elections in Chile (author’s emphasis).
and that men’s proclivities for Allende declined as their preference for Frei increased. The Scare Campaign was admirably suited to meet these goals. It not only cast Allende in a decidedly negative light, it also generated an intense degree of fear and anxiety regarding the outcome of the election. The Scare Campaign told Chileans that their vote mattered because the elections would determine their future and that of their children. This was a call that few Chileans could ignore.

**THE SCARE CAMPAIGN**

The Scare Campaign began in late June 1964 and continued until September 1964.\(^{25}\) During the first week of operation, a barrage of anti-Communist propaganda deluged the Chilean media. According to the U.S. Senate report on covert action in Chile, in that first week alone “a CIA-funded propaganda group produced twenty radio spots per day in Santiago and on 44 provincial stations; twelve-minute news broadcasts five times daily on three Santiago stations and 24 provincial outlets; thousands of cartoons, and much paid press advertising.” The propaganda group also produced “26 weekly ‘commentary’ programs, and distributed 3,000 posters daily.”\(^{26}\)

This anti-Communist propaganda filled the airwaves, walls, and newspapers of Chile and promoted an atmosphere of hysteria. The campaign “supported anti-communist propaganda activities through wall posters attributed to fictitious groups, leaflet campaigns, and public heckling.”\(^{27}\) Although the medium varied, a consistent message ran through the propaganda: Chileans must act now and vote against Allende and for Frei in order to save their nation from falling into the morass of totalitarianism, which is how the ads characterized the systems operating in Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The Scare Campaign skillfully used fear and played on people’s emotions to convince Chileans that Allende represented danger and insecurity while Frei signified security and stability. It portrayed the 1964 elections in Manichean terms: on one side, Frei, the valiant hero fighting to preserve Chilean democracy, who called his campaign the “Revolution in Liberty,” and on the other, Allende, the nefarious representative of the international Marxist conspiracy who, upon victory, planned to turn Chile into both a replica and a puppet of the Soviet Union and Cuba.

---

25. This section draws on material from Margaret Power, *Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende, 1964–1973* (University Park, PA, 2002), ch. 3.


27. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action*, Hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 4–5 December 1975, Washington, DC, 18.
Beginning on August 1 and continuing until September 3, the day before the elections, ads appearing in El Mercurio, the newspaper of the conservative elite and some of the middle class, heightened the already-existing tension. The first of these ads announced, in large type, “Only Thirty-Four Days Left!” and on subsequent days the number decreased until there was “Only One Day Left!” Left for what? Left for Chileans to decide their fate, almost like the hands of the Doomsday Clock ticking away, advancing steadily to midnight. In this case, Doomsday was the threatened Allende victory and the end of Chile, because the country would no longer belong to Chileans but to the “communists.” Text below the headline emphasized this point by asking, “Can we allow international Marxism to take over a part of our territory, land that has belonged to all Chileans? To them [the Communists], we free men respond: After September 4, Chile will continue to be Chilean.”

Because most Chileans did not have television at the time, the campaign relied on the radio, newspapers, and walls of Santiago to transmit its message. Radio propaganda was a major focus of the campaign because most Chileans had radios and many women, the central target of the campaign, were at home during the day with the radio on. Jack Webster, who was the Santiago manager of the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency at the time, later recalled that in the early 1960s more men than women read newspapers. Therefore, the best way to reach women was through the radio.

The combined goal of the frequently broadcast radio announcements and the posters plastered all over Santiago was to inspire fear in listeners and viewers, fear of what a “communist” victory in Chile would mean for them and their children. A typical radio ad opened with the sound of a machine gun followed by a woman shouting, “They have killed my son. The Communists!” The radio announcer, his voice laden with emotion, then intoned, “Communism offers only blood and pain. To make sure this does not happen in Chile, elect Eduardo Frei for president.” A poster echoed the same theme: if Allende wins, your family will be lost. It read, “Chilean Mother: Fidel Castro sent 15,000 children to Russia, tearing them from their mothers’ arms. If you don’t want to lose your children, vote for Durán [the Radical party nominee].”

Articles in El Mercurio reinforced the idea that communism threatened women’s well-being and that of the family. One article features a huge picture of the statue of the Russian boy Pavlik Morozov. Who was Pavlik Morozov and why did the Soviet Union dedicate a statue to him? According to the article, Pavlik Morozov was the son of Russian peasants and a member of the Soviet

---

29. In 1961 only 21,000 Chileans had TV sets. It was estimated that by 1964, 30,000 would. Miles Wolpin, Cuban Foreign Policy and Chilean Politics (Lexington, MA, 1972), 75.
31. Labarca Goddard, Chile invadido, 66.
32. Ben G. Burnett, Political Groups in Chile: The Dialogue between Order and Change (Austin, TX, 1970), 251.
Youth group Komsomol. One day, young Pavlik discovered that his father had taken a small amount of grain from the agricultural collective on which he worked and lived to help feed his hungry family. Pavlik, the model product of Soviet youth culture, unhesitatingly informed on his father. As a result of Pavlik’s betrayal, the father was sentenced to ten years of hard labor and Pavlik became a hero; in December 1948 a statue was dedicated to him. Evoking the Orwellian nightmare, the article plaintively asked its Chilean readers, “Isn’t this glorification of [Pavlik’s] betrayal of his father and the stripping of the most basic sentiments of a family strange? These characteristics of the Communist Youth in Russia are replicated in the satellite countries and in Cuba.”

The article expanded what the Scare Campaign ads equally forcefully, if more succinctly, told Chileans: the victory of Allende will signal the death knell for the Chilean family and the roles of Chilean fathers and mothers.

A purportedly objective examination of life in the Communist world titled “Women and the Family in the Communist World” continued the bleak portrait of family life graphically depicted above. It featured a dramatic picture of a group of seven Czechoslovaks, three of whom are women crying with handkerchiefs pressed to their faces, staring in grief at something outside the range of the picture. The caption reads, “Family members of the accused Czech listen to the sentence pronounced on him while a [woman] police officer watches closely over them.” The inclusion of the woman police officer caught my eye. Why did the text make a point of mentioning her despite the fact that she was not even visible in the picture? The caption implies, and the text of the article clearly states, that this is what communism did to women: it hardens them and converts them into stern, desexed repressors who have lost their feminine traits of compassion and are therefore willing to participate in the breakup of the family.

The article foregrounds the idea that communism is particularly and specifically harmful to women. It notes that communism promises “well being, happiness, work that is well paid and satisfying, and the enjoyment of all types of advantages for those who live in the Marxist paradise.” But, the article hastens to point out, “reality is, nevertheless, very different.” In fact, along with “the shortages in the production of goods and the low material and spiritual level of [society], the situation of women and children is dramatic and frankly tragic.”

One of the primary problems of Communist society for women is that “Russian women are to carry out tasks that are extraordinarily hard for them, ones which

---

33. *El Mercurio*, 5 July 1964. Part of the U.S. government’s covert actions in Chile included the “development of ‘assets’ in media organizations who can place articles or be asked to write them.” U.S. Senate, *Covert Action*, 7. We can assume that some or many of the anti-Communist articles published in *El Mercurio* are the product of this work, which was replicated throughout South America. The story of Pavlik Morozov is a case in point. A month later the same picture of the statue of Pavlik Morozov, along with the same title and text, appeared in a Brazilian newspaper. See *O Globo*, 12 August 1964.

34. Ibid., 19 July 1964.
no civilized country makes people of their sex perform.” The Communist
governments “don’t worry about women’s lower [than men’s] physical resis-
tance”; in fact, they make them work in “highway [construction] or heavy work
on the trains or preparing the fields for cultivation.” The Communist govern-
ment’s assignment of women to such work is wrong because it ignores the fact
that “women’s physical makeup is not made for these tasks.” Furthermore, in
order to work at these jobs, women “have to leave their homes for many hours,
leaving their children with other people or with State functionaries.” As a result,
women in Communist societies cannot “dedicate themselves to the care and
education of their children, who are taught to inform and spy on their parents.
Do the women of this country [Chile] want this paradise for themselves and their
families?”

Both the Scare Campaign ads and newspaper articles like the ones discussed
above primarily represented women as mothers. In fact, it was to the mothers of
Chile that the anti-Allende propaganda directed much of its attention. Repeat-
edly, the ads threatened Chilean women that an Allende victory would mean the
loss of their children, the destruction of their homes, and the end of motherhood
as they knew it. For example, one ad called on Chilean women to “Listen, as a
mother, as a wife, as a daughter. Have you thought of the unity of your home?
The future of your children? Your children’s happiness? Remember that what
you value most in your life is in danger. And remember that the choice is
Democracy or Marxism.”

One of the final messages of the Scare Campaign echoed this idea that the
election represented a pivotal choice for women and that if they made the wrong
choice and voted for Allende, then they and their families would be lost forever.
On September 3, 1964, the night before the presidential election, three major
Chilean radio stations played a tape-recorded message by Juana Castro, Fidel
Castro’s estranged, anti-Communist sister. In it, Juana Castro exhorted Chileans
to vote against Allende, because if they did not, they “would be electing com-
munism. I am very concerned that Chile could become the second communist
country in the continent.” In her emotional broadcast, Juana Castro evoked
women’s gendered identities as mothers and her own personal experience as an
anti-Communist Cuban to warn Chilean women not to vote for Allende.
“Chilean mothers, I am sure that you will not allow your small children to be
taken from you and sent to the Communist bloc, as happened in Cuba. . . . The
enemy is stalking, it is at your doors. I repeat once again: Don’t let yourselves be
deceived! Don’t be confused! Be alert! Remember your families. Remember
your children.”

35. Ibid. (author’s emphasis).
36. Ibid., 5 August 1964.
37. Labarca Goddard, Chile invadido; El Mercurio, 30 September 1964.
The Scare Campaign relied on Chilean constructions of gender that conflated womanhood with motherhood and masculinity with being the provider and protector. During the early 1960s, only about 22 percent of women worked outside the home and roughly 70 percent were housewives. Many Chileans believed that a woman’s role was to raise children and tend to the house, while that of a man was to earn money to support his family. Of those women who worked outside the home, a large number were employed as servants in the homes of the upper and middle classes. Although this job offered women a wage, it reinforced the gender-based definition of what women’s function in society was. Additionally, although an increasing number of women voted, their level of active political participation was low. Men dominated the political parties, and politics was defined as a masculine activity. As a result, motherhood defined many Chilean women’s identity as well as much of their lived reality. It was precisely because the Scare Campaign spoke to women’s quotidian experiences and self-definitions that it so effectively inspired fear of what an Allende victory would mean for them, precisely what it was designed to do.

Despite its focus on women, the campaign also addressed men, who it characterized as the patriarchal heads of the family, responsible for ensuring the survival and sustenance of their wives and children. One ad, entitled “Chile at the Crossroads,” pictured a nuclear family, with the husband in the foreground and his wife and daughter in the background, both dominated and protected by him. Reflecting the idea that a man worked in order to provide for his family—and that consequently his family’s well-being depended on him—the ad said, “For you, the word FREEDOM means the right to work, to express your opinion, to live with your family, to develop your children spiritually. Are you willing to sacrifice the rights to which freedom entitles you for the Marxist adventure? Think of your children’s future.”

Although both ads played on feelings of fear, one notable difference between them is that the level of emotion and the threat each expresses is distinct, depending on which gender was its prime object/subject. The ads warned that Chilean men would lose their ability to work freely and earn an income that could support their family, thus undermining both their role in society and their masculine identity, and endangering their children’s future. The ads directed at women stressed the emotional impact of an Allende victory. Their children’s happiness was at stake. Their homes and their ability to be mothers would be destroyed. Both scenarios generated fear; however, the cause of the fear differed, depending on whether the target was men or women. The ads simultaneously assumed and reinforced the idea that men were more rational than women and

that women were more emotional than men, and constructed the different
appeals accordingly.

Of course, there is no reason to assume that the ads directed to women only
affected women or that the ads addressed to men only influenced men. In a
society that is based on a binary definition of gender, the idea that a husband and
father could not sustain his family also threatens the wife and mother, just as the
suggestion that a mother would be deprived of her children could also be very
disturbing to the father. Thus, the engendering of fear and anticommunism
simultaneously affected both men and women.

**U.S. Government Financial and Ideological Involvement in the Scare Campaign**

The U.S. government contributed millions of dollars to finance the Scare
Campaign. Estimates of how much money the United States spent on the
campaign range from $3 to $20 million (more precise figures are not known).
This sum may appear insignificant today, but it was a huge sum for Chile in the
1960s. The U.S. Senate investigation of covert action in Chile found that “the
Central Intelligence Agency... spent over $3 million in election programs,
financing in this process over half of the Christian Democratic campaign.” Karl
Inderfurth, a staff member of the Senate committee, pointed out that “the $3
million spent by the CIA in Chile in 1964 represents 30 cents for every man,
woman, and child in Chile. Now if a foreign government had spent an equiva-
 lent amount per capita in our 1964 election, that government would have spent
$60 million... President Johnson and Senator Goldwater spent $25 million
combined, so this would have been about $35 million more.” Inderfurth also
detailed how the money was spent. “The 1964 Presidential election... was the
first major U.S. covert action in Chile.... The CIA mounted a massive anti-
Communist propaganda campaign... The propaganda campaign was, in fact, a
Scare Campaign. It relied heavily on images of Soviet tanks and Cuban firing
squad and was pitched especially to women.” The U.S. government did not just
develop these ads; it also paid its “assets” in other Latin American countries to
write articles, and then “replayed” them in Chile. It sent a message from the
“women of Venezuela” to the women of Chile, warning them of the dire fate that
would befall them should Allende be elected.

The U.S. government was instrumental in injecting graphic anti-Castro
elements into the Scare Campaign. The U.S. State Department believed that
projecting negative images of the Cuban government under Castro and linking

---

41. The United States was not alone in donating money and skills to the Frei campaign.
Christian Democrats in West Germany, Italy, and Belgium provided somewhere between $18
and $20 million dollars as well.
42. Senate Select Committee, *Covert Action*, Hearings, 9, 10.
43. Ibid., 11 (author’s emphasis).
44. Senate Select Committee, *Covert Action*, Report, 16.
them to Allende would undermine the latter’s candidacy. As one June 1964 Department of State telegram spelled out, “In connection with Sept. 4 Presidential elections in Chile [the State] Department has been sending to [the U.S.] Embassy [in] Santiago materials regarding [the] Cuban situation which might be discreetly used to discredit FRAP candidate Allende.” The same memo noted Juana Castro’s recent defection from Cuba to Mexico and said,

[The State] Department believes that defection [of] Juana Castro in Mexico with dramatic, emotional interview denouncing what her own brothers had done to convert Cuba into communist-totalitarian state could be used effectively in Chile. [U.S.] Embassy [in Mexico] requested [to] give highest priority to collecting and forwarding [to U.S.] Embassy [in] Santiago such material as: (1) report on circumstances [of] her defection, (2) newspaper coverage including articles, photos, commentaries and editorials, (3) tapes (video and/or voice) of press interviews.

The U.S. government was instrumental in spreading the words of Juana Castro in Chile and throughout Latin America. In August, the CIA sponsored the Latin American tour of Juana Castro. She recorded her aforementioned message to Chileans in Brazil, which had experienced the U.S.-backed military overthrow of João Goulart in April 1964. Her highly charged message was then brought to Chile and played on three radio stations, in direct violation of Chilean election law which prohibited any campaign material twenty-four hours prior to the opening of the polls.

CHILEAN’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE SCARE CAMPAIGN

Although the U.S. government sponsored and financed the Scare Campaign, it did so in conjunction with anti-Communist Chileans. In other words, the Scare Campaign was not merely a U.S.-sponsored project that was imposed on an unwilling and unreceptive Chilean audience. Indeed, had the campaign not drawn on the insights, networks, influence, and enthusiasm of conservative Chileans, then it is unlikely that it would have made the inroads it did. A variety of Chileans, from the leadership of the Christian Democratic party to the activists of a small anti-Communist women’s group, contributed to the campaign. According to Jacques Chonchol, who in 1964 was a leading member of the Christian Democratic party, Frei worked directly with right-wing Chileans to carry out the Scare Campaign. “Many of the people [who directed his election campaign] were right-wingers and personal friends of Frei. They were responsible for the Campaign.”

45. LBJ Library, National Security File, Chile: Telegram, State Department to Amembassy Mexico and Amembassy Santiago, 30 June 1964, Box 12.
47. “Actividades de las organizaciones ‘Chile Joven’ y ‘Acción de Mujeres’ y de una encuesta política informe de la Comisión Especial Investigadora,” Cámara de Diputados,
Eduardo Frei played an active role in promoting his candidacy, both inside Chile and to U.S. and European audiences. As Bernard Collier wrote, “Frei played his hand with the skill and cunning of a professional Latin American gambler. He played his best card—the one that said, ‘The Only Alternative’—both inside and outside the country. And with equal success.”48 He convinced the Chilean Right and the U.S. government that he was the only candidate who could defeat Allende, and he convinced many Chileans that his government would deliver the reforms he promised them in his speeches. He persuaded women that they should vote and vote for him, which an overwhelming majority did.

The Catholic Church in Chile actively promoted Frei’s candidacy and opposed that of Allende. It shifted its support from the Conservative party, with which it had been allied since the 1800s, to the Christian Democrats. In churches throughout Chile, priests preached against the dangers of communism and warned their congregations against it. Drawing on images that are very similar to those depicted in the El Mercurio articles discussed above, they declared that communism “makes of marriage and the family a purely artificial and civil institution. . . . Communism is particularly characterized by the rejection of any links that bind women to the family and the home, and her emancipation is proclaimed as a basic principle. She is withdrawn from the family and the care of her children, to be thrust into public life and collective production under the same conditions as men.”49

Independent right-wing organizations also contributed to the anti-Communist fear campaign. Women’s Action of Chile was an anti-Communist women’s group composed of elite, conservative women, which formed in 1963. One of its leaders, Elena Larraín, later worked against Allende in the 1970 presidential elections and helped form Feminine Power, the anti-Allende women’s organization, after his election.50 In 1964, she and the conservative

---

49. This is the text of Pope Pius XI’s 1937 encyclical Divini Redemptoris. Pope Pius XI, “Atheistic Communism,” in Gerald C. Treacy, S.J., Five Great Encyclicals (New York, 1939), 81. The CIA paid for the publication of hundreds of thousands of copies of a letter from Pope Paul VI that were then distributed through Christian Democratic organizations. Senate Select Committee, Covert Action, Report, 15.
50. Elena Larraín is from a landowning family in Chile. She is fervently anti-Communist and was an ardent supporter of the 11 September 1973 military coup that overthrew Allende.
organization she helped found mobilized like-minded women to work against Allende by, among other things, plastering walls in Santiago with anti-Allende posters. Larraín boasted to me that she personally convinced the managers of the three radio stations mentioned above to play the tape of Juana Castro and hand delivered copies of it to them to make sure they would do so.  

**The FRAP’s Response to the Scare Campaign**

Just as the U.S. government understood that Chilean women were needed to elect Frei, FRAP realized that women’s votes were critical to the victory or defeat of Allende. FRAP took the potentially damaging impact that the Scare Campaign could have on the female vote quite seriously. In the months leading up to the September election, FRAP both devoted a significant amount of resources to capturing the women’s vote and worked very hard to counter directly the charges lodged against it by the Scare Campaign.

FRAP’s main lines of defense frequently reflected and occasionally differed from the gendered assumptions that underlay the Scare Campaign. The most powerful assertion made by both campaigns was that women were mothers whose role in life was to stay home and take care of their family. Generally speaking, FRAP declared that the allegations made against it by the Scare Campaign were lies or distortions. It further argued that capitalism exploited women whereas socialism benefited them.

The manner in which FRAP supporters refuted the multiple charges against them, for instance that communism hurts women and destroys the family, reveals that it shared many of the same ideas about men and women’s roles in society that underpinned the Scare Campaign. Instead of challenging existing conceptions of masculinity or femininity or offering alternatives to them, the FRAP campaign apparently believed that its strongest line of defense was to point out that capitalism failed the majority of women, regardless of whether they were housewives or paid workers. It stressed that under capitalism, women could not successfully fulfill their proscribed gender roles. Most FRAP members did not question whether or not motherhood embodied a woman’s destiny and her fundamental role in life. Instead, most FRAP defenders countered the charges that communism made women’s lives more difficult or destroyed the family by pointing out all the flaws of capitalism and the social ills, such as infant mortality, associated with it. However, unlike the Scare Campaign, the FRAP propaganda also recognized and addressed itself specifically to the woman as worker (and by worker it meant a person who received a wage). It simultaneously acknowledged the fact that some Chilean women worked outside the home and promised to end their exploitation and improve their working conditions.

FRAP supporters repeatedly made it clear that they supported motherhood and the family. At one event in the southern city of Valdivia, they gave an award to the mother with the most children: Pascualita Carrasco de Cárcano, the mother of twenty.\textsuperscript{52} In their ads and speeches, partisans of Allende stressed the idea that by improving the standard of living of Chileans, his government would make life better for the mothers and children of Chile. María Maluenda, a national leader of the Communist party, denied “that communism dissolves the family.” She pointed out that “divorce is much higher in the United States than it is in the Soviet Union, because families are more stable there than in the U.S.”\textsuperscript{53}

FRAP partisans were aware that the Scare Campaign could have a negative impact on women. They also knew that with or without the campaign, winning women’s votes would be difficult. They therefore devoted a considerable amount of energy and resources to countering the Scare Campaign, in part by presenting Allende as an attractive candidate who would definitely advance the quality of life for women and the Chilean family. Allende supporters galvanized women members of FRAP to work for his election; they also attempted to mobilize women outside the parties, concentrating on those who were “independents.” To attract the latter, FRAP set up the Independent Committee of Pro-Allende Women headed by Laura Allende, Salvador Allende’s sister. One of the most important activities employed by pro-Allende women to recruit other women were the Women’s Teas. As Edda Gaviola, Lorella Lopresti, and Claudia Rojas point out, the teas represented a direct effort to “get close to the private, specific world of women.” The teas, organized by a supporter or supporters of Allende, typically entailed inviting neighbors or friends who were (hopefully) receptive to the message of the Allende campaign. When possible, a female member of the Allende family or an important woman in the campaign would attend the tea, bringing with them “a warm, feminine, and familiar message, which they identified with a convenient image of women’s interests, whose activity centered on the home and children.”\textsuperscript{54}

Not all events were so intimate, however. The Allende campaign also organized massive public rallies to demonstrate how popular the candidate was. These events simultaneously showed women (and men) that a large number of women supported Allende and allowed women to participate in a public activity in the company of their peers. The campaign also encouraged women to join with other women in expressing their political opinions, hoping as well, I suspect, that their willingness to be publicly active would transfer over to September 4, on which day they would go to the polls along with other women (women and men vote separately in Chile) and cast their ballots for Allende.

\textsuperscript{52} El Siglo, 12 August 1964.
\textsuperscript{53} María Maluenda, “Los dos caminos de la mujer Chilena: Derecha de Frei o Izquierda de Allende” [The Two Paths of the Chilean Woman: Right with Frei or Left with Allende], Vistazo, 8 June 1964, 5.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 6.
(The other parties organized similar events for their respective candidates and presumably wished the same thing regarding their respective candidates.)

U.S. involvement in the 1964 elections included personal observation of the events organized by the Allende campaign. John Joseph Jova, who went to the first mass rally for Allende along with several U.S. embassy officers, estimated that roughly 50,000–60,000 men and women attended. Jova noted that the rally was a “peaceful affair . . . with a more than normal influx of women.” He concluded that “the rally [was] an impressive affair probably outmatching anything in 1958.”

In addition to the teas and rallies, which were held throughout the country, FRAP organized several large-scale events. In July 1964, the women’s branches of the Allende campaign launched their Month of Women activities with a series of teas, gatherings, and small meetings held throughout metropolitan Santiago, leading up to a major event in the Caupolicán Theater on July 18. Clearly, FRAP’s emphasis on organizing women reflected its recognition that it needed to challenge the negative propaganda regarding the impact that an Allende victory would have on Chilean women. Also, given the results of the 1958 presidential election, the leftist coalition understood that it needed to work hard to convince women that they should vote for Allende. Thus, in one of the teas organized in the working-class district of San Miguel, the women “agreed to protest the lies [being spread] against the popular candidate [Allende].”

Activities for and with women continued through the month, culminating in a major march through downtown Santiago on August 1. For days preceding the event, ads and articles in El Siglo, the paper of the Communist party of Chile, enthused about the upcoming demonstration and exhorted women to attend. Women were assigned to one of four different columns based on where they lived or what they did. For example, in column one, the Paula Jaraquemada column, young people, teachers, and women from Nuñoa (a middle-class neighborhood in Santiago) marched together. The four columns formed on different but fairly contiguous corners of downtown Santiago and marched to a common spot, where Allende was waiting to greet and address them.

55. For example, 2,500 women rallied for Frei in Ovalle and, according to the reports, 30,000 women gathered in a Santiago event sponsored by the Frei campaign. La Nación, 12 August 1964.
56. LBJ Library, National Security Country File, Chile: John Joseph Jova to Department of State, Telegram, 11 May 1964, Box 12.
57. Women FRAP activists repeatedly challenged the image of women as being more conservative than men in Chile. At one of the pro-Allende mass rallies, María Vásquez, president of the Women’s Commission of the pro-Allende Women Workers, said, “Fulfilling once more our role as Chilean women, we will give Dr. Salvador Allende an absolute majority [of the vote] and end once and for all the myth, created by the Right, that women do not support the Left.” El Siglo, 20 July 1964.
59. Paula Jaraquemada was a Chilean heroine who participated in Chile’s independence struggle against Spain.
60. El Siglo, 31 July 1964.
The march combined a party atmosphere with serious political mobilization. Many of the articles and announcements about the march stressed the fun side of the march, perhaps to allay women's fears about participating with the Left and to counter the gloom-and-doom picture of life under communism projected by the Scare Campaign. For example, one announcement said the march will include a parade, “representing a real party, an allegory for how Chile will be in the future popular government.” The article also noted that in the working-class district of Maipú, men would run “five huge childcare centers so the pro-Allende women can go to the march.” It was not clear whether or not men doing childcare was also an allegory, or a promise for what life would be like if Allende won the election.

The organizers of the march clearly saw the activity as an opportunity to reject the message of the Scare Campaign and to offer their own critique of what capitalism meant for women. Elena González, vice president of the Women’s Unit, declared, “The only fear that the women of Chile have is that they can’t feed their children. Their only fear is that of seeing their children sick and not having the money they need to buy them the medicine they need.”

Allende, too, attempted to refute the picture of life under communism drawn by the Scare Campaign and the implications that this was what life would be like in Chile if he won the election. In a presentation that directly challenged the allegations made in both the Scare Campaign and El Mercurio concerning the family and women in Communist countries, Allende argued that women’s lives in a capitalist system were very difficult, even harder than men’s. He stressed that the capitalist system “attacks, exploits and denies opportunities to women.” He decried the fact that in capitalist Chile “the only destiny for many women is to be servants, a degree of servitude that is unbelievable in this day and age.” He also noted “women are discriminated against in the medical profession,” adding, “such prejudices do not exist in the socialist countries, where women have great possibilities.” He reminded his audience of the example of the Russian cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova, noting that “many years would go by before a woman in a capitalist regime would do what she had done.”

Juana Castro’s words, delivered on the eve of the presidential election, particularly outraged Allende. He viewed the potential damage that her message and the Scare Campaign posed to his candidacy as so great that he dedicated the final words of his last campaign speech to refuting them: “The Chilean woman is very conscious of her position in this struggle in which we are engaged. I know that today she will act according to her own conscience. For this reason, the words that were expressed yesterday [by Juana Castro] constitute an offense to

61. Ibid., 29 July 1964.
62. Ibid., 31 July 1964.
63. Ibid., 17 July 1964. Allende was right. In 1963, Valentina Tereshkova became the first woman to fly to outer space and it was not until 1983 that North American astronaut Sally K. Ride went to outer space.
our [female] compatriots.” In addition to criticizing the fact that her message had been played on Chilean radios, he noted that [Juana Castro’s] words . . . were not an isolated incident. They are part of the international conspiracy [the Scare Campaign] that began several months ago.”

Even though the dominant message of the Allende campaign was pro-family, some challenging voices were heard. One song, “The Hymn of the Allendista Women,” written by Inés Moreno and sung by women on July 18 at the pro-Allende rally in the Caupolicán Theater, begins with the declaration, “Forward, women of Chile, together with the Frente de Acción Popular [FRAP], we will all vote for Allende on September 4.” However, in a rare questioning of male domination, the second stanza asks, “For how long, Chilean women, will men reign in our home, for how long will we be miserable without schools, houses, and bread?” Moreno’s was not the only woman’s voice that questioned women’s status quo. María Maluenda called on women to recognize that Frei and Allende had different attitudes toward women. She characterized the election as one between “two forces that have and have always had completely different and opposed conceptions concerning the role women should play within society.” According to Maluenda, “the Frei camp, which includes the Right, has always opposed women’s political participation as well as the development of their personality.” Maluenda argued that Allende, unlike Frei and the Right, “has always struggled for women’s rights.” Although her comments primarily reflect pro-Allende campaign propaganda, implicit in her statement is the idea that women have rights and one of them is the full development of a woman’s personality. Maluenda also added that women have the right to leisure time, which only a small percentage of them enjoyed at the time, and to have fun. She capped her assertion with the observation that when women do well, men feel uncomfortable and that all women “suffer from this retrograde attitude toward our sex.”

In general, FRAP contested the accusations lodged against it by the Scare Campaign by affirming the role of women as mothers and by promising them that both their ability to be mothers and the lives of their children would greatly improve under Allende. Far from destroying the family, the Allende government would reinforce it by improving its material conditions. Despite this general acceptance of existing gender relations, some voices challenged the status of women by questioning male domination and the lack of women’s rights and enjoyment. Although theirs were the minority voices, they raised issues that the Scare Campaign ignored, ones that, perhaps, the FRAP as a whole should have taken much more seriously.

64. El Mercurio, 4 September 1964.
66. The Chilean Right early on recognized the importance of women and their proclivity to support the Right; as a result, it has supported women’s political activity, knowing that it would benefit the most from it. See Power, Right-Wing Women, ch. 2.
67. Vistazo, 8 June 1964.
The 1964 Presidential Election

Eduardo Frei won the 1964 presidential election. Frei won both men’s and women’s vote, but he won the overwhelming majority of women’s vote—62.8 percent to only 49.3 percent of men’s. Record numbers of women turned out to vote and women of all classes voted for Frei, albeit disproportionately. Women in the elite Santiago neighborhoods of Providencia and Las Condes gave 83 and 80 percent of their votes to Frei, respectively; women in the middle-class neighborhoods of Ñuñoa and La Reina cast 72 and 73 percent of their ballots for Frei; the average of women’s vote in working-class neighborhoods in Santiago, while less, was still high, about 59 percent. The corresponding figures for men are significantly lower, in all classes.68

Never before in Chilean history had a presidential candidate obtained such a high percentage of votes. Although the extent to which the Scare Campaign influenced how Chileans voted is not quantifiable, it is clear that both North Americans and Chileans believe it had a significant impact.69 The CIA special report on “Implications of Recent Elections” attributed Frei’s large victory to his “unexpected strength among the slum dwellers and his unparalleled appeal to women voters. The women voters, who never before exceeded 35% of the presidential electorate, increased their share to 46.6% and rallied to Frei.” The report concluded, “The single most important campaign issue contributing to Allende’s defeat was undoubtedly the people’s fear of Communism which was exploited and dramatized during the Campaign.”70 The Church Committee on U.S. covert action in Chile echoed the CIA’s conclusion: “The CIA regards the anti-communist Scare Campaign as the most effective activity undertaken by the U.S. on behalf of the Christian Democratic candidate.”71

Although John Joseph Jova was less explicit about the Scare Campaign, he clearly believed that the United States was instrumental in electing Frei. When asked whether or not the United States had been “doing things we shouldn’t” have done in Chile in the 1970s presidential campaign and during the Allende presidency, Jova responded by referring back to the 1964 elections. He said, “Remember that we defeated [Allende] once. I know that we helped the Christian Democrats, I mean helped fund them.” He then added, “Certainly there were people [in the U.S. embassy] trained in running election campaigns.” Jova credited the staff in the U.S. embassy for contributing to Allende’s defeat in 1964 and positively contrasted their work to the efforts of

---

68. República de Chile, Dirección de Registro Electoral, Santiago: Servicio Electoral, n.d.
69. Unfortunately, no studies were conducted at the time that could reveal to what extent the Scare Campaign influenced voters.
70. LBJ Library, National Security File, CIA: “Special Report,” 2 October 1964, Box 13, Chile Memos, 1–2 (author’s emphasis).
71. Senate Select Committee, Covert Action, Report, 16.
those in the embassy who were not similarly successful in 1970 when Allende did win the election.  

Elena Larraín denies any connection existed between Chile and the U.S. government. When I interviewed her, she would not say how she got the tape of Juana Castro. However, she is not shy in asserting that the work of Women’s Action of Chile was decisive in delivering women’s votes to Frei. Despite feeling proud about her role in electing Frei she, like many on the Right who also voted for him, later came to revile him and consider him the Alexander Kerensky of Chile.

On the other side of the political spectrum, Mireya Baltra, a leading member of the Communist party, also credited the Scare Campaign with obtaining such a high percentage of the female vote for Frei. “Allende lost in 1964 because of women . . . . Their consciousness could be manipulated [by the Scare Campaign] so they would not vote for Allende,” she said.

In 1970 Allende again ran for the presidency, and once again the U.S. government conducted a Scare Campaign against him. In 1964, Bernardo Leighton had been Frei’s campaign manager and was, as a result, very familiar with the Scare Campaign. In 1970, still active in the Christian Democratic party, he led the congressional investigation into the Scare Campaign. He warned his colleagues to beware of this campaign, because the one in 1964 had “left a deep imprint that helps no one in terms of either our political struggles or our democratic system.” Although Allende won the 1970 election, Leighton was right. The powerful and sensationalist imagery employed as part of the Scare Campaign helped to sear its threats deep into the consciousness and subconscious of the Chilean people.

CONCLUSION

This examination of the 1964 Scare Campaign reveals that U.S. government officials went beyond simply projecting gendered language and stereotypes onto other nations and peoples: they also incorporated ideas about gender into their formulation of policy. U.S. officials believed, and subsequently learned, that gendered appeals could effectively influence political choices and determine the outcome of elections. Drawing on constructions of gender then prevalent in Chile (and the United States), they designed a campaign that engendered anti-

72. Georgetown University, Special Collections, John Joseph Jova, the Association for Diplomatic Studies, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 71–73.
73. Elena Larraín, interview by author, tape recording, Santiago, 16 March 1994. She detests Frei because of his agrarian reform policies and because she believes that his government prepared the path for Allende, just like, according to her, Kerensky did for Lenin in Russia.
communism and fear. They equated Allende with communism and communism with the destruction of the family and Chileans’ established gender roles. Their work contributed to Frei’s defeat of Allende. Their success in Chile encouraged U.S. officials to employ the Scare Campaign as a model for other anti-Communist projects in Latin America, as William Robinson points out in his discussion of the 1990 presidential elections in Nicaragua.76

Despite substantial efforts, the Chilean Left did not successfully counter the Scare Campaign’s association of Allende with the breakup of the family and the undermining of women’s and men’s roles within the family. Although my questions can only be speculative, I wonder what would have happened if FRAP had adopted the positions advanced by some of its female members who questioned aspects of male domination. Would this challenge to patriarchal control have generated support among women, or would it have only served to alienate the Left’s male base while not winning over the critical number of women?

The impact of the Scare Campaign endured long after the 1964 elections. The politics of fear framed much of the Chilean Right’s attacks on the Left for decades to come. It laid the basis for much of the anti-Allende discourse employed so skillfully by the opposition during the Popular Unity years (1970–1973); it partially explains why the anti-Communist political language that saturated much of the media, speeches, and propaganda of the period resonated with so many women, and to a lesser degree with men. Fear and hatred convinced many women that the only solution to their problems was the imposition of military dictatorship. Conditioned to believe that Allende represented a vital threat to their identities as women and their roles as mothers, they looked to “their” General Augusto Pinochet to save them and their families from the “horrors” of the Allende government. The imagined threats portrayed in the Scare Campaign were replaced by the terrifying reality of the military dictatorship, as Chileans lost their democratic rights, loved ones, and many of their economic benefits for seventeen long years during the brutal military regime that ruled Chile (1973–1990). The possibility of fear became the certainty of terror.
